- Linux-kselftest-mirror - lists.linaro.org

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 22/34] selftests/powerpc/spectre_v2: Return skip code when miss_percent is high

by Sasha Levin

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)canonical.com> [ Upstream commit 3c42e9542050d49610077e083c7c3f5fd5e26820 ] A mis-match between reported and actual mitigation is not restricted to the Vulnerable case. The guest might also report the mitigation as "Software count cache flush" and the host will still mitigate with branch cache disabled. So, instead of skipping depending on the detected mitigation, simply skip whenever the detected miss_percent is the expected one for a fully mitigated system, that is, above 95%. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211207130557.40566-1-cascardo@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c index adc2b7294e5fd..83647b8277e7d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int spectre_v2_test(void) * We are not vulnerable and reporting otherwise, so * missing such a mismatch is safe. */ - if (state == VULNERABLE) + if (miss_percent > 95) return 4; return 1; -- 2.34.1

3 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 33/44] selftests/powerpc: Add a test of sigreturning to the kernel

by Sasha Levin

From: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> [ Upstream commit a8968521cfdc3e339fe69473d6632e0aa8d7202a ] We have a general signal fuzzer, sigfuz, which can modify the MSR & NIP before sigreturn. But the chance of it hitting a kernel address and also clearing MSR_PR is fairly slim. So add a specific test of sigreturn to a kernel address, both with and without attempting to clear MSR_PR (which the kernel must block). Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209115944.4062384-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- .../selftests/powerpc/signal/.gitignore | 1 + .../testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/Makefile | 1 + .../powerpc/signal/sigreturn_kernel.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 134 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/sigreturn_kernel.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/.gitignore index ce3375cd8e73e..8f6c816099a48 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/.gitignore +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/.gitignore @@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ signal_tm sigfuz sigreturn_vdso sig_sc_double_restart +sigreturn_kernel diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/Makefile index d6ae54663aed7..84e201572466d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/Makefile @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 TEST_GEN_PROGS := signal signal_tm sigfuz sigreturn_vdso sig_sc_double_restart +TEST_GEN_PROGS += sigreturn_kernel CFLAGS += -maltivec $(OUTPUT)/signal_tm: CFLAGS += -mhtm diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/sigreturn_kernel.c b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/sigreturn_kernel.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..0a1b6e591eeed --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/sigreturn_kernel.c @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Test that we can't sigreturn to kernel addresses, or to kernel mode. + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "utils.h" + +#define MSR_PR (1ul << 14) + +static volatile unsigned long long sigreturn_addr; +static volatile unsigned long long sigreturn_msr_mask; + +static void sigusr1_handler(int signo, siginfo_t *si, void *uc_ptr) +{ + ucontext_t *uc = (ucontext_t *)uc_ptr; + + if (sigreturn_addr) + UCONTEXT_NIA(uc) = sigreturn_addr; + + if (sigreturn_msr_mask) + UCONTEXT_MSR(uc) &= sigreturn_msr_mask; +} + +static pid_t fork_child(void) +{ + pid_t pid; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + raise(SIGUSR1); + exit(0); + } + + return pid; +} + +static int expect_segv(pid_t pid) +{ + int child_ret; + + waitpid(pid, &child_ret, 0); + FAIL_IF(WIFEXITED(child_ret)); + FAIL_IF(!WIFSIGNALED(child_ret)); + FAIL_IF(WTERMSIG(child_ret) != 11); + + return 0; +} + +int test_sigreturn_kernel(void) +{ + struct sigaction act; + int child_ret, i; + pid_t pid; + + act.sa_sigaction = sigusr1_handler; + act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; + sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask); + + FAIL_IF(sigaction(SIGUSR1, &act, NULL)); + + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + // Return to kernel + sigreturn_addr = 0xcull << 60; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to kernel virtual + sigreturn_addr = 0xc008ull << 48; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return out of range + sigreturn_addr = 0xc010ull << 48; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to no-man's land, just below PAGE_OFFSET + sigreturn_addr = (0xcull << 60) - (64 * 1024); + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to no-man's land, above TASK_SIZE_4PB + sigreturn_addr = 0x1ull << 52; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to 0xd space + sigreturn_addr = 0xdull << 60; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to 0xe space + sigreturn_addr = 0xeull << 60; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to 0xf space + sigreturn_addr = 0xfull << 60; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Attempt to set PR=0 for 2nd loop (should be blocked by kernel) + sigreturn_msr_mask = ~MSR_PR; + } + + printf("All children killed as expected\n"); + + // Don't change address, just MSR, should return to user as normal + sigreturn_addr = 0; + sigreturn_msr_mask = ~MSR_PR; + pid = fork_child(); + waitpid(pid, &child_ret, 0); + FAIL_IF(!WIFEXITED(child_ret)); + FAIL_IF(WIFSIGNALED(child_ret)); + FAIL_IF(WEXITSTATUS(child_ret) != 0); + + return 0; +} + +int main(void) +{ + return test_harness(test_sigreturn_kernel, "sigreturn_kernel"); +} -- 2.34.1

