Linaro-mm-sig September 2023

linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org

27 participants
17 discussions

[RFC PATCH] dma-buf/dma-fence: Use a successful read_trylock() annotation for dma_fence_begin_signalling()

by Thomas Hellström

Condsider the following call sequence: /* Upper layer */ dma_fence_begin_signalling(); lock(tainted_shared_lock); /* Driver callback */ dma_fence_begin_signalling(); ... The driver might here use a utility that is annotated as intended for the dma-fence signalling critical path. Now if the upper layer isn't correctly annotated yet for whatever reason, resulting in /* Upper layer */ lock(tainted_shared_lock); /* Driver callback */ dma_fence_begin_signalling(); We will receive a false lockdep locking order violation notification from dma_fence_begin_signalling(). However entering a dma-fence signalling critical section itself doesn't block and could not cause a deadlock. So use a successful read_trylock() annotation instead for dma_fence_begin_signalling(). That will make sure that the locking order is correctly registered in the first case, and doesn't register any locking order in the second case. The alternative is of course to make sure that the "Upper layer" is always correctly annotated. But experience shows that's not easily achievable in all cases. Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c index f177c56269bb..17f632768ef9 100644 --- a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c @@ -308,8 +308,8 @@ bool dma_fence_begin_signalling(void) if (in_atomic()) return true; - /* ... and non-recursive readlock */ - lock_acquire(&dma_fence_lockdep_map, 0, 0, 1, 1, NULL, _RET_IP_); + /* ... and non-recursive successful read_trylock */ + lock_acquire(&dma_fence_lockdep_map, 0, 1, 1, 1, NULL, _RET_IP_); return false; } @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ void __dma_fence_might_wait(void) lock_map_acquire(&dma_fence_lockdep_map); lock_map_release(&dma_fence_lockdep_map); if (tmp) - lock_acquire(&dma_fence_lockdep_map, 0, 0, 1, 1, NULL, _THIS_IP_); + lock_acquire(&dma_fence_lockdep_map, 0, 1, 1, 1, NULL, _THIS_IP_); } #endif -- 2.39.2

3 weeks, 3 days

[PATCH] drm/shmem-helper: Remove duplicate include

by Jiapeng Chong

./drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c: linux/module.h is included more than once. Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci(a)linux.alibaba.com> Link: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=4567 Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong(a)linux.alibaba.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c index 4ea6507a77e5..f401df26facf 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ #include <linux/shmem_fs.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> -#include <linux/module.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86 #include <asm/set_memory.h> -- 2.20.1.7.g153144c

5 months, 4 weeks

[syzbot] [dri?] KMSAN: uninit-value in drm_mode_setcrtc

by syzbot

Hello, syzbot found the following issue on: HEAD commit: 2741f1b02117 string: use __builtin_memcpy() in strlcpy/str.. git tree: https://github.com/google/kmsan.git master console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17bb33d1280000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=753079601b2300f9 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4fad2e57beb6397ab2fc compiler: Debian clang version 15.0.7, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=16d669a5280000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=14d8f095280000 Downloadable assets: disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/ebd05512d8d7/disk-2741f1b0.raw… vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/aa555b09582c/vmlinux-2741f1b0.… kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5ea0934e02cc/bzImage-2741f1b0.… IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: syzbot+4fad2e57beb6397ab2fc(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in drm_mode_setcrtc+0x1ad3/0x24a0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc.c:896 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x1ad3/0x24a0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc.c:896 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x5ae/0x730 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:788 drm_ioctl+0xd12/0x1590 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:891 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x222/0x400 fs/ioctl.c:856 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xe0 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x12d/0xb60 mm/slab.h:716 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3451 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x4ff/0x8b0 mm/slub.c:3490 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:965 [inline] __kmalloc+0x121/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:979 kmalloc_array include/linux/slab.h:596 [inline] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x1dba/0x24a0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc.c:846 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x5ae/0x730 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:788 drm_ioctl+0xd12/0x1590 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:891 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x222/0x400 fs/ioctl.c:856 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xe0 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd CPU: 1 PID: 4955 Comm: syz-executor275 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc4-syzkaller-g2741f1b02117 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/25/2023 ===================================================== --- This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com. syzbot will keep track of this issue. See: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot. If the bug is already fixed, let syzbot know by replying with: #syz fix: exact-commit-title If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with: #syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before testing. If you want to change bug's subsystems, reply with: #syz set subsystems: new-subsystem (See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard) If the bug is a duplicate of another bug, reply with: #syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report If you want to undo deduplication, reply with: #syz undup

