August 2022 - Linux-kselftest-mirror

[PATCH linux-next] KVM: selftests: remove redundant variable tsc_val

by cgel.zte＠gmail.com

From: Jinpeng Cui <cui.jinpeng2(a)zte.com.cn> Return value directly from expression instead of getting value from redundant variable tsc_val. Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci(a)zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Jinpeng Cui <cui.jinpeng2(a)zte.com.cn> --- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h index 0cbc71b7af50..75920678f34d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h @@ -237,7 +237,6 @@ static inline uint64_t get_desc64_base(const struct desc64 *desc) static inline uint64_t rdtsc(void) { uint32_t eax, edx; - uint64_t tsc_val; /* * The lfence is to wait (on Intel CPUs) until all previous * instructions have been executed. If software requires RDTSC to be @@ -245,8 +244,8 @@ static inline uint64_t rdtsc(void) * execute LFENCE immediately after RDTSC */ __asm__ __volatile__("lfence; rdtsc; lfence" : "=a"(eax), "=d"(edx)); - tsc_val = ((uint64_t)edx) << 32 | eax; - return tsc_val; + + return ((uint64_t)edx) << 32 | eax; } static inline uint64_t rdtscp(uint32_t *aux) -- 2.25.1

2 years, 3 months

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[PATCH v4 0/4] arm64/sme: ptrace support for TPIDR2_EL0

by Mark Brown

When SME was initially merged we did not add support for TPIDR2_EL0 to the ptrace interface, creating difficulties for debuggers in accessing lazy save state for ZA. This series implements that support, extending the existing NT_ARM_TLS regset to support the register when available, and adds kselftest coverage for the existing and new NT_ARM_TLS functionality. Existing programs that query the size of the register set will be able to observe the increased size of the register set. Programs that assume the register set is single register will see no change. On systems that do not support SME TPIDR2_EL0 will read as 0 and writes will be ignored, support for SME should be queried via hwcaps as normal. v4: - Rebase onto v6.0-rc3. v3: - Fix copyright date on test program. v2: - Rebase onto v6.0-rc1. Mark Brown (4): kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for NT_ARM_TLS arm64/ptrace: Document extension of NT_ARM_TLS to cover TPIDR2_EL0 arm64/ptrace: Support access to TPIDR2_EL0 kselftest/arm64: Add coverage of TPIDR2_EL0 ptrace interface Documentation/arm64/sme.rst | 3 + arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 25 +- tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/ptrace.c | 241 +++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 266 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/ptrace.c base-commit: b90cb1053190353cc30f0fef0ef1f378ccc063c5 -- 2.30.2

2 years, 3 months

3
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[PATCH v6 1/2] x86/fpu: Allow PKRU to be (once again) written by ptrace.