3 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 25/44] selftests/powerpc/spectre_v2: Return skip code when miss_percent is high

by Sasha Levin

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)canonical.com> [ Upstream commit 3c42e9542050d49610077e083c7c3f5fd5e26820 ] A mis-match between reported and actual mitigation is not restricted to the Vulnerable case. The guest might also report the mitigation as "Software count cache flush" and the host will still mitigate with branch cache disabled. So, instead of skipping depending on the detected mitigation, simply skip whenever the detected miss_percent is the expected one for a fully mitigated system, that is, above 95%. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211207130557.40566-1-cascardo@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c index adc2b7294e5fd..83647b8277e7d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int spectre_v2_test(void) * We are not vulnerable and reporting otherwise, so * missing such a mismatch is safe. */ - if (state == VULNERABLE) + if (miss_percent > 95) return 4; return 1; -- 2.34.1

3 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.16 39/52] selftests/powerpc: Add a test of sigreturning to the kernel

by Sasha Levin

From: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> [ Upstream commit a8968521cfdc3e339fe69473d6632e0aa8d7202a ] We have a general signal fuzzer, sigfuz, which can modify the MSR & NIP before sigreturn. But the chance of it hitting a kernel address and also clearing MSR_PR is fairly slim. So add a specific test of sigreturn to a kernel address, both with and without attempting to clear MSR_PR (which the kernel must block). Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209115944.4062384-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- .../selftests/powerpc/signal/.gitignore | 1 + .../testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/Makefile | 1 + .../powerpc/signal/sigreturn_kernel.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 134 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/sigreturn_kernel.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/.gitignore index ce3375cd8e73e..8f6c816099a48 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/.gitignore +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/.gitignore @@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ signal_tm sigfuz sigreturn_vdso sig_sc_double_restart +sigreturn_kernel diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/Makefile index d6ae54663aed7..84e201572466d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/Makefile @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 TEST_GEN_PROGS := signal signal_tm sigfuz sigreturn_vdso sig_sc_double_restart +TEST_GEN_PROGS += sigreturn_kernel CFLAGS += -maltivec $(OUTPUT)/signal_tm: CFLAGS += -mhtm diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/sigreturn_kernel.c b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/sigreturn_kernel.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..0a1b6e591eeed --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/signal/sigreturn_kernel.c @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Test that we can't sigreturn to kernel addresses, or to kernel mode. + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "utils.h" + +#define MSR_PR (1ul << 14) + +static volatile unsigned long long sigreturn_addr; +static volatile unsigned long long sigreturn_msr_mask; + +static void sigusr1_handler(int signo, siginfo_t *si, void *uc_ptr) +{ + ucontext_t *uc = (ucontext_t *)uc_ptr; + + if (sigreturn_addr) + UCONTEXT_NIA(uc) = sigreturn_addr; + + if (sigreturn_msr_mask) + UCONTEXT_MSR(uc) &= sigreturn_msr_mask; +} + +static pid_t fork_child(void) +{ + pid_t pid; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + raise(SIGUSR1); + exit(0); + } + + return pid; +} + +static int expect_segv(pid_t pid) +{ + int child_ret; + + waitpid(pid, &child_ret, 0); + FAIL_IF(WIFEXITED(child_ret)); + FAIL_IF(!WIFSIGNALED(child_ret)); + FAIL_IF(WTERMSIG(child_ret) != 11); + + return 0; +} + +int test_sigreturn_kernel(void) +{ + struct sigaction act; + int child_ret, i; + pid_t pid; + + act.sa_sigaction = sigusr1_handler; + act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; + sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask); + + FAIL_IF(sigaction(SIGUSR1, &act, NULL)); + + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + // Return to kernel + sigreturn_addr = 0xcull << 60; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to kernel virtual + sigreturn_addr = 0xc008ull << 48; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return out of range + sigreturn_addr = 0xc010ull << 48; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to no-man's land, just below PAGE_OFFSET + sigreturn_addr = (0xcull << 60) - (64 * 1024); + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to no-man's land, above TASK_SIZE_4PB + sigreturn_addr = 0x1ull << 52; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to 0xd space + sigreturn_addr = 0xdull << 60; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to 0xe space + sigreturn_addr = 0xeull << 60; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Return to 0xf space + sigreturn_addr = 0xfull << 60; + pid = fork_child(); + expect_segv(pid); + + // Attempt to set PR=0 for 2nd loop (should be blocked by kernel) + sigreturn_msr_mask = ~MSR_PR; + } + + printf("All children killed as expected\n"); + + // Don't change address, just MSR, should return to user as normal + sigreturn_addr = 0; + sigreturn_msr_mask = ~MSR_PR; + pid = fork_child(); + waitpid(pid, &child_ret, 0); + FAIL_IF(!WIFEXITED(child_ret)); + FAIL_IF(WIFSIGNALED(child_ret)); + FAIL_IF(WEXITSTATUS(child_ret) != 0); + + return 0; +} + +int main(void) +{ + return test_harness(test_sigreturn_kernel, "sigreturn_kernel"); +} -- 2.34.1

