Linaro-mm-sig July 2024

linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org

19 participants
46 discussions

Re: [PATCH v7 03/16] dt-bindings: mfd: mediatek: Add codec property for MT6357 PMIC

by Krzysztof Kozlowski

On 22/07/2024 08:53, Alexandre Mergnat wrote: > Add the audio codec sub-device. This sub-device is used to set the > optional voltage values according to the hardware. > The properties are: > - Setup of microphone bias voltage. > - Setup of the speaker pin pull-down. > > Also, add the audio power supply property which is dedicated for > the audio codec sub-device. > > Signed-off-by: Alexandre Mergnat <amergnat(a)baylibre.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Best regards, Krzysztof

5 months

Re: [PATCH RFC 1/3] firmware: qcom: implement object invoke support

by Krzysztof Kozlowski

On 03/07/2024 07:57, Amirreza Zarrabi wrote: > Qualcomm TEE hosts Trusted Applications and Services that run in the > secure world. Access to these resources is provided using object > capabilities. A TEE client with access to the capability can invoke > the object and request a service. Similarly, TEE can request a service > from nonsecure world with object capabilities that are exported to secure > world. > > We provide qcom_tee_object which represents an object in both secure > and nonsecure world. TEE clients can invoke an instance of qcom_tee_object > to access TEE. TEE can issue a callback request to nonsecure world > by invoking an instance of qcom_tee_object in nonsecure world. > > Any driver in nonsecure world that is interested to export a struct (or a > service object) to TEE, requires to embed an instance of qcom_tee_object in > the relevant struct and implements the dispatcher function which is called > when TEE invoked the service object. > > We also provids simplified API which implements the Qualcomm TEE transport > protocol. The implementation is independent from any services that may > reside in nonsecure world. > > Signed-off-by: Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com> > --- > drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig | 14 + > drivers/firmware/qcom/Makefile | 2 + > drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/Makefile | 4 + > drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/async.c | 142 +++ > drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/core.c | 1139 ++++++++++++++++++++ > drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/core.h | 186 ++++ > .../qcom/qcom_object_invoke/qcom_scm_invoke.c | 22 + > .../firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/release_wq.c | 90 ++ > include/linux/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke.h | 233 ++++ > 9 files changed, 1832 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig > index 7f6eb4174734..103ab82bae9f 100644 > --- a/drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig > +++ b/drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig > @@ -84,4 +84,18 @@ config QCOM_QSEECOM_UEFISECAPP > Select Y here to provide access to EFI variables on the aforementioned > platforms. > > +config QCOM_OBJECT_INVOKE_CORE Let's avoid another rant from Linus and add here either proper defaults or dependencies. > + bool "Secure TEE Communication Support" > + help > + Various Qualcomm SoCs have a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) running > + in the Trust Zone. This module provides an interface to that via the > + capability based object invocation, using SMC calls. > + > + OBJECT_INVOKE_CORE allows capability based secure communication between > + TEE and VMs. Using OBJECT_INVOKE_CORE, kernel can issue calls to TEE or > + TAs to request a service or exposes services to TEE and TAs. It implements > + the necessary marshaling of messages with TEE. > + > + Select Y here to provide access to TEE. > + > endmenu > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/qcom/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/qc ... > + } else { > + /* TEE obtained the ownership of QCOM_TEE_OBJECT_TYPE_CB_OBJECT > + * input objects in 'u'. On further failure, TEE is responsible > + * to release them. > + */ > + > + oic->flags |= OIC_FLAG_QCOM_TEE; > + } > + > + /* Is it a callback request?! */ > + if (response_type != QCOM_TEE_RESULT_INBOUND_REQ_NEEDED) { > + if (!*result) { > + ret = update_args(u, oic); > + if (ret) { > + arg_for_each_output_object(i, u) > + put_qcom_tee_object(u[i].o); > + } > + } > + > + break; > + > + } else { > + oic->flags |= OIC_FLAG_BUSY; > + > + /* Before dispatching the request, handle any pending async requests. */ > + __fetch__async_reqs(oic); > + > + qcom_tee_object_invoke(oic, cb_msg); > + } > + } > + > + __fetch__async_reqs(oic); > + > +out: > + qcom_tee_object_invoke_ctx_uninit(oic); > + > + return ret; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(qcom_tee_object_do_invoke); > + > +/* Primordial Object. */ > +/* It is invoked by TEE for kernel services. */ > + > +static struct qcom_tee_object *primordial_object = NULL_QCOM_TEE_OBJECT; > +static DEFINE_MUTEX(primordial_object_lock); Oh my... except that it looks like undocumented ABI, please avoid file-scope variables. Best regards, Krzysztof

