September 2025 - Linux-kselftest-mirror

[PATCH v12] exec: Fix dead-lock in de_thread with ptrace_attach

by Bernd Edlinger

This introduces signal->exec_bprm, which is used to fix the case when at least one of the sibling threads is traced, and therefore the trace process may dead-lock in ptrace_attach, but de_thread will need to wait for the tracer to continue execution. The solution is to detect this situation and allow ptrace_attach to continue by temporarily releasing the cred_guard_mutex, while de_thread() is still waiting for traced zombies to be eventually released by the tracer. In the case of the thread group leader we only have to wait for the thread to become a zombie, which may also need co-operation from the tracer due to PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT. When a tracer wants to ptrace_attach a task that already is in execve, we simply retry the ptrace_may_access check while temporarily installing the new credentials and dumpability which are about to be used after execve completes. If the ptrace_attach happens on a thread that is a sibling-thread of the thread doing execve, it is sufficient to check against the old credentials, as this thread will be waited for, before the new credentials are installed. Other threads die quickly since the cred_guard_mutex is released, but a deadly signal is already pending. In case the mutex_lock_killable misses the signal, the non-zero current->signal->exec_bprm makes sure they release the mutex immediately and return with -ERESTARTNOINTR. This means there is no API change, unlike the previous version of this patch which was discussed here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b6537ae6-31b1-5c50-f32b-8b8332ace882@hotmail.d… See tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c for a test case that gets fixed by this change. Note that since the test case was originally designed to test the ptrace_attach returning an error in this situation, the test expectation needed to be adjusted, to allow the API to succeed at the first attempt. Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger(a)hotmail.de> --- fs/exec.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++------- fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++ include/linux/cred.h | 1 + include/linux/sched/signal.h | 18 ++++++ kernel/cred.c | 28 +++++++-- kernel/ptrace.c | 32 +++++++++++ kernel/seccomp.c | 12 +++- tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c | 23 +++++--- 8 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) v10: Changes to previous version, make the PTRACE_ATTACH retun -EAGAIN, instead of execve return -ERESTARTSYS. Added some lessions learned to the description. v11: Check old and new credentials in PTRACE_ATTACH again without changing the API. Note: I got actually one response from an automatic checker to the v11 patch, https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202107121344.wu68hEPF-lkp@intel.com/ which is complaining about: >> kernel/ptrace.c:425:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) @@ expected struct cred const *old_cred @@ got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *real_cred @@ 417 struct linux_binprm *bprm = task->signal->exec_bprm; 418 const struct cred *old_cred; 419 struct mm_struct *old_mm; 420 421 retval = down_write_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); 422 if (retval) 423 goto unlock_creds; 424 task_lock(task); > 425 old_cred = task->real_cred; v12: Essentially identical to v11. - Fixed a minor merge conflict in linux v5.17, and fixed the above mentioned nit by adding __rcu to the declaration. - re-tested the patch with all linux versions from v5.11 to v6.6 v10 was an alternative approach which did imply an API change. But I would prefer to avoid such an API change. The difficult part is getting the right dumpability flags assigned before de_thread starts, hope you like this version. If not, the v10 is of course also acceptable. Thanks Bernd. diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 2f2b0acec4f0..902d3b230485 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1041,11 +1041,13 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) return 0; } -static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) +static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal; struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand; spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock; + struct task_struct *t = tsk; + bool unsafe_execve_in_progress = false; if (thread_group_empty(tsk)) goto no_thread_group; @@ -1068,6 +1070,19 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) sig->notify_count--; + while_each_thread(tsk, t) { + if (unlikely(t->ptrace) + && (t != tsk->group_leader || !t->exit_state)) + unsafe_execve_in_progress = true; + } + + if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) { + spin_unlock_irq(lock); + sig->exec_bprm = bprm; + mutex_unlock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); + spin_lock_irq(lock); + } + while (sig->notify_count) { __set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE); spin_unlock_irq(lock); @@ -1158,6 +1173,11 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) release_task(leader); } + if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) { + mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); + sig->exec_bprm = NULL; + } + sig->group_exec_task = NULL; sig->notify_count = 0; @@ -1169,6 +1189,11 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) return 0; killed: + if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) { + mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); + sig->exec_bprm = NULL; + } + /* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); sig->group_exec_task = NULL; @@ -1253,6 +1278,24 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) if (retval) return retval; + /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */ + would_dump(bprm, bprm->file); + if (bprm->have_execfd) + would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable); + + /* + * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current + * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing + * bprm->secureexec instead. + */ + if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP || + is_dumpability_changed(current_cred(), bprm->cred) || + !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && + gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))) + set_dumpable(bprm->mm, suid_dumpable); + else + set_dumpable(bprm->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER); + /* * Ensure all future errors are fatal. */ @@ -1261,7 +1304,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) /* * Make this the only thread in the thread group. */ - retval = de_thread(me); + retval = de_thread(me, bprm); if (retval) goto out; @@ -1284,11 +1327,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) if (retval) goto out; - /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */ - would_dump(bprm, bprm->file); - if (bprm->have_execfd) - would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable); - /* * Release all of the old mmap stuff */ @@ -1350,18 +1388,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0; - /* - * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current - * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing - * bprm->secureexec instead. - */ - if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP || - !