This patch series introduces LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC, a new Landlock
scoping mechanism that restricts execution of anonymous memory file
descriptors (memfd) created via memfd_create(2). This addresses security
gaps where processes can bypass W^X policies and execute arbitrary code
through anonymous memory objects.
Fixes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/37
SECURITY PROBLEM
================
Current Landlock filesystem restrictions do not cover memfd objects,
allowing processes to:
1. Read-to-execute bypass: Create writable memfd, inject code,
then execute via mmap(PROT_EXEC) or direct execve()
2. Anonymous execution: Execute code without touching the filesystem via
execve("/proc/self/fd/N") where N is a memfd descriptor
3. Cross-domain access violations: Pass memfd between processes to
bypass domain restrictions
These scenarios can occur in sandboxed environments where filesystem
access is restricted but memfd creation remains possible.
IMPLEMENTATION
==============
The implementation adds hierarchical execution control through domain
scoping:
Core Components:
- is_memfd_file(): Reliable memfd detection via "memfd:" dentry prefix
- domain_is_scoped(): Cross-domain hierarchy checking (moved to domain.c)
- LSM hooks: mmap_file, file_mprotect, bprm_creds_for_exec
- Creation-time restrictions: hook_file_alloc_security
Security Matrix:
Execution decisions follow domain hierarchy rules preventing both
same-domain bypass attempts and cross-domain access violations while
preserving legitimate hierarchical access patterns.
Domain Hierarchy with LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC:
===============================================
Root (no domain) - No restrictions
|
+-- Domain A [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 1
| +-- memfd_A (tagged with Domain A as creator)
| |
| +-- Domain A1 (child) [NO SCOPE] Layer 2
| | +-- Inherits Layer 1 restrictions from parent
| | +-- memfd_A1 (can create, inherits restrictions)
| | +-- Domain A1a [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 3
| | +-- memfd_A1a (tagged with Domain A1a)
| |
| +-- Domain A2 (child) [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 2
| +-- memfd_A2 (tagged with Domain A2 as creator)
| +-- CANNOT access memfd_A1 (different subtree)
|
+-- Domain B [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 1
+-- memfd_B (tagged with Domain B as creator)
+-- CANNOT access ANY memfd from Domain A subtree
Execution Decision Matrix:
========================
Executor-> | A | A1 | A1a | A2 | B | Root
Creator | | | | | |
------------|-----|----|-----|----|----|-----
Domain A | X | X | X | X | X | Y
Domain A1 | Y | X | X | X | X | Y
Domain A1a | Y | Y | X | X | X | Y
Domain A2 | Y | X | X | X | X | Y
Domain B | X | X | X | X | X | Y
Root | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y
Legend: Y = Execution allowed, X = Execution denied
Scenarios Covered:
- Direct mmap(PROT_EXEC) on memfd files
- Two-stage mmap(PROT_READ) + mprotect(PROT_EXEC) bypass attempts
- execve("/proc/self/fd/N") anonymous execution
- execveat() and fexecve() file descriptor execution
- Cross-process memfd inheritance and IPC passing
TESTING
=======
All patches have been validated with:
- scripts/checkpatch.pl --strict (clean)
- Selftests covering same-domain restrictions, cross-domain
hierarchy enforcement, and regular file isolation
- KUnit tests for memfd detection edge cases
DISCLAIMER
==========
My understanding of Landlock scoping semantics may be limited, but this
implementation reflects my current understanding based on available
documentation and code analysis. I welcome feedback and corrections
regarding the scoping logic and domain hierarchy enforcement.
Signed-off-by: Abhinav Saxena <xandfury(a)gmail.com>
---
Abhinav Saxena (4):
landlock: add LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC scope
landlock: implement memfd detection
landlock: add memfd exec LSM hooks and scoping
selftests/landlock: add memfd execution tests
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 5 +
security/landlock/.kunitconfig | 1 +
security/landlock/audit.c | 4 +
security/landlock/audit.h | 1 +
security/landlock/cred.c | 14 -
security/landlock/domain.c | 67 ++++
security/landlock/domain.h | 4 +
security/landlock/fs.c | 405 ++++++++++++++++++++-
security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +-
security/landlock/task.c | 67 ----
.../selftests/landlock/scoped_memfd_exec_test.c | 325 +++++++++++++++++
11 files changed, 812 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 5b74b2eff1eeefe43584e5b7b348c8cd3b723d38
change-id: 20250716-memfd-exec-ac0d582018c3
Best regards,
--
Abhinav Saxena <xandfury(a)gmail.com>
Basics and overview
===================
Software with larger attack surfaces (e.g. network facing apps like databases,
browsers or apps relying on browser runtimes) suffer from memory corruption
issues which can be utilized by attackers to bend control flow of the program
to eventually gain control (by making their payload executable). Attackers are
able to perform such attacks by leveraging call-sites which rely on indirect
calls or return sites which rely on obtaining return address from stack memory.
To mitigate such attacks, risc-v extension zicfilp enforces that all indirect
calls must land on a landing pad instruction `lpad` else cpu will raise software
check exception (a new cpu exception cause code on riscv).
Similarly for return flow, risc-v extension zicfiss extends architecture with
- `sspush` instruction to push return address on a shadow stack
- `sspopchk` instruction to pop return address from shadow stack
and compare with input operand (i.e. return address on stack)
- `sspopchk` to raise software check exception if comparision above
was a mismatch
- Protection mechanism using which shadow stack is not writeable via
regular store instructions
More information an details can be found at extensions github repo [1].
