On Mon, Oct 01, 2018 at 01:29:16PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
On Mon, Oct 1, 2018 at 12:42 PM Christian Brauner christian@brauner.io wrote:
On Mon, Oct 01, 2018 at 03:44:28PM +1000, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
On 2018-09-29, Jann Horn jannh@google.com wrote:
The problem is what happens if a folder you are walking through is concurrently moved out of the chroot. Consider the following scenario:
You attempt to open "C/../../etc/passwd" under the root "/A/B". Something else concurrently moves /A/B/C to /A/C. This can result in the following:
- You start the path walk and reach /A/B/C.
- The other process moves /A/B/C to /A/C. Your path walk is now at /A/C.
- Your path walk follows the first ".." up into /A. This is outside
the process root, but you never actually encountered the process root, so you don't notice. 4. Your path walk follows the second ".." up to /. Again, this is outside the process root, but you don't notice. 5. Your path walk walks down to /etc/passwd, and the open completes successfully. You now have an fd pointing outside your chroot.
If the root of your walk is below an attacker-controlled directory, this of course means that you lose instantly. If you point the root of the walk at a directory out of which a process in the container wouldn't be able to move the file, you're probably kinda mostly fine - as long as you know, for certain, that nothing else on the system would ever do that. But I still wouldn't feel good about that.
Please correct me if I'm wrong here (this is the first patch I've written for VFS). Isn't the retry/LOOKUP_REVAL code meant to handle this -- or does that only handle if a particular path component changes *while* it's being walked through? Is it possible for a path walk to succeed after a path component was unmounted (obviously you can't delete a directory path component since you'd get -ENOTEMPTY)?
If this is an issue for AT_THIS_ROOT, I believe this might also be an issue for AT_BENEATH since they are effectively both using the same nd->root trick (so you could similarly trick AT_BENEATH to not error out). So we'd need to figure out how to solve this problem in order for AT_BENEATH to be safe.
Speaking naively, doesn't it make sense to invalidate the walk if a path component was modified? Or is this something that would be far too costly with little benefit? What if we do more aggressive nd->root checks when resolving with AT_BENEATH or AT_THIS_ROOT (or if nd->root != current->mnt_ns->root)?
Regarding chroot attacks, I was aware of the trivial chroot-open-chroot-fchdir attack but I was not aware that there was a rename attack for chroot. Thanks for bringing this up!
I believe that the only way to robustly use this would be to point the dirfd at a mount point, such that you know that being moved out of the chroot is impossible because the mount point limits movement of directories under it. (Well, technically, it doesn't, but it ensures that if a directory does dangerously move away, the syscall fails.) It might make sense to hardcode this constraint in the implementation of AT_THIS_ROOT, to keep people from shooting themselves in the foot.
Unless I'm missing something, would this not also affect using a mountpoint as a dirfd-root (with MS_MOVE of an already-walked-through path component) -- or does MS_MOVE cause a rewalk in a way that rename does not?
I wouldn't mind tying AT_THIS_ROOT to only work on mountpoints (I thought that bind-mounts would be an issue but you also get -EXDEV when trying to rename across bind-mounts even if they are on the same underlying filesystem). But AT_BENEATH might be a more bitter pill to swallow. I'm not sure.
In the usecase of container runtimes, we wouldn't generally be doing resolution of attacker-controlled paths but it still definitely doesn't hurt to consider this part of the threat model -- to avoid foot-gunning as you've said. (There also might be some nested-container cases where you might want to do that.)
Currently most container runtimes try to do this resolution in userspace[1], causing many potential race conditions. In addition, the "obvious" alternative (actually performing a {ch,pivot_}root(2)) requires a fork+exec which is *very* costly if necessary for every filesystem operation involving a container.
Wait. fork() I understand, but why exec? And actually, you don't need a full fork() either, clone() lets you do this with some process parts shared. And then you also shouldn't need to use SCM_RIGHTS, just keep the file descriptor table shared. And why chroot()/pivot_root(), wouldn't you want to use setns()?
You're right about this -- for C runtimes. In Go we cannot do a raw clone() or fork() (if you do it manually with RawSyscall you'll end with broken runtime state). So you're forced to do fork+exec (which then means that you can't use CLONE_FILES and must use SCM_RIGHTS). Same goes for CLONE_VFORK.
(It should be noted that multi-threaded C runtimes have somewhat similar issues -- AFAIK you can technically only use AS-Safe glibc functions after a fork() but that's more of a theoretical concern here. If you just use raw syscalls there isn't an issue.)
As for why use setns() rather than pivot_root(), there are cases where you're operating on a container's image without a running container (think image extraction or snapshotting tools). In those cases, you would need to set up a dummy container process in order to setns() into its namespaces. You are right that setns() would be a better option if you want the truthful state of what mounts the container sees.
[I also don't like the idea of joining the user namespace of a malicious container unless it's necessary but that's probably just needless paranoia more than anything -- since you're not joining the pidns you aren't trivially addressable by a malicious container.]
// Ensure that we are non-dumpable. Together with // commit bfedb589252c, this ensures that container root // can't trace our child once it enters the container. // My patch // https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1451098351-8917-1-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net... // would make this unnecessary, but that patch didn't // land because Eric nacked it (for political reasons, // because people incorrectly claimed that this was a // security fix):
Unless I'm very much mistaken this was fixed by bfedb589252c ("mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks"). If you join a user namespace then processes within that user namespace won't have ptrace_may_access() permissions because your mm is owned by an ancestor user namespace -- only after exec() will you be traceable.
That is not _completely_ true. Iirc (Please someone do yell at me if I'm wrong!), this is as follows. You will in fact be dumpable as long as you don't set{g,u}id() to an effective uid that is different from the effective uid of the process that created the task. For example, if you clone(CLONE_NEWUSER) as an unprivileged user with uid and euid 1000 you are in fact dumpable and thus traceable *but* if you do a setuid(0) in the new task then you will end up with old->euid = 1000 and new->euid = 0 at which point the kernel will remove the dumpable flag and the creating process cannot trace you anymore (which has funny consequences for lsm isolation and sending fds around). Iiuc, The same logic applies when you do a setns() to another user namespace.
(Note that this is only true if your un-namespaced UID actually changes. If you create a user namespace and then write to its uid_map such that your namespaced UID is zero, that won't trigger this logic.)
The way I figured this works is that it actually only applies to the case where you're creating a user namespace as an unprivileged user. And even in that case you will retain dumpability in two cases: 1. mapping userns id 0 to <my-unpriv-host-uid> and any identity mapping, i.e. 2. mapping <my-unpriv-host-uid> to <my-unpriv-host-uid>
If you're creating a user namespace as root and set up mappings you should always retain the dumpable flag (I might not be remembering all corner-cases atm.) if you don't muck with capability sets and so on.