9 months

[RFC] drm/scheduler: Unwrap job dependencies

by Rob Clark

From: Rob Clark <robdclark(a)chromium.org> Container fences have burner contexts, which makes the trick to store at most one fence per context somewhat useless if we don't unwrap array or chain fences. Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark(a)chromium.org> --- tbh, I'm not sure why we weren't doing this already, unless there is something I'm overlooking drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c index c2ee44d6224b..f59e5335afbb 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c @@ -41,20 +41,21 @@ * 4. Entities themselves maintain a queue of jobs that will be scheduled on * the hardware. * * The jobs in a entity are always scheduled in the order that they were pushed. */ #include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/wait.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/completion.h> +#include <linux/dma-fence-unwrap.h> #include <linux/dma-resv.h> #include <uapi/linux/sched/types.h> #include <drm/drm_print.h> #include <drm/drm_gem.h> #include <drm/gpu_scheduler.h> #include <drm/spsc_queue.h> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include "gpu_scheduler_trace.h" @@ -665,41 +666,27 @@ void drm_sched_job_arm(struct drm_sched_job *job) sched = entity->rq->sched; job->sched = sched; job->s_priority = entity->rq - sched->sched_rq; job->id = atomic64_inc_return(&sched->job_id_count); drm_sched_fence_init(job->s_fence, job->entity); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_job_arm); -/** - * drm_sched_job_add_dependency - adds the fence as a job dependency - * @job: scheduler job to add the dependencies to - * @fence: the dma_fence to add to the list of dependencies. - * - * Note that @fence is consumed in both the success and error cases. - * - * Returns: - * 0 on success, or an error on failing to expand the array. - */ -int drm_sched_job_add_dependency(struct drm_sched_job *job, - struct dma_fence *fence) +static int _add_dependency(struct drm_sched_job *job, struct dma_fence *fence) { struct dma_fence *entry; unsigned long index; u32 id = 0; int ret; - if (!fence) - return 0; - /* Deduplicate if we already depend on a fence from the same context. * This lets the size of the array of deps scale with the number of * engines involved, rather than the number of BOs. */ xa_for_each(&job->dependencies, index, entry) { if (entry->context != fence->context) continue; if (dma_fence_is_later(fence, entry)) { dma_fence_put(entry); @@ -709,20 +696,46 @@ int drm_sched_job_add_dependency(struct drm_sched_job *job, } return 0; } ret = xa_alloc(&job->dependencies, &id, fence, xa_limit_32b, GFP_KERNEL); if (ret != 0) dma_fence_put(fence); return ret; } + +/** + * drm_sched_job_add_dependency - adds the fence as a job dependency + * @job: scheduler job to add the dependencies to + * @fence: the dma_fence to add to the list of dependencies. + * + * Note that @fence is consumed in both the success and error cases. + * + * Returns: + * 0 on success, or an error on failing to expand the array. + */ +int drm_sched_job_add_dependency(struct drm_sched_job *job, + struct dma_fence *fence) +{ + struct dma_fence_unwrap iter; + struct dma_fence *f; + int ret = 0; + + dma_fence_unwrap_for_each (f, &iter, fence) { + ret = _add_dependency(job, f); + if (ret) + break; + } + + return ret; +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_job_add_dependency); /** * drm_sched_job_add_resv_dependencies - add all fences from the resv to the job * @job: scheduler job to add the dependencies to * @resv: the dma_resv object to get the fences from * @usage: the dma_resv_usage to use to filter the fences * * This adds all fences matching the given usage from @resv to @job. * Must be called with the @resv lock held. -- 2.39.2

