On Wed, Sep 10, 2025 at 07:21:22PM +0200, Amir Goldstein wrote:
On Wed, Sep 10, 2025 at 4:39 PM Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org wrote:
A while ago we added support for file handles to pidfs so pidfds can be encoded and decoded as file handles. Userspace has adopted this quickly and it's proven very useful.
Pidfd file handles are exhaustive meaning they don't require a handle on another pidfd to pass to open_by_handle_at() so it can derive the filesystem to decode in.
Implement the exhaustive file handles for namespaces as well.
I think you decide to split the "exhaustive" part to another patch, so better drop this paragraph?
Yes, good point. I've dont that.
I am missing an explanation about the permissions for opening these file handles.
My understanding of the code is that the opener needs to meet one of the conditions:
- user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the userns owning the opened namespace
- current task is in the opened namespace
Yes.
But I do not fully understand the rationale behind the 2nd condition, that is, when is it useful?
A caller is always able to open a file descriptor to it's own set of namespaces. File handles will behave the same way.
And as far as I can tell, your selftest does not cover this condition (only both true or both false)?
I've added this now.
I suggest to start with allowing only the useful and important cases, so if cond #1 is useful enough, drop cond #2 and we can add it later if needed and then your selftests already cover cond #1 true and false.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org
After documenting the permissions, with ot without dropping cond #2 feel free to add:
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein amir73il@gmail.com
Thanks!
fs/nsfs.c | 176 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/exportfs.h | 6 ++ 2 files changed, 182 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/nsfs.c b/fs/nsfs.c index 6f8008177133..a1585a2f4f03 100644 --- a/fs/nsfs.c +++ b/fs/nsfs.c @@ -13,6 +13,12 @@ #include <linux/nsfs.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/mnt_namespace.h> +#include <linux/ipc_namespace.h> +#include <linux/time_namespace.h> +#include <linux/utsname.h> +#include <linux/exportfs.h> +#include <linux/nstree.h> +#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include "mount.h" #include "internal.h" @@ -417,12 +423,182 @@ static const struct stashed_operations nsfs_stashed_ops = { .put_data = nsfs_put_data, };
+struct nsfs_fid {
u64 ns_id;
u32 ns_type;
u32 ns_inum;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+#define NSFS_FID_SIZE (sizeof(struct nsfs_fid) / sizeof(u32))
+static int nsfs_encode_fh(struct inode *inode, u32 *fh, int *max_len,
struct inode *parent)
+{
struct nsfs_fid *fid = (struct nsfs_fid *)fh;
struct ns_common *ns = inode->i_private;
int len = *max_len;
/*
* TODO:
* For hierarchical namespaces we should start to encode the
* parent namespace. Then userspace can walk a namespace
* hierarchy purely based on file handles.
*/
if (parent)
return FILEID_INVALID;
if (len < NSFS_FID_SIZE) {
*max_len = NSFS_FID_SIZE;
return FILEID_INVALID;
}
len = NSFS_FID_SIZE;
fid->ns_id = ns->ns_id;
fid->ns_type = ns->ops->type;
fid->ns_inum = inode->i_ino;
*max_len = len;
return FILEID_NSFS;
+}
+static struct dentry *nsfs_fh_to_dentry(struct super_block *sb, struct fid *fh,
int fh_len, int fh_type)
+{
struct path path __free(path_put) = {};
struct nsfs_fid *fid = (struct nsfs_fid *)fh;
struct user_namespace *owning_ns = NULL;
struct ns_common *ns;
int ret;
if (fh_len < NSFS_FID_SIZE)
return NULL;
switch (fh_type) {
case FILEID_NSFS:
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
scoped_guard(rcu) {
ns = ns_tree_lookup_rcu(fid->ns_id, fid->ns_type);
if (!ns)