Equivalent to landing pad (zicfilp) on x86 is `ENDBRANCH` instruction in Intel
CET [3] and branch target identification (BTI) [4] on arm.
Similarly x86's Intel CET has shadow stack [5] and arm64 has guarded control
stack (GCS) [6] which are very similar to risc-v's zicfiss shadow stack.
x86 and arm64 support for user mode shadow stack is already in mainline.
Kernel awareness for user control flow integrity
================================================
This series picks up Samuel Holland's envcfg changes [2] as well. So if those are
being applied independently, they should be removed from this series.
Enabling:
In order to maintain compatibility and not break anything in user mode, kernel
doesn't enable control flow integrity cpu extensions on binary by default.
Instead exposes a prctl interface to enable, disable and lock the shadow stack
or landing pad feature for a task. This allows userspace (loader) to enumerate
if all objects in its address space are compiled with shadow stack and landing
pad support and accordingly enable the feature. Additionally if a subsequent
`dlopen` happens on a library, user mode can take a decision again to disable
the feature (if incoming library is not compiled with support) OR terminate the
task (if user mode policy is strict to have all objects in address space to be
compiled with control flow integirty cpu feature). prctl to enable shadow stack
results in allocating shadow stack from virtual memory and activating for user
address space. x86 and arm64 are also following same direction due to similar
reason(s).
clone/fork:
On clone and fork, cfi state for task is inherited by child. Shadow stack is
part of virtual memory and is a writeable memory from kernel perspective
(writeable via a restricted set of instructions aka shadow stack instructions)
Thus kernel changes ensure that this memory is converted into read-only when
fork/clone happens and COWed when fault is taken due to sspush, sspopchk or
ssamoswap. In case `CLONE_VM` is specified and shadow stack is to be enabled,
kernel will automatically allocate a shadow stack for that clone call.
map_shadow_stack:
x86 introduced `map_shadow_stack` system call to allow user space to explicitly
map shadow stack memory in its address space. It is useful to allocate shadow
for different contexts managed by a single thread (green threads or contexts)
risc-v implements this system call as well.
signal management:
If shadow stack is enabled for a task, kernel performs an asynchronous control
flow diversion to deliver the signal and eventually expects userspace to issue
sigreturn so that original execution can be resumed. Even though resume context
is prepared by kernel, it is in user space memory and is subject to memory
corruption and corruption bugs can be utilized by attacker in this race window
to perform arbitrary sigreturn and eventually bypass cfi mechanism.
Another issue is how to ensure that cfi related state on sigcontext area is not
trampled by legacy apps or apps compiled with old kernel headers.
In order to mitigate control-flow hijacting, kernel prepares a token and place
it on shadow stack before signal delivery and places address of token in
sigcontext structure. During sigreturn, kernel obtains address of token from
sigcontext struture, reads token from shadow stack and validates it and only
then allow sigreturn to succeed. Compatiblity issue is solved by adopting
dynamic sigcontext management introduced for vector extension. This series
re-factor the code little bit to allow future sigcontext management easy (as
proposed by Andy Chiu from SiFive)
config and compilation:
Introduce a new risc-v config option `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`. Selecting this
config option picks the kernel support for user control flow integrity. This
optin is presented only if toolchain has shadow stack and landing pad support.
And is on purpose guarded by toolchain support. Reason being that eventually
vDSO also needs to be compiled in with shadow stack and landing pad support.
vDSO compile patches are not included as of now because landing pad labeling
scheme is yet to settle for usermode runtime.
To get more information on kernel interactions with respect to
zicfilp and zicfiss, patch series adds documentation for
`zicfilp` and `zicfiss` in following:
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst
How to test this series
=======================
Toolchain
---------
$ git clone git@github.com:sifive/riscv-gnu-toolchain.git -b cfi-dev
$ riscv-gnu-toolchain/configure --prefix=<path-to-where-to-build> --with-arch=rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss --enable-linux --disable-gdb --with-extra-multilib-test="rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss-lp64d:-static"
$ make -j$(nproc)
Qemu
----
Get the lastest qemu
$ cd qemu
$ mkdir build
$ cd build
$ ../configure --target-list=riscv64-softmmu
$ make -j$(nproc)
Opensbi
-------
$ git clone git@github.com:deepak0414/opensbi.git -b v6_cfi_spec_split_opensbi
$ make CROSS_COMPILE=<your riscv toolchain> -j$(nproc) PLATFORM=generic
Linux
-----
Running defconfig is fine. CFI is enabled by default if the toolchain
supports it.
$ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc) defconfig
$ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc)
In case you're building your own rootfs using toolchain, please make sure you
pick following patch to ensure that vDSO compiled with lpad and shadow stack.
"arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad"
Branch where above patch can be picked
https://github.com/deepak0414/linux-riscv-cfi/tree/vdso_user_cfi_v6.12-rc1
Running
-------
Modify your qemu command to have:
-bios <path-to-cfi-opensbi>/build/platform/generic/firmware/fw_dynamic.bin
-cpu rv64,zicfilp=true,zicfiss=true,zimop=true,zcmop=true
vDSO related Opens (in the flux)
=================================
I am listing these opens for laying out plan and what to expect in future
patch sets. And of course for the sake of discussion.