3 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.16 28/52] selftests/powerpc/spectre_v2: Return skip code when miss_percent is high

by Sasha Levin

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)canonical.com> [ Upstream commit 3c42e9542050d49610077e083c7c3f5fd5e26820 ] A mis-match between reported and actual mitigation is not restricted to the Vulnerable case. The guest might also report the mitigation as "Software count cache flush" and the host will still mitigate with branch cache disabled. So, instead of skipping depending on the detected mitigation, simply skip whenever the detected miss_percent is the expected one for a fully mitigated system, that is, above 95%. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211207130557.40566-1-cascardo@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c index adc2b7294e5fd..83647b8277e7d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/spectre_v2.c @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int spectre_v2_test(void) * We are not vulnerable and reporting otherwise, so * missing such a mismatch is safe. */ - if (state == VULNERABLE) + if (miss_percent > 95) return 4; return 1; -- 2.34.1

3 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v3 2/2] selftests: tpm: add async space test with noneexisting handle

by Tadeusz Struk

Add a test for /dev/tpmrm0 in async mode that checks if the code handles invalid handles correctly. Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org> Cc: <linux-integrity(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-kselftest(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen<jarkko(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tstruk(a)gmail.com> --- Changed in v2: - Updated commit message Changed in v3: - Fixed typo in the function name --- tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2_tests.py | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2_tests.py b/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2_tests.py index 9d764306887b..340ffef97fb6 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2_tests.py +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2_tests.py @@ -302,3 +302,19 @@ class AsyncTest(unittest.TestCase): log.debug("Calling get_cap in a NON_BLOCKING mode") async_client.get_cap(tpm2.TPM2_CAP_HANDLES, tpm2.HR_LOADED_SESSION) async_client.close() + + def test_flush_invalid_context(self): + log = logging.getLogger(__name__) + log.debug(sys._getframe().f_code.co_name) + + async_client = tpm2.Client(tpm2.Client.FLAG_SPACE | tpm2.Client.FLAG_NONBLOCK) + log.debug("Calling flush_context passing in an invalid handle ") + handle = 0x80123456 + rc = 0 + try: + async_client.flush_context(handle) + except OSError as e: + rc = e.errno + + self.assertEqual(rc, 22) + async_client.close() -- 2.30.2

