- Linux-kselftest-mirror - lists.linaro.org

[PATCH bpf-next 2/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests for SHA hash kfuncs

by Daniel Hodges

Add selftests to validate the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 hash kfuncs introduced in the BPF crypto subsystem. The tests verify both correct functionality and proper error handling. Test Data: All tests use the well-known NIST test vector input "abc" and validate against the standardized expected outputs for each algorithm. This ensures the BPF kfunc wrappers correctly delegate to the kernel crypto library. Signed-off-by: Daniel Hodges <git(a)danielhodges.dev> --- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/crypto_hash.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++ .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/crypto_hash.c | 83 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 212 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/crypto_hash.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/crypto_hash.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/crypto_hash.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/crypto_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4600dad693d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/crypto_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <test_progs.h> +#include "crypto_hash.skel.h" + +/* NIST test vectors for SHA-256("abc") */ +static const unsigned char expected_sha256[32] = { + 0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea, + 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x22, 0x23, + 0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c, + 0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad +}; + +/* NIST test vectors for SHA-384("abc") */ +static const unsigned char expected_sha384[48] = { + 0xcb, 0x00, 0x75, 0x3f, 0x45, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x8b, + 0xb5, 0xa0, 0x3d, 0x69, 0x9a, 0xc6, 0x50, 0x07, + 0x27, 0x2c, 0x32, 0xab, 0x0e, 0xde, 0xd1, 0x63, + 0x1a, 0x8b, 0x60, 0x5a, 0x43, 0xff, 0x5b, 0xed, + 0x80, 0x86, 0x07, 0x2b, 0xa1, 0xe7, 0xcc, 0x23, + 0x58, 0xba, 0xec, 0xa1, 0x34, 0xc8, 0x25, 0xa7 +}; + +/* NIST test vectors for SHA-512("abc") */ +static const unsigned char expected_sha512[64] = { + 0xdd, 0xaf, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x93, 0x61, 0x7a, 0xba, + 0xcc, 0x41, 0x73, 0x49, 0xae, 0x20, 0x41, 0x31, + 0x12, 0xe6, 0xfa, 0x4e, 0x89, 0xa9, 0x7e, 0xa2, + 0x0a, 0x9e, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x4b, 0x55, 0xd3, 0x9a, + 0x21, 0x92, 0x99, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x4f, 0xc1, 0xa8, + 0x36, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x23, 0xa3, 0xfe, 0xeb, 0xbd, + 0x45, 0x4d, 0x44, 0x23, 0x64, 0x3c, 0xe8, 0x0e, + 0x2a, 0x9a, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0xa5, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x9f +}; + +static void test_sha256_basic(void) +{ + struct crypto_hash *skel; + int err, prog_fd; + + LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts); + + skel = crypto_hash__open_and_load(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "crypto_hash__open_and_load")) + return; + + prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.test_sha256); + err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &topts); + ASSERT_OK(err, "test_sha256"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->sha256_status, 0, "sha256_status"); + ASSERT_EQ(memcmp(skel->bss->sha256_output, expected_sha256, 32), 0, + "sha256_output_match"); + + crypto_hash__destroy(skel); +} + +static void test_sha384_basic(void) +{ + struct crypto_hash *skel; + int err, prog_fd; + + LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts); + + skel = crypto_hash__open_and_load(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "crypto_hash__open_and_load")) + return; + + /* Run SHA-384 test */ + prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.test_sha384); + err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &topts); + ASSERT_OK(err, "test_sha384"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->sha384_status, 0, "sha384_status"); + ASSERT_EQ(memcmp(skel->bss->sha384_output, expected_sha384, 48), 0, + "sha384_output_match"); + + crypto_hash__destroy(skel); +} + +static void test_sha512_basic(void) +{ + struct crypto_hash *skel; + int err, prog_fd; + + LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts); + + skel = crypto_hash__open_and_load(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "crypto_hash__open_and_load")) + return; + + prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.test_sha512); + err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &topts); + ASSERT_OK(err, "test_sha512"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->sha512_status, 0, "sha512_status"); + ASSERT_EQ(memcmp(skel->bss->sha512_output, expected_sha512, 64), 0, + "sha512_output_match"); + + crypto_hash__destroy(skel); +} + +static void test_sha256_invalid_params(void) +{ + struct crypto_hash *skel; + int err, prog_fd; + + LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts); + + skel = crypto_hash__open_and_load(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "crypto_hash__open_and_load")) + return; + + prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.test_sha256_zero_len); + err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &topts); + ASSERT_OK(err, "test_zero_len"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->sha256_status, 0, "zero_len_rejected"); + + crypto_hash__destroy(skel); +} + +void test_crypto_hash(void) +{ + if (test__start_subtest("sha256_basic")) + test_sha256_basic(); + if (test__start_subtest("sha384_basic")) + test_sha384_basic(); + if (test__start_subtest("sha512_basic")) + test_sha512_basic(); + if (test__start_subtest("sha256_invalid_params")) + test_sha256_invalid_params(); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/crypto_hash.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/crypto_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d01f23557411 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/crypto_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> +#include "bpf_misc.h" +#include "bpf_kfuncs.h" + +unsigned char test_input[3] = "abc"; + +/* Expected SHA-256 hash of "abc" */ +/* ba7816bf 8f01cfea 414140de 5dae2223 b00361a3 96177a9c b410ff61 f20015ad */ +unsigned char expected_sha256[32] = { + 0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea, + 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x22, 0x23, + 0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c, + 0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad +}; + +/* Output buffers for test results */ +unsigned char sha256_output[32] = {}; +unsigned char sha384_output[48] = {}; +unsigned char sha512_output[64] = {}; + +int sha256_status = -1; +int sha384_status = -1; +int sha512_status = -1; + +/* Declare the SHA hash kfuncs */ +extern int bpf_sha256_hash(const struct bpf_dynptr *data, const struct bpf_dynptr *out) __ksym; +extern int bpf_sha384_hash(const struct bpf_dynptr *data, const struct bpf_dynptr *out) __ksym; +extern int bpf_sha512_hash(const struct bpf_dynptr *data, const struct bpf_dynptr *out) __ksym; + +SEC("syscall") +int test_sha256(void *ctx) +{ + struct bpf_dynptr input_ptr, output_ptr; + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(test_input, sizeof(test_input), 0, &input_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(sha256_output, sizeof(sha256_output), 0, &output_ptr); + + sha256_status = bpf_sha256_hash(&input_ptr, &output_ptr); + return 0; +} + +SEC("syscall") +int test_sha384(void *ctx) +{ + struct bpf_dynptr input_ptr, output_ptr; + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(test_input, sizeof(test_input), 0, &input_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(sha384_output, sizeof(sha384_output), 0, &output_ptr); + + sha384_status = bpf_sha384_hash(&input_ptr, &output_ptr); + return 0; +} + +SEC("syscall") +int test_sha512(void *ctx) +{ + struct bpf_dynptr input_ptr, output_ptr; + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(test_input, sizeof(test_input), 0, &input_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(sha512_output, sizeof(sha512_output), 0, &output_ptr); + + sha512_status = bpf_sha512_hash(&input_ptr, &output_ptr); + return 0; +} + +SEC("syscall") +int test_sha256_zero_len(void *ctx) +{ + struct bpf_dynptr input_ptr, output_ptr; + int ret; + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(test_input, 0, 0, &input_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(sha256_output, sizeof(sha256_output), 0, &output_ptr); + + ret = bpf_sha256_hash(&input_ptr, &output_ptr); + sha256_status = (ret == -22) ? 0 : ret; + return 0; +} + +char __license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; -- 2.51.0