Shadow stack and landing pad enabling in vDSO
----------------------------------------------
vDSO must have shadow stack and landing pad support compiled in for task
to have shadow stack and landing pad support. This patch series doesn't
enable that (yet). Enabling shadow stack support in vDSO should be
straight forward (intend to do that in next versions of patch set). Enabling
landing pad support in vDSO requires some collaboration with toolchain folks
to follow a single label scheme for all object binaries. This is necessary to
ensure that all indirect call-sites are setting correct label and target landing
pads are decorated with same label scheme.
How many vDSOs
---------------
Shadow stack instructions are carved out of zimop (may be operations) and if CPU
doesn't implement zimop, they're illegal instructions. Kernel could be running on
a CPU which may or may not implement zimop. And thus kernel will have to carry 2
different vDSOs and expose the appropriate one depending on whether CPU implements
zimop or not.
References
==========
[1] - https://github.com/riscv/riscv-cfi
[2] - https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240814081126.956287-1-samuel.holland@sifive.c…
[3] - https://lwn.net/Articles/889475/
[4] - https://developer.arm.com/documentation/109576/0100/Branch-Target-Identific…
[5] - https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/catc17-i…
[6] - https://lwn.net/Articles/940403/
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com>
To: x86(a)kernel.org
To: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
To: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)oracle.com>
To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
To: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
To: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley(a)sifive.com>
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To: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
To: Conor Dooley <conor+dt(a)kernel.org>
To: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
To: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor(a)gmail.com>
To: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng(a)gmail.com>
To: Gary Guo <gary(a)garyguo.net>
To: Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh(a)protonmail.com>
To: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me>
To: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg(a)kernel.org>
To: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>
To: Trevor Gross <tmgross(a)umich.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org
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changelog
---------
v19:
- riscv_nousercfi was `int`. changed it to unsigned long.
Thanks to Alex Ghiti for reporting it. It was a bug.
- ELP is cleared on trap entry only when CONFIG_64BIT.
- restore ssp back on return to usermode was being done
before `riscv_v_context_nesting_end` on trap exit path.
If kernel shadow stack were enabled this would result in
kernel operating on user shadow stack and panic (as I found
in my testing of kcfi patch series). So fixed that.
v18:
- rebased on 6.16-rc1
- uprobe handling clears ELP in sstatus image in pt_regs
- vdso was missing shadow stack elf note for object files.
added that. Additional asm file for vdso needed the elf marker
flag. toolchain should complain if `-fcf-protection=full` and
marker is missing for object generated from asm file. Asked
toolchain folks to fix this. Although no reason to gate the merge
on that.
- Split up compile options for march and fcf-protection in vdso
Makefile
- CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI option is moved under "Kernel features" menu
Added `arch/riscv/configs/hardening.config` fragment which selects
CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI
v17:
- fixed warnings due to empty macros in usercfi.h (reported by alexg)
- fixed prefixes in commit titles reported by alexg
- took below uprobe with fcfi v2 patch from Zong Li and squashed it with
"riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception and uprobe handling"
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250604093403.10916-1-zong.li@sifive.com/
v16:
- If FWFT is not implemented or returns error for shadow stack activation, then
no_usercfi is set to disable shadow stack. Although this should be picked up
by extension validation and activation. Fixed this bug for zicfilp and zicfiss
both. Thanks to Charlie Jenkins for reporting this.
- If toolchain doesn't support cfi, cfi kselftest shouldn't build. Suggested by
Charlie Jenkins.
- Default for CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI is set to no. Charlie/Atish suggested to
keep it off till we have more hardware availibility with RVA23 profile and
zimop/zcmop implemented. Else this will start breaking people's workflow
- Includes the fix if "!RV64 and !SBI" then definitions for FWFT in
asm-offsets.c error.
v15:
- Toolchain has been updated to include `-fcf-protection` flag. This
exists for x86 as well. Updated kernel patches to compile vDSO and
selftest to compile with `fcf-protection=full` flag.
- selecting CONFIG_RISCV_USERCFI selects CONFIG_RISCV_SBI.
- Patch to enable shadow stack for kernel wasn't hidden behind
CONFIG_RISCV_USERCFI and CONFIG_RISCV_SBI. fixed that.
v14:
- rebased on top of palmer/sbi-v3. Thus dropped clement's FWFT patches
Updated RISCV_ISA_EXT_XXXX in hwcap and hwprobe constants.
- Took Radim's suggestions on bitfields.
- Placed cfi_state at the end of thread_info block so that current situation
is not disturbed with respect to member fields of thread_info in single
cacheline.
v13:
- cpu_supports_shadow_stack/cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr uses
riscv_has_extension_unlikely()
- uses nops(count) to create nop slide
- RISCV_ACQUIRE_BARRIER is not needed in `amo_user_shstk`. Removed it
- changed ternaries to simply use implicit casting to convert to bool.
- kernel command line allows to disable zicfilp and zicfiss independently.
updated kernel-parameters.txt.
- ptrace user abi for cfi uses bitmasks instead of bitfields. Added ptrace
kselftest.
- cosmetic and grammatical changes to documentation.
v12:
- It seems like I had accidently squashed arch agnostic indirect branch
tracking prctl and riscv implementation of those prctls. Split them again.
- set_shstk_status/set_indir_lp_status perform CSR writes only when CPU
support is available. As suggested by Zong Li.