by Kyle Huey

From: Kyle Huey <me(a)kylehuey.com> When management of the PKRU register was moved away from XSTATE, emulation of PKRU's existence in XSTATE was added for reading PKRU through ptrace, but not for writing PKRU through ptrace. This can be seen by running gdb and executing `p $pkru`, `set $pkru = 42`, and `p $pkru`. On affected kernels (5.14+) the write to the PKRU register (which gdb performs through ptrace) is ignored. There are three APIs that write PKRU: sigreturn, PTRACE_SETREGSET with NT_X86_XSTATE, and KVM_SET_XSAVE. sigreturn still uses XRSTOR to write to PKRU. KVM_SET_XSAVE has its own special handling to make PKRU writes take effect (in fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate). Push that down into copy_uabi_to_xstate and have PTRACE_SETREGSET with NT_X86_XSTATE pass in a pointer to the appropriate PKRU slot. copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate depends on copy_uabi_to_xstate populating the PKRU field in the task's XSTATE so that __fpu_restore_sig can do a XRSTOR from it, so continue doing that. This also adds code to initialize the PKRU value to the hardware init value (namely 0) if the PKRU bit is not set in the XSTATE header provided to ptrace, to match XRSTOR. Fixes: e84ba47e313d ("x86/fpu: Hook up PKRU into ptrace()") Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <me(a)kylehuey.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.14+ --- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 20 +++++++++----------- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index 3b28c5b25e12..c273669e8a00 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -391,8 +391,6 @@ int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf, { struct fpstate *kstate = gfpu->fpstate; const union fpregs_state *ustate = buf; - struct pkru_state *xpkru; - int ret; if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) { if (ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & ~XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) @@ -406,16 +404,16 @@ int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf, if (ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & ~xcr0) return -EINVAL; - ret = copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(kstate, ustate); - if (ret) - return ret; + /* + * Nullify @vpkru to preserve its current value if PKRU's bit isn't set + * in the header. KVM's odd ABI is to leave PKRU untouched in this + * case (all other components are eventually re-initialized). + * (Not clear that this is actually necessary for compat). + */ + if (!(ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU)) + vpkru = NULL; - /* Retrieve PKRU if not in init state */ - if (kstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) { - xpkru = get_xsave_addr(&kstate->regs.xsave, XFEATURE_PKRU); - *vpkru = xpkru->pkru; - } - return 0; + return copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(kstate, ustate, vpkru); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate); #endif /* CONFIG_KVM */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c index 75ffaef8c299..6d056b68f4ed 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset, } fpu_force_restore(fpu); - ret = copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(fpu->fpstate, kbuf ?: tmpbuf); + ret = copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(fpu->fpstate, kbuf ?: tmpbuf, &target->thread.pkru); out: vfree(tmpbuf); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c index 91d4b6de58ab..558076dbde5b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static bool __fpu_restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, fpregs = &fpu->fpstate->regs; if (use_xsave() && !fx_only) { - if (copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate(fpu->fpstate, buf_fx)) + if (copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate(tsk, buf_fx)) return false; } else { if (__copy_from_user(&fpregs->fxsave, buf_fx, diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c index c8340156bfd2..8f14981a3936 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c @@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ static int copy_from_buffer(void *dst, unsigned int offset, unsigned int size, static int copy_uabi_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void *kbuf, - const void __user *ubuf) + const void __user *ubuf, u32 *pkru) { struct xregs_state *xsave = &fpstate->regs.xsave; unsigned int offset, size; @@ -1246,6 +1246,21 @@ static int copy_uabi_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void *kbuf, } } + /* + * Update the user protection key storage. Allow KVM to + * pass in a NULL pkru pointer if the mask bit is unset + * for its legacy ABI behavior. + */ + if (pkru) + *pkru = 0; + + if (hdr.xfeatures & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) { + struct pkru_state *xpkru; + + xpkru = __raw_xsave_addr(xsave, XFEATURE_PKRU); + *pkru = xpkru->pkru; + } + /* * The state that came in from userspace was user-state only. * Mask all the user states out of 'xfeatures': @@ -1264,9 +1279,9 @@ static int copy_uabi_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void *kbuf, * Convert from a ptrace standard-format kernel buffer to kernel XSAVE[S] * format and copy to the target thread. Used by ptrace and KVM. */ -int copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void *kbuf) +int copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void *kbuf, u32 *pkru) { - return copy_uabi_to_xstate(fpstate, kbuf, NULL); + return copy_uabi_to_xstate(fpstate, kbuf, NULL, pkru); } /* @@ -1274,10 +1289,10 @@ int copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void *kbuf) * XSAVE[S] format and copy to the target thread. This is called from the * sigreturn() and rt_sigreturn() system calls. */ -int copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, +int copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate(struct task_struct *tsk, const void __user *ubuf) { - return copy_uabi_to_xstate(fpstate, NULL, ubuf); + return copy_uabi_to_xstate(tsk->thread.fpu.fpstate, NULL, ubuf, &tsk->thread.pkru); } static bool validate_independent_components(u64 mask) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h index 5ad47031383b..a4ecb04d8d64 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h @@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ extern void __copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(struct membuf to, struct fpstate *fpstate, u32 pkru_val, enum xstate_copy_mode copy_mode); extern void copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(struct membuf to, struct task_struct *tsk, enum xstate_copy_mode mode); -extern int copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void *kbuf); -extern int copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void __user *ubuf); +extern int copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, const void *kbuf, u32 *pkru); +extern int copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate(struct task_struct *tsk, const void __user *ubuf); extern void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void); -- 2.37.2 Changelog since v5: - Avoids a second copy from the uabi buffer as suggested. - Preserves old KVM_SET_XSAVE behavior where leaving the PKRU bit in the XSTATE header results in PKRU remaining unchanged instead of reinitializing it. - Fixed up patch metadata as requested. Changelog since v4: - Selftest additionally checks PKRU readbacks through ptrace. - Selftest flips all PKRU bits (except the default key). Changelog since v3: - The v3 patch is now part 1 of 2. - Adds a selftest in part 2 of 2. Changelog since v2: - Removed now unused variables in fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate Changelog since v1: - Handles the error case of copy_to_buffer().