1 week, 6 days

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[PATCH v6] selftests: af_unix: Add tests for ECONNRESET and EOF semantics

by Sunday Adelodun

Add selftests to verify and document Linux’s intended behaviour for UNIX domain sockets (SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_DGRAM) when a peer closes. The tests verify that: 1. SOCK_STREAM returns EOF when the peer closes normally. 2. SOCK_STREAM returns ECONNRESET if the peer closes with unread data. 3. SOCK_SEQPACKET returns EOF when the peer closes normally. 4. SOCK_SEQPACKET returns ECONNRESET if the peer closes with unread data. 5. SOCK_DGRAM does not return ECONNRESET when the peer closes. This follows up on review feedback suggesting a selftest to clarify Linux’s semantics. Suggested-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Sunday Adelodun <adelodunolaoluwa(a)yahoo.com> --- changelog: changes from v5 to v6 - Remove the not-needed check for self->child > 0 in the FIXTURE_TEARDOWN changes from v4 to v5: 1. Moved the send() call before the socket type check in Test 2 to ensure the unread data behavior is tested for SOCK_DGRAM as well. 2. Removed the misleading commend about accept() for clarity. 3. Applied indentation fixes for style consistency (alignment with open parenthesis). 4. Minor comment and formatting cleanups for clarity and adherence to kernel coding style. tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/Makefile | 1 + .../selftests/net/af_unix/unix_connreset.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 179 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/unix_connreset.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore index 439101b518ee..e89a60581a13 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore @@ -65,3 +65,4 @@ udpgso udpgso_bench_rx udpgso_bench_tx unix_connect +unix_connreset diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/Makefile index de805cbbdf69..5826a8372451 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/Makefile @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS := \ scm_pidfd \ scm_rights \ unix_connect \ + unix_connreset \ # end of TEST_GEN_PROGS include ../../lib.mk diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/unix_connreset.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/unix_connreset.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bffef2b54bfd --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/af_unix/unix_connreset.c @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Selftest for AF_UNIX socket close and ECONNRESET behaviour. + * + * This test verifies: + * 1. SOCK_STREAM returns EOF when the peer closes normally. + * 2. SOCK_STREAM returns ECONNRESET if peer closes with unread data. + * 3. SOCK_SEQPACKET returns EOF when the peer closes normally. + * 4. SOCK_SEQPACKET returns ECONNRESET if the peer closes with unread data. + * 5. SOCK_DGRAM does not return ECONNRESET when the peer closes. + * + * These tests document the intended Linux behaviour. + * + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/un.h> +#include "../../kselftest_harness.h" + +#define SOCK_PATH "/tmp/af_unix_connreset.sock" + +static void remove_socket_file(void) +{ + unlink(SOCK_PATH); +} + +FIXTURE(unix_sock) +{ + int server; + int client; + int child; +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT(unix_sock) +{ + int socket_type; + const char *name; +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_sock, stream) { + .socket_type = SOCK_STREAM, + .name = "SOCK_STREAM", +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_sock, dgram) { + .socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM, + .name = "SOCK_DGRAM", +}; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_sock, seqpacket) { + .socket_type = SOCK_SEQPACKET, + .name = "SOCK_SEQPACKET", +}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP(unix_sock) +{ + struct sockaddr_un addr = {}; + int err; + + addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strcpy(addr.sun_path, SOCK_PATH); + remove_socket_file(); + + self->server = socket(AF_UNIX, variant->socket_type, 0); + ASSERT_LT(-1, self->server); + + err = bind(self->server, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, err); + + if (variant->socket_type == SOCK_STREAM || + variant->socket_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) { + err = listen(self->server, 1); + ASSERT_EQ(0, err); + } + + self->client = socket(AF_UNIX, variant->socket_type | SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0); + ASSERT_LT(-1, self->client); + + err = connect(self->client, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, err); +} + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(unix_sock) +{ + if (variant->socket_type == SOCK_STREAM || + variant->socket_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) + close(self->child); + + close(self->client); + close(self->server); + remove_socket_file(); +} + +/* Test 1: peer closes normally */ +TEST_F(unix_sock, eof) +{ + char buf[16] = {}; + ssize_t n; + + if (variant->socket_type == SOCK_STREAM || + variant->socket_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) { + self->child = accept(self->server, NULL, NULL); + ASSERT_LT(-1, self->child); + + close(self->child); + } else { + close(self->server); + } + + n = recv(self->client, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + + if (variant->socket_type == SOCK_STREAM || + variant->socket_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, n); + } else { + ASSERT_EQ(-1, n); + ASSERT_EQ(EAGAIN, errno); + } +} + +/* Test 2: peer closes with unread data */ +TEST_F(unix_sock, reset_unread_behavior) +{ + char buf[16] = {}; + ssize_t n; + + /* Send data that will remain unread */ + send(self->client, "hello", 5, 0); + + if (variant->socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) { + /* No real connection, just close the server */ + close(self->server); + } else { + self->child = accept(self->server, NULL, NULL); + ASSERT_LT(-1, self->child); + + /* Peer closes before client reads */ + close(self->child); + } + + n = recv(self->client, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, n); + + if (variant->socket_type == SOCK_STREAM || + variant->socket_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) { + ASSERT_EQ(ECONNRESET, errno); + } else { + ASSERT_EQ(EAGAIN, errno); + } +} + +/* Test 3: closing unaccepted (embryo) server socket should reset client. */ +TEST_F(unix_sock, reset_closed_embryo) +{ + char buf[16] = {}; + ssize_t n; + + if (variant->socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) + SKIP(return, "This test only applies to SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET"); + + /* Close server without accept()ing */ + close(self->server); + + n = recv(self->client, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, n); + ASSERT_EQ(ECONNRESET, errno); +} + +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN + -- 2.43.0

2 weeks

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[PATCH net-next 0/8] selftests: mptcp: counter cache & stats before timeout

by Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)

Here are a bunch of small improvements to the MPTCP selftests: - Patch 1: move code to mptcp_lib.sh to prepare the new features. - Patch 2: simplify mptcp_lib_pr_err_stats helper use. - Patch 3: remove unused last column from nstat output. - Patch 4: improve stats dump in mptcp_join.sh. - Patch 5: get counters from nstat history and simplify mptcp_connect.sh. - Patch 6: avoid taking the same packet trace twice. - Patch 7: wait for an event instead of a fix time. - Patch 8: instead of using 'timeout' and print the stats after, another internal timeout is used: if it fires, it will print stats, then stop everything. This avoids confusions around stats in case of timeout. Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> --- Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) (8): selftests: mptcp: lib: introduce 'nstat_{init,get}' selftests: mptcp: lib: remove stats files args selftests: mptcp: lib: stats: remove nstat rate columns selftests: mptcp: join: dump stats from history selftests: mptcp: lib: get counters from nstat history selftests: mptcp: connect: avoid double packet traces selftests: mptcp: wait for port instead of sleep selftests: mptcp: get stats just before timing out tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_connect.sh | 140 ++++++++++----------- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh | 65 +++++----- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_lib.sh | 58 +++++++-- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_sockopt.sh | 43 ++++--- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/simult_flows.sh | 44 ++++--- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/userspace_pm.sh | 3 +- 6 files changed, 203 insertions(+), 150 deletions(-) --- base-commit: df58ee7d8faf353ebf5d4703c35fcf3e578e9b1b change-id: 20251114-net-next-mptcp-sft-count-cache-stats-timeout-faa64482db92 Best regards, -- Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>