3 years, 6 months

2
6
0 0

[RFC PATCH 00/13] x86 User Interrupts support

by Sohil Mehta

User Interrupts Introduction ============================ User Interrupts (Uintr) is a hardware technology that enables delivering interrupts directly to user space. Today, virtually all communication across privilege boundaries happens by going through the kernel. These include signals, pipes, remote procedure calls and hardware interrupt based notifications. User interrupts provide the foundation for more efficient (low latency and low CPU utilization) versions of these common operations by avoiding transitions through the kernel. In the User Interrupts hardware architecture, a receiver is always expected to be a user space task. However, a user interrupt can be sent by another user space task, kernel or an external source (like a device). In addition to the general infrastructure to receive user interrupts, this series introduces a single source: interrupts from another user task. These are referred to as User IPIs. The first implementation of User IPIs will be in the Intel processor code-named Sapphire Rapids. Refer Chapter 11 of the Intel Architecture instruction set extensions for details of the hardware architecture [1]. Series-reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com> Main goals of this RFC ====================== - Introduce this upcoming technology to the community. This cover letter includes a hardware architecture summary along with the software architecture and kernel design choices. This post is a bit long as a result. Hopefully, it helps answer more questions than it creates :) I am also planning to talk about User Interrupts next week at the LPC Kernel summit. - Discuss potential use cases. We are starting to look at actual usages and libraries (like libevent[2] and liburing[3]) that can take advantage of this technology. Unfortunately, we don't have much to share on this right now. We need some help from the community to identify usages that can benefit from this. We would like to make sure the proposed APIs work for the eventual consumers. - Get early feedback on the software architecture. We are hoping to get some feedback on the direction of overall software architecture - starting with User IPI, extending it for kernel-to-user interrupt notifications and external interrupts in the future. - Discuss some of the main architecture opens. There is lot of work that still needs to happen to enable this technology. We are looking for some input on future patches that would be of interest. Here are some of the big opens that we are looking to resolve. * Should Uintr interrupt all blocking system calls like sleep(), read(), poll(), etc? If so, should we implement an SA_RESTART type of mechanism similar to signals? - Refer Blocking for interrupts section below. * Should the User Interrupt Target table (UITT) be shared between threads of a multi-threaded application or maybe even across processes? - Refer Sharing the UITT section below. Why care about this? - Micro benchmark performance ================================================== There is a ~9x or higher performance improvement using User IPI over other IPC mechanisms for event signaling. Below is the average normalized latency for a 1M ping-pong IPC notifications with message size=1. +------------+-------------------------+ | IPC type | Relative Latency | | |(normalized to User IPI) | +------------+-------------------------+ | User IPI | 1.0 | | Signal | 14.8 | | Eventfd | 9.7 | | Pipe | 16.3 | | Domain | 17.3 | +------------+-------------------------+ Results have been estimated based on tests on internal hardware with Linux v5.14 + User IPI patches. Original benchmark: https://github.com/goldsborough/ipc-bench Updated benchmark: https://github.com/intel/uintr-ipc-bench/tree/linux-rfc-v1 *Performance varies by use, configuration and other factors. How it works underneath? - Hardware Summary =========================================== User Interrupts is a posted interrupt delivery mechanism. The interrupts are first posted to a memory location and then delivered to the receiver when they are running with CPL=3. Kernel managed architectural data structures -------------------------------------------- UPID: User Posted Interrupt Descriptor - Holds receiver interrupt vector information and notification state (like an ongoing notification, suppressed notifications). UITT: User Interrupt Target Table - Stores UPID pointer and vector information for interrupt routing on the sender side. Referred by the senduipi instruction. The interrupt state of each task is referenced via MSRs which are saved and restored by the kernel during context switch. Instructions ------------ senduipi <index> - send a user IPI to a target task based on the UITT index. clui - Mask user interrupts by clearing UIF (User Interrupt Flag). stui - Unmask user interrupts by setting UIF. testui - Test current value of UIF. uiret - return from a user interrupt handler. User IPI -------- When a User IPI sender executes 'senduipi <index>', the hardware refers the UITT table entry pointed by the index and posts the interrupt vector (63-0) into the receiver's UPID. If the receiver is running (CPL=3), the sender cpu would send a physical IPI to the receiver's cpu. On the receiver side this IPI is detected as a User Interrupt. The User Interrupt handler for the receiver is invoked and the vector number (63-0) is pushed onto the stack. Upon execution of 'uiret' in the interrupt handler, the control is transferred back to instruction that was interrupted. Refer Chapter 11 of the Intel Architecture instruction set extensions [1] for more details. Application interface - Software Architecture ============================================= User Interrupts (Uintr) is an opt-in feature (unlike signals). Applications wanting to use Uintr are expected to register themselves with the kernel using the Uintr related system calls. A Uintr receiver is always a userspace task. A Uintr sender can be another userspace task, kernel or a device. 