On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 11:59 AM Christian Brauner christian.brauner@ubuntu.com wrote:
This allows the seccomp notifier to continue a syscall.
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Recently we landed seccomp support for SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF (cf. [4]) which enables a process (watchee) to retrieve an fd for its seccomp filter. This fd can then be handed to another (usually more privileged) process (watcher). The watcher will then be able to receive seccomp messages about the syscalls having been performed by the watchee.
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This can be solved by telling seccomp to resume the syscall.
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@@ -780,8 +783,14 @@ static void seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall, list_del(&n.list); out: mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock);
/* Userspace requests to continue the syscall. */if (flags & SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE)return 0;syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current), err, ret);return -1;}
Seccomp currently expects the various seccomp return values to be fully ordered based on how much action the kernel should take against the requested syscall. Currently, the range of return values is basically divided into three regions: "block syscall in some way" (from SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS to SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF), "let ptrace decide" (SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) and "allow" (SECCOMP_RET_LOG and SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW). If SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF becomes able to allow syscalls, it will be able to override a negative decision from SECCOMP_RET_TRACE.
In practice, that's probably not a big deal, since I'm not aware of anyone actually using SECCOMP_RET_TRACE for security purposes, and on top of that, you'd have to allow ioctl(..., SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, ...) and seccomp() with SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER in your seccomp policy for this to work.
More interestingly, what about the case where two SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filters are installed? The most recently installed filter takes precedence if the return values's action parts are the same (and this is also documented in the manpage); so if a container engine installs a filter that always intercepts sys_foobar() (and never uses SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE), and then something inside the container also installs a filter that always intercepts sys_foobar() (and always uses SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE), the container engine's filter will become ineffective.
With my tendency to overcomplicate things, I'm thinking that maybe it might be a good idea to: - collect a list of all filters that returned SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, as well as the highest-precedence return value that was less strict than SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF - sequentially send notifications to all of the SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filters until one doesn't return SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE - if all returned SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE, go with the highest-precedence return value that was less strict than SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, or allow if no such return value was encountered
But perhaps, for now, it would also be enough to just expand the big fat warning note and tell people that if they allow the use of SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND and SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER in their filter, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF is bypassable. And if someone actually has a usecase where SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF should be secure and nested SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF support is needed, that more complicated logic could be added later?