During my testing, I found that guest debugging with 'DR6.BD' does not
work in instruction emulation, as the current code only considers the
guest's DR7. Upon reviewing the code, I also observed that the checks
for the userspace guest debugging feature and the guest's own debugging
feature are repeated in different places during instruction
emulation, but the overall logic is the same. If guest debugging
is enabled, it needs to exit to userspace; otherwise, a #DB
exception needs to be injected into the guest. Therefore, as
suggested by Jiangshan Lai, some cleanup has been done for #DB
handling in instruction emulation in this patchset. A new
function named 'kvm_inject_emulated_db()' is introduced to
consolidate all the checking logic. Moreover, I hope we can make
the #DB interception path use the same function as well.
Additionally, when I looked into the single-step #DB handling in
instruction emulation, I noticed that the interrupt shadow is toggled,
but it is not considered in the single-step #DB injection. This
oversight causes VM entry to fail on VMX (due to pending debug
exceptions checking) or breaks the 'MOV SS' suppressed #DB. For the
latter, I have kept the behavior for now in my patchset, as I need some
suggestions.
Hou Wenlong (7):
KVM: x86: Set guest DR6 by kvm_queue_exception_p() in instruction
emulation
KVM: x86: Check guest debug in DR access instruction emulation
KVM: x86: Only check effective code breakpoint in emulation
KVM: x86: Consolidate KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP check into the
kvm_inject_emulated_db()
KVM: VMX: Set 'BS' bit in pending debug exceptions during instruction
emulation
KVM: selftests: Verify guest debug DR7.GD checking during instruction
emulation
KVM: selftests: Verify 'BS' bit checking in pending debug exception
during VM entry
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 14 +--
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h | 7 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 9 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 14 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 109 +++++++++++-------
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 7 ++
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h | 3 +-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/debug_regs.c | 64 +++++++++-
11 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
base-commit: ecbcc2461839e848970468b44db32282e5059925
--
2.31.1
Problem
=======
When host APEI is unable to claim a synchronous external abort (SEA)
during guest abort, today KVM directly injects an asynchronous SError
into the VCPU then resumes it. The injected SError usually results in
unpleasant guest kernel panic.
One of the major situation of guest SEA is when VCPU consumes recoverable
uncorrected memory error (UER), which is not uncommon at all in modern
datacenter servers with large amounts of physical memory. Although SError
and guest panic is sufficient to stop the propagation of corrupted memory,
there is room to recover from an UER in a more graceful manner.
Proposed Solution
=================
The idea is, we can replay the SEA to the faulting VCPU. If the memory
error consumption or the fault that cause SEA is not from guest kernel,
the blast radius can be limited to the poison-consuming guest process,
while the VM can keep running.
In addition, instead of doing under the hood without involving userspace,
there are benefits to redirect the SEA to VMM:
- VM customers care about the disruptions caused by memory errors, and
VMM usually has the responsibility to start the process of notifying
the customers of memory error events in their VMs. For example some
cloud provider emits a critical log in their observability UI [1], and
provides a playbook for customers on how to mitigate disruptions to
their workloads.
- VMM can protect future memory error consumption by unmapping the poisoned
pages from stage-2 page table with KVM userfault [2], or by splitting the
memslot that contains the poisoned pages.
- VMM can keep track of SEA events in the VM. When VMM thinks the status
on the host or the VM is bad enough, e.g. number of distinct SEAs
exceeds a threshold, it can restart the VM on another healthy host.
- Behavior parity with x86 architecture. When machine check exception
(MCE) is caused by VCPU, kernel or KVM signals userspace SIGBUS to
let VMM either recover from the MCE, or terminate itself with VM.
The prior RFC proposes to implement SIGBUS on arm64 as well, but
Marc preferred KVM exit over signal [3]. However, implementation
aside, returning SEA to VMM is on par with returning MCE to VMM.
Once SEA is redirected to VMM, among other actions, VMM is encouraged
to inject external aborts into the faulting VCPU.
New UAPIs
=========
This patchset introduces following userspace-visible changes to empower
VMM to control what happens for SEA on guest memory:
- KVM_CAP_ARM_SEA_TO_USER. While taking SEA, if userspace has enabled
this new capability at VM creation, and the SEA is not owned by kernel
allocated memory, instead of injecting SError, return KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA
to userspace.
- KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA. This is the VM exit reason VMM gets. The details
about the SEA is provided in arm_sea as much as possible, including
sanitized ESR value at EL2, faulting guest virtual and physical
addresses if available.
* From v3 [4]
- Rebased on commit 3a8660878839 ("Linux 6.18-rc1").
- In selftest, print a message if GVA or GPA expects to be valid.
* From v2 [5]:
- Rebased on "[PATCH] KVM: arm64: nv: Handle SEAs due to VNCR redirection" [6]
and kvmarm/next commit 7b8346bd9fce6 ("KVM: arm64: Don't attempt vLPI
mappings when vPE allocation is disabled")
- Took the host_owns_sea implementation from Oliver [7, 8].
- Excluded the guest SEA injection patches.
- Updated selftest.
* From v1 [9]:
- Rebased on commit 4d62121ce9b5 ("KVM: arm64: vgic-debug: Avoid
dereferencing NULL ITE pointer").
- Sanitize ESR_EL2 before reporting it to userspace.
- Do not do KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA when SEA is caused by memory allocated to
stage-2 translation table.
[1] https://cloud.google.com/solutions/sap/docs/manage-host-errors
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250109204929.1106563-1-jthoughton@google.com
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/86pljbqqh0.wl-maz@kernel.org
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/20250731205844.1346839-1-jiaqiyan@google.com
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250604050902.3944054-1-jiaqiyan@google.com
[6] https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/20250729182342.3281742-1-oliver.upton@linux.…
[7] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/aHFohmTb9qR_JG1E@linux.dev
[8] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/aHK-DPufhLy5Dtuk@linux.dev
[9] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250505161412.1926643-1-jiaqiyan@google.com
Jiaqi Yan (3):
KVM: arm64: VM exit to userspace to handle SEA
KVM: selftests: Test for KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA
Documentation: kvm: new UAPI for handling SEA
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 61 ++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 5 +
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 68 +++-
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 10 +
tools/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 1 +
.../testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/sea_to_user.c | 331 ++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 1 +
9 files changed, 480 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/sea_to_user.c
--
2.51.0.760.g7b8bcc2412-goog
This is a follow-up series of [1]. It tries to fix a possible UAF in the
fops of cros_ec_chardev after the underlying protocol device has gone by
using revocable.
The 1st patch introduces the revocable which is an implementation of ideas
from the talk [2].
The 2nd and 3rd patches add test cases for revocable in Kunit and selftest.
The 4th patch converts existing protocol devices to resource providers
of cros_ec_device.
The 5th - 7th are PoC patches for showing the use case of "Replace file
operations" below.
---
I came out with 2 possible usages of revocable.
1. Use primitive APIs
Use the primitive APIs of revocable directly.
The file operations make sure the resources are available when using them.
This is what the series original proposed[3][4]. Even though it has the
finest grain for accessing the resources, it makes the user code verbose.
Per feedback from the community, I'm looking for some subsystem level
helpers so that user code can be simlper.
2. Replace file operations
Replace filp->f_op to revocable-aware warppers.
The warppers make sure the resources are available in the file operations.
The user code needs to provide a callback .try_access() to tell the wrappers
where/how to *save* the pointers of resources.
Known drawback:
- The warppers reserve the resources for all file operations even if they
might be unused.
- The user code still needs to be revocable-aware.
- The whole file operation becomes a SRCU read-side critical section. Are
there any functions can't be called in the critical section? If there is,
the file operations may not be awared of that.
See 5th - 7th patches for an example usage.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/chrome-platform/20250721044456.2736300-6-tzungbi@ke…
[2] https://lpc.events/event/17/contributions/1627/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/chrome-platform/20250912081718.3827390-5-tzungbi@ke…
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/chrome-platform/20250912081718.3827390-6-tzungbi@ke…
v5:
- Rebase onto next-20251015.
- Add more context about the PoC.
- Support multiple revocable providers in the PoC.
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/chrome-platform/20250923075302.591026-1-tzungbi@ker…
- Rebase onto next-20250922.
- Remove the 5th patch from v3.