5 months

Re: [PATCH RFC 0/3] Implement Qualcomm TEE IPC and ioctl calls

by Dmitry Baryshkov

Adding TEE mailing list and maintainers to the CC list. Amirreza, please include them in future even if you are not going to use the framework. On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 09:16:48AM GMT, Amirreza Zarrabi wrote: > > > On 7/3/2024 9:36 PM, Dmitry Baryshkov wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 02, 2024 at 10:57:35PM GMT, Amirreza Zarrabi wrote: > >> Qualcomm TEE hosts Trusted Applications (TAs) and services that run in > >> the secure world. Access to these resources is provided using MinkIPC. > >> MinkIPC is a capability-based synchronous message passing facility. It > >> allows code executing in one domain to invoke objects running in other > >> domains. When a process holds a reference to an object that lives in > >> another domain, that object reference is a capability. Capabilities > >> allow us to separate implementation of policies from implementation of > >> the transport. > >> > >> As part of the upstreaming of the object invoke driver (called SMC-Invoke > >> driver), we need to provide a reasonable kernel API and UAPI. The clear > >> option is to use TEE subsystem and write a back-end driver, however the > >> TEE subsystem doesn't fit with the design of Qualcomm TEE. > >> > > To answer your "general comment", maybe a bit of background :). > > Traditionally, policy enforcement is based on access-control models, > either (1) access-control list or (2) capability [0]. A capability is an > opaque ("non-forge-able") object reference that grants the holder the > right to perform certain operations on the object (e.g. Read, Write, > Execute, or Grant). Capabilities are preferred mechanism for representing > a policy, due to their fine-grained representation of access right, inline > with > (P1) the principle of least privilege [1], and > (P2) the ability to avoid the confused deputy problem [2]. > > [0] Jack B. Dennis and Earl C. Van Horn. 1966. Programming Semantics for > Multiprogrammed Computations. Commun. ACM 9 (1966), 143–155. > > [1] Jerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder. 1975. The Protection of > Information in Computer Systems. Proc. IEEE 63 (1975), 1278–1308. > > [2] Norm Hardy. 1988. The Confused Deputy (or Why Capabilities Might Have > Been Invented). ACM Operating Systems Review 22, 4 (1988), 36–38. > > For MinkIPC, an object represents a TEE or TA service. The reference to > the object is the "handle" that is returned from TEE (let's call it > TEE-Handle). The supported operations are "service invocation" (similar > to Execute), and "sharing access to a service" (similar to Grant). > Anyone with access to the TEE-Handle can invoke the service or pass the > TEE-Handle to someone else to access the same service. > > The responsibility of the MinkIPC framework is to hide the TEE-Handle, > so that the client can not forge it, and allow the owner of the handle > to transfer it to other clients as it wishes. Using a file descriptor > table we can achieve that. We wrap the TEE-Handle as a FD and let the > client invoke FD (e.g. using IOCTL), or transfer the FD (e.g. using > UNIX socket). > > As a side note, for the sake of completeness, capabilities are fundamentally > a "discretionary mechanism", as the holder of the object reference has the > ability to share it with others. A secure system requires "mandatory > enforcement" (i.e. ability to revoke authority and ability to control > the authority propagation). This is out of scope for the MinkIPC. > MinkIPC is only interested in P1 and P2 (mention above). > > > >> Does TEE subsystem fit requirements of a capability based system? > >> ----------------------------------------------------------------- > >> In TEE subsystem, to invoke a function: > >> - client should open a device file "/dev/teeX", > >> - create a session with a TA, and > >> - invoke the functions in that session. > >> > >> 1. The privilege to invoke a function is determined by a session. If a > >> client has a session, it cannot share it with other clients. Even if > >> it does, it is not fine-grained enough, i.e. either all accessible > >> functions/resources in a session or none. Assume a scenario when a client > >> wants to grant a permission to invoke just a function that it has the rights, > >> to another client. > >> > >> The "all or nothing" for sharing sessions is not in line with our > >> capability system: "if you own a capability, you should be able to grant > >> or share it". > > > > Can you please be more specific here? What kind of sharing is expected > > on the user side of it? > > In MinkIPC, after authenticating a client credential, a TA (or TEE) may > return multiple TEE-Handles, each representing a service that the client > has privilege to access. The client should be able to "individually" > reference each TEE-Handle, e.g. to invoke and share it (as per capability- > based system requirements). > > If we use TEE subsystem, which has a session based design, all TEE-Handles > are meaningful with respect to the session in which they are allocated, > hence the use of "__u32 session" in "struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg". > > Here, we have a contradiction with MinkIPC. We may ignore the session > and say "even though a TEE-Handle is allocated in a session but it is also > valid outside a session", i.e. the session-id in TEE uapi becomes redundant > (a case of divergence from definition). > > > > >> 2. In TEE subsystem, resources are managed in a context. Every time a > >> client opens "/dev/teeX", a new context is created to keep track of > >> the allocated resources, including opened sessions and remote objects. Any > >> effort for sharing resources between two independent clients requires > >> involvement of context manager, i.e. the back-end driver. This requires > >> implementing some form of policy in the back-end driver. > > > > What kind of resource sharing? > > TEE subsystem "rightfully" allocates a context each time a client opens > a device file. This context pass around to the backend driver to identify > independent clients that opened the device file. > > The context is used by backend driver to keep track of the resources. Type > of resources are TEE driver dependent. As an example of resource in TEE > subsystem, you can look into 'shm' register and unregister (specially, > see comment in function 'shm_alloc_helper'). > > For MinkIPC, all clients are treated the same and the TEE-Handles are > representative of the resources, accessible "globally" if a client has the > capability for them. In kernel, clients access an object if they have > access to "qcom_tee_object", in userspace, clients access an object if > they have the FD wrapper for the TEE-Handle. > > If we use context, instead of the file descriptor table, any form of object > transfer requires involvement of the backend driver. If we use the file > descriptor table, contexts are becoming useless for MinkIPC (i.e. > 'ctx->data' will "always" be null). > > > > >> 3. The TEE subsystem supports two type of memory sharing: > >> - per-device memory pools, and > >> - user defined memory references. > >> User defined memory references are private to the application and cannot > >> be shared. Memory allocated from per-device "shared" pools are accessible > >> using a file descriptor. It can be mapped by any process if it has > >> access to it. This means, we cannot provide the resource isolation > >> between two clients. Assume a scenario when a client wants to allocate a > >> memory (which is shared with TEE) from an "isolated" pool and share it > >> with another client, without the right to access the contents of memory. > > > > This doesn't explain, why would it want to share such memory with > > another client. > > Ok, I believe there is a misunderstanding here. I did not try to justify > specific usecase. We want to separate the memory allocation from the > framework. This way, how the memory is obtained, e.g. it is allocated > (1) from an isolated pool, (2) a shared pool, (3) a secure heap, > (4) a system dma-heap, (5) process address space, or (6) other memory > with "different constraints", becomes independent. > > We introduced "memory object" type. User implements a kernel service > using "qcom_tee_object" to represent the memory object. We have an > implementation of memory objects based on dma-buf. > > > > >> 4. The kernel API provided by TEE subsystem does not support a kernel > >> supplicant. Adding support requires an execution context (e.g. a > >> kernel thread) due to the TEE subsystem design. tee_driver_ops supports > >> only "send" and "receive" callbacks and to deliver a request, someone > >> should wait on "receive". > > > > There is nothing wrong here, but maybe I'm misunderstanding something. > > I agree. But, I am trying to re-emphasize how useful TEE subsystem is > for MinkIPC. For kernel services, we solely rely on the backend driver. > For instance, to expose RPMB service we will use "qcom_tee_object". > So there is nothing provided by the framework to simplify the service > development. > > > > >> We need a callback to "dispatch" or "handle" a request in the context of > >> the client thread. It should redirect a request to a kernel service or > >> a user supplicant. In TEE subsystem such requirement should be implemented > >> in TEE back-end driver, independent from the TEE subsystem. > >> > >> 5. The UAPI provided by TEE subsystem is similar to the GPTEE Client > >> interface. This interface is not suitable for a capability system. > >> For instance, there is no session in a capability system which means > >> either its should not be used, or we should overload its definition. > > > > General comment: maybe adding more detailed explanation of how the > > capabilities are aquired and how they can be used might make sense. > > > > BTW. It might be my imperfect English, but each time I see the word > > 'capability' I'm thinking that some is capable of doing something. I > > find it hard to use 'capability' for the reference to another object. > > > > Explained at the top :). > > >> > >> Can we use TEE subsystem? > >> ------------------------- > >> There are workarounds for some of the issues above. The question is if we > >> should define our own UAPI or try to use a hack-y way of fitting into > >> the TEE subsystem. I am using word hack-y, as most of the workaround > >> involves: > >> > >> - "diverging from the definition". For instance, ignoring the session > >> open and close ioctl calls or use file descriptors for all remote > >> resources (as, fd is the closet to capability) which undermines the > >> isolation provided by the contexts, > >> > >> - "overloading the variables". For instance, passing object ID as file > >> descriptors in a place of session ID, or > >> > >> - "bypass TEE subsystem". For instance, extensively rely on meta > >> parameters or push everything (e.g. kernel services) to the back-end > >> driver, which means leaving almost all TEE subsystem unused. > >> > >> We cannot take the full benefits of TEE subsystem and may need to > >> implement most of the requirements in the back-end driver. Also, as > >> discussed above, the UAPI is not suitable for capability-based use cases. > >> We proposed a new set of ioctl calls for SMC-Invoke driver. > >> > >> In this series we posted three patches. We implemented a transport > >> driver that provides qcom_tee_object. Any object on secure side is > >> represented with an instance of qcom_tee_object and any struct exposed > >> to TEE should embed an instance of qcom_tee_object. Any, support for new > >> services, e.g. memory object, RPMB, userspace clients or supplicants are > >> implemented independently from the driver. > >> > >> We have a simple memory object and a user driver that uses > >> qcom_tee_object. > > > > Could you please point out any user for the uAPI? I'd like to understand > > how does it from from the userspace point of view. > > Sure :), I'll write up a test patch and send it in next series. > > Summary. > > TEE framework provides some nice facilities, including: > - uapi and ioctl interface, > - marshaling parameters and context management, > - memory mapping and sharing, and > - TEE bus and TA drivers. > > For, MinkIPC, we will not use any of them. The only usable piece, is uapi > interface which is not suitable for MinkIPC, as discussed above. > > > > >> > >> Signed-off-by: Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com> > >> --- > >> Amirreza Zarrabi (3): > >> firmware: qcom: implement object invoke support > >> firmware: qcom: implement memory object support for TEE > >> firmware: qcom: implement ioctl for TEE object invocation > >> > >> drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig | 36 + > >> drivers/firmware/qcom/Makefile | 2 + > >> drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/Makefile | 12 + > >> drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/async.c | 142 +++ > >> drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/core.c | 1139 ++++++++++++++++++ > >> drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/core.h | 186 +++ > >> .../qcom/qcom_object_invoke/qcom_scm_invoke.c | 22 + > >> .../firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/release_wq.c | 90 ++ > >> .../qcom/qcom_object_invoke/xts/mem_object.c | 406 +++++++ > >> .../qcom_object_invoke/xts/object_invoke_uapi.c | 1231 ++++++++++++++++++++ > >> include/linux/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke.h | 233 ++++ > >> include/uapi/misc/qcom_tee.h | 117 ++ > >> 12 files changed, 3616 insertions(+) > >> --- > >> base-commit: 74564adfd3521d9e322cfc345fdc132df80f3c79 > >> change-id: 20240702-qcom-tee-object-and-ioctls-6f52fde03485 > >> > >> Best regards, > >> -- > >> Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com> > >> > > -- With best wishes Dmitry