2 years, 3 months

2
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[PATCH v3 0/3] arm64/sve: Document our actual SVE syscall ABI

by Mark Brown

Currently our SVE syscall ABI documentation does not reflect the actual implemented ABI, it says that register state not shared with FPSIMD becomes undefined on syscall when in reality we always clear it. Since changing this would cause a change in the observed kernel behaviour there is a substantial desire to avoid taking advantage of the documented ABI so instead let's document what we actually do so it's clear that it is in reality an ABI. There has been some pushback on tightening the documentation in the past but it is hard to see who that helps, it makes the implementation decisions less clear and makes it harder for people to discover and make use of the actual ABI. The main practical concern is that qemu's user mode does not currently flush the registers. v3: - Rebase onto v6.0-rc3. v2: - Rebase onto v6.0-rc1. Mark Brown (3): kselftest/arm64: Correct buffer allocation for SVE Z registers arm64/sve: Document our actual ABI for clearing registers on syscall kselftest/arm64: Enforce actual ABI for SVE syscalls Documentation/arm64/sve.rst | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/arm64/abi/syscall-abi.c | 61 ++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) base-commit: b90cb1053190353cc30f0fef0ef1f378ccc063c5 -- 2.30.2

2 years, 3 months

2
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[PATCH v2] kselftest/arm64: Add simple hwcap validation

by Mark Brown

Add some trivial hwcap validation which checks that /proc/cpuinfo and AT_HWCAP agree with each other and can verify that for extensions that can generate a SIGILL due to adding new instructions one appears or doesn't appear as expected. I've added SVE and SME, other capabilities can be added later if this gets merged. This isn't super exciting but on the other hand took very little time to write and should be handy when verifying that you wired up AT_HWCAP properly. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> --- tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c | 188 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/.gitignore index b9e54417250d..c31d34d48a30 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/.gitignore +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/.gitignore @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ +hwcap syscall-abi tpidr2 diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/Makefile index c8d7f2495eb2..e60752eb8334 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Copyright (C) 2021 ARM Limited -TEST_GEN_PROGS := syscall-abi tpidr2 +TEST_GEN_PROGS := hwcap syscall-abi tpidr2 include ../../lib.mk diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c b/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8b5c646cea63 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2022 ARM Limited. + */ + +#include <errno.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/auxv.h> +#include <sys/prctl.h> +#include <asm/hwcap.h> +#include <asm/sigcontext.h> +#include <asm/unistd.h> + +#include "../../kselftest.h" + +#define TESTS_PER_HWCAP 2 + +/* + * Function expected to generate SIGILL when the feature is not + * supported and return when it is supported. If SIGILL is generated + * then the handler must be able to skip over the instruction safely. + * + * Note that it is expected that for many architecture extensions + * there are no specific traps due to no architecture state being + * added so we may not fault if running on a kernel which doesn't know + * to add the hwcap. + */ +typedef void (*sigill_fn)(void); + +static void sme_sigill(void) +{ + /* RDSVL x0, #0 */ + asm volatile(".inst 0x04bf5800" : : : "x0"); +} + +static void sve_sigill(void) +{ + /* RDVL x0, #0 */ + asm volatile(".inst 0x04bf5000" : : : "x0"); +} + +static const struct hwcap_data { + const char *name; + unsigned long at_hwcap; + unsigned long hwcap_bit; + const char *cpuinfo; + sigill_fn sigill_fn; + bool sigill_reliable; +} hwcaps[] = { + { + .name = "SME", + .at_hwcap = AT_HWCAP2, + .hwcap_bit = HWCAP2_SME, + .cpuinfo = "sme", + .sigill_fn = sme_sigill, + .sigill_reliable = true, + }, + { + .name = "SVE", + .at_hwcap = AT_HWCAP, + .hwcap_bit = HWCAP_SVE, + .cpuinfo = "sve", + .sigill_fn = sve_sigill, + .sigill_reliable = true, + }, +}; + +static bool seen_sigill; + +static void handle_sigill(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *context) +{ + ucontext_t *uc = context; + + seen_sigill = true; + + /* Skip over the offending instruction */ + uc->uc_mcontext.pc += 4; +} + +bool cpuinfo_present(const char *name) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[2048], name_space[30], name_newline[30]; + char *s; + + /* + * The feature should appear with a leading space and either a + * trailing space or a newline. + */ + snprintf(name_space, sizeof(name_space), " %s ", name); + snprintf(name_newline, sizeof(name_newline), " %s\n", name); + + f = fopen("/proc/cpuinfo", "r"); + if (!f) { + ksft_print_msg("Failed to open /proc/cpuinfo\n"); + return false; + } + + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { + /* Features: line? */ + if (strncmp(buf, "Features\t:", strlen("Features\t:")) != 0) + continue; + + /* All CPUs should be symmetric, don't read any more */ + fclose(f); + + s = strstr(buf, name_space); + if (s) + return true; + s = strstr(buf, name_newline); + if (s) + return true; + + return false; + } + + ksft_print_msg("Failed to find Features in /proc/cpuinfo\n"); + fclose(f); + return false; +} + +int main(void) +{ + const struct hwcap_data *hwcap; + int i, ret; + bool have_cpuinfo, have_hwcap; + struct sigaction sa; + + ksft_print_header(); + ksft_set_plan(ARRAY_SIZE(hwcaps) * TESTS_PER_HWCAP); + + memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); + sa.sa_sigaction = handle_sigill; + sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART | SA_SIGINFO; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + ret = sigaction(SIGILL, &sa, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Failed to install SIGILL handler: %s (%d)\n", + strerror(errno), errno); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hwcaps); i++) { + hwcap = &hwcaps[i]; + + have_hwcap = getauxval(hwcaps->at_hwcap) & hwcap->hwcap_bit; + have_cpuinfo = cpuinfo_present(hwcap->cpuinfo); + + if (have_hwcap) + ksft_print_msg("%s present", hwcap->name); + + ksft_test_result(have_hwcap == have_cpuinfo, + "cpuinfo_match_%s\n", hwcap->name); + + if (hwcap->sigill_fn) { + seen_sigill = false; + hwcap->sigill_fn(); + + if (have_hwcap) { + /* Should be able to use the extension */ + ksft_test_result(!seen_sigill, "sigill_%s\n", + hwcap->name); + } else if (hwcap->sigill_reliable) { + /* Guaranteed a SIGILL */ + ksft_test_result(seen_sigill, "sigill_%s\n", + hwcap->name); + } else { + /* Missing SIGILL might be fine */ + ksft_print_msg("SIGILL %sreported for %s\n", + seen_sigill ? "" : "not ", + hwcap->name); + ksft_test_result_skip("sigill_%s\n", + hwcap->name); + } + } else { + ksft_test_result_skip("sigill_%s\n", + hwcap->name); + } + } + + ksft_print_cnts(); + + return 0; +} base-commit: b90cb1053190353cc30f0fef0ef1f378ccc063c5 -- 2.30.2