2 weeks

2
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[PATCH] rust: allow `clippy::disallowed_names` for doctests

by Miguel Ojeda

Examples (i.e. doctests) may want to use names such as `foo`, thus the `clippy::disallowed_names` lint gets in the way. Thus allow it for all doctests. In addition, remove it from the existing `expect`s we have in a few doctests. This does not mean that we should stop trying to find good names for our examples, though. Suggested-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/rust-for-linux/aRHSLChi5HYXW4-9@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org> --- rust/kernel/init.rs | 3 +-- rust/kernel/types.rs | 1 - scripts/rustdoc_test_gen.rs | 2 +- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/rust/kernel/init.rs b/rust/kernel/init.rs index e476d81c1a27..899b9a962762 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/init.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/init.rs @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ //! ## General Examples //! //! ```rust -//! # #![expect(clippy::disallowed_names, clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks)] +//! # #![expect(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks)] //! use kernel::types::Opaque; //! use pin_init::pin_init_from_closure; //! @@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ //! ``` //! //! ```rust -//! # #![expect(clippy::disallowed_names)] //! use kernel::{prelude::*, types::Opaque}; //! use core::{ptr::addr_of_mut, marker::PhantomPinned, pin::Pin}; //! # mod bindings { diff --git a/rust/kernel/types.rs b/rust/kernel/types.rs index 835824788506..9c5e7dbf1632 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/types.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/types.rs @@ -289,7 +289,6 @@ fn drop(&mut self) { /// # Examples /// /// ``` -/// # #![expect(clippy::disallowed_names)] /// use kernel::types::Opaque; /// # // Emulate a C struct binding which is from C, maybe uninitialized or not, only the C side /// # // knows. diff --git a/scripts/rustdoc_test_gen.rs b/scripts/rustdoc_test_gen.rs index 0e6a0542d1bd..be0561049660 100644 --- a/scripts/rustdoc_test_gen.rs +++ b/scripts/rustdoc_test_gen.rs @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ macro_rules! assert_eq {{ #[allow(unused)] static __DOCTEST_ANCHOR: i32 = ::core::line!() as i32 + {body_offset} + 1; {{ - #![allow(unreachable_pub)] + #![allow(unreachable_pub, clippy::disallowed_names)] {body} main(); }} -- 2.51.2

2 weeks

5
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[PATCH bpf-next 4/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests for ECDSA signature verification kfuncs

