+Eric Biederman too, who might be able to Ack this...
On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 06:00:04PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 7:50 PM Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com wrote:
On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 04:32:52PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
This patch is a part of a series that extends kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments.
In copy_mount_options a user address is being subtracted from TASK_SIZE. If the address is lower than TASK_SIZE, the size is calculated to not allow the exact_copy_from_user() call to cross TASK_SIZE boundary. However if the address is tagged, then the size will be calculated incorrectly.
Untag the address before subtracting.
Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz khalid.aziz@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino vincenzo.frascino@arm.com Reviewed-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov andreyknvl@google.com
fs/namespace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index 7660c2749c96..ec78f7223917 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -2994,7 +2994,7 @@ void *copy_mount_options(const void __user * data) * the remainder of the page. */ /* copy_from_user cannot cross TASK_SIZE ! */
size = TASK_SIZE - (unsigned long)data;
size = TASK_SIZE - (unsigned long)untagged_addr(data); if (size > PAGE_SIZE) size = PAGE_SIZE;I think this patch needs an ack from Al Viro (cc'ed).
-- Catalin
Hi Al,
Could you take a look and give your acked-by?
Thanks!