1) A receiver can register/unregister an interrupt handler using the Uintr receiver related syscalls. uintr_register_handler(handler, flags) uintr_unregister_handler(flags) 2) A syscall also allows a receiver to register a vector and create a user interrupt file descriptor - uintr_fd. uintr_fd = uintr_create_fd(vector, flags) Uintr can be useful in some of the usages where eventfd or signals are used for frequent userspace event notifications. The semantics of uintr_fd are somewhat similar to an eventfd() or the write end of a pipe. 3) Any sender with access to uintr_fd can use it to deliver events (in this case - interrupts) to a receiver. A sender task can manage its connection with the receiver using the sender related syscalls based on uintr_fd. uipi_index = uintr_register_sender(uintr_fd, flags) Using an FD abstraction provides a secure mechanism to connect with a receiver. The FD sharing and isolation mechanisms put in place by the kernel would extend to Uintr as well. 4a) After the initial setup, a sender task can use the SENDUIPI instruction along with the uipi_index to generate user IPIs without any kernel intervention. SENDUIPI <uipi_index> If the receiver is running (CPL=3), then the user interrupt is delivered directly without a kernel transition. If the receiver isn't running the interrupt is delivered when the receiver gets context switched back. If the receiver is blocked in the kernel, the user interrupt is delivered to the kernel which then unblocks the intended receiver to deliver the interrupt. 4b) If the sender is the kernel or a device, the uintr_fd can be passed onto the related kernel entity to allow them to setup a connection and then generate a user interrupt for event delivery. <The exact details of this API are still being worked upon.> For details of the user interface and associated system calls refer the Uintr man-pages draft: https://github.com/intel/uintr-linux-kernel/tree/rfc-v1/tools/uintr/manpages. We have also included the same content as patch 1 of this series to make it easier to review. Refer the Uintr compiler programming guide [4] for details on Uintr integration with GCC and Binutils. Kernel design choices ===================== Here are some of the reasons and trade-offs for the current design of the APIs. System call interface --------------------- Why a system call interface?: The 2 options we considered are using a char device at /dev or use system calls (current approach). A syscall approach avoids exposing a core cpu feature through a driver model. Also, we want to have a user interrupt FD per vector and share a single common interrupt handler among all vectors. This seems easier for the kernel and userspace to accomplish using a syscall based approach. Data sharing using user interrupts: Uintr doesn't include a mechanism to share/transmit data. The expectation is applications use existing data sharing mechanisms to share data and use Uintr only for signaling. An FD for each vector: A uintr_fd is assigned to each vector to allow fine grained priority and event management by the receiver. The alternative we considered was to allocate an FD to the interrupt handler and having that shared with the sender. However, that approach relies on the sender selecting the vector and moves the vector priority management to the sender. Also, if multiple senders want to send unique user interrupts they would need to coordinate the vector selection amongst them. Extending the APIs: Currently, the system calls are only extendable using the flags argument. We can add a variable size struct to some of the syscalls if needed. Extending existing mechanisms ----------------------------- Uintr can be beneficial in some of the usages where eventfd() or signals are used. Since Uintr is hardware-dependent, thread-specific and bypasses the kernel in the fast path, it makes extending existing mechanisms harder. Main issues with extending signals: Signal handlers are defined significantly differently than a User interrupt handler. An application needs to save/restore registers in a user interrupt handler and call uiret to return from it. Also, signals can be process directed (or thread directed) but user interrupts are always thread directed. Comparison of signals with User Interrupts: +=====================+===========================+===========================+ | | Signals | User Interrupts | +=====================+===========================+===========================+ | Stacks | Has alt stacks | Uses application stack | | | | (alternate stack option | | | | not yet enabled) | +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ | Registers state | Kernel manages incl. | App responsible (Use GCC | | | FPU/XSTATE area | 'interrupt' attribute for | | | | general purpose registers)| +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ | Blocking/Masking | sigprocmask(2)/sa_mask | CLUI instruction (No per | | | | vector masking) | +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ | Direction | Uni-directional | Uni-directional | +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ | Post event | kill(), signal(), | SENDUIPI <index> - index | | | sigqueue(), etc. | derived from uintr_fd | +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ | Target | Process-directed or | Thread-directed | | | thread-directed | | +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ | Fork/inheritance | Empty signal set | Nothing is inherited | +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ | Execv | Pending signals preserved | Nothing is inherited | +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ | Order of delivery | Undetermined | High to low vector numbers| | for multiple signals| | | +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ | Handler re-entry | All signals except the | No interrupts can cause | | | one being handled | handler re-entry. | +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ | Delivery feedback | 0 or -1 based on whether | No feedback on whether the| | | the signal was sent | interrupt was sent or | | | | received. | +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ Main issues with extending eventfd(): eventfd() has a counter value that is core to the API. User interrupts can't have an associated counter since the signaling happens at the user level and the hardware doesn't have a