- Add fops replacement PoC in 5th - 7th patches.
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/chrome-platform/20250912081718.3827390-1-tzungbi@ke…
- Rebase onto https://lore.kernel.org/chrome-platform/20250828083601.856083-1-tzungbi@ker…
and next-20250912.
- The 4th patch changed accordingly.
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/chrome-platform/20250820081645.847919-1-tzungbi@ker…
- Rename "ref_proxy" -> "revocable".
- Add test cases in Kunit and selftest.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/chrome-platform/20250814091020.1302888-1-tzungbi@ke…
Tzung-Bi Shih (7):
revocable: Revocable resource management
revocable: Add Kunit test cases
selftests: revocable: Add kselftest cases
platform/chrome: Protect cros_ec_device lifecycle with revocable
revocable: Add fops replacement
char: misc: Leverage revocable fops replacement
platform/chrome: cros_ec_chardev: Secure cros_ec_device via revocable
.../driver-api/driver-model/index.rst | 1 +
.../driver-api/driver-model/revocable.rst | 87 +++++++
MAINTAINERS | 9 +
drivers/base/Kconfig | 8 +
drivers/base/Makefile | 5 +-
drivers/base/revocable.c | 233 ++++++++++++++++++
drivers/base/revocable_test.c | 110 +++++++++
drivers/char/misc.c | 8 +
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec.c | 5 +
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_chardev.c | 22 +-
fs/Makefile | 2 +-
fs/fs_revocable.c | 154 ++++++++++++
include/linux/fs.h | 2 +
include/linux/fs_revocable.h | 21 ++
include/linux/miscdevice.h | 4 +
include/linux/platform_data/cros_ec_proto.h | 4 +
include/linux/revocable.h | 53 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
.../selftests/drivers/base/revocable/Makefile | 7 +
.../drivers/base/revocable/revocable_test.c | 116 +++++++++
.../drivers/base/revocable/test-revocable.sh | 39 +++
.../base/revocable/test_modules/Makefile | 10 +
.../revocable/test_modules/revocable_test.c | 188 ++++++++++++++
23 files changed, 1086 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/driver-api/driver-model/revocable.rst
create mode 100644 drivers/base/revocable.c
create mode 100644 drivers/base/revocable_test.c
create mode 100644 fs/fs_revocable.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/fs_revocable.h
create mode 100644 include/linux/revocable.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/drivers/base/revocable/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/drivers/base/revocable/revocable_test.c
create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/drivers/base/revocable/test-revocable.sh
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/drivers/base/revocable/test_modules/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/drivers/base/revocable/test_modules/revocable_test.c
--
2.51.0.788.g6d19910ace-goog
This series introduces NUMA-aware memory placement support for KVM guests
with guest_memfd memory backends. It builds upon Fuad Tabba's work (V17)
that enabled host-mapping for guest_memfd memory [1] and can be applied
directly applied on KVM tree [2] (branch kvm-next, base commit: a6ad5413,
Merge branch 'guest-memfd-mmap' into HEAD)
== Background ==
KVM's guest-memfd memory backend currently lacks support for NUMA policy
enforcement, causing guest memory allocations to be distributed across host
nodes according to kernel's default behavior, irrespective of any policy
specified by the VMM. This limitation arises because conventional userspace
NUMA control mechanisms like mbind(2) don't work since the memory isn't
directly mapped to userspace when allocations occur.
Fuad's work [1] provides the necessary mmap capability, and this series
leverages it to enable mbind(2).
== Implementation ==
This series implements proper NUMA policy support for guest-memfd by:
1. Adding mempolicy-aware allocation APIs to the filemap layer.
2. Introducing custom inodes (via a dedicated slab-allocated inode cache,
kvm_gmem_inode_info) to store NUMA policy and metadata for guest memory.
3. Implementing get/set_policy vm_ops in guest_memfd to support NUMA
policy.
With these changes, VMMs can now control guest memory placement by mapping
guest_memfd file descriptor and using mbind(2) to specify:
- Policy modes: default, bind, interleave, or preferred
- Host NUMA nodes: List of target nodes for memory allocation
These Policies affect only future allocations and do not migrate existing
memory. This matches mbind(2)'s default behavior which affects only new
allocations unless overridden with MPOL_MF_MOVE/MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL flags (Not
supported for guest_memfd as it is unmovable by design).