5 months

Re: [PATCH 1/2] dma-buf: heaps: DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC_READ_FILE framework

by Christoph Hellwig

On Thu, Jul 18, 2024 at 09:51:39AM +0800, Huan Yang wrote: > Yes, actually, if dma-buf want's to copy_file_range from a file, it need > change something in vfs_copy_file_range: No, it doesn't. copy_file_range is specifically designed to copy inside a single file system as already mentioned. The generic offload for copying between arbitrary FDs is splice and the sendfile convenience wrapper around it

5 months

Re: [PATCH 1/2] dma-buf: heaps: DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC_READ_FILE framework

by Daniel Vetter

On Tue, Jul 16, 2024 at 06:14:48PM +0800, Huan Yang wrote: > > 在 2024/7/16 17:31, Daniel Vetter 写道: > > [你通常不会收到来自 daniel.vetter(a)ffwll.ch 的电子邮件。请访问 https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification，以了解这一点为什么很重要] > > > > On Tue, Jul 16, 2024 at 10:48:40AM +0800, Huan Yang wrote: > > > I just research the udmabuf, Please correct me if I'm wrong. > > > > > > 在 2024/7/15 20:32, Christian König 写道: > > > > Am 15.07.24 um 11:11 schrieb Daniel Vetter: > > > > > On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 11:00:02AM +0200, Christian König wrote: > > > > > > Am 11.07.24 um 09:42 schrieb Huan Yang: > > > > > > > Some user may need load file into dma-buf, current > > > > > > > way is: > > > > > > > 1. allocate a dma-buf, get dma-buf fd > > > > > > > 2. mmap dma-buf fd into vaddr > > > > > > > 3. read(file_fd, vaddr, fsz) > > > > > > > This is too heavy if fsz reached to GB. > > > > > > You need to describe a bit more why that is to heavy. I can only > > > > > > assume you > > > > > > need to save memory bandwidth and avoid the extra copy with the CPU. > > > > > > > > > > > > > This patch implement a feature called DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC_READ_FILE. > > > > > > > User need to offer a file_fd which you want to load into > > > > > > > dma-buf, then, > > > > > > > it promise if you got a dma-buf fd, it will contains the file content. > > > > > > Interesting idea, that has at least more potential than trying > > > > > > to enable > > > > > > direct I/O on mmap()ed DMA-bufs. > > > > > > > > > > > > The approach with the new IOCTL might not work because it is a very > > > > > > specialized use case. > > > > > > > > > > > > But IIRC there was a copy_file_range callback in the file_operations > > > > > > structure you could use for that. I'm just not sure when and how > > > > > > that's used > > > > > > with the copy_file_range() system call. > > > > > I'm not sure any of those help, because internally they're all still > > > > > based > > > > > on struct page (or maybe in the future on folios). And that's the thing > > > > > dma-buf can't give you, at least without peaking behind the curtain. > > > > > > > > > > I think an entirely different option would be malloc+udmabuf. That > > > > > essentially handles the impendence-mismatch between direct I/O and > > > > > dma-buf > > > > > on the dma-buf side. The downside is that it'll make the permanently > > > > > pinned memory accounting and tracking issues even more apparent, but I > > > > > guess eventually we do need to sort that one out. > > > > Oh, very good idea! > > > > Just one minor correction: it's not malloc+udmabuf, but rather > > > > create_memfd()+udmabuf. > > Hm right, it's create_memfd() + mmap(memfd) + udmabuf > > > > > > And you need to complete your direct I/O before creating the udmabuf > > > > since that reference will prevent direct I/O from working. > > > udmabuf will pin all pages, so, if returned fd, can't trigger direct I/O > > > (same as dmabuf). So, must complete read before pin it. > > Why does pinning prevent direct I/O? I haven't tested, but I'd expect the > > rdma folks would be really annoyed if that's the case ... > > > > > But current way is use `memfd_pin_folios` to boost alloc and pin, so maybe > > > need suit it. > > > > > > > > > I currently doubt that the udmabuf solution is suitable for our > > > gigabyte-level read operations. > > > > > > 1. The current mmap operation uses faulting, so frequent page faults will be > > > triggered during reads, resulting in a lot of context switching overhead. > > > > > > 2. current udmabuf size limit is 64MB, even can change, maybe not good to > > > use in large size? > > Yeah that's just a figleaf so we don't have to bother about the accounting > > issue. > > > > > 3. The migration and adaptation of the driver is also a challenge, and > > > currently, we are unable to control it. > > Why does a udmabuf fd not work instead of any other dmabuf fd? That > > shouldn't matter for the consuming driver ... > > Hmm, our production's driver provider by other oem. I see many of they > implement > > their own dma_buf_ops. These may not be generic and may require them to > reimplement. Yeah, for exporting a buffer object allocated by that driver. But any competent gles/vk stack also supports importing dma-buf, and that should work with udmabuf exactly the same way as with a dma-buf allocated from the system heap. > > > Perhaps implementing `copy_file_range` would be more suitable for us. > > See my other mail, fundamentally these all rely on struct page being > > present, and dma-buf doesn't give you that. Which means you need to go > > below the dma-buf abstraction. And udmabuf is pretty much the thing for > > that, because it wraps normal struct page memory into a dmabuf. > Yes, udmabuf give this, I am very interested in whether the page provided by > udmabuf can trigger direct I/O. > > So, I'll give a test and report soon. > > > > And copy_file_range on the underlying memfd might already work, I haven't > > checked though. > > I have doubts. > > I recently tested and found that I need to modify many places in > vfs_copy_file_range in order to run the copy file range with DMA_BUF fd.(I > have managed to get it working, I'm talking about memfd, not dma-buf here. I think copy_file_range to dma-buf is as architecturally unsound as allowing O_DIRECT on the dma-buf mmap. Cheers, Sima > but I don't think the implementation is good enough, so I can't provide the > source code.) > > Maybe memfd can work or not, let's give it a test.:) > > Anyway, it's a good idea too. I currently need to focus on whether it can be > achieved, as well as the performance comparison. > > > > > Cheers, Sima > > -- > > Daniel Vetter > > Software Engineer, Intel Corporation > > http://blog.ffwll.ch/ -- Daniel Vetter Software Engineer, Intel Corporation http://blog.ffwll.ch

5 months

Re: [PATCH 1/2] dma-buf: heaps: DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC_READ_FILE framework

