On Mon, Jan 15, 2024 at 08:22:19PM +0100, Bernd Edlinger wrote:

This introduces signal->exec_bprm, which is used to fix the case when at least one of the sibling threads is traced, and therefore the trace process may dead-lock in ptrace_attach, but de_thread will need to wait for the tracer to continue execution.

Not entirely sure why I've been added to the cc; this doesn't seem like it's even remotely within my realm of expertise.

+++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ extern const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *); extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void); extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void); extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void); +extern bool is_dumpability_changed(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);

Using 'extern' for function declarations is deprecated. More importantly, you have two arguments of the same type, and how do I know which one is which if you don't name them?

+++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -375,6 +375,28 @@ static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset) return false; } +/**

• • is_dumpability_changed - Will changing creds from old to new
• • affect the dumpability in commit_creds?
• • Return: false - dumpability will not be changed in commit_creds.

• •     true  - dumpability will be changed to non-dumpable.
    

• • @old: The old credentials
• • @new: The new credentials
• */

Does kernel-doc really parse this correctly? Normal style would be:

/** * is_dumpability_changed - Will changing creds affect dumpability? * @old: The old credentials. * @new: The new credentials. * * If the @new credentials have no elevated privileges compared to the * @old credentials, the task may remain dumpable. Otherwise we have * to mark the task as undumpable to avoid information leaks from higher * to lower privilege domains. * * Return: True if the task will become undumpable. */

@@ -508,6 +531,14 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void) { int ret = -EPERM;

• if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex))

• return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
  

Do you really want this to be interruptible by a timer signal or a window resize event?

I'll try to recall this problem and actually read the patch tommorrow...

Hmm. but it doesn't apply to Linus's tree, you need to rebase it. In particular, please note the recent commit 5431fdd2c181dd2eac2 ("ptrace: Convert ptrace_attach() to use lock guards")

On 01/15, Bernd Edlinger wrote:

The problem happens when a tracer tries to ptrace_attach to a multi-threaded process, that does an execve in one of the threads at the same time, without doing that in a forked sub-process. That means: There is a race condition, when one or more of the threads are already ptraced, but the thread that invoked the execve is not yet traced. Now in this case the execve locks the cred_guard_mutex and waits for de_thread to complete. But that waits for the traced sibling threads to exit, and those have to wait for the tracer to receive the exit signal, but the tracer cannot call wait right now, because it is waiting for the ptrace call to complete, and this never does not happen. The traced process and the tracer are now in a deadlock situation, and can only be killed by a fatal signal.

This looks very confusing to me. And even misleading.

So IIRC the problem is "simple".

de_thread() sleeps with cred_guard_mutex waiting for other threads to exit and pass release_task/__exit_signal.

If one of the sub-threads is traced, debugger should do ptrace_detach() or wait() to release this tracee, the killed tracee won't autoreap.

Now. If debugger tries to take the same cred_guard_mutex before detach/wait we have a deadlock. This is not specific to ptrace_attach(), proc_pid_attr_write() takes this lock too.

Right? Or are there other issues?

-static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) +static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal; struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand; spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock;

• struct task_struct *t = tsk;

• bool unsafe_execve_in_progress = false;

  if (thread_group_empty(tsk)) goto no_thread_group;

@@ -1066,6 +1068,19 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) sig->notify_count--;

• while_each_thread(tsk, t) {

for_other_threads()

• if (unlikely(t->ptrace)
  

•     && (t != tsk->group_leader || !t->exit_state))
  

• 	unsafe_execve_in_progress = true;
  

The !t->exit_state is not right... This sub-thread can already be a zombie with ->exit_state != 0 but see above, it won't be reaped until the debugger does wait().

• if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) {

• spin_unlock_irq(lock);
  

• sig->exec_bprm = bprm;
  

• mutex_unlock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
  

• spin_lock_irq(lock);
  

I don't understand why do we need to unlock and lock siglock here...

But my main question is why do we need the unsafe_execve_in_progress boolean. If this patch is correct and de_thread() can drop and re-acquire cread_guard_mutex when one of the threads is traced, then why can't we do this unconditionally ?

Oleg.

On 1/22/24 22:30, Kees Cook wrote:

On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 02:24:37PM +0100, Bernd Edlinger wrote:

...