memory counter mechanism. Also, eventfd can be used for bi-directional signaling where as uintr_fd is uni-directional. Comparison of eventfd with uintr_fd: +====================+======================+==============================+ | | Eventfd | uintr_fd (User Interrupt FD) | +====================+======================+==============================+ | Object | Counter - uint64 | Receiver vector information | +--------------------+----------------------+------------------------------+ | Post event | write() to eventfd | SENDUIPI <index> - index | | | | derived from uintr_fd | +--------------------+----------------------+------------------------------+ | Receive event | read() on eventfd | Implicit - Handler is | | | | invoked with associated | | | | vector. | +--------------------+----------------------+------------------------------+ | Direction | Bi-directional | Uni-directional | +--------------------+----------------------+------------------------------+ | Data transmitted | Counter - uint64 | None | +--------------------+----------------------+------------------------------+ | Waiting for events | Poll() family of | No per vector wait. | | | syscalls | uintr_wait() allows waiting | | | | for all user interrupts | +--------------------+----------------------+------------------------------+ Security Model ============== User Interrupts is designed as an opt-in feature (unlike signals). The security model for user interrupts is intended to be similar to eventfd(). The general idea is that any sender with access to uintr_fd would be able to generate the associated interrupt vector for the receiver task that created the fd. Untrusted processes ------------------- The current implementation expects only trusted and cooperating processes to communicate using user interrupts. Coordination is expected between processes for a connection teardown. In situations where coordination doesn't happen (say, due to abrupt process exit), the kernel would end up keeping shared resources (like UPID) allocated to avoid faults. Currently, a sender can easily cause a denial of service for the receiver by generating a storm of user interrupts. A user interrupt handler is invoked with interrupts disabled, but upon execution of uiret, interrupts get enabled again by the hardware. This can lead to the handler being invoked again before normal execution can resume. There isn't a hardware mechanism to mask specific interrupt vectors. To enable untrusted processes to communicate, we need to add a per-vector masking option through another syscall (or maybe IOCTL). However, this can add some complexity to the kernel code. A vector can only be masked by modifying the UITT entries at the source. We need to be careful about races while removing and restoring the UPID from the UITT. Resource limits --------------- The maximum number of receiver-sender connections would be limited by the maximum number of open file descriptors and the size of the UITT. The UITT size is chosen as 4kB fixed size arbitrarily right now. We plan to make it dynamic and configurable in size. RLIMIT_MEMLOCK or ENOMEM should be triggered when the size limits have been hit. Main Opens ========== Blocking for interrupts ----------------------- User interrupts are delivered to applications immediately if they are running in userspace. If a receiver task has blocked in the kernel using the placeholder uintr_wait() syscall, the task would be woken up to deliver the user interrupt. However, if the task is blocked due to any other blocking calls like read(), sleep(), etc; the interrupt will only get delivered when the application gets scheduled again. We need to consider if applications need to receive User Interrupts as soon as they are posted (similar to signals) when they are blocked due to some other reason. Adding this capability would likely make the kernel implementation more complex. Interrupting system calls using User Interrupts would also mean we need to consider an SA_RESTART type of mechanism. We also need to evaluate if some of the signal handler related semantics in the kernel can be reused for User Interrupts. Sharing the User Interrupt Target Table (UITT) ---------------------------------------------- The current implementation assigns a unique UITT to each task. This assumes that User interrupts are used for point-to-point communication between 2 tasks. Also, this keeps the kernel implementation relatively simple. However, there are of benefits to sharing the UITT between threads of a multi-threaded application. One, they would see a consistent view of the UITT. i.e. SENDUIPI <index> would mean the same on all threads of the application. Also, each thread doesn't have to register itself using the common uintr_fd. This would simplify the userspace setup and make efficient use of kernel memory. The potential downside is that the kernel implementation to allocate, modify, expand and free the UITT would be more complex. A similar argument can be made for a set of processes that do a lot of IPC amongst them. They would prefer to have a shared UITT that lets them target any process from any process. With the current file descriptor based approach, the connection setup can be time consuming and somewhat cumbersome. We need to evaluate if this can be made simpler as well. Kernel page table isolation (KPTI) ---------------------------------- SENDUIPI is a special ring-3 instruction that makes a supervisor mode memory access to the UPID and UITT memory. The current patches need KPTI to be disabled for User IPIs to work. To make User IPI work with KPTI, we need to allocate these structures from a special memory region that has supervisor access but it is mapped into userspace. The plan is to implement a mechanism similar to LDT. Processors that support user interrupts are not affected by Meltdown so the auto mode of KPTI will default to off. Users who want to force enable KPTI will need to wait for a later version of this patch series to use user interrupts. Please let us know if you want the development of these patches to be prioritized (or deprioritized). FAQs ==== Q: What happens if a process is "surprised" by a user interrupt? A: For tasks that haven't