2 years, 3 months

2
1
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[PATCH v2 0/4] kselftest/arm64: Floating point stress test harness

by Mark Brown

This series has a few small enhancements for the existing standalone floating point stress tests and then builds on those with a kselftest integrated program which gives those a very quick spin from within kselftest, as well as having an option to set a custom timeout to allow for use with longer soak testing. This makes it much easier to get thorough testing of the floating point state management logic, rather than requiring custom setup for coverage of the various vector lengths in the system as is needed at present. It might be nice in future to extend this to attach to some or all of the test programs with ptrace and read/write their registers as another means of potentially triggering race conditions or corruption but that's definitely another step. v2: - Rebase onto v6.0-rc3. - Announce the results of enumeration before we start everything. Mark Brown (4): kselftest/arm64: Always encourage preemption for za-test kselftest/arm64: Count SIGUSR2 deliveries in FP stress tests kselftest/arm64: Install signal handlers before output in FP stress tests kselftest/arm64: kselftest harness for FP stress tests tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/Makefile | 5 +- .../testing/selftests/arm64/fp/asm-offsets.h | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/fp-stress.c | 535 ++++++++++++++++++ .../testing/selftests/arm64/fp/fpsimd-test.S | 51 +- tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/sve-test.S | 51 +- tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/za-test.S | 58 +- 7 files changed, 641 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/fp-stress.c base-commit: b90cb1053190353cc30f0fef0ef1f378ccc063c5 -- 2.30.2