- Some minor clean up in kselftests as suggested by Zong Li.
v11:
- patch "arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad" was unconditionally
selecting `_zicfilp` for vDSO compile. fixed that. Changed `lpad 1` to
to `lpad 0`.
v10:
- dropped "mm: helper `is_shadow_stack_vma` to check shadow stack vma". This patch
is not that interesting to this patch series for risc-v. There are instances in
arch directories where VM_SHADOW_STACK flag is anyways used. Dropping this patch
to expedite merging in riscv tree.
- Took suggestions from `Clement` on "riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration" to
validate presence of cfi based on config.
- Added a patch for vDSO to have `lpad 0`. I had omitted this earlier to make sure
we add single vdso object with cfi enabled. But a vdso object with scheme of
zero labeled landing pad is least common denominator and should work with all
objects of zero labeled as well as function-signature labeled objects.
v9:
- rebased on master (39a803b754d5 fix braino in "9p: fix ->rename_sem exclusion")
- dropped "mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK" (master has it from arm64/gcs)
- dropped "prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack" (master has it from arm64/gcs)
v8:
- rebased on palmer/for-next
- dropped samuel holland's `envcfg` context switch patches.
they are in parlmer/for-next
v7:
- Removed "riscv/Kconfig: enable HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for riscv"
Instead using `deactivate_mm` flow to clean up.
see here for more context
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230908203655.543765-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.…
- Changed the header include in `kselftest`. Hopefully this fixes compile
issue faced by Zong Li at SiFive.
- Cleaned up an orphaned change to `mm/mmap.c` in below patch
"riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE"
- Lock interfaces for shadow stack and indirect branch tracking expect arg == 0
Any future evolution of this interface should accordingly define how arg should
be setup.
- `mm/map.c` has an instance of using `VM_SHADOW_STACK`. Fixed it to use helper
`is_shadow_stack_vma`.
- Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008-v5_user_cfi_series-v6-0-60d9fe073f37@riv…
v6:
- Picked up Samuel Holland's changes as is with `envcfg` placed in
`thread` instead of `thread_info`
- fixed unaligned newline escapes in kselftest
- cleaned up messages in kselftest and included test output in commit message
- fixed a bug in clone path reported by Zong Li
- fixed a build issue if CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_V is not selected
(this was introduced due to re-factoring signal context
management code)
v5:
- rebased on v6.12-rc1
- Fixed schema related issues in device tree file
- Fixed some of the documentation related issues in zicfilp/ss.rst
(style issues and added index)
- added `SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER` so that implementation can define base
of shadow stack.
- Fixed warnings on definitions added in usercfi.h when
CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI is not selected.
- Adopted context header based signal handling as proposed by Andy Chiu
- Added support for enabling kernel mode access to shadow stack using
FWFT
(https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-sbi-doc/blob/master/src/ext-firmware…)
- Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001-v5_user_cfi_series-v1-0-3ba65b6e550f@riv…
(Note: I had an issue in my workflow due to which version number wasn't
picked up correctly while sending out patches)
v4:
- rebased on 6.11-rc6
- envcfg: Converged with Samuel Holland's patches for envcfg management on per-
thread basis.
- vma_is_shadow_stack is renamed to is_vma_shadow_stack
- picked up Mark Brown's `ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK` patch
- signal context: using extended context management to maintain compatibility.
- fixed `-Wmissing-prototypes` compiler warnings for prctl functions
- Documentation fixes and amending typos.
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240912231650.3740732-1-debug@rivosinc.com/
v3:
- envcfg
logic to pick up base envcfg had a bug where `ENVCFG_CBZE` could have been
picked on per task basis, even though CPU didn't implement it. Fixed in
this series.
- dt-bindings
As suggested, split into separate commit. fixed the messaging that spec is
in public review
- arch_is_shadow_stack change
arch_is_shadow_stack changed to vma_is_shadow_stack
- hwprobe
zicfiss / zicfilp if present will get enumerated in hwprobe
- selftests
As suggested, added object and binary filenames to .gitignore
Selftest binary anyways need to be compiled with cfi enabled compiler which
will make sure that landing pad and shadow stack are enabled. Thus removed
separate enable/disable tests. Cleaned up tests a bit.
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240403234054.2020347-1-debug@rivosinc.com/
v2:
- Using config `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`, kernel support for riscv control flow
integrity for user mode programs can be compiled in the kernel.
- Enabling of control flow integrity for user programs is left to user runtime
- This patch series introduces arch agnostic `prctls` to enable shadow stack
and indirect branch tracking. And implements them on riscv.