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && - gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))) - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); - else - set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER); - perf_event_exec(); __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true); @@ -1480,6 +1506,11 @@ static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) return -ERESTARTNOINTR; + if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + return -ERESTARTNOINTR; + } + bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds(); if (likely(bprm->cred)) return 0; diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index ffd54617c354..0da9adfadb48 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -2788,6 +2788,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, if (rv < 0) goto out_free; + if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + rv = -ERESTARTNOINTR; + goto out_free; + } + rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm, file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, count); diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index f923528d5cc4..b01e309f5686 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ extern const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *); extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void); extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void); extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void); +extern bool is_dumpability_changed(const struct cred *, const struct cred *); extern int commit_creds(struct cred *); extern void abort_creds(struct cred *); extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *); diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h index 0014d3adaf84..14df7073a0a8 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h +++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h @@ -234,9 +234,27 @@ struct signal_struct { struct mm_struct *oom_mm; /* recorded mm when the thread group got * killed by the oom killer */ + struct linux_binprm *exec_bprm; /* Used to check ptrace_may_access + * against new credentials while + * de_thread is waiting for other + * traced threads to terminate. + * Set while de_thread is executing. + * The cred_guard_mutex is released + * after de_thread() has called + * zap_other_threads(), therefore + * a fatal signal is guaranteed to be + * already pending in the unlikely + * event, that + * current->signal->exec_bprm happens + * to be non-zero after the + * cred_guard_mutex was acquired. + */ + struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on * credential calculations * (notably. ptrace) + * Held while execve runs, except when + * a sibling thread is being traced. * Deprecated do not use in new code. * Use exec_update_lock instead. */ diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index 98cb4eca23fb..586cb6c7cf6b 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -433,6 +433,28 @@ static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset) return false; } +/** + * is_dumpability_changed - Will changing creds from old to new + * affect the dumpability in commit_creds? + * + * Return: false - dumpability will not be changed in commit_creds. + * Return: true - dumpability will be changed to non-dumpable. + * + * @old: The old credentials + * @new: The new credentials + */ +bool is_dumpability_changed(const struct cred *old, const struct cred *new) +{ + if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) || + !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) || + !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) || + !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) || + !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) + return true; + + return false; +} + /** * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task * @new: The credentials to be assigned @@ -467,11 +489,7 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new) get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */ /* dumpability changes */ - if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) || - !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) || - !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) || - !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) || - !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) { + if (is_dumpability_changed(old, new)) { if (task->mm) set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable); task->pdeath_signal = 0; diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 443057bee87c..eb1c450bb7d7 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/signal.h> #include <linux/uio.h> #include <linux/audit.h> @@ -435,6 +436,28 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, if (retval) goto unlock_creds; + if (unlikely(task->in_execve)) { + struct linux_binprm *bprm = task->signal->exec_bprm; + const struct cred __rcu *old_cred; + struct mm_struct *old_mm; + + retval = down_write_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (retval) + goto unlock_creds; + task_lock(task); + old_cred = task->real_cred; + old_mm = task->mm; + rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, bprm->cred); + task->mm = bprm->mm; + retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS); + rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, old_cred); + task->mm = old_mm; + task_unlock(task); + up_write(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (retval) + goto unlock_creds; + } + write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); retval = -EPERM; if (unlikely(task->exit_state)) @@ -508,6 +531,14 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void) { int ret = -EPERM; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) + return -ERESTARTNOINTR; + + if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + return -ERESTARTNOINTR; + } + write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); /* Are we already being traced? */ if (!current->ptrace) { @@ -523,6 +554,7 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void) } } write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); return ret; } diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 255999ba9190..b29bbfa0b044 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -1955,9 +1955,15 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec. */ - if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC && - mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) - goto out_put_fd; + if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) { + if (mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) + goto out_put_fd; + + if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) { + mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + goto out_put_fd; + } + } spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c index 4db327b44586..3b7d81fb99bb 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c @@ -39,8 +39,15 @@ TEST(vmaccess) f = open(mm, O_RDONLY); ASSERT_GE(f, 0); close(f); - f = kill(pid, SIGCONT); - ASSERT_EQ(f, 0); + f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); + ASSERT_NE(f, -1); + ASSERT_NE(f, 0); + ASSERT_NE(f, pid); + f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(f, pid); + f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(f, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(errno, ECHILD); } TEST(attach) @@ -57,22 +64,24 @@ TEST(attach) sleep(1); k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L); - ASSERT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN); - ASSERT_EQ(k, -1); + ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG); ASSERT_NE(k, -1); ASSERT_NE(k, 0); ASSERT_NE(k, pid); ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1); ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 0); - sleep(1); - k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L); + k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); + ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1); + ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGTRAP); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L); ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1); ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGSTOP); - k = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0L, 0L); + k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L); ASSERT_EQ(k, 0); k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0); ASSERT_EQ(k, pid); -- 2.39.2