by Daniel Hodges

Add selftests to validate the ECDSA signature verification kfuncs introduced in the BPF crypto subsystem. The tests verify both valid signature acceptance and invalid signature rejection using the context-based ECDSA API. The tests use RFC 6979 test vectors for NIST P-256 (secp256r1) with well-known valid signatures. The algorithm "p1363(ecdsa-nist-p256)" is used to handle standard r||s signature format. Signed-off-by: Daniel Hodges <git(a)danielhodges.dev> --- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ecdsa_verify.c | 96 ++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/ecdsa_verify.c | 228 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 324 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ecdsa_verify.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/ecdsa_verify.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ecdsa_verify.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ecdsa_verify.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d1f83ce08ad6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ecdsa_verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <test_progs.h> +#include "ecdsa_verify.skel.h" + +static void test_ecdsa_verify_valid_signature(void) +{ + struct ecdsa_verify *skel; + int err, prog_fd; + + LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts); + + skel = ecdsa_verify__open_and_load(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "ecdsa_verify__open_and_load")) + return; + + prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.test_ecdsa_verify_valid); + err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &topts); + ASSERT_OK(err, "test_ecdsa_verify_valid"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->ctx_create_status, 0, "ctx_create_status"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->verify_result, 0, "verify_valid_signature"); + + ecdsa_verify__destroy(skel); +} + +static void test_ecdsa_verify_invalid_signature(void) +{ + struct ecdsa_verify *skel; + int err, prog_fd; + + LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts); + + skel = ecdsa_verify__open_and_load(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "ecdsa_verify__open_and_load")) + return; + + prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.test_ecdsa_verify_invalid); + err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &topts); + ASSERT_OK(err, "test_ecdsa_verify_invalid"); + ASSERT_NEQ(skel->data->verify_invalid_result, 0, "verify_invalid_signature_rejected"); + + ecdsa_verify__destroy(skel); +} + +static void test_ecdsa_sign_and_verify(void) +{ + struct ecdsa_verify *skel; + int err, prog_fd; + + LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts); + + skel = ecdsa_verify__open_and_load(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "ecdsa_verify__open_and_load")) + return; + + prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.test_ecdsa_sign_verify); + err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &topts); + ASSERT_OK(err, "test_ecdsa_sign_verify"); + ASSERT_GT(skel->data->sign_result, 0, "sign_returns_signature_size"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->sign_verify_result, 0, "verify_generated_signature"); + + ecdsa_verify__destroy(skel); +} + +static void test_ecdsa_size_queries(void) +{ + struct ecdsa_verify *skel; + int err, prog_fd; + + LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts); + + skel = ecdsa_verify__open_and_load(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "ecdsa_verify__open_and_load")) + return; + + prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.test_ecdsa_size_queries); + err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &topts); + ASSERT_OK(err, "test_ecdsa_size_queries"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->keysize_result, 256, "keysize_p256"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->digestsize_result, 64, "digestsize_p256"); + ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->maxsize_result, 64, "maxsize_p256"); + + ecdsa_verify__destroy(skel); +} + +void test_ecdsa_verify(void) +{ + if (test__start_subtest("verify_valid_signature")) + test_ecdsa_verify_valid_signature(); + if (test__start_subtest("verify_invalid_signature")) + test_ecdsa_verify_invalid_signature(); + if (test__start_subtest("sign_and_verify")) + test_ecdsa_sign_and_verify(); + if (test__start_subtest("size_queries")) + test_ecdsa_size_queries(); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/ecdsa_verify.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/ecdsa_verify.