registered with the kernel and requested for user interrupts aren't expected or able to receive to user interrupts. Q: Do user interrupts affect kernel scheduling? A: No. If a task is blocked waiting for user interrupts, when the kernel receives a notification on behalf of that task we only put it back on the runqueue. Delivery of a user interrupt in no way changes the scheduling priorities of a task. Q: Does the sender get to know if the interrupt was delivered? A: No. User interrupts only provides a posted interrupt delivery mechanism. If applications need to rely on whether the interrupt was delivered they should consider a userspace mechanism for feedback (like a shared memory counter or a user interrupt back to the sender). Q: Why is there no feedback on interrupt delivery? A: Being a posted interrupt delivery mechanism, the interrupt delivery happens in 2 steps: 1) The interrupt information is stored in a memory location (UPID). 2) The physical interrupt is delivered to the interrupt receiver. The 2nd step could happen immediately, after an extended period, or it might never happen based on the state of the receiver after step 1. (The receiver could have disabled interrupts, have been context switched out or it might have crashed during that time.) This makes it very hard for the hardware to reliably provide feedback upon execution of SENDUIPI. Q: Can user interrupts be nested? A: Yes. Using STUI instruction in the interrupt handler would allow new user interrupts to be delivered. However, there no TPR(thread priority register) like mechanism to allow only higher priority interrupts. Any user interrupt can be taken when nesting is enabled. Q: Can a task receive all pending user interrupts in one go? A: No. The hardware allows only one vector to be processed at a time. If a task is interested in knowing all the interrupts that are pending then we could add a syscall that provides the pending interrupts information. Q: Do the processes need to be pinned to a cpu? A: No. User interrupts will be routed correctly to whichever cpu the receiver is running on. The kernel updates the cpu information in the UPID during context switch. Q: Why are UPID and UITT allocated by the kernel? A: If allocated by user space, applications could misuse the UPID and UITT to write to unauthorized memory and generate interrupts on any cpu. The UPID and UITT are allocated by the kernel and accessed by the hardware with supervisor privilege. Patch structure for this series =============================== - Man-pages and Kernel documentation (patch 1,2) - Hardware enumeration (patch 3, 4) - User IPI kernel vector reservation (patch 5) - Syscall interface for interrupt receiver, sender and vector management(uintr_fd) (patch 6-12) - Basic selftests (patch 13) Along with the patches in this RFC, there are additional tests and samples that are available at: https://github.com/intel/uintr-linux-kernel/tree/rfc-v1 Links ===== [1]: https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/download/intel-archite… [2]: https://libevent.org/ [3]: https://github.com/axboe/liburing [4]: https://github.com/intel/uintr-compiler-guide/blob/uintr-gcc-11.1/UINTR-com… Sohil Mehta (13): x86/uintr/man-page: Include man pages draft for reference Documentation/x86: Add documentation for User Interrupts x86/cpu: Enumerate User Interrupts support x86/fpu/xstate: Enumerate User Interrupts supervisor state x86/irq: Reserve a user IPI notification vector x86/uintr: Introduce uintr receiver syscalls x86/process/64: Add uintr task context switch support x86/process/64: Clean up uintr task fork and exit paths x86/uintr: Introduce vector registration and uintr_fd syscall x86/uintr: Introduce user IPI sender syscalls x86/uintr: Introduce uintr_wait() syscall x86/uintr: Wire up the user interrupt syscalls selftests/x86: Add basic tests for User IPI .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 + Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/user-interrupts.rst | 107 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 20 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 5 + arch/x86/include/asm/irq_vectors.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 8 + arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 8 + arch/x86/include/asm/uintr.h | 76 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 61 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 17 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 20 +- arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/irq.c | 51 + arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 10 + arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/uintr_core.c | 880 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/uintr_fd.c | 300 ++++++ include/linux/syscalls.h | 8 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 15 +- kernel/sys_ni.c | 8 + scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 6 + tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile | 10 + tools/testing/selftests/x86/uintr.c | 147 +++ tools/uintr/manpages/0_overview.txt | 265 ++++++ tools/uintr/manpages/1_register_receiver.txt | 122 +++ .../uintr/manpages/2_unregister_receiver.txt | 62 ++ tools/uintr/manpages/3_create_fd.txt | 104 +++ tools/uintr/manpages/4_register_sender.txt | 121 +++ tools/uintr/manpages/5_unregister_sender.txt | 79 ++ tools/uintr/manpages/6_wait.txt | 59 ++ 42 files changed, 2626 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/user-interrupts.rst create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/uintr.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/uintr_core.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/uintr_fd.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/uintr.c create mode 100644 tools/uintr/manpages/0_overview.txt create mode 100644 tools/uintr/manpages/1_register_receiver.txt create mode 100644 tools/uintr/manpages/2_unregister_receiver.txt create mode 100644 tools/uintr/manpages/3_create_fd.txt create mode 100644 tools/uintr/manpages/4_register_sender.txt create mode 100644 tools/uintr/manpages/5_unregister_sender.txt create mode 100644 tools/uintr/manpages/6_wait.txt base-commit: 6880fa6c56601bb8ed59df6c30fd390cc5f6dd8f -- 2.33.0