10 hours, 18 minutes

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[PATCH v8 00/29] KVM: arm64: Implement support for SME

by Mark Brown

I've removed the RFC tag from this version of the series, but the items that I'm looking for feedback on remains the same: - The userspace ABI, in particular: - The vector length used for the SVE registers, access to the SVE registers and access to ZA and (if available) ZT0 depending on the current state of PSTATE.{SM,ZA}. - The use of a single finalisation for both SVE and SME. - The addition of control for enabling fine grained traps in a similar manner to FGU but without the UNDEF, I'm not clear if this is desired at all and at present this requires symmetric read and write traps like FGU. That seemed like it might be desired from an implementation point of view but we already have one case where we enable an asymmetric trap (for ARM64_WORKAROUND_AMPERE_AC03_CPU_38) and it seems generally useful to enable asymmetrically. This series implements support for SME use in non-protected KVM guests. Much of this is very similar to SVE, the main additional challenge that SME presents is that it introduces a new vector length similar to the SVE vector length and two new controls which change the registers seen by guests: - PSTATE.ZA enables the ZA matrix register and, if SME2 is supported, the ZT0 LUT register. - PSTATE.SM enables streaming mode, a new floating point mode which uses the SVE register set with the separately configured SME vector length. In streaming mode implementation of the FFR register is optional. It is also permitted to build systems which support SME without SVE, in this case when not in streaming mode no SVE registers or instructions are available. Further, there is no requirement that there be any overlap in the set of vector lengths supported by SVE and SME in a system, this is expected to be a common situation in practical systems. Since there is a new vector length to configure we introduce a new feature parallel to the existing SVE one with a new pseudo register for the streaming mode vector length. Due to the overlap with SVE caused by streaming mode rather than finalising SME as a separate feature we use the existing SVE finalisation to also finalise SME, a new define KVM_ARM_VCPU_VEC is provided to help make user code clearer. Finalising SVE and SME separately would introduce complication with register access since finalising SVE makes the SVE registers writeable by userspace and doing multiple finalisations results in an error being reported. Dealing with a state where the SVE registers are writeable due to one of SVE or SME being finalised but may have their VL changed by the other being finalised seems like needless complexity with minimal practical utility, it seems clearer to just express directly that only one finalisation can be done in the ABI. Access to the floating point registers follows the architecture: - When both SVE and SME are present: - If PSTATE.SM == 0 the vector length used for the Z and P registers is the SVE vector length. - If PSTATE.SM == 1 the vector length used for the Z and P registers is the SME vector length. - If only SME is present: - If PSTATE.SM == 0 the Z and P registers are inaccessible and the floating point state accessed via the encodings for the V registers. - If PSTATE.SM == 1 the vector length used for the Z and P registers - The SME specific ZA and ZT0 registers are only accessible if SVCR.ZA is 1. The VMM must understand this, in particular when loading state SVCR should be configured before other state. It should be noted that while the architecture refers to PSTATE.SM and PSTATE.ZA these PSTATE bits are not preserved in SPSR_ELx, they are only accessible via SVCR. There are a large number of subfeatures for SME, most of which only offer additional instructions but some of which (SME2 and FA64) add architectural state. These are configured via the ID registers as per usual. Protected KVM supported, with the implementation maintaining the existing restriction that the hypervisor will refuse to run if streaming mode or ZA is enabled. This both simplfies the code and avoids the need to allocate storage for host ZA and ZT0 state, there seems to be little practical use case for supporting this and the memory usage would be non-trivial. The new KVM_ARM_VCPU_VEC feature and ZA and ZT0 registers have not been added to the get-reg-list selftest, the idea of supporting additional features there without restructuring the program to generate all possible feature combinations has been rejected. I will post a separate series which does that restructuring. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> --- Changes in v8: - Small fixes in ABI documentation. - Link to v7: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250822-kvm-arm64-sme-v7-0-7a65d82b8b10@kernel.o… Changes in v7: - Rebase onto v6.17-rc1. - Handle SMIDR_EL1 as a VM wide ID register and use this in feat_sme_smps(). - Expose affinity fields in SMIDR_EL1. - Remove SMPRI_EL1 from vcpu_sysreg, the value is always 0 currently. - Prevent userspace writes to SMPRIMAP_EL2. - Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625-kvm-arm64-sme-v6-0-114cff4ffe04@kernel.o… Changes in v6: - Rebase onto v6.16-rc3. - Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250417-kvm-arm64-sme-v5-0-f469a2d5f574@kernel.o… Changes in v5: - Rebase onto v6.15-rc2. - Add pKVM guest support. - Always restore SVCR. - Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250214-kvm-arm64-sme-v4-0-d64a681adcc2@kernel.o… Changes in v4: - Rebase onto v6.14-rc2 and Mark Rutland's fixes. - Expose SME to nested guests. - Additional cleanups and test fixes following on from the rebase. - Flush register state on VMM PSTATE.{SM,ZA}. - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241220-kvm-arm64-sme-v3-0-05b018c1ffeb@kernel.o… Changes in v3: - Rebase onto v6.12-rc2. - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231222-kvm-arm64-sme-v2-0-da226cb180bb@kernel.o… Changes in v2: - Rebase onto v6.7-rc3. - Configure subfeatures based on host system only. - Complete nVHE support. - There was some snafu with sending v1 out, it didn't make it to the lists but in case it hit people's inboxes I'm sending as v2. --- Mark Brown (29): arm64/sysreg: Update SMIDR_EL1 to DDI0601 2025-06 arm64/fpsimd: Update FA64 and ZT0 enables when loading SME state arm64/fpsimd: Decide to save ZT0 and streaming mode FFR at bind time arm64/fpsimd: Check enable bit for FA64 when saving EFI state arm64/fpsimd: Determine maximum virtualisable SME vector length KVM: arm64: Introduce non-UNDEF FGT control KVM: arm64: Pay attention to FFR parameter in SVE save and load KVM: arm64: Pull ctxt_has_ helpers to start of sysreg-sr.h KVM: arm64: Move SVE state access macros after feature test macros KVM: arm64: Rename SVE finalization constants to be more general KVM: arm64: Document the KVM ABI for SME KVM: arm64: Define internal features for SME KVM: arm64: Rename sve_state_reg_region KVM: arm64: Store vector lengths in an array KVM: arm64: Implement SME vector length configuration KVM: arm64: Support SME control registers KVM: arm64: Support TPIDR2_EL0 KVM: arm64: Support SME identification registers for guests KVM: arm64: Support SME priority registers KVM: arm64: Provide assembly for SME register access KVM: arm64: Support userspace access to streaming mode Z and P registers KVM: arm64: Flush register state on writes to SVCR.SM and SVCR.ZA KVM: arm64: Expose SME specific state to userspace KVM: arm64: Context switch SME state for guests KVM: arm64: Handle SME exceptions KVM: arm64: Expose SME to nested guests KVM: arm64: Provide interface for configuring and enabling SME for guests KVM: arm64: selftests: Add SME system registers to get-reg-list KVM: arm64: selftests: Add SME to set_id_regs test Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 115 ++++++++--- arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h | 26 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 6 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 169 ++++++++++++--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h | 5 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/vncr_mapping.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 33 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 - arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 89 ++++---- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 10 + arch/arm64/kvm/config.c | 8 +- arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c | 28 ++- arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c | 252 ++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 14 ++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/fpsimd.S | 28 ++- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 175 ++++++++++++++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/sysreg-sr.h | 110 ++++++---- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 86 ++++++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 85 ++++++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c | 6 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c | 17 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/sysreg-sr.c | 7 + arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 3 +- arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 156 ++++++++++---- arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 141 ++++++++++++- arch/arm64/tools/sysreg | 8 +- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/get-reg-list.c | 15 +- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/set_id_regs.c | 27 ++- 31 files changed, 1327 insertions(+), 303 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 062b3e4a1f880f104a8d4b90b767788786aa7b78 change-id: 20230301-kvm-arm64-sme-06a1246d3636 Best regards, -- Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>