by Daniel Vetter

On Tue, Jul 16, 2024 at 10:48:40AM +0800, Huan Yang wrote: > I just research the udmabuf, Please correct me if I'm wrong. > > 在 2024/7/15 20:32, Christian König 写道: > > Am 15.07.24 um 11:11 schrieb Daniel Vetter: > > > On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 11:00:02AM +0200, Christian König wrote: > > > > Am 11.07.24 um 09:42 schrieb Huan Yang: > > > > > Some user may need load file into dma-buf, current > > > > > way is: > > > > > 1. allocate a dma-buf, get dma-buf fd > > > > > 2. mmap dma-buf fd into vaddr > > > > > 3. read(file_fd, vaddr, fsz) > > > > > This is too heavy if fsz reached to GB. > > > > You need to describe a bit more why that is to heavy. I can only > > > > assume you > > > > need to save memory bandwidth and avoid the extra copy with the CPU. > > > > > > > > > This patch implement a feature called DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC_READ_FILE. > > > > > User need to offer a file_fd which you want to load into > > > > > dma-buf, then, > > > > > it promise if you got a dma-buf fd, it will contains the file content. > > > > Interesting idea, that has at least more potential than trying > > > > to enable > > > > direct I/O on mmap()ed DMA-bufs. > > > > > > > > The approach with the new IOCTL might not work because it is a very > > > > specialized use case. > > > > > > > > But IIRC there was a copy_file_range callback in the file_operations > > > > structure you could use for that. I'm just not sure when and how > > > > that's used > > > > with the copy_file_range() system call. > > > I'm not sure any of those help, because internally they're all still > > > based > > > on struct page (or maybe in the future on folios). And that's the thing > > > dma-buf can't give you, at least without peaking behind the curtain. > > > > > > I think an entirely different option would be malloc+udmabuf. That > > > essentially handles the impendence-mismatch between direct I/O and > > > dma-buf > > > on the dma-buf side. The downside is that it'll make the permanently > > > pinned memory accounting and tracking issues even more apparent, but I > > > guess eventually we do need to sort that one out. > > > > Oh, very good idea! > > Just one minor correction: it's not malloc+udmabuf, but rather > > create_memfd()+udmabuf. Hm right, it's create_memfd() + mmap(memfd) + udmabuf > > And you need to complete your direct I/O before creating the udmabuf > > since that reference will prevent direct I/O from working. > > udmabuf will pin all pages, so, if returned fd, can't trigger direct I/O > (same as dmabuf). So, must complete read before pin it. Why does pinning prevent direct I/O? I haven't tested, but I'd expect the rdma folks would be really annoyed if that's the case ... > But current way is use `memfd_pin_folios` to boost alloc and pin, so maybe > need suit it. > > > I currently doubt that the udmabuf solution is suitable for our > gigabyte-level read operations. > > 1. The current mmap operation uses faulting, so frequent page faults will be > triggered during reads, resulting in a lot of context switching overhead. > > 2. current udmabuf size limit is 64MB, even can change, maybe not good to > use in large size? Yeah that's just a figleaf so we don't have to bother about the accounting issue. > 3. The migration and adaptation of the driver is also a challenge, and > currently, we are unable to control it. Why does a udmabuf fd not work instead of any other dmabuf fd? That shouldn't matter for the consuming driver ... > Perhaps implementing `copy_file_range` would be more suitable for us. See my other mail, fundamentally these all rely on struct page being present, and dma-buf doesn't give you that. Which means you need to go below the dma-buf abstraction. And udmabuf is pretty much the thing for that, because it wraps normal struct page memory into a dmabuf. And copy_file_range on the underlying memfd might already work, I haven't checked though. Cheers, Sima -- Daniel Vetter Software Engineer, Intel Corporation http://blog.ffwll.ch

5 months, 1 week

Re: [PATCH RFC 0/3] Implement Qualcomm TEE IPC and ioctl calls

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 1:17 AM Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com> wrote: > > > > On 7/3/2024 9:36 PM, Dmitry Baryshkov wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 02, 2024 at 10:57:35PM GMT, Amirreza Zarrabi wrote: > >> Qualcomm TEE hosts Trusted Applications (TAs) and services that run in > >> the secure world. Access to these resources is provided using MinkIPC. > >> MinkIPC is a capability-based synchronous message passing facility. It > >> allows code executing in one domain to invoke objects running in other > >> domains. When a process holds a reference to an object that lives in > >> another domain, that object reference is a capability. Capabilities > >> allow us to separate implementation of policies from implementation of > >> the transport. > >> > >> As part of the upstreaming of the object invoke driver (called SMC-Invoke > >> driver), we need to provide a reasonable kernel API and UAPI. The clear > >> option is to use TEE subsystem and write a back-end driver, however the > >> TEE subsystem doesn't fit with the design of Qualcomm TEE. > >> > > To answer your "general comment", maybe a bit of background :). > > Traditionally, policy enforcement is based on access-control models, > either (1) access-control list or (2) capability [0]. A capability is an > opaque ("non-forge-able") object reference that grants the holder the > right to perform certain operations on the object (e.g. Read, Write, > Execute, or Grant). Capabilities are preferred mechanism for representing > a policy, due to their fine-grained representation of access right, inline > with > (P1) the principle of least privilege [1], and > (P2) the ability to avoid the confused deputy problem [2]. > > [0] Jack B. Dennis and Earl C. Van Horn. 1966. Programming Semantics for > Multiprogrammed Computations. Commun. ACM 9 (1966), 143–155. > > [1] Jerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder. 1975. The Protection of > Information in Computer Systems. Proc. IEEE 63 (1975), 1278–1308. > > [2] Norm Hardy. 1988. The Confused Deputy (or Why Capabilities Might Have > Been Invented). ACM Operating Systems Review 22, 4 (1988), 36–38. > > For MinkIPC, an object represents a TEE or TA service. The reference to > the object is the "handle" that is returned from TEE (let's call it > TEE-Handle). The supported operations are "service invocation" (similar > to Execute), and "sharing access to a service" (similar to Grant). > Anyone with access to the TEE-Handle can invoke the service or pass the > TEE-Handle to someone else to access the same service. > > The responsibility of the MinkIPC framework is to hide the TEE-Handle, > so that the client can not forge it, and allow the owner of the handle > to transfer it to other clients as it wishes. Using a file descriptor > table we can achieve that. We wrap the TEE-Handle as a FD and let the > client invoke FD (e.g. using IOCTL), or transfer the FD (e.g. using > UNIX socket). > > As a side note, for the sake of completeness, capabilities are fundamentally > a "discretionary mechanism", as the holder of the object reference has the > ability to share it with others. A secure system requires "mandatory > enforcement" (i.e. ability to revoke authority and ability to control > the authority propagation). This is out of scope for the MinkIPC. > MinkIPC is only interested in P1 and P2 (mention above). This is still quite abstract. We have tried to avoid inventing yet another IPC mechanism in the TEE subsystem. But that's not written in stone if it turns out there's a use case that needs it. > > > >> Does TEE subsystem fit requirements of a capability based system? > >> ----------------------------------------------------------------- > >> In TEE subsystem, to invoke a function: > >> - client should open a device file "/dev/teeX", > >> - create a session with a TA, and > >> - invoke the functions in that session. > >> > >> 1. The privilege to invoke a function is determined by a session. If a > >> client has a session, it cannot share it with other clients. Even if > >> it does, it is not fine-grained enough, i.e. either all accessible > >> functions/resources in a session or none. Assume a scenario when a client > >> wants to grant a permission to invoke just a function that it has the rights, > >> to another client. > >> > >> The "all or nothing" for sharing sessions is not in line with our > >> capability system: "if you own a capability, you should be able to grant > >> or share it". > > > > Can you please be more specific here? What kind of sharing is expected > > on the user side of it? > > In MinkIPC, after authenticating a client credential, a TA (or TEE) may > return multiple TEE-Handles, each representing a service that the client > has privilege to access. The client should be able to "individually" > reference each TEE-Handle, e.g. to invoke and share it (as per capability- > based system requirements). > > If we use TEE subsystem, which has a session based design, all TEE-Handles > are meaningful with respect to the session in which they are allocated, > hence the use of "__u32 session" in "struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg". > > Here, we have a contradiction with MinkIPC. We may ignore the session > and say "even though a TEE-Handle is allocated in a session but it is also > valid outside a session", i.e. the session-id in TEE uapi becomes redundant > (a case of divergence from definition). Only the backend drivers put a meaning to a session, the TEE subsystem doesn't enforce anything. All fields but num_params and params in struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg are only interpreted by the backend driver if I recall correctly. Using the fields for something completely different would be confusing so if struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg isn't matching well enough we might need a new IOCTL for whatever you have in mind. > > > > >> 2. In TEE subsystem, resources are managed in a context. Every time a > >> client opens "/dev/teeX", a new context is created to keep track of > >> the allocated resources, including opened sessions and remote objects. Any > >> effort for sharing resources between two independent clients requires > >> involvement of context manager, i.e. the back-end driver. This requires > >> implementing some form of policy in the back-end driver. > > > > What kind of resource sharing? > > TEE subsystem "rightfully" allocates a context each time a client opens > a device file. This context pass around to the backend driver to identify > independent clients that opened the device file. > > The context is used by backend driver to keep track of the resources. Type > of resources are TEE driver dependent. As an example of resource in TEE > subsystem, you can look into 'shm' register and unregister (specially, > see comment in function 'shm_alloc_helper'). > > For MinkIPC, all clients are treated the same and the TEE-Handles are > representative of the resources, accessible "globally" if a client has the > capability for them. In kernel, clients access an object if they have > access to "qcom_tee_object", in userspace, clients access an object if > they have the FD wrapper for the TEE-Handle. So if a client has a file descriptor representing a TEE-Handle, then it has the capability to access a TEE-object? Is the kernel controlling anything more about these capabilities? > > If we use context, instead of the file descriptor table, any form of object > transfer requires involvement of the backend driver. If we use the file > descriptor table, contexts are becoming useless for MinkIPC (i.e. > 'ctx->data' will "always" be null). You still need to open a device to be able to create TEE-handles. > > > > >> 3. The TEE subsystem supports two type of memory sharing: > >> - per-device memory pools, and > >> - user defined memory references. > >> User defined memory references are private to the application and cannot > >> be shared. Memory allocated from per-device "shared" pools are accessible > >> using a file descriptor. It can be mapped by any process if it has > >> access to it. This means, we cannot provide the resource isolation > >> between two clients. Assume a scenario when a client wants to allocate a > >> memory (which is shared with TEE) from an "isolated" pool and share it > >> with another client, without the right to access the contents of memory. > > > > This doesn't explain, why would it want to share such memory with > > another client. > > Ok, I believe there is a misunderstanding here. I did not try to justify > specific usecase. We want to separate the memory allocation from the > framework. This way, how the memory is obtained, e.g. it is allocated > (1) from an isolated pool, (2) a shared pool, (3) a secure heap, > (4) a system dma-heap, (5) process address space, or (6) other memory > with "different constraints", becomes independent. Especially points 3 and 4 are of great interest for the TEE Subsystem. > > We introduced "memory object" type. User implements a kernel service > using "qcom_tee_object" to represent the memory object. We have an > implementation of memory objects based on dma-buf. Do you have an idea of what it would take to extend to TEE subsystem to cover this? > > > > >> 4. The kernel API provided by TEE subsystem does not support a kernel > >> supplicant. Adding support requires an execution context (e.g. a > >> kernel thread) due to the TEE subsystem design. tee_driver_ops supports > >> only "send" and "receive" callbacks and to deliver a request, someone > >> should wait on "receive". So far we haven't needed a kernel thread, but if you need one feel free to propose something. > > > > There is nothing wrong here, but maybe I'm misunderstanding something. > > I agree. But, I am trying to re-emphasize how useful TEE subsystem is > for MinkIPC. For kernel services, we solely rely on the backend driver. > For instance, to expose RPMB service we will use "qcom_tee_object". > So there is nothing provided by the framework to simplify the service > development. The same is true for all backend drivers. > > > > >> We need a callback to "dispatch" or "handle" a request in the context of > >> the client thread. It should redirect a request to a kernel service or > >> a user supplicant. In TEE subsystem such requirement should be implemented > >> in TEE back-end driver, independent from the TEE subsystem. > >> > >> 5. The UAPI provided by TEE subsystem is similar to the GPTEE Client > >> interface. This interface is not suitable for a capability system. > >> For instance, there is no session in a capability system which means > >> either its should not be used, or we should overload its definition. Not using the session field doesn't seem like such a big obstacle. Overloading it for something different might be messy. We can add a new IOCTL if needed as I mentioned above. > > > > General comment: maybe adding more detailed explanation of how the > > capabilities are aquired and how they can be used might make sense. > > > > BTW. It might be my imperfect English, but each time I see the word > > 'capability' I'm thinking that some is capable of doing something. I > > find it hard to use 'capability' for the reference to another object. > > > > Explained at the top :). > > >> > >> Can we use TEE subsystem? > >> ------------------------- > >> There are workarounds for some of the issues above. The question is if we > >> should define our own UAPI or try to use a hack-y way of fitting into > >> the TEE subsystem. I am using word hack-y, as most of the workaround > >> involves: Instead of hack-y workarounds, we should consider extending the TEE subsystem as needed. > >> > >> - "diverging from the definition". For instance, ignoring the session > >> open and close ioctl calls or use file descriptors for all remote > >> resources (as, fd is the closet to capability) which undermines the > >> isolation provided by the contexts, > >> > >> - "overloading the variables". For instance, passing object ID as file > >> descriptors in a place of session ID, or struct qcom_tee_object_invoke_arg and struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg are quite similar, there are only a few more fields in the latter and we are missing a TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_OBJECT. Does it make sense to have a direction on objects? > >> > >> - "bypass TEE subsystem". For instance, extensively rely on meta > >> parameters or push everything (e.g. kernel services) to the back-end > >> driver, which means leaving almost all TEE subsystem unused. The TEE subsystem is largely "bypassed" by all backend drivers, with the exception of some SHM handling. I'm sure the TEE subsystem can be extended to handle the "common" part of SHM handling needed by QTEE. > >> > >> We cannot take the full benefits of TEE subsystem and may need to > >> implement most of the requirements in the back-end driver. Also, as > >> discussed above, the UAPI is not suitable for capability-based use cases. > >> We proposed a new set of ioctl calls for SMC-Invoke driver. > >> > >> In this series we posted three patches. We implemented a transport > >> driver that provides qcom_tee_object. Any object on secure side is > >> represented with an instance of qcom_tee_object and any struct exposed > >> to TEE should embed an instance of qcom_tee_object. Any, support for new > >> services, e.g. memory object, RPMB, userspace clients or supplicants are > >> implemented independently from the driver. > >> > >> We have a simple memory object and a user driver that uses > >> qcom_tee_object. > > > > Could you please point out any user for the uAPI? I'd like to understand > > how does it from from the userspace point of view. > > Sure :), I'll write up a test patch and send it in next series. > > Summary. > > TEE framework provides some nice facilities, including: > - uapi and ioctl interface, > - marshaling parameters and context management, > - memory mapping and sharing, and > - TEE bus and TA drivers. > > For, MinkIPC, we will not use any of them. The only usable piece, is uapi > interface which is not suitable for MinkIPC, as discussed above. I hope that we can change that. :-) For instance, extending the TEE subsystem with the memory-sharing QTEE needs could be useful for other TEE drivers. Cheers, Jens