The main concern was when a set-suid program is executed by execve. Then it makes a difference if the current thread is traced before the execve or not. That means if the current thread is already traced, the decision, which credentials will be used is different than otherwise.

So currently there are two possbilities, either the trace happens before the execve, and the suid-bit will be ignored, or the trace happens after the execve, but it is checked that the now potentially more privileged credentials allow the tracer to proceed.

With this patch we will have a third prossibility, that is in order to avoid the possible dead-lock we allow the suid-bit to take effect, but only if the tracer's privileges allow both to attach the current credentials and the new credentials. But I would only do that as a last resort, to avoid the possible dead-lock, and not unless a dead-lock is really expected to happen.

Instead of doing this special cred check (which I am worried could become fragile -- I'd prefer all privilege checks happen in the same place and in the same way...), could we just fail the ptrace_attach of the execve?

Hmm, yes. That is also possible, and that was actually my first approach, but I think the current patch is superior. I have nevertheless tried it again, to get a better picture of the differences between those two approaches.

See below for how that alternative approach would look like: + the advantage of that would be simplicity. + it avoids the dead-lock in the tracer. - it is an API change, which we normally try to avoid. - the adjusted test case(s) show that the tracer cannot successfully attach to the resulting process before the execve'd process starts up. So although there is no suid process involved in my test cases, the traced program simply escapes out of the tracer's control.

The advantage of the current approach would be: + it avoids the dead-lock in the tracer + it avoids a potentially breaking API change. + the tracer is normally able to successfully attach to the resulting process after the execve completes, before it starts to execute. + the debug experience is just better. - worst case that can happen, is that the security policy denies the tracer the access to the new process after the execve. In that case the PTRACE_ATTACH will fail each time it is attempted, in a similar way as the the alternate approach. But the overall result is still correct. The privileged process escapes, and that is okay in that case. - it is theoretically possible that the security engine gets confused by the additional call to security_ptrace_access_check, but that will be something that can be fixed, when it happens.

However my main motivation, why I started this work was the security implication.

I assume the tracer is a privileged process, like an anti virus program, that supervises all processes and if it detects some anomaly it can ptrace attach to the target, check what it does and prevent it from doing bad things.

- Currently a non-privileged program can potentially send such a privileged tracer into a deadlock. - With the alternative patch below that non-privileged can no longer send the tracer into a deadlock, but it can still quickly escape out of the tracer's control. - But with my latest patch a sufficiently privileged tracer can neither be sent into a deadlock nor can the attached process escape. Mission completed.

Thanks Bernd.

Here is the alternative patch for reference: diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index e88249a1ce07..0a948f5821b7 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1045,6 +1045,8 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal; struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand; spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock; + struct task_struct *t; + bool unsafe_execve_in_progress = false;

if (thread_group_empty(tsk)) goto no_thread_group; @@ -1067,6 +1069,18 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) sig->notify_count--;

+ for_other_threads(tsk, t) { + if (unlikely(t->ptrace) + && (t != tsk->group_leader || !t->exit_state)) + unsafe_execve_in_progress = true; + } + + if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) { + spin_unlock_irq(lock); + mutex_unlock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); + spin_lock_irq(lock); + } + while (sig->notify_count) { __set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE); spin_unlock_irq(lock); @@ -1157,6 +1171,9 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) release_task(leader); }

+ if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) + mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); + sig->group_exec_task = NULL; sig->notify_count = 0;

@@ -1168,6 +1185,9 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) return 0;

killed: + if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) + mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); + /* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); sig->group_exec_task = NULL; @@ -1479,6 +1499,11 @@ static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) return -ERESTARTNOINTR;

+ if (unlikely(current->signal->group_exec_task)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + return -ERESTARTNOINTR; + } + bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds(); if (likely(bprm->cred)) return 0; diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 98a031ac2648..55816320c103 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -2785,6 +2785,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, if (rv < 0) goto out_free;

+ if (unlikely(current->signal->group_exec_task)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + rv = -ERESTARTNOINTR; + goto out_free; + } + rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsmid, file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, count); diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 2fabd497d659..162e4c8f7b08 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -444,6 +444,9 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, scoped_cond_guard (mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTNOINTR, &task->signal->cred_guard_mutex) {