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fb24baf6c437 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/ecdsa_verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,228 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> +#include "bpf_misc.h" + +struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx; +extern struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx * +bpf_ecdsa_ctx_create(const struct bpf_dynptr *algo_name, + const struct bpf_dynptr *public_key, int *err) __ksym; +extern struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx * +bpf_ecdsa_ctx_create_with_privkey(const struct bpf_dynptr *algo_name, + const struct bpf_dynptr *private_key, int *err) __ksym; +extern int bpf_ecdsa_verify(struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx *ctx, + const struct bpf_dynptr *message, + const struct bpf_dynptr *signature) __ksym; +extern int bpf_ecdsa_sign(struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx *ctx, + const struct bpf_dynptr *message, + const struct bpf_dynptr *signature) __ksym; +extern int bpf_ecdsa_keysize(struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx *ctx) __ksym; +extern int bpf_ecdsa_digestsize(struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx *ctx) __ksym; +extern int bpf_ecdsa_maxsize(struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx *ctx) __ksym; +extern void bpf_ecdsa_ctx_release(struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx *ctx) __ksym; + +/* NIST P-256 test vector + * This is a known valid ECDSA signature for testing purposes + */ + +/* Algorithm name for P-256 with p1363 format (standard r||s signature) */ +char algo_p256[] = "p1363(ecdsa-nist-p256)"; + +/* Public key in uncompressed format: 0x04 || x || y (65 bytes) */ +unsigned char pubkey_p256[65] = { + 0x04, /* Uncompressed point indicator */ + /* X coordinate (32 bytes) */ + 0x60, 0xfe, 0xd4, 0xba, 0x25, 0x5a, 0x9d, 0x31, + 0xc9, 0x61, 0xeb, 0x74, 0xc6, 0x35, 0x6d, 0x68, + 0xc0, 0x49, 0xb8, 0x92, 0x3b, 0x61, 0xfa, 0x6c, + 0xe6, 0x69, 0x62, 0x2e, 0x60, 0xf2, 0x9f, 0xb6, + /* Y coordinate (32 bytes) */ + 0x79, 0x03, 0xfe, 0x10, 0x08, 0xb8, 0xbc, 0x99, + 0xa4, 0x1a, 0xe9, 0xe9, 0x56, 0x28, 0xbc, 0x64, + 0xf2, 0xf1, 0xb2, 0x0c, 0x2d, 0x7e, 0x9f, 0x51, + 0x77, 0xa3, 0xc2, 0x94, 0xd4, 0x46, 0x22, 0x99 +}; + +/* Message hash (32 bytes) - SHA-256 of "sample" */ +unsigned char message_hash[32] = { + 0xaf, 0x2b, 0xdb, 0xe1, 0xaa, 0x9b, 0x6e, 0xc1, + 0xe2, 0xad, 0xe1, 0xd6, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x1f, 0xc7, + 0x1a, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x02, 0x68, 0xe9, 0x89, 0x15, + 0x62, 0x11, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x62, 0xad, 0xd1, 0xbf +}; + +/* Valid signature r || s (64 bytes) */ +unsigned char valid_signature[64] = { + /* r component (32 bytes) */ + 0xef, 0xd4, 0x8b, 0x2a, 0xac, 0xb6, 0xa8, 0xfd, + 0x11, 0x40, 0xdd, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0x81, 0xd6, + 0x9d, 0x2c, 0x87, 0x7b, 0x56, 0xaa, 0xf9, 0x91, + 0xc3, 0x4d, 0x0e, 0xa8, 0x4e, 0xaf, 0x37, 0x16, + /* s component (32 bytes) */ + 0xf7, 0xcb, 0x1c, 0x94, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x7c, 0x41, + 0xd4, 0x36, 0xc7, 0xa1, 0xb6, 0xe2, 0x9f, 0x65, + 0xf3, 0xe9, 0x00, 0xdb, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xf4, 0x06, + 0x4d, 0xc4, 0xab, 0x2f, 0x84, 0x3a, 0xcd, 0xa8 +}; + +/* Invalid signature (modified r component) for negative test */ +unsigned char invalid_signature[64] = { + /* r component (32 bytes) - first byte modified */ + 0xff, 0xd4, 0x8b, 0x2a, 0xac, 0xb6, 0xa8, 0xfd, + 0x11, 0x40, 0xdd, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0x81, 0xd6, + 0x9d, 0x2c, 0x87, 0x7b, 0x56, 0xaa, 0xf9, 0x91, + 0xc3, 0x4d, 0x0e, 0xa8, 0x4e, 0xaf, 0x37, 0x16, + /* s component (32 bytes) */ + 0xf7, 0xcb, 0x1c, 0x94, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x7c, 0x41, + 0xd4, 0x36, 0xc7, 0xa1, 0xb6, 0xe2, 0x9f, 0x65, + 0xf3, 0xe9, 0x00, 0xdb, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xf4, 0x06, + 0x4d, 0xc4, 0xab, 0x2f, 0x84, 0x3a, 0xcd, 0xa8 +}; + +/* Private key for signing (32 bytes) - matches the public key above */ +unsigned char privkey_p256[32] = { + 0xc9, 0xaf, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0x45, 0xba, 0x75, 0x16, + 0x6b, 0x5c, 0x21, 0x57, 0x67, 0xb1, 0xd6, 0x93, + 0x4e, 0x50, 0xc3, 0xdb, 0x36, 0xe8, 0x9b, 0x12, + 0x7b, 0x8a, 0x62, 0x2b, 0x12, 0x0f, 0x67, 0x21 +}; + +/* Test results */ +int verify_result = -1; +int verify_invalid_result = -1; +int ctx_create_status = -1; +int sign_result = -1; +int sign_verify_result = -1; +int keysize_result = -1; +int digestsize_result = -1; +int maxsize_result = -1; +unsigned char generated_signature[64] = {0}; + +SEC("syscall") +int test_ecdsa_verify_valid(void *ctx) +{ + struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx *ecdsa_ctx; + struct bpf_dynptr algo_ptr, key_ptr, msg_ptr, sig_ptr; + int err = 0; + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(algo_p256, sizeof(algo_p256) - 1, 0, &algo_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(pubkey_p256, sizeof(pubkey_p256), 0, &key_ptr); + + ecdsa_ctx = bpf_ecdsa_ctx_create(&algo_ptr, &key_ptr, &err); + if (!ecdsa_ctx) { + ctx_create_status = err; + return 0; + } + ctx_create_status = 0; + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(message_hash, sizeof(message_hash), 0, &msg_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(valid_signature, sizeof(valid_signature), 0, &sig_ptr); + + verify_result = bpf_ecdsa_verify(ecdsa_ctx, &msg_ptr, &sig_ptr); + + bpf_ecdsa_ctx_release(ecdsa_ctx); + + return 0; +} + +SEC("syscall") +int test_ecdsa_verify_invalid(void *ctx) +{ + struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx *ecdsa_ctx; + struct bpf_dynptr algo_ptr, key_ptr, msg_ptr, sig_ptr; + int err = 0; + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(algo_p256, sizeof(algo_p256) - 1, 0, &algo_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(pubkey_p256, sizeof(pubkey_p256), 0, &key_ptr); + + ecdsa_ctx = bpf_ecdsa_ctx_create(&algo_ptr, &key_ptr, &err); + if (!ecdsa_ctx) + return 0; + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(message_hash, sizeof(message_hash), 0, &msg_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(invalid_signature, sizeof(invalid_signature), 0, &sig_ptr); + + verify_invalid_result = bpf_ecdsa_verify(ecdsa_ctx, &msg_ptr, &sig_ptr); + + bpf_ecdsa_ctx_release(ecdsa_ctx); + + return 0; +} + +SEC("syscall") +int test_ecdsa_sign_verify(void *ctx) +{ + struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx *sign_ctx, *verify_ctx; + struct bpf_dynptr algo_ptr, privkey_ptr, pubkey_ptr, msg_ptr, sig_ptr; + int err = 0; + + /* Create signing context with private key */ + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(algo_p256, sizeof(algo_p256) - 1, 0, &algo_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(privkey_p256, sizeof(privkey_p256), 0, &privkey_ptr); + + sign_ctx = bpf_ecdsa_ctx_create_with_privkey(&algo_ptr, &privkey_ptr, &err); + if (!sign_ctx) { + sign_result = err; + return 0; + } + + /* Sign the message */ + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(message_hash, sizeof(message_hash), 0, &msg_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(generated_signature, sizeof(generated_signature), 0, &sig_ptr); + + sign_result = bpf_ecdsa_sign(sign_ctx, &msg_ptr, &sig_ptr); + + bpf_ecdsa_ctx_release(sign_ctx); + + /* If signing succeeded, verify the generated signature */ + if (sign_result > 0 && sign_result <= (int)sizeof(generated_signature)) { + unsigned int sig_size; + + /* Explicitly bound the value for the verifier */ + sig_size = sign_result & 0x3F; /* Max 64 bytes */ + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(algo_p256, sizeof(algo_p256) - 1, 0, &algo_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(pubkey_p256, sizeof(pubkey_p256), 0, &pubkey_ptr); + + verify_ctx = bpf_ecdsa_ctx_create(&algo_ptr, &pubkey_ptr, &err); + if (!verify_ctx) { + sign_verify_result = err; + return 0; + } + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(message_hash, sizeof(message_hash), 0, &msg_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(generated_signature, sig_size, 0, &sig_ptr); + + sign_verify_result = bpf_ecdsa_verify(verify_ctx, &msg_ptr, &sig_ptr); + + bpf_ecdsa_ctx_release(verify_ctx); + } + + return 0; +} + +SEC("syscall") +int test_ecdsa_size_queries(void *ctx) +{ + struct bpf_ecdsa_ctx *ecdsa_ctx; + struct bpf_dynptr algo_ptr, key_ptr; + int err = 0; + + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(algo_p256, sizeof(algo_p256) - 1, 0, &algo_ptr); + bpf_dynptr_from_mem(pubkey_p256, sizeof(pubkey_p256), 0, &key_ptr); + + ecdsa_ctx = bpf_ecdsa_ctx_create(&algo_ptr, &key_ptr, &err); + if (!ecdsa_ctx) + return 0; + + keysize_result = bpf_ecdsa_keysize(ecdsa_ctx); + digestsize_result = bpf_ecdsa_digestsize(ecdsa_ctx); + maxsize_result = bpf_ecdsa_maxsize(ecdsa_ctx); + + bpf_ecdsa_ctx_release(ecdsa_ctx); + + return 0; +} + +char __license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; -- 2.51.0