== Upstream Plan ==
Phased approach as per David's guest_memfd extension overview [3] and
community calls [4]:
Phase 1 (this series):
1. Focuses on shared guest_memfd support (non-CoCo VMs).
2. Builds on Fuad's host-mapping work [1].
Phase2 (future work):
1. NUMA support for private guest_memfd (CoCo VMs).
2. Depends on SNP in-place conversion support [5].
This series provides a clean integration path for NUMA-aware memory
management for guest_memfd and lays the groundwork for future confidential
computing NUMA capabilities.
Thanks,
Shivank
== Changelog ==
- v1,v2: Extended the KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD IOCTL to pass mempolicy.
- v3: Introduced fbind() syscall for VMM memory-placement configuration.
- v4-v6: Current approach using shared_policy support and vm_ops (based on
suggestions from David [6] and guest_memfd bi-weekly upstream
call discussion [7]).
- v7: Use inodes to store NUMA policy instead of file [8].
- v8: Rebase on top of Fuad's V12: Host mmaping for guest_memfd memory.
- v9: Rebase on top of Fuad's V13 and incorporate review comments
- V10: Rebase on top of Fuad's V17. Use latest guest_memfd inode patch
from Ackerley (with David's review comments). Use newer kmem_cache_create()
API variant with arg parameter (Vlastimil)
- V11: Rebase on kvm-next, remove RFC tag, use Ackerley's latest patch
and fix a rcu race bug during kvm module unload.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250729225455.670324-1-seanjc@google.com
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm.git/log/?h=next
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/c1c9591d-218a-495c-957b-ba356c8f8e09@redhat.com
[4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M6766BzdY1Lhk7LiR5IqVR8B8mG3cr-cxTxOrAo…
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250613005400.3694904-1-michael.roth@amd.com
[6] https://lore.kernel.org/all/6fbef654-36e2-4be5-906e-2a648a845278@redhat.com
[7] https://lore.kernel.org/all/2b77e055-98ac-43a1-a7ad-9f9065d7f38f@amd.com
[8] https://lore.kernel.org/all/diqzbjumm167.fsf@ackerleytng-ctop.c.googlers.com
Ackerley Tng (1):
KVM: guest_memfd: Use guest mem inodes instead of anonymous inodes
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) (2):
mm/filemap: Add NUMA mempolicy support to filemap_alloc_folio()
mm/filemap: Extend __filemap_get_folio() to support NUMA memory
policies
Shivank Garg (4):
mm/mempolicy: Export memory policy symbols
KVM: guest_memfd: Add slab-allocated inode cache
KVM: guest_memfd: Enforce NUMA mempolicy using shared policy
KVM: guest_memfd: selftests: Add tests for mmap and NUMA policy
support
fs/bcachefs/fs-io-buffered.c | 2 +-
fs/btrfs/compression.c | 4 +-
fs/btrfs/verity.c | 2 +-
fs/erofs/zdata.c | 2 +-
fs/f2fs/compress.c | 2 +-
include/linux/pagemap.h | 18 +-
include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 +
mm/filemap.c | 23 +-
mm/mempolicy.c | 6 +
mm/readahead.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 1 +
.../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 121 ++++++++
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 262 ++++++++++++++++--
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 7 +-
virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h | 9 +-
15 files changed, 412 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
---
== Earlier Postings ==
v10: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250811090605.16057-2-shivankg@amd.com
v9: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250713174339.13981-2-shivankg@amd.com
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250618112935.7629-1-shivankg@amd.com
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250408112402.181574-1-shivankg@amd.com
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250226082549.6034-1-shivankg@amd.com
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250219101559.414878-1-shivankg@amd.com
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250210063227.41125-1-shivankg@amd.com
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241105164549.154700-1-shivankg@amd.com
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240919094438.10987-1-shivankg@amd.com
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240916165743.201087-1-shivankg@amd.com
From: Patrick Roy <roypat(a)amazon.co.uk>
[ based on kvm/next ]
Unmapping virtual machine guest memory from the host kernel's direct map is a
successful mitigation against Spectre-style transient execution issues: If the
kernel page tables do not contain entries pointing to guest memory, then any
attempted speculative read through the direct map will necessarily be blocked
by the MMU before any observable microarchitectural side-effects happen. This
means that Spectre-gadgets and similar cannot be used to target virtual machine
memory. Roughly 60% of speculative execution issues fall into this category [1,
Table 1].