9 months

[PATCH v9 0/3] dma-fence: Deadline awareness (uabi edition)

by Rob Clark

From: Rob Clark <robdclark(a)chromium.org> This is a re-post of the remaining patches from: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/114490/ Part of the hold-up of the remaining uabi patches was compositor support, but now an MR for kwin exists: https://invent.kde.org/plasma/kwin/-/merge_requests/4358 The syncobj userspace is: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/merge_requests/21973 v1: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/93035/ v2: Move filtering out of later deadlines to fence implementation to avoid increasing the size of dma_fence v3: Add support in fence-array and fence-chain; Add some uabi to support igt tests and userspace compositors. v4: Rebase, address various comments, and add syncobj deadline support, and sync_file EPOLLPRI based on experience with perf/ freq issues with clvk compute workloads on i915 (anv) v5: Clarify that this is a hint as opposed to a more hard deadline guarantee, switch to using u64 ns values in UABI (still absolute CLOCK_MONOTONIC values), drop syncobj related cap and driver feature flag in favor of allowing count_handles==0 for probing kernel support. v6: Re-work vblank helper to calculate time of _start_ of vblank, and work correctly if the last vblank event was more than a frame ago. Add (mostly unrelated) drm/msm patch which also uses the vblank helper. Use dma_fence_chain_contained(). More verbose syncobj UABI comments. Drop DMA_FENCE_FLAG_HAS_DEADLINE_BIT. v7: Fix kbuild complaints about vblank helper. Add more docs. v8: Add patch to surface sync_file UAPI, and more docs updates. v9: Repost the remaining patches that expose new uabi to userspace. Rob Clark (3): drm/syncobj: Add deadline support for syncobj waits dma-buf/sync_file: Add SET_DEADLINE ioctl dma-buf/sw_sync: Add fence deadline support drivers/dma-buf/dma-fence.c | 3 +- drivers/dma-buf/sw_sync.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/dma-buf/sync_debug.h | 2 + drivers/dma-buf/sync_file.c | 19 ++++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/drm_syncobj.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++------ include/uapi/drm/drm.h | 17 +++++++ include/uapi/linux/sync_file.h | 22 +++++++++ 7 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) -- 2.41.0

9 months, 1 week

[syzbot] [dri?] kernel BUG in vmf_insert_pfn_prot (2)