4 days, 16 hours

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[RFC PATCH v2 0/3] Add testable code specifications

by Gabriele Paoloni

[1] was an initial proposal defining testable code specifications for some functions in /drivers/char/mem.c. However a Guideline to write such specifications was missing and test cases tracing to such specifications were missing. This patchset represents a next step and is organised as follows: - patch 1/3 contains the Guideline for writing code specifications - patch 2/3 contains examples of code specfications defined for some functions of drivers/char/mem.c - patch 3/3 contains examples of selftests that map to some code specifications of patch 2/3 [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250821170419.70668-1-gpaoloni@redhat.com/ --- Changes from v1: 1) Added a Guideline to write code specifications in the Linux Kernel Documentation 2) Addressed Greg KH comments in /drivers/char/mem.c 3) Added example of test cases mapping to the code specifications in /drivers/char/mem.c --- Alessandro Carminati (1): selftests/devmem: initial testset Gabriele Paoloni (2): Documentation: add guidelines for writing testable code specifications /dev/mem: Add initial documentation of memory_open() and mem_fops .../doc-guide/code-specifications.rst | 208 +++++++ Documentation/doc-guide/index.rst | 1 + drivers/char/mem.c | 231 ++++++- tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/devmem/Makefile | 13 + tools/testing/selftests/devmem/debug.c | 25 + tools/testing/selftests/devmem/debug.h | 14 + tools/testing/selftests/devmem/devmem.c | 200 ++++++ tools/testing/selftests/devmem/ram_map.c | 250 ++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/devmem/ram_map.h | 38 ++ tools/testing/selftests/devmem/secret.c | 46 ++ tools/testing/selftests/devmem/secret.h | 13 + tools/testing/selftests/devmem/tests.c | 569 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/devmem/tests.h | 45 ++ tools/testing/selftests/devmem/utils.c | 379 ++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/devmem/utils.h | 119 ++++ 16 files changed, 2146 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/doc-guide/code-specifications.rst create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/debug.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/debug.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/devmem.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/ram_map.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/ram_map.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/secret.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/secret.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/tests.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/tests.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/utils.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/devmem/utils.h -- 2.48.1

5 days, 18 hours

7
23
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[PATCH 00/32] ns: support file handles

by Christian Brauner

For a while now we have supported file handles for pidfds. This has proven to be very useful. Extend the concept to cover namespaces as well. After this patchset it is possible to encode and decode namespace file handles using the commong name_to_handle_at() and open_by_handle_at() apis. Namespaces file descriptors can already be derived from pidfds which means they aren't subject to overmount protection bugs. IOW, it's irrelevant if the caller would not have access to an appropriate /proc/<pid>/ns/ directory as they could always just derive the namespace based on a pidfd already. It has the same advantage as pidfds. It's possible to reliably and for the lifetime of the system refer to a namespace without pinning any resources and to compare them. Permission checking is kept simple. If the caller is located in the namespace the file handle refers to they are able to open it otherwise they must hold privilege over the owning namespace of the relevant namespace. Both the network namespace and the mount namespace already have an associated cookie that isn't recycled and is fully exposed to userspace. Move this into ns_common and use the same id space for all namespaces so they can trivially and reliably be compared. There's more coming based on the iterator infrastructure but the series is large enough and focuses on file handles. Extensive selftests included. I still have various other test-suites to run but it holds up so far. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> --- Christian Brauner (32): pidfs: validate extensible ioctls nsfs: validate extensible ioctls block: use extensible_ioctl_valid() ns: move to_ns_common() to ns_common.h nsfs: add nsfs.h header ns: uniformly initialize ns_common mnt: use ns_common_init() ipc: use ns_common_init() cgroup: use ns_common_init() pid: use ns_common_init() time: use ns_common_init() uts: use ns_common_init() user: use ns_common_init() net: use ns_common_init() ns: remove ns_alloc_inum() nstree: make iterator generic mnt: support iterator cgroup: support iterator ipc: support iterator net: support iterator pid: support iterator time: support iterator userns: support iterator uts: support iterator ns: add to_<type>_ns() to respective headers nsfs: add current_in_namespace() nsfs: support file handles nsfs: support exhaustive file handles nsfs: add missing id retrieval support tools: update nsfs.h uapi header selftests/namespaces: add identifier selftests selftests/namespaces: add file handle selftests block/blk-integrity.c | 8 +- fs/fhandle.c | 6 + fs/internal.h | 1 + fs/mount.h | 10 +- fs/namespace.c | 156 +-- fs/nsfs.c | 266 +++- fs/pidfs.c | 2 +- include/linux/cgroup.h | 5 + include/linux/exportfs.h | 6 + include/linux/fs.h | 14 + include/linux/ipc_namespace.h | 5 + include/linux/ns_common.h | 29 + include/linux/nsfs.h | 40 + include/linux/nsproxy.h | 11 - include/linux/nstree.h | 89 ++ include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 5 + include/linux/proc_ns.h | 32 +- include/linux/time_namespace.h | 9 + include/linux/user_namespace.h | 5 + include/linux/utsname.h | 5 + include/net/net_namespace.h | 6 + include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 12 +- init/main.c | 2 + ipc/msgutil.c | 1 + ipc/namespace.c | 12 +- ipc/shm.c | 2 + kernel/Makefile | 2 +- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 2 + kernel/cgroup/namespace.c | 24 +- kernel/nstree.c | 233 ++++ kernel/pid_namespace.c | 13 +- kernel/time/namespace.c | 23 +- kernel/user_namespace.c | 17 +- kernel/utsname.c | 28 +- net/core/net_namespace.c | 59 +- tools/include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 23 +- tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/Makefile | 7 + tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/config | 7 + .../selftests/namespaces/file_handle_test.c | 1410 ++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/nsid_test.c | 986 ++++++++++++++ 42 files changed, 3306 insertions(+), 270 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 8f5ae30d69d7543eee0d70083daf4de8fe15d585 change-id: 20250905-work-namespace-c68826dda0d4