This patch series extends guest_memfd with the ability to remove its memory
from the host kernel's direct map, to be able to attain the above protection
for KVM guests running inside guest_memfd.
Additionally, a Firecracker branch with support for these VMs can be found on
GitHub [2].
For more details, please refer to the v5 cover letter [v5]. No
substantial changes in design have taken place since.
=== Changes Since v6 ===
- Drop patch for passing struct address_space to ->free_folio(), due to
possible races with freeing of the address_space. (Hugh)
- Stop using PG_uptodate / gmem preparedness tracking to keep track of
direct map state. Instead, use the lowest bit of folio->private. (Mike, David)
- Do direct map removal when establishing mapping of gmem folio instead
of at allocation time, due to impossibility of handling direct map
removal errors in kvm_gmem_populate(). (Patrick)
- Do TLB flushes after direct map removal, and provide a module
parameter to opt out from them, and a new patch to export
flush_tlb_kernel_range() to KVM. (Will)
[1]: https://download.vusec.net/papers/quarantine_raid23.pdf
[2]: https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hidi…
[RFCv1]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240709132041.3625501-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
[RFCv2]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240910163038.1298452-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
[RFCv3]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20241030134912.515725-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
[v4]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250221160728.1584559-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
[v5]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250828093902.2719-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
[v6]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250912091708.17502-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
Patrick Roy (12):
arch: export set_direct_map_valid_noflush to KVM module
x86/tlb: export flush_tlb_kernel_range to KVM module
mm: introduce AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP
KVM: guest_memfd: Add stub for kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate
KVM: guest_memfd: Add flag to remove from direct map
KVM: guest_memfd: add module param for disabling TLB flushing
KVM: selftests: load elf via bounce buffer
KVM: selftests: set KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD in vm_mem_add() if guest_memfd
!= -1
KVM: selftests: Add guest_memfd based vm_mem_backing_src_types
KVM: selftests: cover GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP in existing
selftests
KVM: selftests: stuff vm_mem_backing_src_type into vm_shape
KVM: selftests: Test guest execution from direct map removed gmem
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 5 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 12 ++++
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 1 +
arch/loongarch/mm/pageattr.c | 1 +
arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 1 +
arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 1 +
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 1 +
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 9 +++
include/linux/pagemap.h | 16 +++++
include/linux/secretmem.h | 18 -----
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 +
lib/buildid.c | 4 +-
mm/gup.c | 19 ++----
mm/mlock.c | 2 +-
mm/secretmem.c | 8 +--
.../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 2 +
.../testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h | 37 ++++++++---
.../testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h | 8 +++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/elf.c | 8 +--
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/io.c | 23 +++++++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 61 +++++++++--------
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/test_util.c | 8 +++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/pre_fault_memory_test.c | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c | 50 ++++++++++++--
.../kvm/x86/private_mem_conversions_test.c | 7 +-
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++--
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 8 +++
30 files changed, 290 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)
base-commit: a6ad54137af92535cfe32e19e5f3bc1bb7dbd383
--
2.51.0
Fix compilation error in UPROBE_setup caused by pointer type mismatch
in ternary expression. The probed_uretprobe and probed_uprobe function
pointers have different type attributes (__attribute__((nocf_check))),
which causes the conditional operator to fail with:
seccomp_bpf.c:5175:74: error: pointer type mismatch in conditional
expression [-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
Cast both function pointers to 'const void *' to match the expected
parameter type of get_uprobe_offset(), resolving the type mismatch
while preserving the function selection logic.
Signed-off-by: Nirbhay Sharma <nirbhay.lkd(a)gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
index 874f17763536..e13ffe18ef95 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -5172,7 +5172,8 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(UPROBE)
ASSERT_GE(bit, 0);
}
- offset = get_uprobe_offset(variant->uretprobe ? probed_uretprobe : probed_uprobe);
+ offset = get_uprobe_offset(variant->uretprobe ?