by syzbot

Hello, syzbot found the following issue on: HEAD commit: 9e6c269de404 Merge tag 'i2c-for-6.5-rc7' of git://git.kern.. git tree: upstream console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=110b32d3a80000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=aa796b6080b04102 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=398e17b61dab22cc56bc compiler: gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=14284307a80000 Downloadable assets: disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/481d8421bfb2/disk-9e6c269d.raw… vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5ec626f94634/vmlinux-9e6c269d.… kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/ab1e59619bd6/bzImage-9e6c269d.… IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: syzbot+398e17b61dab22cc56bc(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/memory.c:2214! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 5157 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc6-syzkaller-00253-g9e6c269de404 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 RIP: 0010:vmf_insert_pfn_prot+0x247/0x430 mm/memory.c:2214 Code: 0f 0b e8 0c 4f c0 ff 49 89 ef bf 20 00 00 00 41 83 e7 28 4c 89 fe e8 88 4a c0 ff 49 83 ff 20 0f 85 aa fe ff ff e8 e9 4e c0 ff <0f> 0b 48 bd ff ff ff ff ff ff 0f 00 e8 d8 4e c0 ff 4c 89 f6 48 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000415f750 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880275a0d00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff888018379dc0 RSI: ffffffff81c5b9b7 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 000000000c140477 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000020 R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 000000000000001f R12: 0000000020ffc000 R13: 1ffff9200082beeb R14: 000000000007e79e R15: 0000000000000020 FS: 00007f235bd9a6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020ffc000 CR3: 0000000022a32000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> drm_gem_shmem_fault+0x1ea/0x3a0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:563 __do_fault+0x107/0x5f0 mm/memory.c:4198 do_read_fault mm/memory.c:4547 [inline] do_fault mm/memory.c:4670 [inline] do_pte_missing mm/memory.c:3664 [inline] handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:4939 [inline] __handle_mm_fault+0x27e0/0x3b80 mm/memory.c:5079 handle_mm_fault+0x2ab/0x9d0 mm/memory.c:5233 do_user_addr_fault+0x446/0xfc0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1392 handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1486 [inline] exc_page_fault+0x5c/0xd0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542 asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:570 RIP: 0010:rep_movs_alternative+0x4a/0xb0 arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S:71 Code: 75 f1 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 8b 06 48 89 07 48 83 c6 08 48 83 c7 08 83 e9 08 74 df 83 f9 08 73 e8 eb c9 <f3> a4 c3 0f 1f 00 4c 8b 06 4c 8b 4e 08 4c 8b 56 10 4c 8b 5e 18 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc9000415fb50 EFLAGS: 00050206 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000020ffc000 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020ffc000 RDI: ffff88807b764000 RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed100f6ec9ff R10: ffff88807b764fff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000020ffd000 R13: ffff88807b764000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000020ffc000 copy_user_generic arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:112 [inline] raw_copy_from_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:127 [inline] _copy_from_user+0xc2/0xf0 lib/usercopy.c:23 copy_from_user include/linux/uaccess.h:183 [inline] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x360/0x860 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1618 snd_rawmidi_write+0x278/0xc10 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1687 vfs_write+0x2a4/0xe40 fs/read_write.c:582 ksys_write+0x1f0/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f235b07cae9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f235bd9a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f235b19bf80 RCX: 00007f235b07cae9 RDX: 00000000fffffd2c RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f235b0c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f235b19bf80 R15: 00007ffd9cdf0fe8 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:vmf_insert_pfn_prot+0x247/0x430 mm/memory.c:2214 Code: 0f 0b e8 0c 4f c0 ff 49 89 ef bf 20 00 00 00 41 83 e7 28 4c 89 fe e8 88 4a c0 ff 49 83 ff 20 0f 85 aa fe ff ff e8 e9 4e c0 ff <0f> 0b 48 bd ff ff ff ff ff ff 0f 00 e8 d8 4e c0 ff 4c 89 f6 48 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000415f750 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880275a0d00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff888018379dc0 RSI: ffffffff81c5b9b7 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 000000000c140477 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000020 R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 000000000000001f R12: 0000000020ffc000 R13: 1ffff9200082beeb R14: 000000000007e79e R15: 0000000000000020 FS: 00007f235bd9a6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f93c20ffac1 CR3: 0000000022a32000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 ---------------- Code disassembly (best guess): 0: 75 f1 jne 0xfffffff3 2: c3 ret 3: 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 data16 cs nopw 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) a: 00 00 00 00 e: 66 90 xchg %ax,%ax 10: 48 8b 06 mov (%rsi),%rax 13: 48 89 07 mov %rax,(%rdi) 16: 48 83 c6 08 add $0x8,%rsi 1a: 48 83 c7 08 add $0x8,%rdi 1e: 83 e9 08 sub $0x8,%ecx 21: 74 df je 0x2 23: 83 f9 08 cmp $0x8,%ecx 26: 73 e8 jae 0x10 28: eb c9 jmp 0xfffffff3 * 2a: f3 a4 rep movsb %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi) <-- trapping instruction 2c: c3 ret 2d: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax) 30: 4c 8b 06 mov (%rsi),%r8 33: 4c 8b 4e 08 mov 0x8(%rsi),%r9 37: 4c 8b 56 10 mov 0x10(%rsi),%r10 3b: 4c 8b 5e 18 mov 0x18(%rsi),%r11 3f: 4c rex.WR --- This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com. syzbot will keep track of this issue. See: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot. If the bug is already fixed, let syzbot know by replying with: #syz fix: exact-commit-title If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with: #syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before testing. If you want to overwrite bug's subsystems, reply with: #syz set subsystems: new-subsystem (See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard) If the bug is a duplicate of another bug, reply with: #syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report If you want to undo deduplication, reply with: #syz undup