---
Changes in v19:
- Link to v18: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250711-v5_user_cfi_series-v18-0-a8ee62f9f38e@ri…
Changes in v18:
- Link to v17: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250604-v5_user_cfi_series-v17-0-4565c2cf869f@ri…
Changes in v17:
- Link to v16: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250522-v5_user_cfi_series-v16-0-64f61a35eee7@ri…
Changes in v16:
- Link to v15: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502-v5_user_cfi_series-v15-0-914966471885@ri…
Changes in v15:
- changelog posted just below cover letter
- Link to v14: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250429-v5_user_cfi_series-v14-0-5239410d012a@ri…
Changes in v14:
- changelog posted just below cover letter
- Link to v13: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250424-v5_user_cfi_series-v13-0-971437de586a@ri…
Changes in v13:
- changelog posted just below cover letter
- Link to v12: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250314-v5_user_cfi_series-v12-0-e51202b53138@ri…
Changes in v12:
- changelog posted just below cover letter
- Link to v11: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310-v5_user_cfi_series-v11-0-86b36cbfb910@ri…
Changes in v11:
- changelog posted just below cover letter
- Link to v10: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210-v5_user_cfi_series-v10-0-163dcfa31c60@ri…
---
Andy Chiu (1):
riscv: signal: abstract header saving for setup_sigcontext
Deepak Gupta (25):
mm: VM_SHADOW_STACK definition for riscv
dt-bindings: riscv: zicfilp and zicfiss in dt-bindings (extensions.yaml)
riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration
riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions
riscv: usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exit
riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE
riscv/mm: manufacture shadow stack pte
riscv/mm: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs
riscv/mm: write protect and shadow stack
riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall
riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone
riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls
prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for indirect branch tracking
riscv: Implements arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctls
riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception and uprobe handling
riscv/signal: save and restore of shadow stack for signal
riscv/kernel: update __show_regs to print shadow stack register
riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files
riscv/hwprobe: zicfilp / zicfiss enumeration in hwprobe
riscv: kernel command line option to opt out of user cfi
riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call
riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support
riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking
riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv
kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi
Jim Shu (1):
arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad and shadow stack note
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +
Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst | 2 +
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst | 115 +++++
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst | 179 +++++++
.../devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml | 14 +
arch/riscv/Kconfig | 21 +
arch/riscv/Makefile | 5 +-
arch/riscv/configs/hardening.config | 4 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 1 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/assembler.h | 44 ++
arch/riscv/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 12 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h | 16 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/entry-common.h | 2 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h | 2 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h | 26 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 7 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 30 +-
arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h | 3 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 95 ++++
arch/riscv/include/asm/vector.h | 3 +
arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/hwprobe.h | 2 +
arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 34 ++
arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 1 +
arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 10 +
arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c | 27 +
arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 38 ++
arch/riscv/kernel/head.S | 27 +
arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 27 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 95 ++++
arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c | 148 +++++-
arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c | 2 +
arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c | 10 +
arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c | 54 ++
arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 545 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile | 11 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S | 4 +
arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/getcpu.S | 4 +
arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/rt_sigreturn.S | 4 +
arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/sys_hwprobe.S | 4 +
arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S | 5 +-
arch/riscv/mm/init.c | 2 +-
arch/riscv/mm/pgtable.c | 16 +
include/linux/cpu.h | 4 +
include/linux/mm.h | 7 +
include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 2 +
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 27 +
kernel/sys.c | 30 ++
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/Makefile | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/.gitignore | 3 +
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/Makefile | 16 +
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/cfi_rv_test.h | 82 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/riscv_cfi_test.c | 173 +++++++
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.c | 385 +++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.h | 27 +
56 files changed, 2389 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: a2a05801de77ca5122fc34e3eb84d6359ef70389
change-id: 20240930-v5_user_cfi_series-3dc332f8f5b2
--
- debug
This series introduces NUMA-aware memory placement support for KVM guests
with guest_memfd memory backends. It builds upon Fuad Tabba's work (V17)
that enabled host-mapping for guest_memfd memory [1] and can be applied
directly applied on KVM tree [2] (branch kvm-next, base commit: a6ad5413,
Merge branch 'guest-memfd-mmap' into HEAD)
== Background ==
KVM's guest-memfd memory backend currently lacks support for NUMA policy
enforcement, causing guest memory allocations to be distributed across host
nodes according to kernel's default behavior, irrespective of any policy
specified by the VMM. This limitation arises because conventional userspace
NUMA control mechanisms like mbind(2) don't work since the memory isn't
directly mapped to userspace when allocations occur.
Fuad's work [1] provides the necessary mmap capability, and this series
leverages it to enable mbind(2).
== Implementation ==
This series implements proper NUMA policy support for guest-memfd by:
1. Adding mempolicy-aware allocation APIs to the filemap layer.
2. Introducing custom inodes (via a dedicated slab-allocated inode cache,
kvm_gmem_inode_info) to store NUMA policy and metadata for guest memory.
3. Implementing get/set_policy vm_ops in guest_memfd to support NUMA
policy.
With these changes, VMMs can now control guest memory placement by mapping
guest_memfd file descriptor and using mbind(2) to specify:
- Policy modes: default, bind, interleave, or preferred
- Host NUMA nodes: List of target nodes for memory allocation
These Policies affect only future allocations and do not migrate existing
memory. This matches mbind(2)'s default behavior which affects only new
allocations unless overridden with MPOL_MF_MOVE/MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL flags (Not
supported for guest_memfd as it is unmovable by design).
== Upstream Plan ==
Phased approach as per David's guest_memfd extension overview [3] and
community calls [4]:
Phase 1 (this series):
1. Focuses on shared guest_memfd support (non-CoCo VMs).
2. Builds on Fuad's host-mapping work [1].
Phase2 (future work):
1. NUMA support for private guest_memfd (CoCo VMs).
2. Depends on SNP in-place conversion support [5].
This series provides a clean integration path for NUMA-aware memory
management for guest_memfd and lays the groundwork for future confidential
computing NUMA capabilities.
Thanks,
Shivank
== Changelog ==
- v1,v2: Extended the KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD IOCTL to pass mempolicy.