2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v2] cpuset: relax the overlap check for cgroup-v2

by Sun Shaojie

In cgroup v2, a mutual overlap check is required when at least one of two cpusets is exclusive. However, this check should be relaxed and limited to cases where both cpusets are exclusive. The table 1 shows the partition states of A1 and B1 after each step before applying this patch. Table 1: Before applying the patch Step | A1's prstate | B1's prstate | #1> mkdir -p A1 | member | | #2> echo "0-1" > A1/cpuset.cpus | member | | #3> echo "root" > A1/cpuset.cpus.partition | root | | #4> mkdir -p B1 | root | member | #5> echo "0-3" > B1/cpuset.cpus | root invalid | member | #6> echo "root" > B1/cpuset.cpus.partition | root invalid | root invalid | After step #5, A1 changes from "root" to "root invalid" because its CPUs (0-1) overlap with those requested by B1 (0-3). However, B1 can actually use CPUs 2-3, so it would be more reasonable for A1 to remain as "root." This patch relaxes the exclusive cpuset check for cgroup v2 while preserving the current cgroup v1 behavior. Signed-off-by: Sun Shaojie <sunshaojie(a)kylinos.cn> --- v1 -> v2: - Keeps the current cgroup v1 behavior unchanged - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/cgroups/c8e234f4-2c27-4753-8f39-8ae83197efd3@redhat… --- kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 9 +++++++-- tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_cpuset_prs.sh | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c index 52468d2c178a..3240b3ab5998 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c @@ -592,8 +592,13 @@ static inline bool cpusets_are_exclusive(struct cpuset *cs1, struct cpuset *cs2) */ static inline bool cpus_excl_conflict(struct cpuset *cs1, struct cpuset *cs2) { - /* If either cpuset is exclusive, check if they are mutually exclusive */ - if (is_cpu_exclusive(cs1) || is_cpu_exclusive(cs2)) + /* If both cpusets are exclusive, check if they are mutually exclusive */ + if (is_cpu_exclusive(cs1) && is_cpu_exclusive(cs2)) + return !cpusets_are_exclusive(cs1, cs2); + + /* In cgroup-v1, if either cpuset is exclusive, check if they are mutually exclusive */ + if (!is_in_v2_mode() && + (is_cpu_exclusive(cs1) != is_cpu_exclusive(cs2))) return !cpusets_are_exclusive(cs1, cs2); /* Exclusive_cpus cannot intersect */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_cpuset_prs.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_cpuset_prs.sh index a17256d9f88a..903dddfe88d7 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_cpuset_prs.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_cpuset_prs.sh @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ TEST_MATRIX=( " C0-3:S+ C1-3:S+ C2-3 . X2-3 X3:P2 . . 0 A1:0-2|A2:3|A3:3 A1:P0|A2:P2 3" " C0-3:S+ C1-3:S+ C2-3 . X2-3 X2-3 X2-3:P2 . 0 A1:0-1|A2:1|A3:2-3 A1:P0|A3:P2 2-3" " C0-3:S+ C1-3:S+ C2-3 . X2-3 X2-3 X2-3:P2:C3 . 0 A1:0-1|A2:1|A3:2-3 A1:P0|A3:P2 2-3" - " C0-3:S+ C1-3:S+ C2-3 C2-3 . . . P2 0 A1:0-3|A2:1-3|A3:2-3|B1:2-3 A1:P0|A3:P0|B1:P-2" + " C0-3:S+ C1-3:S+ C2-3 C2-3 . . . P2 0 A1:0-1|A2:1|A3:1|B1:2-3 A1:P0|A3:P0|B1:P2 2-3" " C0-3:S+ C1-3:S+ C2-3 C4-5 . . . P2 0 B1:4-5 B1:P2 4-5" " C0-3:S+ C1-3:S+ C2-3 C4 X2-3 X2-3 X2-3:P2 P2 0 A3:2-3|B1:4 A3:P2|B1:P2 2-4" " C0-3:S+ C1-3:S+ C2-3 C4 X2-3 X2-3 X2-3:P2:C1-3 P2 0 A3:2-3|B1:4 A3:P2|B1:P2 2-4" @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ TEST_MATRIX=( # Invalid to valid local partition direct transition tests " C1-3:S+:P2 X4:P2 . . . . . . 0 A1:1-3|XA1:1-3|A2:1-3:XA2: A1:P2|A2:P-2 1-3" " C1-3:S+:P2 X4:P2 . . . X3:P2 . . 0 A1:1-2|XA1:1-3|A2:3:XA2:3 A1:P2|A2:P2 1-3" - " C0-3:P2 . . C4-6 C0-4 . . . 0 A1:0-4|B1:4-6 A1:P-2|B1:P0" + " C0-3:P2 . . C4-6 C0-4 . . . 0 A1:0-4|B1:5-6 A1:P2|B1:P0 0-4" " C0-3:P2 . . C4-6 C0-4:C0-3 . . . 0 A1:0-3|B1:4-6 A1:P2|B1:P0 0-3" # Local partition invalidation tests @@ -388,10 +388,10 @@ TEST_MATRIX=( " C0-1:S+ C1 . C2-3 . P2 . . 0 A1:0-1|A2:1 A1:P0|A2:P-2" " C0-1:S+ C1:P2 . C2-3 P1 . . . 0 A1:0|A2:1 A1:P1|A2:P2 0-1|1" - # A non-exclusive cpuset.cpus change will invalidate partition and its siblings - " C0-1:P1 . . C2-3 C0-2 . . . 0 A1:0-2|B1:2-3 A1:P-1|B1:P0" + # A non-exclusive cpuset.cpus change will not invalidate partition and its siblings + " C0-1:P1 . . C2-3 C0-2 . . . 0 A1:0-2|B1:3 A1:P1|B1:P0" " C0-1:P1 . . P1:C2-3 C0-2 . . . 0 A1:0-2|B1:2-3 A1:P-1|B1:P-1" - " C0-1 . . P1:C2-3 C0-2 . . . 0 A1:0-2|B1:2-3 A1:P0|B1:P-1" + " C0-1 . . P1:C2-3 C0-2 . . . 0 A1:0-1|B1:2-3 A1:P0|B1:P1" # cpuset.cpus can overlap with sibling cpuset.cpus.exclusive but not subsumed by it " C0-3 . . C4-5 X5 . . . 0 A1:0-3|B1:4-5" -- 2.25.1