2 years, 3 months

2
5
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[PATCH v2 0/2] kselftest/arm64: Small improvements to ZA signal handling coverag

by Mark Brown

These patches improve the coverage of ZA signal contexts a bit, adding some validation that the actual data is correct and covering the case where ZA is not enabled. v2: - Rebase onto v6.0-rc3. Mark Brown (2): kselftest/arm64: Tighten up validation of ZA signal context kselftest/arm64: Add a test for signal frames with ZA disabled .../arm64/signal/testcases/za_no_regs.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++ .../arm64/signal/testcases/za_regs.c | 16 ++- 2 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/za_no_regs.c base-commit: b90cb1053190353cc30f0fef0ef1f378ccc063c5 -- 2.30.2

2 years, 3 months

2
3
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[PATCH v2 00/10] kselftest/arm64: EXTRA_CONTEXT related fixes

by Mark Brown

The arm64 architecture originally made the signal context a fixed size structure containing a linked list of records with the various kinds of register and other state which may be present. When SVE was implemented it was realised that it supported implementations with more state than could fit in that structure so a new record type EXTRA_CONTEXT was introduced allowing the signal context to be extended beyond the original size. Unfortunately the signal handling tests can not cope with these EXTRA_CONTEXT records at all - some support was implemented but it simply never worked. v2: - Rebase onto v6.0-rc3 Mark Brown (10): kselftest/arm64: Enumerate SME rather than SVE vector lengths for za_regs kselftest/arm64: Validate signal ucontext in place kselftest/arm64: Fix validatation termination record after EXTRA_CONTEXT kselftest/arm64: Fix validation of EXTRA_CONTEXT signal context location kselftest/arm64: Remove unneeded protype for validate_extra_context() kselftest/arm64: Only validate each signal context once kselftest/arm64: Validate contents of EXTRA_CONTEXT blocks kselftest/arm64: Preserve any EXTRA_CONTEXT in handle_signal_copyctx() kselftest/arm64: Allow larger buffers in get_signal_context() kselftest/arm64: Include larger SVE and SME VLs in signal tests .../arm64/signal/test_signals_utils.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++-- .../arm64/signal/test_signals_utils.h | 5 +- .../testcases/fake_sigreturn_bad_magic.c | 2 +- .../testcases/fake_sigreturn_bad_size.c | 2 +- .../fake_sigreturn_bad_size_for_magic0.c | 2 +- .../fake_sigreturn_duplicated_fpsimd.c | 2 +- .../testcases/fake_sigreturn_misaligned_sp.c | 2 +- .../testcases/fake_sigreturn_missing_fpsimd.c | 2 +- .../testcases/fake_sigreturn_sme_change_vl.c | 2 +- .../testcases/fake_sigreturn_sve_change_vl.c | 2 +- .../selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/sme_vl.c | 2 +- .../arm64/signal/testcases/ssve_regs.c | 25 +++----- .../arm64/signal/testcases/sve_regs.c | 23 +++----- .../selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/sve_vl.c | 2 +- .../arm64/signal/testcases/testcases.c | 48 +++++++++++---- .../arm64/signal/testcases/testcases.h | 9 ++- .../arm64/signal/testcases/za_regs.c | 28 ++++----- 17 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) base-commit: b90cb1053190353cc30f0fef0ef1f378ccc063c5 -- 2.30.2

2 years, 3 months

2
11
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[PATCH v2 4/6] selftests/sgx: Add SGX selftest augment_via_eaccept_long