- v3: Introduced fbind() syscall for VMM memory-placement configuration.
- v4-v6: Current approach using shared_policy support and vm_ops (based on
suggestions from David [6] and guest_memfd bi-weekly upstream
call discussion [7]).
- v7: Use inodes to store NUMA policy instead of file [8].
- v8: Rebase on top of Fuad's V12: Host mmaping for guest_memfd memory.
- v9: Rebase on top of Fuad's V13 and incorporate review comments
- V10: Rebase on top of Fuad's V17. Use latest guest_memfd inode patch
from Ackerley (with David's review comments). Use newer kmem_cache_create()
API variant with arg parameter (Vlastimil)
- V11: Rebase on kvm-next, remove RFC tag, use Ackerley's latest patch
and fix a rcu race bug during kvm module unload.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250729225455.670324-1-seanjc@google.com
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm.git/log/?h=next
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/c1c9591d-218a-495c-957b-ba356c8f8e09@redhat.com
[4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M6766BzdY1Lhk7LiR5IqVR8B8mG3cr-cxTxOrAo…
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250613005400.3694904-1-michael.roth@amd.com
[6] https://lore.kernel.org/all/6fbef654-36e2-4be5-906e-2a648a845278@redhat.com
[7] https://lore.kernel.org/all/2b77e055-98ac-43a1-a7ad-9f9065d7f38f@amd.com
[8] https://lore.kernel.org/all/diqzbjumm167.fsf@ackerleytng-ctop.c.googlers.com
Ackerley Tng (1):
KVM: guest_memfd: Use guest mem inodes instead of anonymous inodes
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) (2):
mm/filemap: Add NUMA mempolicy support to filemap_alloc_folio()
mm/filemap: Extend __filemap_get_folio() to support NUMA memory
policies
Shivank Garg (4):
mm/mempolicy: Export memory policy symbols
KVM: guest_memfd: Add slab-allocated inode cache
KVM: guest_memfd: Enforce NUMA mempolicy using shared policy
KVM: guest_memfd: selftests: Add tests for mmap and NUMA policy
support
fs/bcachefs/fs-io-buffered.c | 2 +-
fs/btrfs/compression.c | 4 +-
fs/btrfs/verity.c | 2 +-
fs/erofs/zdata.c | 2 +-
fs/f2fs/compress.c | 2 +-
include/linux/pagemap.h | 18 +-
include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 +
mm/filemap.c | 23 +-
mm/mempolicy.c | 6 +
mm/readahead.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 1 +
.../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 121 ++++++++
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 262 ++++++++++++++++--
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 7 +-
virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h | 9 +-
15 files changed, 412 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
---
== Earlier Postings ==
v10: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250811090605.16057-2-shivankg@amd.com
v9: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250713174339.13981-2-shivankg@amd.com
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250618112935.7629-1-shivankg@amd.com
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250408112402.181574-1-shivankg@amd.com
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250226082549.6034-1-shivankg@amd.com
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250219101559.414878-1-shivankg@amd.com
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250210063227.41125-1-shivankg@amd.com
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241105164549.154700-1-shivankg@amd.com
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240919094438.10987-1-shivankg@amd.com
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240916165743.201087-1-shivankg@amd.com
This is series 2a/5 of the migration to `core::ffi::CStr`[0].
20250704-core-cstr-prepare-v1-0-a91524037783(a)gmail.com.
This series depends on the prior series[0] and is intended to go through
the rust tree to reduce the number of release cycles required to
complete the work.
Subsystem maintainers: I would appreciate your `Acked-by`s so that this
can be taken through Miguel's tree (where the other series must go).
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250704-core-cstr-prepare-v1-0-a91524037783@gm…
Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird(a)gmail.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Add a patch to address new code in device.rs.
- Drop incorrectly applied Acked-by tags from Danilo.
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250719-core-cstr-fanout-1-v2-0-1ab5ba189c6e@gma…
Changes in v2:
- Rebase on rust-next.
- Drop pin-init patch, which is no longer needed.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250709-core-cstr-fanout-1-v1-0-64308e7203fc@gma…
---
Tamir Duberstein (9):
gpu: nova-core: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}`
rust: alloc: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}`
rust: block: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}`
rust: device: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}`
rust: file: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}`
rust: kunit: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}`
rust: seq_file: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}`
rust: sync: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}`
rust: device: use `kernel::{fmt,prelude::fmt!}`
drivers/block/rnull.rs | 2 +-
drivers/gpu/nova-core/gpu.rs | 3 +--
drivers/gpu/nova-core/regs/macros.rs | 6 +++---
rust/kernel/alloc/kbox.rs | 2 +-
rust/kernel/alloc/kvec.rs | 2 +-
rust/kernel/alloc/kvec/errors.rs | 2 +-
rust/kernel/block/mq.rs | 2 +-
rust/kernel/block/mq/gen_disk.rs | 2 +-
rust/kernel/block/mq/raw_writer.rs | 3 +--
rust/kernel/device.rs | 6 +++---
rust/kernel/device/property.rs | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
rust/kernel/fs/file.rs | 5 +++--
rust/kernel/kunit.rs | 8 ++++----
rust/kernel/seq_file.rs | 6 +++---
rust/kernel/sync/arc.rs | 2 +-
scripts/rustdoc_test_gen.rs | 2 +-
16 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 8f5ae30d69d7543eee0d70083daf4de8fe15d585
change-id: 20250709-core-cstr-fanout-1-f20611832272
Best regards,
--
Tamir Duberstein <tamird(a)gmail.com>
Hi,
While staring at epoll, I noticed ep_events_available() looks wrong. I
wrote a small program to confirm, and yes it is definitely wrong.
