On Mon, Jul 21, 2025 at 1:44 AM Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com wrote:
Ever since the introduction of pid namespaces, procfs has had very implicit behaviour surrounding them (the pidns used by a procfs mount is auto-selected based on the mounting process's active pidns, and the pidns itself is basically hidden once the mount has been constructed). This has historically meant that userspace was required to do some special dances in order to configure the pidns of a procfs mount as desired. Examples include:
In order to bypass the mnt_too_revealing() check, Kubernetes creates a procfs mount from an empty pidns so that user namespaced containers can be nested (without this, the nested containers would fail to mount procfs). But this requires forking off a helper process because you cannot just one-shot this using mount(2).
Container runtimes in general need to fork into a container before configuring its mounts, which can lead to security issues in the case of shared-pidns containers (a privileged process in the pidns can interact with your container runtime process). While SUID_DUMP_DISABLE and user namespaces make this less of an issue, the strict need for this due to a minor uAPI wart is kind of unfortunate.
Things would be much easier if there was a way for userspace to just specify the pidns they want. Patch 1 implements a new "pidns" argument which can be set using fsconfig(2):
fsconfig(procfd, FSCONFIG_SET_FD, "pidns", NULL, nsfd); fsconfig(procfd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "pidns", "/proc/self/ns/pid", 0);or classic mount(2) / mount(8):
// mount -t proc -o pidns=/proc/self/ns/pid proc /tmp/proc mount("proc", "/tmp/proc", "proc", MS_..., "pidns=/proc/self/ns/pid");The initial security model I have in this RFC is to be as conservative as possible and just mirror the security model for setns(2) -- which means that you can only set pidns=... to pid namespaces that your current pid namespace is a direct ancestor of. This fulfils the requirements of container runtimes, but I suspect that this may be too strict for some usecases.
The pidns argument is not displayed in mountinfo -- it's not clear to me what value it would make sense to show (maybe we could just use ns_dname to provide an identifier for the namespace, but this number would be fairly useless to userspace). I'm open to suggestions.
In addition, being able to figure out what pid namespace is being used by a procfs mount is quite useful when you have an administrative process (such as a container runtime) which wants to figure out the correct way of mapping PIDs between its own namespace and the namespace for procfs (using NS_GET_{PID,TGID}_{IN,FROM}_PIDNS). There are alternative ways to do this, but they all rely on ancillary information that third-party libraries and tools do not necessarily have access to.
To make this easier, add a new ioctl (PROCFS_GET_PID_NAMESPACE) which can be used to get a reference to the pidns that a procfs is using.
It's not quite clear what is the correct security model for this API, but the current approach I've taken is to:
Make the ioctl only valid on the root (meaning that a process without access to the procfs root -- such as only having an fd to a procfs file or some open_tree(2)-like subset -- cannot use this API).
Require that the process requesting either has access to /proc/1/ns/pid anyway (i.e. has ptrace-read access to the pidns pid1), has CAP_SYS_ADMIN access to the pidns (i.e. has administrative access to it and can join it if they had a handle), or is in a pidns that is a direct ancestor of the target pidns (i.e. all of the pids are already visible in the procfs for the current process's pidns).
What's the motivation for the ptrace-read option? While I don't see an attack off the top of my head, it seems like creating a procfs mount may give write-ish access to things in the pidns (because the creator is likely to have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, etc) and possibly even access to namespace-wide things that aren't inherently visible to PID1.
Even the ancestor check seems dicey. Imagine that uid 1000 makes an unprivileged container complete with a userns. Then uid 1001 (outside the container) makes its own userns and mountns but stays in the init pidns and then mounts (and owns, with all filesystem-related capabilities) that mount. Is this really safe?
CAP_SYS_ADMIN seems about right.
--Andy