+ (const void *)probed_uretprobe : (const void *)probed_uprobe);
ASSERT_GE(offset, 0);
if (variant->uretprobe)
--
2.48.1
I've removed the RFC tag from this version of the series, but the items
that I'm looking for feedback on remains the same:
- The userspace ABI, in particular:
- The vector length used for the SVE registers, access to the SVE
registers and access to ZA and (if available) ZT0 depending on
the current state of PSTATE.{SM,ZA}.
- The use of a single finalisation for both SVE and SME.
- The addition of control for enabling fine grained traps in a similar
manner to FGU but without the UNDEF, I'm not clear if this is desired
at all and at present this requires symmetric read and write traps like
FGU. That seemed like it might be desired from an implementation
point of view but we already have one case where we enable an
asymmetric trap (for ARM64_WORKAROUND_AMPERE_AC03_CPU_38) and it
seems generally useful to enable asymmetrically.
This series implements support for SME use in non-protected KVM guests.
Much of this is very similar to SVE, the main additional challenge that
SME presents is that it introduces a new vector length similar to the
SVE vector length and two new controls which change the registers seen
by guests:
- PSTATE.ZA enables the ZA matrix register and, if SME2 is supported,
the ZT0 LUT register.
- PSTATE.SM enables streaming mode, a new floating point mode which
uses the SVE register set with the separately configured SME vector
length. In streaming mode implementation of the FFR register is
optional.
It is also permitted to build systems which support SME without SVE, in
this case when not in streaming mode no SVE registers or instructions
are available. Further, there is no requirement that there be any
overlap in the set of vector lengths supported by SVE and SME in a
system, this is expected to be a common situation in practical systems.
Since there is a new vector length to configure we introduce a new
feature parallel to the existing SVE one with a new pseudo register for
the streaming mode vector length. Due to the overlap with SVE caused by
streaming mode rather than finalising SME as a separate feature we use
the existing SVE finalisation to also finalise SME, a new define
KVM_ARM_VCPU_VEC is provided to help make user code clearer. Finalising
SVE and SME separately would introduce complication with register access
since finalising SVE makes the SVE registers writeable by userspace and
doing multiple finalisations results in an error being reported.
Dealing with a state where the SVE registers are writeable due to one of
SVE or SME being finalised but may have their VL changed by the other
being finalised seems like needless complexity with minimal practical
utility, it seems clearer to just express directly that only one
finalisation can be done in the ABI.
Access to the floating point registers follows the architecture:
- When both SVE and SME are present:
- If PSTATE.SM == 0 the vector length used for the Z and P registers
is the SVE vector length.
- If PSTATE.SM == 1 the vector length used for the Z and P registers
is the SME vector length.
- If only SME is present:
- If PSTATE.SM == 0 the Z and P registers are inaccessible and the
floating point state accessed via the encodings for the V registers.
- If PSTATE.SM == 1 the vector length used for the Z and P registers
- The SME specific ZA and ZT0 registers are only accessible if SVCR.ZA is 1.
The VMM must understand this, in particular when loading state SVCR
should be configured before other state. It should be noted that while
the architecture refers to PSTATE.SM and PSTATE.ZA these PSTATE bits are
not preserved in SPSR_ELx, they are only accessible via SVCR.
There are a large number of subfeatures for SME, most of which only
offer additional instructions but some of which (SME2 and FA64) add
architectural state. These are configured via the ID registers as per
usual.
Protected KVM supported, with the implementation maintaining the
existing restriction that the hypervisor will refuse to run if streaming
mode or ZA is enabled. This both simplfies the code and avoids the need
to allocate storage for host ZA and ZT0 state, there seems to be little
practical use case for supporting this and the memory usage would be
non-trivial.
The new KVM_ARM_VCPU_VEC feature and ZA and ZT0 registers have not been
added to the get-reg-list selftest, the idea of supporting additional
features there without restructuring the program to generate all
possible feature combinations has been rejected. I will post a separate
series which does that restructuring.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
---
Changes in v8:
- Small fixes in ABI documentation.
- Link to v7: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250822-kvm-arm64-sme-v7-0-7a65d82b8b10@kernel.o…
Changes in v7:
- Rebase onto v6.17-rc1.