This series adds a reproducer to kselftest, and fix the bug.
Nam Cao (2):
selftests/eventpoll: Add test for multiple waiters
eventpoll: Fix epoll_wait() report false negative
fs/eventpoll.c | 16 +------
.../filesystems/epoll/epoll_wakeup_test.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--
2.39.5
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu(a)google.com>
Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfd have always had their
execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting
it differently.
However, in a secure by default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all
executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by Verified
boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass
and enables “confused deputy attack”. E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm
process created a memfd to share the content with an external process,
however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code
and root escalation. [2] lists more VRP in this kind.
On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use, runc uses memfd’s
seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then
execute them, for such system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's
use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3].
To address those above, this set of patches add following:
1> Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time.
2> Let memfd to be sealed for modifying X bit.
3> A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control the behavior of
X bit.For example, if a container has vm.memfd_noexec=2, then
memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected.
4> A new security hook in memfd_create(). This make it possible to a new
LSM, which rejects or allows executable memfd based on its security policy.
Change history:
v7:
- patch 2/6: remove #ifdef and MAX_PATH (memfd_test.c).
- patch 3/6: check capability (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) from userns instead of
global ns (pid_sysctl.h). Add a tab (pid_namespace.h).
- patch 5/6: remove #ifdef (memfd_test.c)
- patch 6/6: remove unneeded security_move_mount(security.c).
v6:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221206150233.1963717-1-jeffxu@google.com/
- Address comment and move "#ifdef CONFIG_" from .c file to pid_sysctl.h
v5:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221206152358.1966099-1-jeffxu@google.com/
- Pass vm.memfd_noexec from current ns to child ns.
- Fix build issue detected by kernel test robot.
- Add missing security.c
v3:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221202013404.163143-1-jeffxu@google.com/
- Address API design comments in v2.
- Let memfd_create() to set X bit at creation time.
- A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control behavior of X bit.
- A new security hook in memfd_create().
v2:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220805222126.142525-1-jeffxu@google.com/
- address comments in V1.
- add sysctl (vm.mfd_noexec) to set the default file permissions of
memfd_create to be non-executable.
v1:https://lwn.net/Articles/890096/
[1] https://crbug.com/1305411
[2] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=type%3Dbug-security%20me…
[3] https://lwn.net/Articles/781013/
Daniel Verkamp (2):
mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC
selftests/memfd: add tests for F_SEAL_EXEC
Jeff Xu (4):
mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC
mm/memfd: Add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd
selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC
mm/memfd: security hook for memfd_create
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 +
include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 19 ++
include/linux/security.h | 6 +
include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 4 +
kernel/pid_namespace.c | 5 +
kernel/pid_sysctl.h | 59 ++++
mm/memfd.c | 61 +++-
mm/shmem.c | 6 +
security/security.c | 5 +
tools/testing/selftests/memfd/fuse_test.c | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 341 ++++++++++++++++++++-
13 files changed, 510 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 kernel/pid_sysctl.h
base-commit: eb7081409f94a9a8608593d0fb63a1aa3d6f95d8
--
2.39.0.rc1.256.g54fd8350bd-goog
Add a README file for RISC-V specific kernel selftests under
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/. This mirrors the existing README
for arm64, providing clear guidance on how the tests are architecture
specific and skipped on non-riscv systems. It also includes
standard make commands for building, running and installing the
tests, along with a reference to general kselftest documentation.
Signed-off-by: Bala-Vignesh-Reddy <reddybalavignesh9979(a)gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/README | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/riscv/README
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/README b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/README
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..443da395da68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/README
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+KSelfTest RISC-V
+================
+
+- These tests are riscv specific and so not built or run but just skipped
+ completely when env-variable ARCH is found to be different than 'riscv'.
+
+- Holding true the above, RISC-V KSFT tests can be run within the
+ KSelfTest framework using standard Linux top-level-makefile targets:
+
+ $ make TARGETS=riscv kselftest-clean
+ $ make TARGETS=riscv kselftest
+
+ or
+
+ $ make -C tools/testing/selftests TARGETS=riscv \
+ INSTALL_PATH=<your-installation-path> install
+
+ or, alternatively, only specific riscv/ subtargets can be picked:
+
+ $ make -C tools/testing/selftests TARGETS=riscv RISCV_SUBTARGETS="mm vector" \
+ INSTALL_PATH=<your-installation-path> install
+
+ Further details on building and running KSFT can be found in:
+ Documentation/dev-tools/kselftest.rst
--
2.43.0
Currently it is not possible to disable streaming mode via ptrace on SME
only systems, the interface for doing this is to write via NT_ARM_SVE but
such writes will be rejected on a system without SVE support. Enable this
functionality by allowing userspace to write SVE_PT_REGS_FPSIMD format data
via NT_ARM_SVE with the vector length set to 0 on SME only systems. Such
writes currently error since we require that a vector length is specified
which should minimise the risk that existing software is relying on current
behaviour.