5 days, 20 hours

15
80
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[PATCH v2 0/5] Add Zilsd/Zclsd support in hwprobe and KVM

by Pincheng Wang

Hi all, This is v2 of a short series that adds kernel support for the ratified Zilsd (Load/Store pair) and Zclsd (Compressed Load/Store pair) RISC-V ISA extensions. The series enables kernel-side exposure so user-space (for example glibc) can detect and use these extensions via hwprobe and runtime checks. Patches: - Patch 1：Add device tree bindings documentation for Zilsd and Zclsd. - Patch 2: Extend RISC-V ISA extension string parsing to recognize them. - Patch 3: Export Zilsd and Zclsd via riscv_hwprobe. - Patch 4: Allow KVM guests to use them. - Patch 5: Add KVM selftests. Changes in v2: - Device-tree schema: simplified the rv64 validation for Zilsd by removing a redundant `contais: const: zilsd` in the `if` clause; the simpler `if (riscv, isa-base contains rv64i) then (riscv, isa-extension not contains zilsd)` form is used instead. Behaviour is unchanged, and the logic is cleaner. - Device-tree schema: corrected Zclsd dependency to require both Zilsd and Zca (previous `anyOf` was incorrect; now both are enforced). - Commit message typo fixed: "dt-bidings" -> "dt-bindings" in the Patch 1 commit subject. The v2 changes are documentation/schema corrections in extensions.yaml. No functional changes were made to ISA parsing, hwprobe syscall, KVM guest support or the selftests beyond ensuring the binding correctly documents and validates the extension relationships. Please review v2 and advise if futher changes are needed. Thanks, Pincheng Wang Pincheng Wang (5): dt-bindings: riscv: add Zilsd and Zclsd extension descriptions riscv: add ISA extension parsing for Zilsd and Zclsd riscv: hwprobe: export Zilsd and Zclsd ISA extensions riscv: KVM: allow Zilsd and Zclsd extensions for Guest/VM KVM: riscv: selftests: add Zilsd and Zclsd extension to get-reg-list test Documentation/arch/riscv/hwprobe.rst | 8 +++++ .../devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h | 2 ++ arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/hwprobe.h | 2 ++ arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 2 ++ arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c | 24 +++++++++++++ arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c | 2 ++ arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_onereg.c | 2 ++ .../selftests/kvm/riscv/get-reg-list.c | 6 ++++ 9 files changed, 84 insertions(+) -- 2.39.5

6 days, 22 hours

4
12
0 0

[PATCH RFC 0/4] landlock: add LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC execution

by Abhinav Saxena

This patch series introduces LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC, a new Landlock scoping mechanism that restricts execution of anonymous memory file descriptors (memfd) created via memfd_create(2). This addresses security gaps where processes can bypass W^X policies and execute arbitrary code through anonymous memory objects. Fixes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/37 SECURITY PROBLEM ================ Current Landlock filesystem restrictions do not cover memfd objects, allowing processes to: 1. Read-to-execute bypass: Create writable memfd, inject code, then execute via mmap(PROT_EXEC) or direct execve() 2. Anonymous execution: Execute code without touching the filesystem via execve("/proc/self/fd/N") where N is a memfd descriptor 3. Cross-domain access violations: Pass memfd between processes to bypass domain restrictions These scenarios can occur in sandboxed environments where filesystem access is restricted but memfd creation remains possible. IMPLEMENTATION ============== The implementation adds hierarchical execution control through domain scoping: Core Components: - is_memfd_file(): Reliable memfd detection via "memfd:" dentry prefix - domain_is_scoped(): Cross-domain hierarchy checking (moved to domain.c) - LSM hooks: mmap_file, file_mprotect, bprm_creds_for_exec - Creation-time restrictions: hook_file_alloc_security Security Matrix: Execution decisions follow domain hierarchy rules preventing both same-domain bypass attempts and cross-domain access violations while preserving legitimate hierarchical access patterns. Domain Hierarchy with LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC: =============================================== Root (no domain) - No restrictions | +-- Domain A [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 1 | +-- memfd_A (tagged with Domain A as creator) | | | +-- Domain A1 (child) [NO SCOPE] Layer 2 | | +-- Inherits Layer 1 restrictions from parent | | +-- memfd_A1 (can create, inherits restrictions) | | +-- Domain A1a [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 3 | | +-- memfd_A1a (tagged with Domain A1a) | | | +-- Domain A2 (child) [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 2 | +-- memfd_A2 (tagged with Domain A2 as creator) | +-- CANNOT access memfd_A1 (different subtree) | +-- Domain B [SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC] Layer 1 +-- memfd_B (tagged with Domain B as creator) +-- CANNOT access ANY memfd from Domain A subtree Execution Decision Matrix: ======================== Executor-> | A | A1 | A1a | A2 | B | Root Creator | | | | | | ------------|-----|----|-----|----|----|----- Domain A | X | X | X | X | X | Y Domain A1 | Y | X | X | X | X | Y Domain A1a | Y | Y | X | X | X | Y Domain A2 | Y | X | X | X | X | Y Domain B | X | X | X | X | X | Y Root | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y Legend: Y = Execution allowed, X = Execution denied Scenarios Covered: - Direct mmap(PROT_EXEC) on memfd files - Two-stage mmap(PROT_READ) + mprotect(PROT_EXEC) bypass attempts - execve("/proc/self/fd/N") anonymous execution - execveat() and fexecve() file descriptor execution - Cross-process memfd inheritance and IPC passing TESTING ======= All patches have been validated with: - scripts/checkpatch.pl --strict (clean) - Selftests covering same-domain restrictions, cross-domain hierarchy enforcement, and regular file isolation - KUnit tests for memfd detection edge cases DISCLAIMER ========== My understanding of Landlock scoping semantics may be limited, but this implementation reflects my current understanding based on available documentation and code analysis. I welcome feedback and corrections regarding the scoping logic and domain hierarchy enforcement. Signed-off-by: Abhinav Saxena <xandfury(a)gmail.com> --- Abhinav Saxena (4): landlock: add LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC scope landlock: implement memfd detection landlock: add memfd exec LSM hooks and scoping selftests/landlock: add memfd execution tests include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 5 + security/landlock/.kunitconfig | 1 + security/landlock/audit.c | 4 + security/landlock/audit.h | 1 + security/landlock/cred.c | 14 - security/landlock/domain.c | 67 ++++ security/landlock/domain.h | 4 + security/landlock/fs.c | 405 ++++++++++++++++++++- security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/task.c | 67 ---- .../selftests/landlock/scoped_memfd_exec_test.c | 325 +++++++++++++++++ 11 files changed, 812 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 5b74b2eff1eeefe43584e5b7b348c8cd3b723d38 change-id: 20250716-memfd-exec-ac0d582018c3 Best regards, -- Abhinav Saxena <xandfury(a)gmail.com>