+ if (unlikely(task->signal->group_exec_task)) + return -EAGAIN; + scoped_guard (task_lock, task) { retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS); if (retval) @@ -491,6 +494,14 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void) { int ret = -EPERM;

+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) + return -ERESTARTNOINTR; + + if (unlikely(current->signal->group_exec_task)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + return -ERESTARTNOINTR; + } + write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); /* Are we already being traced? */ if (!current->ptrace) { @@ -506,6 +517,7 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void) } } write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);

return ret; } diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index aca7b437882e..6a136d6ddf7c 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -1955,9 +1955,15 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec. */ - if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC && - mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) - goto out_put_fd; + if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) { + if (mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) + goto out_put_fd; + + if (unlikely(current->signal->group_exec_task)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + goto out_put_fd; + } + }

spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c index 4db327b44586..7a51a350a068 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <signal.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h>

static void *thread(void *arg) { @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ static void *thread(void *arg)

TEST(vmaccess) { - int f, pid = fork(); + int s, f, pid = fork(); char mm[64];

if (!pid) { @@ -31,19 +32,42 @@ TEST(vmaccess)

pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread, NULL); pthread_join(pt, NULL); - execlp("true", "true", NULL); + execlp("false", "false", NULL); + return; }

sleep(1); sprintf(mm, "/proc/%d/mem", pid); + /* deadlock did happen here */ f = open(mm, O_RDONLY); ASSERT_GE(f, 0); close(f); - f = kill(pid, SIGCONT); - ASSERT_EQ(f, 0); + f = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_NE(f, -1); + ASSERT_NE(f, 0); + ASSERT_NE(f, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 0); + f = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(f, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 1); + f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(f, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, ECHILD); }

-TEST(attach) +/* + * Same test as previous, except that + * we try to ptrace the group leader, + * which is about to call execve, + * when the other thread is already ptraced. + * This exercises the code in de_thread + * where it is waiting inside the + * while (sig->notify_count) { + * loop. + */ +TEST(attach1) { int s, k, pid = fork();

@@ -52,19 +76,67 @@ TEST(attach)

pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread, NULL); pthread_join(pt, NULL); - execlp("sleep", "sleep", "2", NULL); + execlp("false", "false", NULL); + return; }

sleep(1); + /* deadlock may happen here */ k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L); - ASSERT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN); ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN); k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); ASSERT_NE(k, -1); ASSERT_NE(k, 0); ASSERT_NE(k, pid); ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1); ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 0); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L); + ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 1); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L); + ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, ESRCH); + k = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, ECHILD); +} + +/* + * Same test as previous, except that + * the group leader is ptraced first, + * but this time with PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT, + * and the thread that does execve is + * not yet ptraced. This exercises the + * code block in de_thread where the + * if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) { + * is executed and enters a wait state. + */ +static long thread2_tid; +static void *thread2(void *arg) +{ + thread2_tid = syscall(__NR_gettid); + sleep(2); + execlp("false", "false", NULL); + return NULL; +} + +TEST(attach2) +{ + int s, k, pid = fork(); + + if (!pid) { + pthread_t pt; + + pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread2, NULL); + pthread_join(pt, NULL); + return; + } + sleep(1); k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L); ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); @@ -72,12 +144,40 @@ TEST(attach) ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1); ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGSTOP); - k = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0L, 0L); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, 0L, PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + thread2_tid = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, pid, &thread2_tid, 0L); + ASSERT_NE(thread2_tid, -1); + ASSERT_NE(thread2_tid, 0); + ASSERT_NE(thread2_tid, pid); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + sleep(2); + /* deadlock may happen here */ + k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, thread2_tid, 0L, 0L); + ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGTRAP); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, thread2_tid, 0L, 0L); + ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L); ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, thread2_tid, 0L, 0L); + ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN); k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1); - ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 1); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, thread2_tid, 0L, 0L); + ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, ESRCH); k = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); ASSERT_EQ(errno, ECHILD);

This introduces signal->exec_bprm, which is used to fix the case when at least one of the sibling threads is traced, and therefore the trace process may dead-lock in ptrace_attach, but de_thread will need to wait for the tracer to continue execution.