3 years, 6 months

13
86
0 0

<> Advanced SEO plans <>

by Mehran

Off the shell SEO plans to increase your website`s SEO Metrics and Ranks within just 1 month See more details here https://liftmyrank.co/affordable-seo-services-small-businesses/ Unsubscribe: https://mgdots.co/unsubscribe/

3 years, 6 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v4 0/2] selftests: tpm2: Determine available PCR bank

by Stefan Berger

From: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> This series of patches fixes two issues with TPM2 selftest. - Determines available PCR banks for use by test cases - Resets DA lock on TPM2 to avoid subsequent test failures Stefan v4: - Switch to query TPM2_GET_CAP to determine the available PCR banks - Moved call to reset DA lock into finally branch at end of test - Dropped patch 3 v3: - Mention SHA-256 PCR bank as alternative in patch 1 description v2: - Clarified patch 1 description - Added patch 3 with support for SHA-384 and SHA-512 Stefan Berger (2): selftests: tpm2: Determine available PCR bank selftests: tpm2: Reset the dictionary attack lock tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2.py | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/tpm2/tpm2_tests.py | 31 ++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.31.1

3 years, 6 months

3
12
0 0

[PATCH bpf-next] test: selftests: remove unused various in sockmap_verdict_prog.c

by menglong8.dong＠gmail.com

From: Menglong Dong <imagedong(a)tencent.com> 'lport' and 'rport' in bpf_prog1() of sockmap_verdict_prog.c is not used, just remove them. Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <imagedong(a)tencent.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sockmap_parse_prog.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sockmap_parse_prog.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sockmap_parse_prog.c index 95d5b941bc1f..c9abfe3a11af 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sockmap_parse_prog.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sockmap_parse_prog.c @@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { void *data_end = (void *)(long) skb->data_end; void *data = (void *)(long) skb->data; - __u32 lport = skb->local_port; - __u32 rport = skb->remote_port; __u8 *d = data; int err; -- 2.34.1

3 years, 6 months

3
2
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-kselftest-mirror