10 months

[PATCH 0/9] dma-buf: heaps: Add MediaTek secure heap

by Yong Wu

This patchset consists of two parts, the first is from John and TJ. It adds some heap interfaces, then our kernel users could allocate buffer from special heap. The second part is adding MTK secure heap for SVP (Secure Video Path). A total of two heaps are added, one is mtk_svp and the other is mtk_svp_cma. The mtk_svp buffer is reserved for the secure world after bootup and it is used for ES/working buffer, while the mtk_svp_cma buffer is dynamically reserved for the secure world and will be get ready when we start playing secure videos, this heap is used for the frame buffer. Once the security video playing is complete, the CMA will be released. For easier viewing, I've split the new heap file into several patches. The consumers of new heap and new interfaces are our codec and drm which will send upstream soon, probably this week. Base on v6.6-rc1. John Stultz (2): dma-heap: Add proper kref handling on dma-buf heaps dma-heap: Provide accessors so that in-kernel drivers can allocate dmabufs from specific heaps T.J. Mercier (1): dma-buf: heaps: Deduplicate docs and adopt common format Yong Wu (6): dma-buf: heaps: Initialise MediaTek secure heap dma-buf: heaps: mtk_sec_heap: Initialise tee session dma-buf: heaps: mtk_sec_heap: Add tee service call for buffer allocating/freeing dma-buf: heaps: mtk_sec_heap: Add dma_ops dt-bindings: reserved-memory: MediaTek: Add reserved memory for SVP dma_buf: heaps: mtk_sec_heap: Add a new CMA heap .../mediatek,secure_cma_chunkmem.yaml | 42 ++ drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c | 127 +++-- drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Kconfig | 8 + drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Makefile | 1 + drivers/dma-buf/heaps/mtk_secure_heap.c | 458 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/dma-heap.h | 42 +- 6 files changed, 630 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/reserved-memory/mediatek,secure_cma_chunkmem.yaml create mode 100644 drivers/dma-buf/heaps/mtk_secure_heap.c -- 2.18.0

10 months, 1 week

[PATCH] udmabuf: Fix a potential (and unlikely) access to unallocated memory

by Christophe JAILLET

If 'list_limit' is set to a very high value, 'lsize' computation could overflow if 'head.count' is big enough. In such a case, udmabuf_create() will access to memory beyond 'list'. Use size_mul() to saturate the value, and have memdup_user() fail. Fixes: fbb0de795078 ("Add udmabuf misc device") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> --- drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c b/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c index c40645999648..fb4c4b5b3332 100644 --- a/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c @@ -314,13 +314,13 @@ static long udmabuf_ioctl_create_list(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg) struct udmabuf_create_list head; struct udmabuf_create_item *list; int ret = -EINVAL; - u32 lsize; + size_t lsize; if (copy_from_user(&head, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(head))) return -EFAULT; if (head.count > list_limit) return -EINVAL; - lsize = sizeof(struct udmabuf_create_item) * head.count; + lsize = size_mul(sizeof(struct udmabuf_create_item), head.count); list = memdup_user((void __user *)(arg + sizeof(head)), lsize); if (IS_ERR(list)) return PTR_ERR(list); -- 2.34.1