The problem happens when a tracer tries to ptrace_attach to a multi-threaded process, that does an execve in one of the threads at the same time, without doing that in a forked sub-process. That means: There is a race condition, when one or more of the threads are already ptraced, but the thread that invoked the execve is not yet traced. Now in this case the execve locks the cred_guard_mutex and waits for de_thread to complete. But that waits for the traced sibling threads to exit, and those have to wait for the tracer to receive the exit signal, but the tracer cannot call wait right now, because it is waiting for the ptrace call to complete, and this never does not happen. The traced process and the tracer are now in a deadlock situation, and can only be killed by a fatal signal.

The solution is to detect this situation and allow ptrace_attach to continue by temporarily releasing the cred_guard_mutex, while de_thread() is still waiting for traced zombies to be eventually released by the tracer. In the case of the thread group leader we only have to wait for the thread to become a zombie, which may also need co-operation from the tracer due to PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT.

When a tracer wants to ptrace_attach a task that already is in execve, we simply retry the ptrace_may_access check while temporarily installing the new credentials and dumpability which are about to be used after execve completes. If the ptrace_attach happens on a thread that is a sibling-thread of the thread doing execve, it is sufficient to check against the old credentials, as this thread will be waited for, before the new credentials are installed.

Other threads die quickly since the cred_guard_mutex is released, but a deadly signal is already pending. In case the mutex_lock_killable misses the signal, the non-zero current->signal->exec_bprm makes sure they release the mutex immediately and return with -ERESTARTNOINTR.

This means there is no API change, unlike the previous version of this patch which was discussed here:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b6537ae6-31b1-5c50-f32b-8b8332ace882@hotmail.de...

See tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c for a test case that gets fixed by this change.

Note that since the test case was originally designed to test the ptrace_attach returning an error in this situation, the test expectation needed to be adjusted, to allow the API to succeed at the first attempt.

Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de --- fs/exec.c | 69 ++++++++--- fs/proc/base.c | 6 + include/linux/cred.h | 1 + include/linux/sched/signal.h | 18 +++ kernel/cred.c | 30 ++++- kernel/ptrace.c | 31 +++++ kernel/seccomp.c | 12 +- tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 8 files changed, 265 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

v10: Changes to previous version, make the PTRACE_ATTACH return -EAGAIN, instead of execve return -ERESTARTSYS. Added some lessions learned to the description.

v11: Check old and new credentials in PTRACE_ATTACH again without changing the API.

Note: I got actually one response from an automatic checker to the v11 patch,

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202107121344.wu68hEPF-lkp@intel.com/

which is complaining about:

...

...

...

kernel/ptrace.c:425:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) @@ expected struct cred const *old_cred @@ got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *real_cred @@

417 struct linux_binprm *bprm = task->signal->exec_bprm; 418 const struct cred *old_cred; 419 struct mm_struct *old_mm; 420 421 retval = down_write_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); 422 if (retval) 423 goto unlock_creds; 424 task_lock(task);

425 old_cred = task->real_cred;

v12: Essentially identical to v11.

- Fixed a minor merge conflict in linux v5.17, and fixed the above mentioned nit by adding __rcu to the declaration.

- re-tested the patch with all linux versions from v5.11 to v6.6

v10 was an alternative approach which did imply an API change. But I would prefer to avoid such an API change.

The difficult part is getting the right dumpability flags assigned before de_thread starts, hope you like this version. If not, the v10 is of course also acceptable.

v13: Fixed duplicated Return section in function header of is_dumpability_changed which was reported by the kernel test robot

v14: rebased to v6.7, refreshed and retested. And added a more detailed description of the actual bug.

v15: rebased to v6.8-rc1, addressed some review comments. Split the test case vmaccess into vmaccess1 and vmaccess2 to improve overall test coverage.

Thanks Bernd.