5 months, 1 week

Re: [PATCH 1/2] dma-buf: heaps: DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC_READ_FILE framework

by Christian König

Am 11.07.24 um 09:42 schrieb Huan Yang: > Some user may need load file into dma-buf, current > way is: > 1. allocate a dma-buf, get dma-buf fd > 2. mmap dma-buf fd into vaddr > 3. read(file_fd, vaddr, fsz) > This is too heavy if fsz reached to GB. You need to describe a bit more why that is to heavy. I can only assume you need to save memory bandwidth and avoid the extra copy with the CPU. > This patch implement a feature called DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC_READ_FILE. > User need to offer a file_fd which you want to load into dma-buf, then, > it promise if you got a dma-buf fd, it will contains the file content. Interesting idea, that has at least more potential than trying to enable direct I/O on mmap()ed DMA-bufs. The approach with the new IOCTL might not work because it is a very specialized use case. But IIRC there was a copy_file_range callback in the file_operations structure you could use for that. I'm just not sure when and how that's used with the copy_file_range() system call. Regards, Christian. > > Notice, file_fd depends on user how to open this file. So, both buffer > I/O and Direct I/O is supported. > > Signed-off-by: Huan Yang <link(a)vivo.com> > --- > drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c | 525 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > include/linux/dma-heap.h | 57 +++- > include/uapi/linux/dma-heap.h | 32 +++ > 3 files changed, 611 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c > index 2298ca5e112e..abe17281adb8 100644 > --- a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c > +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c > @@ -15,9 +15,11 @@ > #include <linux/list.h> > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/nospec.h> > +#include <linux/highmem.h> > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > #include <linux/syscalls.h> > #include <linux/dma-heap.h> > +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> > #include <uapi/linux/dma-heap.h> > > #define DEVNAME "dma_heap" > @@ -43,12 +45,462 @@ struct dma_heap { > struct cdev heap_cdev; > }; > > +/** > + * struct dma_heap_file - wrap the file, read task for dma_heap allocate use. > + * @file: file to read from. > + * > + * @cred: kthread use, user cred copy to use for the read. > + * > + * @max_batch: maximum batch size to read, if collect match batch, > + * trigger read, default 128MB, must below file size. > + * > + * @fsz: file size. > + * > + * @direct: use direct IO? > + */ > +struct dma_heap_file { > + struct file *file; > + struct cred *cred; > + size_t max_batch; > + size_t fsz; > + bool direct; > +}; > + > +/** > + * struct dma_heap_file_work - represents a dma_heap file read real work. > + * @vaddr: contigous virtual address alloc by vmap, file read need. > + * > + * @start_size: file read start offset, same to @dma_heap_file_task->roffset. > + * > + * @need_size: file read need size, same to @dma_heap_file_task->rsize. > + * > + * @heap_file: file wrapper. > + * > + * @list: child node of @dma_heap_file_control->works. > + * > + * @refp: same @dma_heap_file_task->ref, if end of read, put ref. > + * > + * @failp: if any work io failed, set it true, pointp @dma_heap_file_task->fail. > + */ > +struct dma_heap_file_work { > + void *vaddr; > + ssize_t start_size; > + ssize_t need_size; > + struct dma_heap_file *heap_file; > + struct list_head list; > + atomic_t *refp; > + bool *failp; > +}; > + > +/** > + * struct dma_heap_file_task - represents a dma_heap file read process > + * @ref: current file work counter, if zero, allocate and read > + * done. > + * > + * @roffset: last read offset, current prepared work' begin file > + * start offset. > + * > + * @rsize: current allocated page size use to read, if reach rbatch, > + * trigger commit. > + * > + * @rbatch: current prepared work's batch, below @dma_heap_file's > + * batch. > + * > + * @heap_file: current dma_heap_file > + * > + * @parray: used for vmap, size is @dma_heap_file's batch's number > + * pages.(this is maximum). Due to single thread file read, > + * one page array reuse each work prepare is OK. > + * Each index in parray is PAGE_SIZE.(vmap need) > + * > + * @pindex: current allocated page filled in @parray's index. > + * > + * @fail: any work failed when file read? > + * > + * dma_heap_file_task is the production of file read, will prepare each work > + * during allocate dma_buf pages, if match current batch, then trigger commit > + * and prepare next work. After all batch queued, user going on prepare dma_buf > + * and so on, but before return dma_buf fd, need to wait file read end and > + * check read result. > + */ > +struct dma_heap_file_task { > + atomic_t ref; > + size_t roffset; > + size_t rsize; > + size_t rbatch; > + struct dma_heap_file *heap_file; > + struct page **parray; > + unsigned int pindex; > + bool fail; > +}; > + > +/** > + * struct dma_heap_file_control - global control of dma_heap file read. > + * @works: @dma_heap_file_work's list head. > + * > + * @lock: only lock for @works. > + * > + * @threadwq: wait queue for @work_thread, if commit work, @work_thread > + * wakeup and read this work's file contains. > + * > + * @workwq: used for main thread wait for file read end, if allocation > + * end before file read. @dma_heap_file_task ref effect this. > + * > + * @work_thread: file read kthread. the dma_heap_file_task work's consumer. > + * > + * @heap_fwork_cachep: @dma_heap_file_work's cachep, it's alloc/free frequently. > + * > + * @nr_work: global number of how many work committed. > + */ > +struct dma_heap_file_control { > + struct list_head works; > + spinlock_t lock; > + wait_queue_head_t threadwq; > + wait_queue_head_t workwq; > + struct task_struct *work_thread; > + struct kmem_cache *heap_fwork_cachep; > + atomic_t nr_work; > +}; > + > +static struct dma_heap_file_control *heap_fctl; > static LIST_HEAD(heap_list); > static DEFINE_MUTEX(heap_list_lock); > static dev_t dma_heap_devt; > static struct class *dma_heap_class; > static DEFINE_XARRAY_ALLOC(dma_heap_minors); > > +/** > + * map_pages_to_vaddr - map each scatter page into contiguous virtual address. > + * @heap_ftask: prepared and need to commit's work. > + * > + * Cached pages need to trigger file read, this function map each scatter page > + * into contiguous virtual address, so that file read can easy use. > + * Now that we get vaddr page, cached pages can return to original user, so we > + * will not effect dma-buf export even if file read not end. > + */ > +static void *map_pages_to_vaddr(struct dma_heap_file_task *heap_ftask) > +{ > + return vmap(heap_ftask->parray, heap_ftask->pindex, VM_MAP, > + PAGE_KERNEL); > +} > + > +bool dma_heap_prepare_file_read(struct dma_heap_file_task *heap_ftask, > + struct page *page) > +{ > + struct page **array = heap_ftask->parray; > + int index = heap_ftask->pindex; > + int num = compound_nr(page), i; > + unsigned long sz = page_size(page); > + > + heap_ftask->rsize += sz; > + for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) > + array[index++] = &page[i]; > + heap_ftask->pindex = index; > + > + return heap_ftask->rsize >= heap_ftask->rbatch; > +} > + > +static struct dma_heap_file_work * > +init_file_work(struct dma_heap_file_task *heap_ftask) > +{ > + struct dma_heap_file_work *heap_fwork; > + struct dma_heap_file *heap_file = heap_ftask->heap_file; > + > + if (READ_ONCE(heap_ftask->fail)) > + return NULL; > + > + heap_fwork = kmem_cache_alloc(heap_fctl->heap_fwork_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (unlikely(!heap_fwork)) > + return NULL; > + > + heap_fwork->vaddr = map_pages_to_vaddr(heap_ftask); > + if (unlikely(!heap_fwork->vaddr)) { > + kmem_cache_free(heap_fctl->heap_fwork_cachep, heap_fwork); > + return NULL; > + } > + > + heap_fwork->heap_file = heap_file; > + heap_fwork->start_size = heap_ftask->roffset; > + heap_fwork->need_size = heap_ftask->rsize; > + heap_fwork->refp = &heap_ftask->ref; > + heap_fwork->failp = &heap_ftask->fail; > + atomic_inc(&heap_ftask->ref); > + return heap_fwork; > +} > + > +static void destroy_file_work(struct dma_heap_file_work *heap_fwork) > +{ > + vunmap(heap_fwork->vaddr); > + atomic_dec(heap_fwork->refp); > + wake_up(&heap_fctl->workwq); > + > + kmem_cache_free(heap_fctl->heap_fwork_cachep, heap_fwork); > +} > + > +int dma_heap_submit_file_read(struct dma_heap_file_task *heap_ftask) > +{ > + struct dma_heap_file_work *heap_fwork = init_file_work(heap_ftask); > + struct page *last = NULL; > + struct dma_heap_file *heap_file = heap_ftask->heap_file; > + size_t start = heap_ftask->roffset; > + struct file *file = heap_file->file; > + size_t fsz = heap_file->fsz; > + > + if (unlikely(!heap_fwork)) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + /** > + * If file size is not page aligned, direct io can't process the tail. > + * So, if reach to tail, remain the last page use buffer read. > + */ > + if (heap_file->direct && start + heap_ftask->rsize > fsz) { > + heap_fwork->need_size -= PAGE_SIZE; > + last = heap_ftask->parray[heap_ftask->pindex - 1]; > + } > + > + spin_lock(&heap_fctl->lock); > + list_add_tail(&heap_fwork->list, &heap_fctl->works); > + spin_unlock(&heap_fctl->lock); > + atomic_inc(&heap_fctl->nr_work); > + > + wake_up(&heap_fctl->threadwq); > + > + if (last) { > + char *buf, *pathp; > + ssize_t err; > + void *buffer; > + > + buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (unlikely(!buf)) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + start = PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(fsz); > + > + pathp = file_path(file, buf, PATH_MAX); > + if (IS_ERR(pathp)) { > + kfree(buf); > + return PTR_ERR(pathp); > + } > + > + buffer = kmap_local_page(last); // use page's kaddr. > + err = kernel_read_file_from_path(pathp, start, &buffer, > + fsz - start, &fsz, > + READING_POLICY); > + kunmap_local(buffer); > + kfree(buf); > + if (err < 0) { > + pr_err("failed to use buffer kernel_read_file %s, err=%ld, [%ld, %ld], f_sz=%ld\n", > + pathp, err, start, fsz, fsz); > + > + return err; > + } > + } > + > + heap_ftask->roffset += heap_ftask->rsize; > + heap_ftask->rsize = 0; > + heap_ftask->pindex = 0; > + heap_ftask->rbatch = min_t(size_t, > + PAGE_ALIGN(fsz) - heap_ftask->roffset, > + heap_ftask->rbatch); > + return 0; > +} > + > +bool dma_heap_wait_for_file_read(struct dma_heap_file_task *heap_ftask) > +{ > + wait_event_freezable(heap_fctl->workwq, > + atomic_read(&heap_ftask->ref) == 0); > + return heap_ftask->fail; > +} > + > +bool dma_heap_destroy_file_read(struct dma_heap_file_task *heap_ftask) > +{ > + bool fail; > + > + dma_heap_wait_for_file_read(heap_ftask); > + fail = heap_ftask->fail; > + kvfree(heap_ftask->parray); > + kfree(heap_ftask); > + return fail; > +} > + > +struct dma_heap_file_task * > +dma_heap_declare_file_read(struct dma_heap_file *heap_file) > +{ > + struct dma_heap_file_task *heap_ftask = > + kzalloc(sizeof(*heap_ftask), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (unlikely(!heap_ftask)) > + return NULL; > + > + /** > + * Batch is the maximum size which we prepare work will meet. > + * So, direct alloc this number's page array is OK. > + */ > + heap_ftask->parray = kvmalloc_array(heap_file->max_batch >> PAGE_SHIFT, > + sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (unlikely(!heap_ftask->parray)) > + goto put; > + > + heap_ftask->heap_file = heap_file; > + heap_ftask->rbatch = heap_file->max_batch; > + return heap_ftask; > +put: > + kfree(heap_ftask); > + return NULL; > +} > + > +static void __work_this_io(struct dma_heap_file_work *heap_fwork) > +{ > + struct dma_heap_file *heap_file = heap_fwork->heap_file; > + struct file *file = heap_file->file; > + ssize_t start = heap_fwork->start_size; > + ssize_t size = heap_fwork->need_size; > + void *buffer = heap_fwork->vaddr; > + const struct cred *old_cred; > + ssize_t err; > + > + // use real task's cred to read this file. > + old_cred = override_creds(heap_file->cred); > + err = kernel_read_file(file, start, &buffer, size, &heap_file->fsz, > + READING_POLICY); > + if (err < 0) { > + pr_err("use kernel_read_file, err=%ld, [%ld, %ld], f_sz=%ld\n", > + err, start, (start + size), heap_file->fsz); > + WRITE_ONCE(*heap_fwork->failp, true); > + } > + // recovery to my cred. > + revert_creds(old_cred); > +} > + > +static int dma_heap_file_control_thread(void *data) > +{ > + struct dma_heap_file_control *heap_fctl = > + (struct dma_heap_file_control *)data; > + struct dma_heap_file_work *worker, *tmp; > + int nr_work; > + > + LIST_HEAD(pages); > + LIST_HEAD(workers); > + > + while (true) { > + wait_event_freezable(heap_fctl->threadwq, > + atomic_read(&heap_fctl->nr_work) > 0); > +recheck: > + spin_lock(&heap_fctl->lock); > + list_splice_init(&heap_fctl->works, &workers); > + spin_unlock(&heap_fctl->lock); > + > + if (unlikely(kthread_should_stop())) { > + list_for_each_entry_safe(worker, tmp, &workers, list) { > + list_del(&worker->list); > + destroy_file_work(worker); > + } > + break; > + } > + > + nr_work = 0; > + list_for_each_entry_safe(worker, tmp, &workers, list) { > + ++nr_work; > + list_del(&worker->list); > + __work_this_io(worker); > + > + destroy_file_work(worker); > + } > + atomic_sub(nr_work, &heap_fctl->nr_work); > + > + if (atomic_read(&heap_fctl->nr_work) > 0) > + goto recheck; > + } > + return 0; > +} > + > +size_t dma_heap_file_size(struct dma_heap_file *heap_file) > +{ > + return heap_file->fsz; > +} > + > +static int prepare_dma_heap_file(struct dma_heap_file *heap_file, int file_fd, > + size_t batch) > +{ > + struct file *file; > + size_t fsz; > + int ret; > + > + file = fget(file_fd); > + if (!file) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + fsz = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); > + if (fsz < batch) { > + ret = -EINVAL; > + goto err; > + } > + > + /** > + * Selinux block our read, but actually we are reading the stand-in > + * for this file. > + * So save current's cred and when going to read, override mine, and > + * end of read, revert. > + */ > + heap_file->cred = prepare_kernel_cred(current); > + if (unlikely(!heap_file->cred)) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto err; > + } > + > + heap_file->file = file; > + heap_file->max_batch = batch; > + heap_file->fsz = fsz; > + > + heap_file->direct = file->f_flags & O_DIRECT; > + > +#define DMA_HEAP_SUGGEST_DIRECT_IO_SIZE (1UL << 30) > + if (!heap_file->direct && fsz >= DMA_HEAP_SUGGEST_DIRECT_IO_SIZE) > + pr_warn("alloc read file better to use O_DIRECT to read larget file\n"); > + > + return 0; > + > +err: > + fput(file); > + return ret; > +} > + > +static void destroy_dma_heap_file(struct dma_heap_file *heap_file) > +{ > + fput(heap_file->file); > + put_cred(heap_file->cred); > +} > + > +static int dma_heap_buffer_alloc_read_file(struct dma_heap *heap, int file_fd, > + size_t batch, unsigned int fd_flags, > + unsigned int heap_flags) > +{ > + struct dma_buf *dmabuf; > + int fd; > + struct dma_heap_file heap_file; > + > + fd = prepare_dma_heap_file(&heap_file, file_fd, batch); > + if (fd) > + goto error_file; > + > + dmabuf = heap->ops->allocate_read_file(heap, &heap_file, fd_flags, > + heap_flags); > + if (IS_ERR(dmabuf)) { > + fd = PTR_ERR(dmabuf); > + goto error; > + } > + > + fd = dma_buf_fd(dmabuf, fd_flags); > + if (fd < 0) { > + dma_buf_put(dmabuf); > + /* just return, as put will call release and that will free */ > + } > + > +error: > + destroy_dma_heap_file(&heap_file); > +error_file: > + return fd; > +} > + > static int dma_heap_buffer_alloc(struct dma_heap *heap, size_t len, > u32 fd_flags, > u64 heap_flags) > @@ -93,6 +545,38 @@ static int dma_heap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) > return 0; > } > > +static long dma_heap_ioctl_allocate_read_file(struct file *file, void *data) > +{ > + struct dma_heap_allocation_file_data *heap_allocation_file = data; > + struct dma_heap *heap = file->private_data; > + int fd; > + > + if (heap_allocation_file->fd || !heap_allocation_file->file_fd) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (heap_allocation_file->fd_flags & ~DMA_HEAP_VALID_FD_FLAGS) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (heap_allocation_file->heap_flags & ~DMA_HEAP_VALID_HEAP_FLAGS) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (!heap->ops->allocate_read_file) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + fd = dma_heap_buffer_alloc_read_file( > + heap, heap_allocation_file->file_fd, > + heap_allocation_file->batch ? > + PAGE_ALIGN(heap_allocation_file->batch) : > + DEFAULT_ADI_BATCH, > + heap_allocation_file->fd_flags, > + heap_allocation_file->heap_flags); > + if (fd < 0) > + return fd; > + > + heap_allocation_file->fd = fd; > + return 0; > +} > + > static long dma_heap_ioctl_allocate(struct file *file, void *data) > { > struct dma_heap_allocation_data *heap_allocation = data; > @@ -121,6 +605,7 @@ static long dma_heap_ioctl_allocate(struct file *file, void *data) > > static unsigned int dma_heap_ioctl_cmds[] = { > DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC, > + DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC_AND_READ, > }; > > static long dma_heap_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ucmd, > @@ -170,6 +655,9 @@ static long dma_heap_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ucmd, > case DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC: > ret = dma_heap_ioctl_allocate(file, kdata); > break; > + case DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC_AND_READ: > + ret = dma_heap_ioctl_allocate_read_file(file, kdata); > + break; > default: > ret = -ENOTTY; > goto err; > @@ -316,11 +804,44 @@ static int dma_heap_init(void) > > dma_heap_class = class_create(DEVNAME); > if (IS_ERR(dma_heap_class)) { > - unregister_chrdev_region(dma_heap_devt, NUM_HEAP_MINORS); > - return PTR_ERR(dma_heap_class); > + ret = PTR_ERR(dma_heap_class); > + goto fail_class; > } > dma_heap_class->devnode = dma_heap_devnode; > > + heap_fctl = kzalloc(sizeof(*heap_fctl), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (unlikely(!heap_fctl)) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto fail_alloc; > + } > + > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&heap_fctl->works); > + init_waitqueue_head(&heap_fctl->threadwq); > + init_waitqueue_head(&heap_fctl->workwq); > + > + heap_fctl->work_thread = kthread_run(dma_heap_file_control_thread, > + heap_fctl, "heap_fwork_t"); > + if (IS_ERR(heap_fctl->work_thread)) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto fail_thread; > + } > + > + heap_fctl->heap_fwork_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(dma_heap_file_work, 0); > + if (unlikely(!heap_fctl->heap_fwork_cachep)) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto fail_cache; > + } > + > return 0; > + > +fail_cache: > + kthread_stop(heap_fctl->work_thread); > +fail_thread: > + kfree(heap_fctl); > +fail_alloc: > + class_destroy(dma_heap_class); > +fail_class: > + unregister_chrdev_region(dma_heap_devt, NUM_HEAP_MINORS); > + return ret; > } > subsys_initcall(dma_heap_init); > diff --git a/include/linux/dma-heap.h b/include/linux/dma-heap.h > index 064bad725061..9c25383f816c 100644 > --- a/include/linux/dma-heap.h > +++ b/include/linux/dma-heap.h > @@ -12,12 +12,17 @@ > #include <linux/cdev.h> > #include <linux/types.h> > > +#define DEFAULT_ADI_BATCH (128 << 20) > + > struct dma_heap; > +struct dma_heap_file_task; > +struct dma_heap_file; > > /** > * struct dma_heap_ops - ops to operate on a given heap > * @allocate: allocate dmabuf and return struct dma_buf ptr > - * > + * @allocate_read_file: allocate dmabuf and read file, then return struct > + * dma_buf ptr. > * allocate returns dmabuf on success, ERR_PTR(-errno) on error. > */ > struct dma_heap_ops { > @@ -25,6 +30,11 @@ struct dma_heap_ops { > unsigned long len, > u32 fd_flags, > u64 heap_flags); > + > + struct dma_buf *(*allocate_read_file)(struct dma_heap *heap, > + struct dma_heap_file *heap_file, > + u32 fd_flags, > + u64 heap_flags); > }; > > /** > @@ -65,4 +75,49 @@ const char *dma_heap_get_name(struct dma_heap *heap); > */ > struct dma_heap *dma_heap_add(const struct dma_heap_export_info *exp_info); > > +/** > + * dma_heap_destroy_file_read - waits for a file read to complete then destroy it > + * Returns: true if the file read failed, false otherwise > + */ > +bool dma_heap_destroy_file_read(struct dma_heap_file_task *heap_ftask); > + > +/** > + * dma_heap_wait_for_file_read - waits for a file read to complete > + * Returns: true if the file read failed, false otherwise > + */ > +bool dma_heap_wait_for_file_read(struct dma_heap_file_task *heap_ftask); > + > +/** > + * dma_heap_alloc_file_read - Declare a task to read file when allocate pages. > + * @heap_file: target file to read > + * > + * Return NULL if failed, otherwise return a struct pointer. > + */ > +struct dma_heap_file_task * > +dma_heap_declare_file_read(struct dma_heap_file *heap_file); > + > +/** > + * dma_heap_prepare_file_read - cache each allocated page until we meet this batch. > + * @heap_ftask: prepared and need to commit's work. > + * @page: current allocated page. don't care which order. > + * > + * Returns true if reach to batch, false so go on prepare. > + */ > +bool dma_heap_prepare_file_read(struct dma_heap_file_task *heap_ftask, > + struct page *page); > + > +/** > + * dma_heap_commit_file_read - prepare collect enough memory, going to trigger IO > + * @heap_ftask: info that current IO needs > + * > + * This commit will also check if reach to tail read. > + * For direct I/O submissions, it is necessary to pay attention to file reads > + * that are not page-aligned. For the unaligned portion of the read, buffer IO > + * needs to be triggered. > + * Returns: > + * 0 if all right, -errno if something wrong > + */ > +int dma_heap_submit_file_read(struct dma_heap_file_task *heap_ftask); > +size_t dma_heap_file_size(struct dma_heap_file *heap_file); > + > #endif /* _DMA_HEAPS_H */ > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/dma-heap.h b/include/uapi/linux/dma-heap.h > index a4cf716a49fa..8c20e8b74eed 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/dma-heap.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/dma-heap.h > @@ -39,6 +39,27 @@ struct dma_heap_allocation_data { > __u64 heap_flags; > }; > > +/** > + * struct dma_heap_allocation_file_data - metadata passed from userspace for > + * allocations and read file > + * @fd: will be populated with a fd which provides the > + * handle to the allocated dma-buf > + * @file_fd: file descriptor to read from(suggested to use O_DIRECT open file) > + * @batch: how many memory alloced then file read(bytes), default 128MB > + * will auto aligned to PAGE_SIZE > + * @fd_flags: file descriptor flags used when allocating > + * @heap_flags: flags passed to heap > + * > + * Provided by userspace as an argument to the ioctl > + */ > +struct dma_heap_allocation_file_data { > + __u32 fd; > + __u32 file_fd; > + __u32 batch; > + __u32 fd_flags; > + __u64 heap_flags; > +}; > + > #define DMA_HEAP_IOC_MAGIC 'H' > > /** > @@ -50,4 +71,15 @@ struct dma_heap_allocation_data { > #define DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC _IOWR(DMA_HEAP_IOC_MAGIC, 0x0,\ > struct dma_heap_allocation_data) > > +/** > + * DOC: DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC_AND_READ - allocate memory from pool and both > + * read file when allocate memory. > + * > + * Takes a dma_heap_allocation_file_data struct and returns it with the fd field > + * populated with the dmabuf handle of the allocation. When return, the dma-buf > + * content is read from file. > + */ > +#define DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC_AND_READ \ > + _IOWR(DMA_HEAP_IOC_MAGIC, 0x1, struct dma_heap_allocation_file_data) > + > #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_DMABUF_POOL_H */