return NULL;
VFS_WARN_ON_ONCE(ns->ns_id != fid->ns_id);
VFS_WARN_ON_ONCE(ns->ops->type != fid->ns_type);
VFS_WARN_ON_ONCE(ns->inum != fid->ns_inum);
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&ns->count))
return NULL;
}
switch (ns->ops->type) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
case CLONE_NEWCGROUP:
if (!current_in_namespace(to_cg_ns(ns)))
owning_ns = to_cg_ns(ns)->user_ns;
break;
+#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IPC_NS
case CLONE_NEWIPC:
if (!current_in_namespace(to_ipc_ns(ns)))
owning_ns = to_ipc_ns(ns)->user_ns;
break;
+#endif
case CLONE_NEWNS:
if (!current_in_namespace(to_mnt_ns(ns)))
owning_ns = to_mnt_ns(ns)->user_ns;
break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS
case CLONE_NEWNET:
if (!current_in_namespace(to_net_ns(ns)))
owning_ns = to_net_ns(ns)->user_ns;
break;
+#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS
case CLONE_NEWPID:
if (!current_in_namespace(to_pid_ns(ns))) {
owning_ns = to_pid_ns(ns)->user_ns;
} else if (!READ_ONCE(to_pid_ns(ns)->child_reaper)) {
ns->ops->put(ns);
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
}
break;
+#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TIME_NS
case CLONE_NEWTIME:
if (!current_in_namespace(to_time_ns(ns)))
owning_ns = to_time_ns(ns)->user_ns;
break;
+#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
case CLONE_NEWUSER:
if (!current_in_namespace(to_user_ns(ns)))
owning_ns = to_user_ns(ns);
break;
+#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_UTS_NS
case CLONE_NEWUTS:
if (!current_in_namespace(to_uts_ns(ns)))
owning_ns = to_uts_ns(ns)->user_ns;
break;
+#endif
default:
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
if (owning_ns && !ns_capable(owning_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
ns->ops->put(ns);
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
}
/* path_from_stashed() unconditionally consumes the reference. */
ret = path_from_stashed(&ns->stashed, nsfs_mnt, ns, &path);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
return no_free_ptr(path.dentry);
+}
+/*
- Make sure that we reject any nonsensical flags that users pass via
- open_by_handle_at().
- */
+#define VALID_FILE_HANDLE_OPEN_FLAGS \
(O_RDONLY | O_WRONLY | O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC | O_EXCL)
+static int nsfs_export_permission(struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx,
unsigned int oflags)
+{
if (oflags & ~(VALID_FILE_HANDLE_OPEN_FLAGS | O_LARGEFILE))
return -EINVAL;
/* nsfs_fh_to_dentry() is performs further permission checks. */
return 0;
+}
+static struct file *nsfs_export_open(struct path *path, unsigned int oflags) +{
/* Clear O_LARGEFILE as open_by_handle_at() forces it. */
oflags &= ~O_LARGEFILE;
return file_open_root(path, "", oflags, 0);
+}
+static const struct export_operations nsfs_export_operations = {
.encode_fh = nsfs_encode_fh,
.fh_to_dentry = nsfs_fh_to_dentry,
.open = nsfs_export_open,
.permission = nsfs_export_permission,
+};
static int nsfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) { struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx = init_pseudo(fc, NSFS_MAGIC); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; ctx->ops = &nsfs_ops;
ctx->eops = &nsfs_export_operations; ctx->dops = &ns_dentry_operations; fc->s_fs_info = (void *)&nsfs_stashed_ops; return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/exportfs.h b/include/linux/exportfs.h index cfb0dd1ea49c..3aac58a520c7 100644 --- a/include/linux/exportfs.h +++ b/include/linux/exportfs.h @@ -122,6 +122,12 @@ enum fid_type { FILEID_BCACHEFS_WITHOUT_PARENT = 0xb1, FILEID_BCACHEFS_WITH_PARENT = 0xb2,
/*
*
* 64 bit namespace identifier, 32 bit namespace type, 32 bit inode number.
*/
FILEID_NSFS = 0xf1,
/* * 64 bit unique kernfs id */
-- 2.47.3