by Jarkko Sakkinen

From: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj(a)intel.com> Add a new test case which is same as augment_via_eaccept but adds a larger number of EPC pages to stress test EAUG via EACCEPT. Signed-off-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj(a)intel.com> Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v3: - Addressed Reinette's feedback: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/bd5285dd-d6dd-8a46-fca9-728db5e2f369@inte… v2: - Addressed Reinette's feedback: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/24bd8e42-ff4e-0090-d9e1-cd81e4807f21@inte… --- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c | 5 +- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h | 3 +- 3 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c index 94bdeac1cf04..47b2786d6a77 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c @@ -171,7 +171,8 @@ uint64_t encl_get_entry(struct encl *encl, const char *symbol) return 0; } -bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size) +bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size, + unsigned long edmm_size) { const char device_path[] = "/dev/sgx_enclave"; struct encl_segment *seg; @@ -300,7 +301,7 @@ bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size) encl->src_size = encl->segment_tbl[j].offset + encl->segment_tbl[j].size; - for (encl->encl_size = 4096; encl->encl_size < encl->src_size; ) + for (encl->encl_size = 4096; encl->encl_size < encl->src_size + edmm_size;) encl->encl_size <<= 1; return true; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c index 9820b3809c69..c5aa9f323745 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c @@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ static const uint64_t MAGIC = 0x1122334455667788ULL; static const uint64_t MAGIC2 = 0x8877665544332211ULL; +/* Message-ID: <DM8PR11MB55912A7F47A84EC9913A6352F6999(a)DM8PR11MB5591.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> */ +static const uint64_t EDMM_SIZE_LONG = 8L * 1024L * 1024L * 1024L; +static const uint64_t TIMEOUT_LONG = 900; /* seconds */ + vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t vdso_sgx_enter_enclave; /* @@ -173,7 +177,8 @@ FIXTURE(enclave) { }; static bool setup_test_encl(unsigned long heap_size, struct encl *encl, - struct __test_metadata *_metadata) + struct __test_metadata *_metadata, + unsigned long edmm_size) { Elf64_Sym *sgx_enter_enclave_sym = NULL; struct vdso_symtab symtab; @@ -183,7 +188,7 @@ static bool setup_test_encl(unsigned long heap_size, struct encl *encl, unsigned int i; void *addr; - if (!encl_load("test_encl.elf", encl, heap_size)) { + if (!encl_load("test_encl.elf", encl, heap_size, edmm_size)) { encl_delete(encl); TH_LOG("Failed to load the test enclave."); return false; @@ -284,7 +289,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso) struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op; struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op; - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -357,7 +362,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed) total_mem = get_total_epc_mem(); ASSERT_NE(total_mem, 0); - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -401,7 +406,7 @@ TEST_F_TIMEOUT(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed_remove, 900) ASSERT_NE(total_mem, 0); TH_LOG("Creating an enclave with %lu bytes heap may take a while ...", total_mem); - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); /* * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start @@ -506,7 +511,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso) struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op; struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op; - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -542,7 +547,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso_and_user_function) struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op; struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op; - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -575,7 +580,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, tcs_entry) { struct encl_op_header op; - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -620,7 +625,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, pte_permissions) unsigned long data_start; int ret; - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -722,7 +727,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, tcs_permissions) struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions ioc; int ret, errno_save; - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -785,7 +790,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, epcm_permissions) unsigned long data_start; int ret, errno_save; - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -986,7 +991,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, augment) if (!sgx2_supported()) SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported"); - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -1116,7 +1121,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, augment_via_eaccept) if (!sgx2_supported()) SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported"); - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -1210,6 +1215,108 @@ TEST_F(enclave, augment_via_eaccept) munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE); } +/* + * Test for the addition of large number of pages to an initialized enclave via + * a pre-emptive run of EACCEPT on every page to be added. + */ +TEST_F_TIMEOUT(enclave, augment_via_eaccept_long, TIMEOUT_LONG) +{ + struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op; + struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op; + struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op; + size_t total_size = 0; + unsigned long i; + void *addr; + + if (!sgx2_supported()) + SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported"); + + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, + EDMM_SIZE_LONG)); + + memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); + self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; + + for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) { + struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i]; + + total_size += seg->size; + } + + /* + * mmap() every page at end of existing enclave to be used for + * EDMM. + */ + addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, EDMM_SIZE_LONG, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, + self->encl.fd, 0); + EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED); + + self->run.exception_vector = 0; + self->run.exception_error_code = 0; + self->run.exception_addr = 0; + + /* + * Run EACCEPT on every page to trigger the #PF->EAUG->EACCEPT(again + * without a #PF). All should be transparent to userspace. + */ + eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING; + eaccept_op.ret = 0; + eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT; + + for (i = 0; i < EDMM_SIZE_LONG; i += 4096) { + eaccept_op.epc_addr = (uint64_t)(addr + i); + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0); + if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 && + self->run.exception_error_code == 4 && + self->run.exception_addr == self->encl.encl_base) { + munmap(addr, EDMM_SIZE_LONG); + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave"); + } + + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(self->run.function, EEXIT); + } + + /* + * Pool of pages were successfully added to enclave. Perform sanity + * check on first page of the pool only to ensure data can be written + * to and read from a dynamically added enclave page. + */ + put_addr_op.value = MAGIC; + put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr; + put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + /* + * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to, + * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present. + */ + get_addr_op.value = 0; + get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr; + get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS; + + EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0); + + EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC); + EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0); + EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0); + + munmap(addr, EDMM_SIZE_LONG); +} + /* * SGX2 page type modification test in two phases: * Phase 1: @@ -1238,7 +1345,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, tcs_create) int ret, i; ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, - _metadata)); + _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -1568,7 +1675,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_no_eaccept) unsigned long data_start; int ret, errno_save; - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -1679,7 +1786,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access) unsigned long data_start; int ret, errno_save; - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -1794,7 +1901,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access_after_eaccept) unsigned long data_start; int ret, errno_save; - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run)); self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base; @@ -1918,7 +2025,7 @@ TEST_F(enclave, remove_untouched_page) unsigned long data_start; int ret, errno_save; - ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata)); + ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata, 0)); /* * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h index fc585be97e2f..5c190e21a5ff 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h @@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ extern unsigned char sign_key[]; extern unsigned char sign_key_end[]; void encl_delete(struct encl *ctx); -bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size); +bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size, + unsigned long edmm_size); bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl); bool encl_build(struct encl *encl); uint64_t encl_get_entry(struct encl *encl, const char *symbol); -- 2.37.2