11 months, 2 weeks

Re: [PATCH 00/10] Add mediate-drm secure flow for SVP

by Jeffrey Kardatzke

On Tue, Sep 19, 2023 at 10:26 PM CK Hu (胡俊光) <ck.hu(a)mediatek.com> wrote: > > Hi, Jason: > > On Tue, 2023-09-19 at 11:03 +0800, Jason-JH.Lin wrote: > > The patch series provides drm driver support for enabling secure > > video > > path (SVP) playback on MediaiTek hardware in the Linux kernel. > > > > Memory Definitions: > > secure memory - Memory allocated in the TEE (Trusted Execution > > Environment) which is inaccessible in the REE (Rich Execution > > Environment, i.e. linux kernel/userspace). > > secure handle - Integer value which acts as reference to 'secure > > memory'. Used in communication between TEE and REE to reference > > 'secure memory'. > > secure buffer - 'secure memory' that is used to store decrypted, > > compressed video or for other general purposes in the TEE. > > secure surface - 'secure memory' that is used to store graphic > > buffers. > > > > Memory Usage in SVP: > > The overall flow of SVP starts with encrypted video coming in from an > > outside source into the REE. The REE will then allocate a 'secure > > buffer' and send the corresponding 'secure handle' along with the > > encrypted, compressed video data to the TEE. The TEE will then > > decrypt > > the video and store the result in the 'secure buffer'. The REE will > > then allocate a 'secure surface'. The REE will pass the 'secure > > handles' for both the 'secure buffer' and 'secure surface' into the > > TEE for video decoding. The video decoder HW will then decode the > > contents of the 'secure buffer' and place the result in the 'secure > > surface'. The REE will then attach the 'secure surface' to the > > overlay > > plane for rendering of the video. > > > > Everything relating to ensuring security of the actual contents of > > the > > 'secure buffer' and 'secure surface' is out of scope for the REE and > > is the responsibility of the TEE. > > > > DRM driver handles allocation of gem objects that are backed by a > > 'secure > > surface' and for displaying a 'secure surface' on the overlay plane. > > This introduces a new flag for object creation called > > DRM_MTK_GEM_CREATE_ENCRYPTED which indicates it should be a 'secure > > surface'. All changes here are in MediaTek specific code. > > How do you define SVP? Is there standard requirement we could refer to? > If the secure video buffer is read by display hardware and output to > HDMI without any protection and user could capture HDMI signal, is this > secure? SVP (Secure Video Path) is essentially the video being completed isolated from the kernel/userspace. The specific requirements for it vary between implementations. Regarding HDMI/HDCP output; it's the responsibility of the TEE to enforce that. Nothing on the kernel/userspace side needs to be concerned about enforcing HDCP. The only thing userspace is involved in there is actually turning on HDCP via the kernel drivers; and then the TEE ensures that it is active if the policy for the encrypted content requires it. > > Regards, > CK > > > > > --- > > Based on 2 series: > > [1] Add CMDQ secure driver for SVP > > - > > https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-medi… > > > > > > [2] dma-buf: heaps: Add MediaTek secure heap > > - > > https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-medi… > > > > --- > > > > CK Hu (1): > > drm/mediatek: Add interface to allocate MediaTek GEM buffer. > > > > Jason-JH.Lin (9): > > drm/mediatek/uapi: Add DRM_MTK_GEM_CREATED_ENCRYPTTED flag > > drm/mediatek: Add secure buffer control flow to mtk_drm_gem > > drm/mediatek: Add secure identify flag and funcution to > > mtk_drm_plane > > drm/mediatek: Add mtk_ddp_sec_write to config secure buffer info > > drm/mediatek: Add get_sec_port interface to mtk_ddp_comp > > drm/mediatek: Add secure layer config support for ovl > > drm/mediatek: Add secure layer config support for ovl_adaptor > > drm/mediatek: Add secure flow support to mediatek-drm > > arm64: dts: mt8195-cherry: Add secure mbox settings for vdosys > > > > .../boot/dts/mediatek/mt8195-cherry.dtsi | 10 + > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_disp_drv.h | 3 + > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_disp_ovl.c | 31 +- > > .../gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_disp_ovl_adaptor.c | 15 + > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_crtc.c | 271 > > +++++++++++++++++- > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_crtc.h | 1 + > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_ddp_comp.c | 14 + > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_ddp_comp.h | 13 + > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_drv.c | 16 +- > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_gem.c | 121 ++++++++ > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_gem.h | 16 ++ > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c | 7 + > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.h | 2 + > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_mdp_rdma.c | 11 +- > > drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_mdp_rdma.h | 2 + > > include/uapi/drm/mediatek_drm.h | 59 ++++ > > 16 files changed, 575 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > create mode 100644 include/uapi/drm/mediatek_drm.h > >