5 months, 1 week

[PATCH 1/2] drm: Add might_fault to drm_modeset_lock priming

by Daniel Vetter

We already teach lockdep that dma_resv nests within drm_modeset_lock, but there's a lot more: All drm kms ioctl rely on being able to put/get_user while holding modeset locks, so we really need a might_fault in there too to complete the picture. Add it. Motivated by a syzbot report that blew up on bcachefs doing an unconditional console_lock way deep in the locking hierarchy, and lockdep only noticing the depency loop in a drm ioctl instead of much earlier. This annotation will make sure such issues have a much harder time escaping. References: https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/00000000000073db8b061cd43496@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter(a)intel.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard(a)kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal(a)linaro.org> Cc: "Christian König" <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Cc: linux-media(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: linaro-mm-sig(a)lists.linaro.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c index 568972258222..37d2e0a4ef4b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c @@ -456,6 +456,8 @@ int drmm_mode_config_init(struct drm_device *dev) if (ret == -EDEADLK) ret = drm_modeset_backoff(&modeset_ctx); + might_fault(); + ww_acquire_init(&resv_ctx, &reservation_ww_class); ret = dma_resv_lock(&resv, &resv_ctx); if (ret == -EDEADLK) -- 2.45.2

5 months, 1 week

Re: [PATCH 0/2] Support direct I/O read and write for memory allocated by dmabuf

by Christian König

Am 10.07.24 um 15:57 schrieb Lei Liu: > Use vm_insert_page to establish a mapping for the memory allocated > by dmabuf, thus supporting direct I/O read and write; and fix the > issue of incorrect memory statistics after mapping dmabuf memory. Well big NAK to that! Direct I/O is intentionally disabled on DMA-bufs. We already discussed enforcing that in the DMA-buf framework and this patch probably means that we should really do that. Regards, Christian. > > Lei Liu (2): > mm: dmabuf_direct_io: Support direct_io for memory allocated by dmabuf > mm: dmabuf_direct_io: Fix memory statistics error for dmabuf allocated > memory with direct_io support > > drivers/dma-buf/heaps/system_heap.c | 5 +++-- > fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 8 +++++++- > include/linux/mm.h | 1 + > mm/memory.c | 15 ++++++++++----- > mm/rmap.c | 9 +++++---- > 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) >

5 months, 1 week

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