Reads are not supported since I am not aware of any use case for this and
there is some risk that an existing userspace application may be confused if
it reads NT_ARM_SVE on a system without SVE. Existing kernels will return
FPSIMD formatted register state from NT_ARM_SVE if full SVE state is not
stored, for example if the task has not used SVE. Returning a vector length
of 0 would create a risk that software could try to do things like allocate
space for register state with zero sizes, while returning a vector length of
128 bits would look like SVE is supported. It seems safer to just not make
the changes to add read support.
It remains possible for userspace to detect a SME only system via the ptrace
interface only since reads of NT_ARM_SSVE and NT_ARM_ZA will suceed while
reads of NT_ARM_SVE will fail. Read/write access to the FPSIMD registers in
non-streaming mode is available via REGSET_FPR.
The aim is is to make a minimally invasive change, no operation that would
previously have succeeded will be affected, and we use a previously defined
interface in new circumstances rather than define completely new ABI.
The series starts with some enhancements to sve-ptrace to cover some
further corners of existing behaviours in order to reduce the risk of
inadvertent changes, implements the proposed new ABI, then extends both
sve-ptrace and fp-ptrace to exercise it.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
---
Mark Brown (5):
kselftest/arm64: Verify that we reject out of bounds VLs in sve-ptrace
kselftest/arm64: Check that unsupported regsets fail in sve-ptrace
arm64/sme: Support disabling streaming mode via ptrace on SME only systems
kselftst/arm64: Test NT_ARM_SVE FPSIMD format writes on non-SVE systems
kselftest/arm64: Cover disabling streaming mode without SVE in fp-ptrace
Documentation/arch/arm64/sve.rst | 5 +
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 40 ++++++--
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/fp-ptrace.c | 5 +-
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/sve-ptrace.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 177 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 768361ab16ce943ef3577cea204dc81aa4a47517
change-id: 20250717-arm64-sme-ptrace-sme-only-1fb850600ea0
prerequisite-change-id: 20250808-arm64-fp-trace-macro-02ede083da51
Best regards,
--
Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
From: Yicong Yang <yangyicong(a)hisilicon.com>
Armv8.7 introduces single-copy atomic 64-byte loads and stores
instructions and its variants named under FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V}.
Add support for Armv8.7 FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V}:
- Add identifying and enabling in the cpufeature list
- Expose the support of these features to userspace through HWCAP3
and cpuinfo
- Add related hwcap test
- Handle the trap of unsupported memory (normal/uncacheable) access in a VM
A real scenario for this feature is that the userspace driver can make use of
this to implement direct WQE (workqueue entry) - a mechanism to fill WQE
directly into the hardware.
Picked Marc's 2 patches form [1] for handling the LS64 trap in a VM on emulated
MMIO and the introduce of KVM_EXIT_ARM_LDST64B.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20240815125959.2097734-1-maz@kerne…
Tested with updated hwcap test:
[root@localhost tmp]# dmesg | grep "All CPU(s) started"
[ 14.789859] CPU: All CPU(s) started at EL2
[root@localhost tmp]# ./hwcap
# LS64 present
ok 217 cpuinfo_match_LS64
ok 218 sigill_LS64
ok 219 # SKIP sigbus_LS64_V
# LS64_V present
ok 220 cpuinfo_match_LS64_V
ok 221 sigill_LS64_V
ok 222 # SKIP sigbus_LS64_V
# 115 skipped test(s) detected. Consider enabling relevant config options to improve coverage.
# Totals: pass:107 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:115 error:0
root@localhost:/mnt# dmesg | grep "All CPU(s) started"
[ 0.281152] CPU: All CPU(s) started at EL1
root@localhost:/mnt# ./hwcap
# LS64 present
ok 217 cpuinfo_match_LS64
ok 218 sigill_LS64
ok 219 # SKIP sigbus_LS64
# LS64_V present
ok 220 cpuinfo_match_LS64_V
ok 221 sigill_LS64_V
ok 222 # SKIP sigbus_LS64_V
# 115 skipped test(s) detected. Consider enabling relevant config options to improve coverage.
# Totals: pass:107 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:115 error:0
Change since v3:
- Inject DABT fault for LS64 fault on unsupported memory but with valid memslot
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20250626080906.64230-1-yangyicong@…
Change since v2:
- Handle the LS64 fault to userspace and allow userspace to inject LS64 fault
- Reorder the patches to make KVM handling prior to feature support
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20250331094320.35226-1-yangyicong@…
Change since v1:
- Drop the support for LS64_ACCDATA
- handle the DABT of unsupported memory type after checking the memory attributes
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20241202135504.14252-1-yangyicong@…
Marc Zyngier (2):
KVM: arm64: Add exit to userspace on {LD,ST}64B* outside of memslots
KVM: arm64: Add documentation for KVM_EXIT_ARM_LDST64B
Yicong Yang (5):
KVM: arm64: Handle DABT caused by LS64* instructions on unsupported
memory
arm64: Provide basic EL2 setup for FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V} usage at EL0/1
arm64: Add support for FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V}
KVM: arm64: Enable FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V} in the supported guest
kselftest/arm64: Add HWCAP test for FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V}
Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 12 +++
Documentation/arch/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst | 6 ++
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 43 +++++++++--
arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h | 12 ++-
arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 8 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 2 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 7 ++
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 2 +
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 51 +++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 2 +
arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c | 29 ++++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c | 27 ++++++-
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 14 +++-
arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps | 2 +
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 3 +-
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++
16 files changed, 299 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--
2.24.0