11 months, 3 weeks

[PATCH 00/10] Add mediate-drm secure flow for SVP

by Jason-JH.Lin

The patch series provides drm driver support for enabling secure video path (SVP) playback on MediaiTek hardware in the Linux kernel. Memory Definitions: secure memory - Memory allocated in the TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) which is inaccessible in the REE (Rich Execution Environment, i.e. linux kernel/userspace). secure handle - Integer value which acts as reference to 'secure memory'. Used in communication between TEE and REE to reference 'secure memory'. secure buffer - 'secure memory' that is used to store decrypted, compressed video or for other general purposes in the TEE. secure surface - 'secure memory' that is used to store graphic buffers. Memory Usage in SVP: The overall flow of SVP starts with encrypted video coming in from an outside source into the REE. The REE will then allocate a 'secure buffer' and send the corresponding 'secure handle' along with the encrypted, compressed video data to the TEE. The TEE will then decrypt the video and store the result in the 'secure buffer'. The REE will then allocate a 'secure surface'. The REE will pass the 'secure handles' for both the 'secure buffer' and 'secure surface' into the TEE for video decoding. The video decoder HW will then decode the contents of the 'secure buffer' and place the result in the 'secure surface'. The REE will then attach the 'secure surface' to the overlay plane for rendering of the video. Everything relating to ensuring security of the actual contents of the 'secure buffer' and 'secure surface' is out of scope for the REE and is the responsibility of the TEE. DRM driver handles allocation of gem objects that are backed by a 'secure surface' and for displaying a 'secure surface' on the overlay plane. This introduces a new flag for object creation called DRM_MTK_GEM_CREATE_ENCRYPTED which indicates it should be a 'secure surface'. All changes here are in MediaTek specific code. --- Based on 2 series: [1] Add CMDQ secure driver for SVP - https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-mediatek/list/?series=785332 [2] dma-buf: heaps: Add MediaTek secure heap - https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-mediatek/list/?series=782776 --- CK Hu (1): drm/mediatek: Add interface to allocate MediaTek GEM buffer. Jason-JH.Lin (9): drm/mediatek/uapi: Add DRM_MTK_GEM_CREATED_ENCRYPTTED flag drm/mediatek: Add secure buffer control flow to mtk_drm_gem drm/mediatek: Add secure identify flag and funcution to mtk_drm_plane drm/mediatek: Add mtk_ddp_sec_write to config secure buffer info drm/mediatek: Add get_sec_port interface to mtk_ddp_comp drm/mediatek: Add secure layer config support for ovl drm/mediatek: Add secure layer config support for ovl_adaptor drm/mediatek: Add secure flow support to mediatek-drm arm64: dts: mt8195-cherry: Add secure mbox settings for vdosys .../boot/dts/mediatek/mt8195-cherry.dtsi | 10 + drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_disp_drv.h | 3 + drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_disp_ovl.c | 31 +- .../gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_disp_ovl_adaptor.c | 15 + drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_crtc.c | 271 +++++++++++++++++- drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_crtc.h | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_ddp_comp.c | 14 + drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_ddp_comp.h | 13 + drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_drv.c | 16 +- drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_gem.c | 121 ++++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_gem.h | 16 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c | 7 + drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.h | 2 + drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_mdp_rdma.c | 11 +- drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_mdp_rdma.h | 2 + include/uapi/drm/mediatek_drm.h | 59 ++++ 16 files changed, 575 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/uapi/drm/mediatek_drm.h -- 2.18.0

11 months, 3 weeks

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