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index e88249a1ce07..499380d74899 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1040,11 +1040,13 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) return 0; }

-static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) +static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal; struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand; spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock; + struct task_struct *t; + bool unsafe_execve_in_progress = false;

if (thread_group_empty(tsk)) goto no_thread_group; @@ -1067,6 +1069,19 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) sig->notify_count--;

+ for_other_threads(tsk, t) { + if (unlikely(t->ptrace) + && (t != tsk->group_leader || !t->exit_state)) + unsafe_execve_in_progress = true; + } + + if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) { + spin_unlock_irq(lock); + sig->exec_bprm = bprm; + mutex_unlock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); + spin_lock_irq(lock); + } + while (sig->notify_count) { __set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE); spin_unlock_irq(lock); @@ -1157,6 +1172,11 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) release_task(leader); }

+ if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) { + mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); + sig->exec_bprm = NULL; + } + sig->group_exec_task = NULL; sig->notify_count = 0;

@@ -1168,6 +1188,11 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) return 0;

killed: + if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) { + mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); + sig->exec_bprm = NULL; + } + /* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); sig->group_exec_task = NULL; @@ -1252,6 +1277,24 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) if (retval) return retval;

+ /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */ + would_dump(bprm, bprm->file); + if (bprm->have_execfd) + would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable); + + /* + * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current + * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing + * bprm->secureexec instead. + */ + if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP || + is_dumpability_changed(current_cred(), bprm->cred) || + !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && + gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))) + set_dumpable(bprm->mm, suid_dumpable); + else + set_dumpable(bprm->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER); + /* * Ensure all future errors are fatal. */ @@ -1260,7 +1303,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) /* * Make this the only thread in the thread group. */ - retval = de_thread(me); + retval = de_thread(me, bprm); if (retval) goto out;

@@ -1283,11 +1326,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) if (retval) goto out;

- /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */ - would_dump(bprm, bprm->file); - if (bprm->have_execfd) - would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable); - /* * Release all of the old mmap stuff */ @@ -1349,18 +1387,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)

me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;

- /* - * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current - * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing - * bprm->secureexec instead. - */ - if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP || - !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && - gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))) - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - else - set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER); - perf_event_exec(); __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);

@@ -1479,6 +1505,11 @@ static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) return -ERESTARTNOINTR;

+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + return -ERESTARTNOINTR; + } + bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds(); if (likely(bprm->cred)) return 0; diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 98a031ac2648..eab3461e4da7 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -2785,6 +2785,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, if (rv < 0) goto out_free;

+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + rv = -ERESTARTNOINTR; + goto out_free; + } + rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsmid, file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, count); diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index 2976f534a7a3..a1a1ac38f749 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ extern const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *); extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void); extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void); extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void); +extern bool is_dumpability_changed(const struct cred *, const struct cred *); extern int commit_creds(struct cred *); extern void abort_creds(struct cred *); extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *); diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h index 4b7664c56208..6364e115e9e9 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h +++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h @@ -235,9 +235,27 @@ struct signal_struct { struct mm_struct *oom_mm; /* recorded mm when the thread group got * killed by the oom killer */

+ struct linux_binprm *exec_bprm; /* Used to check ptrace_may_access + * against new credentials while + * de_thread is waiting for other + * traced threads to terminate. + * Set while de_thread is executing. + * The cred_guard_mutex is released + * after de_thread() has called + * zap_other_threads(), therefore + * a fatal signal is guaranteed to be + * already pending in the unlikely + * event, that + * current->signal->exec_bprm happens + * to be non-zero after the + * cred_guard_mutex was acquired. + */ + struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on * credential calculations * (notably. ptrace) + * Held while execve runs, except when + * a sibling thread is being traced. * Deprecated do not use in new code. * Use exec_update_lock instead. */ diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index c033a201c808..0066b5b0f052 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -375,6 +375,30 @@ static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset) return false; }

+/** + * is_dumpability_changed - Will changing creds affect dumpability? + * @old: The old credentials. + * @new: The new credentials. + * + * If the @new credentials have no elevated privileges compared to the + * @old credentials, the task may remain dumpable. Otherwise we have + * to mark the task as undumpable to avoid information leaks from higher + * to lower privilege domains. + * + * Return: True if the task will become undumpable. + */ +bool is_dumpability_changed(const struct cred *old, const struct cred *new) +{ + if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) || + !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) || + !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) || + !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) || + !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) + return true; + + return false; +} + /** * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task * @new: The credentials to be assigned @@ -403,11 +427,7 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new) get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */

/* dumpability changes */ - if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) || - !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) || - !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) || - !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) || - !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) { + if (is_dumpability_changed(old, new)) { if (task->mm) set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable); task->pdeath_signal = 0; diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 2fabd497d659..4b9a951b38f1 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/signal.h> #include <linux/uio.h> #include <linux/audit.h> @@ -450,6 +451,27 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, return retval; }