- Handle SMIDR_EL1 as a VM wide ID register and use this in feat_sme_smps().
- Expose affinity fields in SMIDR_EL1.
- Remove SMPRI_EL1 from vcpu_sysreg, the value is always 0 currently.
- Prevent userspace writes to SMPRIMAP_EL2.
- Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625-kvm-arm64-sme-v6-0-114cff4ffe04@kernel.o…
Changes in v6:
- Rebase onto v6.16-rc3.
- Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250417-kvm-arm64-sme-v5-0-f469a2d5f574@kernel.o…
Changes in v5:
- Rebase onto v6.15-rc2.
- Add pKVM guest support.
- Always restore SVCR.
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250214-kvm-arm64-sme-v4-0-d64a681adcc2@kernel.o…
Changes in v4:
- Rebase onto v6.14-rc2 and Mark Rutland's fixes.
- Expose SME to nested guests.
- Additional cleanups and test fixes following on from the rebase.
- Flush register state on VMM PSTATE.{SM,ZA}.
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241220-kvm-arm64-sme-v3-0-05b018c1ffeb@kernel.o…
Changes in v3:
- Rebase onto v6.12-rc2.
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231222-kvm-arm64-sme-v2-0-da226cb180bb@kernel.o…
Changes in v2:
- Rebase onto v6.7-rc3.
- Configure subfeatures based on host system only.
- Complete nVHE support.
- There was some snafu with sending v1 out, it didn't make it to the
lists but in case it hit people's inboxes I'm sending as v2.
---
Mark Brown (29):
arm64/sysreg: Update SMIDR_EL1 to DDI0601 2025-06
arm64/fpsimd: Update FA64 and ZT0 enables when loading SME state
arm64/fpsimd: Decide to save ZT0 and streaming mode FFR at bind time
arm64/fpsimd: Check enable bit for FA64 when saving EFI state
arm64/fpsimd: Determine maximum virtualisable SME vector length
KVM: arm64: Introduce non-UNDEF FGT control
KVM: arm64: Pay attention to FFR parameter in SVE save and load
KVM: arm64: Pull ctxt_has_ helpers to start of sysreg-sr.h
KVM: arm64: Move SVE state access macros after feature test macros
KVM: arm64: Rename SVE finalization constants to be more general
KVM: arm64: Document the KVM ABI for SME
KVM: arm64: Define internal features for SME
KVM: arm64: Rename sve_state_reg_region
KVM: arm64: Store vector lengths in an array
KVM: arm64: Implement SME vector length configuration
KVM: arm64: Support SME control registers
KVM: arm64: Support TPIDR2_EL0
KVM: arm64: Support SME identification registers for guests
KVM: arm64: Support SME priority registers
KVM: arm64: Provide assembly for SME register access
KVM: arm64: Support userspace access to streaming mode Z and P registers
KVM: arm64: Flush register state on writes to SVCR.SM and SVCR.ZA
KVM: arm64: Expose SME specific state to userspace
KVM: arm64: Context switch SME state for guests
KVM: arm64: Handle SME exceptions
KVM: arm64: Expose SME to nested guests
KVM: arm64: Provide interface for configuring and enabling SME for guests
KVM: arm64: selftests: Add SME system registers to get-reg-list
KVM: arm64: selftests: Add SME to set_id_regs test
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 115 ++++++++---
arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h | 26 +++
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 6 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 169 ++++++++++++---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h | 5 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/vncr_mapping.h | 2 +
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 -
arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 89 ++++----
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 10 +
arch/arm64/kvm/config.c | 8 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c | 28 ++-
arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c | 252 ++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 14 ++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/fpsimd.S | 28 ++-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 175 ++++++++++++++--
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/sysreg-sr.h | 110 ++++++----
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 86 ++++++--
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 85 ++++++--
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 4 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c | 6 +
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c | 17 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/sysreg-sr.c | 7 +
arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 3 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 156 ++++++++++----
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 141 ++++++++++++-
arch/arm64/tools/sysreg | 8 +-
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/get-reg-list.c | 15 +-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/set_id_regs.c | 27 ++-
31 files changed, 1327 insertions(+), 303 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 062b3e4a1f880f104a8d4b90b767788786aa7b78
change-id: 20230301-kvm-arm64-sme-06a1246d3636
Best regards,
--
Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
For a while now we have supported file handles for pidfds. This has
proven to be very useful.