1 week, 4 days

3
11
0 0

[PATCH] selftests/seccomp: improve backwards compatibility for older kernels

by Wake Liu

This commit introduces checks for kernel version and seccomp filter flag support to the seccomp selftests. It also includes conditional header inclusions using __GLIBC_PREREQ. Some tests were gated by kernel version, and adjustments were made for flags introduced after kernel 5.4. This ensures the selftests can run and pass correctly on kernel versions 5.4 and later, preventing failures due to features not present in older kernels. The use of __GLIBC_PREREQ ensures proper compilation and functionality across different glibc versions in a mainline Linux kernel context. While it might appear redundant in specific build environments due to global overrides, it is crucial for upstream correctness and portability. Signed-off-by: Wake Liu <wakel(a)google.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 99 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c index 61acbd45ffaa..9b660cff5a4a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c @@ -13,12 +13,14 @@ * we need to use the kernel's siginfo.h file and trick glibc * into accepting it. */ +#if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) #if !__GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 26) # include <asm/siginfo.h> # define __have_siginfo_t 1 # define __have_sigval_t 1 # define __have_sigevent_t 1 #endif +#endif #include <errno.h> #include <linux/filter.h> @@ -300,6 +302,26 @@ int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args) } #endif +int seccomp_flag_supported(int flag) +{ + /* + * Probes if a seccomp filter flag is supported by the kernel. + * + * When an unsupported flag is passed to seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, ...), + * the kernel returns EINVAL. + * + * When a supported flag is passed, the kernel proceeds to validate the + * filter program pointer. By passing NULL for the filter program, + * the kernel attempts to dereference a bad address, resulting in EFAULT. + * + * Therefore, checking for EFAULT indicates that the flag itself was + * recognized and supported by the kernel. + */ + if (seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL) == -1 && errno == EFAULT) + return 1; + return 0; +} + #if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ #define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n])) #elif __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ @@ -2436,13 +2458,12 @@ TEST(detect_seccomp_filter_flags) ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) { TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!"); } - EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret); - EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) { - TH_LOG("Failed to detect that a known-good filter flag (0x%X) is supported!", - flag); - } - all_flags |= flag; + if (seccomp_flag_supported(flag)) + all_flags |= flag; + else + TH_LOG("Filter flag (0x%X) is not found to be supported!", + flag); } /* @@ -2870,6 +2891,12 @@ TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_one_divergence) TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_one_divergence_no_tid_in_err) { + /* Depends on 5189149 (seccomp: allow TSYNC and USER_NOTIF together) */ + if (!seccomp_flag_supported(SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH)) { + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH"); + return; + } + long ret, flags; void *status; @@ -3475,6 +3502,11 @@ TEST(user_notification_basic) TEST(user_notification_with_tsync) { + /* Depends on 5189149 (seccomp: allow TSYNC and USER_NOTIF together) */ + if (!seccomp_flag_supported(SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH)) { + SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH"); + return; + } int ret; unsigned int flags; @@ -3966,6 +3998,13 @@ TEST(user_notification_filter_empty) TEST(user_ioctl_notification_filter_empty) { + /* Depends on 95036a7 (seccomp: interrupt SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV + * when all users have exited) */ + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(6, 11)) { + SKIP(return, "Kernel version < 6.11"); + return; + } + pid_t pid; long ret; int status, p[2]; @@ -4119,6 +4158,12 @@ int get_next_fd(int prev_fd) TEST(user_notification_addfd) { + /* Depends on 0ae71c7 (seccomp: Support atomic "addfd + send reply") */ + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(5, 14)) { + SKIP(return, "Kernel version < 5.14"); + return; + } + pid_t pid; long ret; int status, listener, memfd, fd, nextfd; @@ -4281,6 +4326,12 @@ TEST(user_notification_addfd) TEST(user_notification_addfd_rlimit) { + /* Depends on 7cf97b1 (seccomp: Introduce addfd ioctl to seccomp user notifier) */ + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(5, 9)) { + SKIP(return, "Kernel version < 5.9"); + return; + } + pid_t pid; long ret; int status, listener, memfd; @@ -4326,9 +4377,12 @@ TEST(user_notification_addfd_rlimit) EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd), -1); EXPECT_EQ(errno, EMFILE); - addfd.flags = SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND; - EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd), -1); - EXPECT_EQ(errno, EMFILE); + /* Depends on 0ae71c7 (seccomp: Support atomic "addfd + send reply") */ + if (ksft_min_kernel_version(5, 14)) { + addfd.flags = SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND; + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd), -1); + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EMFILE); + } addfd.newfd = 100; addfd.flags = SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD; @@ -4356,6 +4410,12 @@ TEST(user_notification_addfd_rlimit) TEST(user_notification_sync) { + /* Depends on 48a1084 (seccomp: add the synchronous mode for seccomp_unotify) */ + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(6, 6)) { + SKIP(return, "Kernel version < 6.6"); + return; + } + struct seccomp_notif req = {}; struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {}; int status, listener; @@ -4520,6 +4580,12 @@ static char get_proc_stat(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t pid) TEST(user_notification_fifo) { + /* Depends on 4cbf6f6 (seccomp: Use FIFO semantics to order notifications) */ + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(5, 19)) { + SKIP(return, "Kernel version < 5.19"); + return; + } + struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {}; struct seccomp_notif req = {}; int i, status, listener; @@ -4623,6 +4689,12 @@ static long get_proc_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int pid) /* Ensure non-fatal signals prior to receive are unmodified */ TEST(user_notification_wait_killable_pre_notification) { + /* Depends on c2aa2df (seccomp: Add wait_killable semantic to seccomp user notifier) */ + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(5, 19)) { + SKIP(return, "Kernel version < 5.19"); + return; + } + struct sigaction new_action = { .sa_handler = signal_handler, }; @@ -4693,6 +4765,12 @@ TEST(user_notification_wait_killable_pre_notification) /* Ensure non-fatal signals after receive are blocked */ TEST(user_notification_wait_killable) { + /* Depends on c2aa2df (seccomp: Add wait_killable semantic to seccomp user notifier) */ + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(5, 19)) { + SKIP(return, "Kernel version < 5.19"); + return; + } + struct sigaction new_action = { .sa_handler = signal_handler, }; @@ -4772,6 +4850,12 @@ TEST(user_notification_wait_killable) /* Ensure fatal signals after receive are not blocked */ TEST(user_notification_wait_killable_fatal) { + /* Depends on c2aa2df (seccomp: Add wait_killable semantic to seccomp user notifier) */ + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(5, 19)) { + SKIP(return, "Kernel version < 5.19"); + return; + } + struct seccomp_notif req = {}; int listener, status; pid_t pid; @@ -4854,6 +4938,12 @@ static void *tsync_vs_dead_thread_leader_sibling(void *_args) */ TEST(tsync_vs_dead_thread_leader) { + /* Depends on bfafe5e (seccomp: release task filters when the task exits) */ + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(6, 11)) { + SKIP(return, "Kernel version < 6.11"); + return; + } + int status; pid_t pid; long ret; -- 2.50.1.703.g449372360f-goog