+ if (unlikely(task->in_execve)) { + retval = down_write_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (retval) + return retval; + + scoped_guard (task_lock, task) { + struct linux_binprm *bprm = task->signal->exec_bprm; + const struct cred __rcu *old_cred = task->real_cred; + struct mm_struct *old_mm = task->mm; + rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, bprm->cred); + task->mm = bprm->mm; + retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS); + rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, old_cred); + task->mm = old_mm; + } + + up_write(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (retval) + return retval; + } + scoped_guard (write_lock_irq, &tasklist_lock) { if (unlikely(task->exit_state)) return -EPERM; @@ -491,6 +513,14 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void) { int ret = -EPERM;

+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) + return -ERESTARTNOINTR; + + if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + return -ERESTARTNOINTR; + } + write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); /* Are we already being traced? */ if (!current->ptrace) { @@ -506,6 +536,7 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void) } } write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);

return ret; } diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index aca7b437882e..32ed0da5939a 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -1955,9 +1955,15 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec. */ - if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC && - mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) - goto out_put_fd; + if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) { + if (mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) + goto out_put_fd; + + if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + goto out_put_fd; + } + }

spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c index 4db327b44586..5d4a65eb5a8d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <signal.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h>

static void *thread(void *arg) { @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ static void *thread(void *arg)

TEST(vmaccess) { - int f, pid = fork(); + int s, f, pid = fork(); char mm[64];

if (!pid) { @@ -31,19 +32,42 @@ TEST(vmaccess)

pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread, NULL); pthread_join(pt, NULL); - execlp("true", "true", NULL); + execlp("false", "false", NULL); + return; }

sleep(1); sprintf(mm, "/proc/%d/mem", pid); + /* deadlock did happen here */ f = open(mm, O_RDONLY); ASSERT_GE(f, 0); close(f); - f = kill(pid, SIGCONT); - ASSERT_EQ(f, 0); + f = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_NE(f, -1); + ASSERT_NE(f, 0); + ASSERT_NE(f, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 0); + f = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(f, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 1); + f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(f, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, ECHILD); }

-TEST(attach) +/* + * Same test as previous, except that + * we try to ptrace the group leader, + * which is about to call execve, + * when the other thread is already ptraced. + * This exercises the code in de_thread + * where it is waiting inside the + * while (sig->notify_count) { + * loop. + */ +TEST(attach1) { int s, k, pid = fork();

@@ -52,19 +76,76 @@ TEST(attach)

pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread, NULL); pthread_join(pt, NULL); - execlp("sleep", "sleep", "2", NULL); + execlp("false", "false", NULL); + return; }

sleep(1); + /* deadlock may happen here */ k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L); - ASSERT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN); - ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); ASSERT_NE(k, -1); ASSERT_NE(k, 0); ASSERT_NE(k, pid); ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1); ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 0); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGTRAP); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGSTOP); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 1); + k = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, ECHILD); +} + +/* + * Same test as previous, except that + * the group leader is ptraced first, + * but this time with PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT, + * and the thread that does execve is + * not yet ptraced. This exercises the + * code block in de_thread where the + * if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) { + * is executed and enters a wait state. + */ +static long thread2_tid; +static void *thread2(void *arg) +{ + thread2_tid = syscall(__NR_gettid); + sleep(2); + execlp("false", "false", NULL); + return NULL; +} + +TEST(attach2) +{ + int s, k, pid = fork(); + + if (!pid) { + pthread_t pt; + + pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread2, NULL); + pthread_join(pt, NULL); + return; + } + sleep(1); k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L); ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); @@ -72,12 +153,46 @@ TEST(attach) ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1); ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGSTOP); - k = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0L, 0L); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, 0L, PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + thread2_tid = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, pid, &thread2_tid, 0L); + ASSERT_NE(thread2_tid, -1); + ASSERT_NE(thread2_tid, 0); + ASSERT_NE(thread2_tid, pid); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + sleep(2); + /* deadlock may happen here */ + k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, thread2_tid, 0L, 0L); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGTRAP); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGTRAP); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGSTOP); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L); ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1); - ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 1); k = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); ASSERT_EQ(errno, ECHILD);