Extend the concept to cover namespaces as well. After this patchset it
is possible to encode and decode namespace file handles using the
commong name_to_handle_at() and open_by_handle_at() apis.
Namespaces file descriptors can already be derived from pidfds which
means they aren't subject to overmount protection bugs. IOW, it's
irrelevant if the caller would not have access to an appropriate
/proc/<pid>/ns/ directory as they could always just derive the namespace
based on a pidfd already.
It has the same advantage as pidfds. It's possible to reliably and for
the lifetime of the system refer to a namespace without pinning any
resources and to compare them.
Permission checking is kept simple. If the caller is located in the
namespace the file handle refers to they are able to open it otherwise
they must hold privilege over the owning namespace of the relevant
namespace.
Both the network namespace and the mount namespace already have an
associated cookie that isn't recycled and is fully exposed to userspace.
Move this into ns_common and use the same id space for all namespaces so
they can trivially and reliably be compared.
There's more coming based on the iterator infrastructure but the series
is large enough and focuses on file handles.
Extensive selftests included. I still have various other test-suites to
run but it holds up so far.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org>
---
Christian Brauner (32):
pidfs: validate extensible ioctls
nsfs: validate extensible ioctls
block: use extensible_ioctl_valid()
ns: move to_ns_common() to ns_common.h
nsfs: add nsfs.h header
ns: uniformly initialize ns_common
mnt: use ns_common_init()
ipc: use ns_common_init()
cgroup: use ns_common_init()
pid: use ns_common_init()
time: use ns_common_init()
uts: use ns_common_init()
user: use ns_common_init()
net: use ns_common_init()
ns: remove ns_alloc_inum()
nstree: make iterator generic
mnt: support iterator
cgroup: support iterator
ipc: support iterator
net: support iterator
pid: support iterator
time: support iterator
userns: support iterator
uts: support iterator
ns: add to_<type>_ns() to respective headers
nsfs: add current_in_namespace()
nsfs: support file handles
nsfs: support exhaustive file handles
nsfs: add missing id retrieval support
tools: update nsfs.h uapi header
selftests/namespaces: add identifier selftests
selftests/namespaces: add file handle selftests
block/blk-integrity.c | 8 +-
fs/fhandle.c | 6 +
fs/internal.h | 1 +
fs/mount.h | 10 +-
fs/namespace.c | 156 +--
fs/nsfs.c | 266 +++-
fs/pidfs.c | 2 +-
include/linux/cgroup.h | 5 +
include/linux/exportfs.h | 6 +
include/linux/fs.h | 14 +
include/linux/ipc_namespace.h | 5 +
include/linux/ns_common.h | 29 +
include/linux/nsfs.h | 40 +
include/linux/nsproxy.h | 11 -
include/linux/nstree.h | 89 ++
include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 5 +
include/linux/proc_ns.h | 32 +-
include/linux/time_namespace.h | 9 +
include/linux/user_namespace.h | 5 +
include/linux/utsname.h | 5 +
include/net/net_namespace.h | 6 +
include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 12 +-
init/main.c | 2 +
ipc/msgutil.c | 1 +
ipc/namespace.c | 12 +-
ipc/shm.c | 2 +
kernel/Makefile | 2 +-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 2 +
kernel/cgroup/namespace.c | 24 +-
kernel/nstree.c | 233 ++++
kernel/pid_namespace.c | 13 +-
kernel/time/namespace.c | 23 +-
kernel/user_namespace.c | 17 +-
kernel/utsname.c | 28 +-
net/core/net_namespace.c | 59 +-
tools/include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 23 +-
tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/.gitignore | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/Makefile | 7 +
tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/config | 7 +
.../selftests/namespaces/file_handle_test.c | 1410 ++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/nsid_test.c | 986 ++++++++++++++
42 files changed, 3306 insertions(+), 270 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 8f5ae30d69d7543eee0d70083daf4de8fe15d585
change-id: 20250905-work-namespace-c68826dda0d4