2 years, 3 months

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[PATCH v5 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns()

by Frederick Lawler

While user namespaces do not make the kernel more vulnerable, they are however used to initiate exploits. Some users do not want to block namespace creation for the entirety of the system, which some distributions provide. Instead, we needed a way to have some applications be blocked, and others allowed. This is not possible with those tools. Managing hierarchies also did not fit our case because we're determining which tasks are allowed based on their attributes. While exploring a solution, we first leveraged the LSM cred_prepare hook because that is the closest hook to prevent a call to create_user_ns(). The calls look something like this: cred = prepare_creds() security_prepare_creds() call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ... if (cred) create_user_ns(cred) We noticed that error codes were not propagated from this hook and introduced a patch [1] to propagate those errors. The discussion notes that security_prepare_creds() is not appropriate for MAC policies, and instead the hook is meant for LSM authors to prepare credentials for mutation. [2] Additionally, cred_prepare hook is not without problems. Handling the clone3 case is a bit more tricky due to the user space pointer passed to it. This makes checking the syscall subject to a possible TOCTTOU attack. Ultimately, we concluded that a better course of action is to introduce a new security hook for LSM authors. [3] This patch set first introduces a new security_create_user_ns() function and userns_create LSM hook, then marks the hook as sleepable in BPF. The following patches after include a BPF test and a patch for an SELinux implementation. We want to encourage use of user namespaces, and also cater the needs of users/administrators to observe and/or control access. There is no expectation of an impact on user space applications because access control is opt-in, and users wishing to observe within a LSM context Links: 1. https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220608150942.776446-1-fred@cloudflare.com/ 2. https://lore.kernel.org/all/87y1xzyhub.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org/ 3. https://lore.kernel.org/all/9fe9cd9f-1ded-a179-8ded-5fde8960a586@cloudflare… Past discussions: V4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801180146.1157914-1-fred@cloudflare.com/ V3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220721172808.585539-1-fred@cloudflare.com/ V2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220707223228.1940249-1-fred@cloudflare.com/ V1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220621233939.993579-1-fred@cloudflare.com/ Changes since v4: - Update commit description - Update cover letter Changes since v3: - Explicitly set CAP_SYS_ADMIN to test namespace is created given permission - Simplify BPF test to use sleepable hook only - Prefer unshare() over clone() for tests Changes since v2: - Rename create_user_ns hook to userns_create - Use user_namespace as an object opposed to a generic namespace object - s/domB_t/domA_t in commit message Changes since v1: - Add selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm create_user_ns hook patch - Add selinux: Implement create_user_ns hook patch - Change function signature of security_create_user_ns() to only take struct cred - Move security_create_user_ns() call after id mapping check in create_user_ns() - Update documentation to reflect changes Frederick Lawler (4): security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns() bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook selinux: Implement userns_create hook include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 + include/linux/security.h | 6 ++ kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 1 + kernel/user_namespace.c | 5 + security/security.c | 5 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 + .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/deny_namespace.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_deny_namespace.c | 33 ++++++ 10 files changed, 168 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/deny_namespace.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_deny_namespace.c -- 2.30.2

2 years, 3 months

8
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Linux-kselftest-mirror August 2022