1 week, 6 days

2
2
0 0

[PATCH v7 00/12] Direct Map Removal Support for guest_memfd

by Patrick Roy

From: Patrick Roy <roypat(a)amazon.co.uk> [ based on kvm/next ] Unmapping virtual machine guest memory from the host kernel's direct map is a successful mitigation against Spectre-style transient execution issues: If the kernel page tables do not contain entries pointing to guest memory, then any attempted speculative read through the direct map will necessarily be blocked by the MMU before any observable microarchitectural side-effects happen. This means that Spectre-gadgets and similar cannot be used to target virtual machine memory. Roughly 60% of speculative execution issues fall into this category [1, Table 1]. This patch series extends guest_memfd with the ability to remove its memory from the host kernel's direct map, to be able to attain the above protection for KVM guests running inside guest_memfd. Additionally, a Firecracker branch with support for these VMs can be found on GitHub [2]. For more details, please refer to the v5 cover letter [v5]. No substantial changes in design have taken place since. === Changes Since v6 === - Drop patch for passing struct address_space to ->free_folio(), due to possible races with freeing of the address_space. (Hugh) - Stop using PG_uptodate / gmem preparedness tracking to keep track of direct map state. Instead, use the lowest bit of folio->private. (Mike, David) - Do direct map removal when establishing mapping of gmem folio instead of at allocation time, due to impossibility of handling direct map removal errors in kvm_gmem_populate(). (Patrick) - Do TLB flushes after direct map removal, and provide a module parameter to opt out from them, and a new patch to export flush_tlb_kernel_range() to KVM. (Will) [1]: https://download.vusec.net/papers/quarantine_raid23.pdf [2]: https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hidi… [RFCv1]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240709132041.3625501-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/ [RFCv2]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20240910163038.1298452-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/ [RFCv3]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20241030134912.515725-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/ [v4]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250221160728.1584559-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/ [v5]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250828093902.2719-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/ [v6]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250912091708.17502-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/ Patrick Roy (12): arch: export set_direct_map_valid_noflush to KVM module x86/tlb: export flush_tlb_kernel_range to KVM module mm: introduce AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP KVM: guest_memfd: Add stub for kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate KVM: guest_memfd: Add flag to remove from direct map KVM: guest_memfd: add module param for disabling TLB flushing KVM: selftests: load elf via bounce buffer KVM: selftests: set KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD in vm_mem_add() if guest_memfd != -1 KVM: selftests: Add guest_memfd based vm_mem_backing_src_types KVM: selftests: cover GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_NO_DIRECT_MAP in existing selftests KVM: selftests: stuff vm_mem_backing_src_type into vm_shape KVM: selftests: Test guest execution from direct map removed gmem Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 5 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 12 ++++ arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 1 + arch/loongarch/mm/pageattr.c | 1 + arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 1 + arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 3 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 1 + arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 1 + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 9 +++ include/linux/pagemap.h | 16 +++++ include/linux/secretmem.h | 18 ----- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 + lib/buildid.c | 4 +- mm/gup.c | 19 ++---- mm/mlock.c | 2 +- mm/secretmem.c | 8 +-- .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 2 + .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h | 37 ++++++++--- .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/test_util.h | 8 +++ tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/elf.c | 8 +-- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/io.c | 23 +++++++ tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 61 +++++++++-------- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/test_util.c | 8 +++ tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c | 1 + .../selftests/kvm/pre_fault_memory_test.c | 1 + .../selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c | 50 ++++++++++++-- .../kvm/x86/private_mem_conversions_test.c | 7 +- virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++-- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 8 +++ 30 files changed, 290 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-) base-commit: a6ad54137af92535cfe32e19e5f3bc1bb7dbd383 -- 2.51.0

3 weeks

11
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[PATCH] vfio: selftests: Store libvfio build outputs in $(OUTPUT)/libvfio

by David Matlack

Store the tools/testing/selftests/vfio/lib outputs (e.g. object files) in $(OUTPUT)/libvfio rather than in $(OUTPUT)/lib. This is in preparation for building the VFIO selftests library into the KVM selftests (see Link below). Specifically this will avoid name conflicts between tools/testing/selftests/{vfio,kvm/lib and also avoid leaving behind empty directories under tools/testing/selftests/kvm after a make clean. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20250912222525.2515416-2-dmatlack@google.com/ Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack(a)google.com> --- Note: This patch applies on top of vfio/next. https://github.com/awilliam/linux-vfio/tree/next tools/testing/selftests/vfio/lib/libvfio.mk | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/vfio/lib/libvfio.mk b/tools/testing/selftests/vfio/lib/libvfio.mk index 5d11c3a89a28..3c0cdac30cb6 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/vfio/lib/libvfio.mk +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/vfio/lib/libvfio.mk @@ -1,24 +1,26 @@ include $(top_srcdir)/scripts/subarch.include ARCH ?= $(SUBARCH) -VFIO_DIR := $(selfdir)/vfio +LIBVFIO_SRCDIR := $(selfdir)/vfio/lib -LIBVFIO_C := lib/vfio_pci_device.c -LIBVFIO_C += lib/vfio_pci_driver.c +LIBVFIO_C := vfio_pci_device.c +LIBVFIO_C += vfio_pci_driver.c ifeq ($(ARCH:x86_64=x86),x86) -LIBVFIO_C += lib/drivers/ioat/ioat.c -LIBVFIO_C += lib/drivers/dsa/dsa.c +LIBVFIO_C += drivers/ioat/ioat.c +LIBVFIO_C += drivers/dsa/dsa.c endif -LIBVFIO_O := $(patsubst %.c, $(OUTPUT)/%.o, $(LIBVFIO_C)) +LIBVFIO_OUTPUT := $(OUTPUT)/libvfio + +LIBVFIO_O := $(patsubst %.c, $(LIBVFIO_OUTPUT)/%.o, $(LIBVFIO_C)) LIBVFIO_O_DIRS := $(shell dirname $(LIBVFIO_O) | uniq) $(shell mkdir -p $(LIBVFIO_O_DIRS)) -CFLAGS += -I$(VFIO_DIR)/lib/include +CFLAGS += -I$(LIBVFIO_SRCDIR)/include -$(LIBVFIO_O): $(OUTPUT)/%.o : $(VFIO_DIR)/%.c +$(LIBVFIO_O): $(LIBVFIO_OUTPUT)/%.o : $(LIBVFIO_SRCDIR)/%.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(TARGET_ARCH) -c $< -o $@ -EXTRA_CLEAN += $(LIBVFIO_O) +EXTRA_CLEAN += $(LIBVFIO_OUTPUT) base-commit: acb59a4bb8ed34e738a4c3463127bf3f6b5e11a9 -- 2.51.0.534.gc79095c0ca-goog

3 weeks, 4 days

2
1
0 0

[PATCH] selftests/timers: Skip some posix_timers tests on kernels < 6.13

by Wake Liu

Several tests in the posix_timers selftest fail on kernels older than 6.13. These tests check for timer behavior related to SIG_IGN, which was refactored in the 6.13 kernel cycle, notably by commit caf77435dd8a ("signal: Handle ignored signals in do_sigaction(action != SIG_IGN)"). To ensure the selftests pass on older, stable kernels, gate the affected tests with a ksft_min_kernel_version(6, 13) check. Signed-off-by: Wake Liu <wakel(a)google.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/timers/posix_timers.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/timers/posix_timers.c b/tools/testing/selftests/timers/posix_timers.c index f0eceb0faf34..f228e51f8b58 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/timers/posix_timers.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/timers/posix_timers.c @@ -256,6 +256,11 @@ static void *ignore_thread(void *arg) static void check_sig_ign(int thread) { + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(6, 13)) { + // see caf77435dd8a + ksft_test_result_skip("Depends on refactor of posix timers in 6.13\n"); + return; + } struct tmrsig tsig = { }; struct itimerspec its; unsigned int tid = 0; @@ -342,6 +347,10 @@ static void check_sig_ign(int thread) static void check_rearm(void) { + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(6, 13)) { + ksft_test_result_skip("Depends on refactor of posix timers in 6.13\n"); + return; + } struct tmrsig tsig = { }; struct itimerspec its; struct sigaction sa; @@ -398,6 +407,10 @@ static void check_rearm(void) static void check_delete(void) { + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(6, 13)) { + ksft_test_result_skip("Depends on refactor of posix timers in 6.13\n"); + return; + } struct tmrsig tsig = { }; struct itimerspec its; struct sigaction sa; @@ -455,6 +468,10 @@ static inline int64_t calcdiff_ns(struct timespec t1, struct timespec t2) static void check_sigev_none(int which, const char *name) { + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(6, 13)) { + ksft_test_result_skip("Depends on refactor of posix timers in 6.13\n"); + return; + } struct timespec start, now; struct itimerspec its; struct sigevent sev; @@ -493,6 +510,10 @@ static void check_sigev_none(int which, const char *name) static void check_gettime(int which, const char *name) { + if (!ksft_min_kernel_version(6, 13)) { + ksft_test_result_skip("Depends on refactor of posix timers in 6.13\n"); + return; + } struct itimerspec its, prev; struct timespec start, now; struct sigevent sev; -- 2.50.1.703.g449372360f-goog

4 weeks

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Linux-kselftest-mirror September 2025