2 weeks

4
17
0 0

[PATCH] selftests/mm: fix division-by-zero in uffd-unit-tests

by Carlos Llamas

Commit 4dfd4bba8578 ("selftests/mm/uffd: refactor non-composite global vars into struct") moved some of the operations previously implemented in uffd_setup_environment() earlier in the main test loop. The calculation of nr_pages, which involves a division by page_size, now occurs before checking that default_huge_page_size() returns a non-zero This leads to a division-by-zero error on systems with !CONFIG_HUGETLB. Fix this by relocating the non-zero page_size check before the nr_pages calculation, as it was originally implemented. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4dfd4bba8578 ("selftests/mm/uffd: refactor non-composite global vars into struct") Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c index 9e3be2ee7f1b..f917b4c4c943 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/uffd-unit-tests.c @@ -1758,10 +1758,15 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) uffd_test_ops = mem_type->mem_ops; uffd_test_case_ops = test->test_case_ops; - if (mem_type->mem_flag & (MEM_HUGETLB_PRIVATE | MEM_HUGETLB)) + if (mem_type->mem_flag & (MEM_HUGETLB_PRIVATE | MEM_HUGETLB)) { gopts.page_size = default_huge_page_size(); - else + if (gopts.page_size == 0) { + uffd_test_skip("huge page size is 0, feature missing?"); + continue; + } + } else { gopts.page_size = psize(); + } /* Ensure we have at least 2 pages */ gopts.nr_pages = MAX(UFFD_TEST_MEM_SIZE, gopts.page_size * 2) @@ -1776,12 +1781,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) continue; uffd_test_start("%s on %s", test->name, mem_type->name); - if ((mem_type->mem_flag == MEM_HUGETLB || - mem_type->mem_flag == MEM_HUGETLB_PRIVATE) && - (default_huge_page_size() == 0)) { - uffd_test_skip("huge page size is 0, feature missing?"); - continue; - } if (!uffd_feature_supported(test)) { uffd_test_skip("feature missing"); continue; -- 2.51.2.1041.gc1ab5b90ca-goog

2 weeks

6
9
0 0

[PATCH v4 2/2] selftests/riscv: Add Zicbop prefetch test

by Yao Zihong

Add selftests to cbo.c to verify Zicbop extension behavior, and split the previous `--sigill` mode into two options so they can be tested independently. The test checks: - That hwprobe correctly reports Zicbop presence and block size. - That prefetch instructions execute without exception on valid and NULL addresses when Zicbop is present. Signed-off-by: Yao Zihong <zihong.plct(a)isrc.iscas.ac.cn> --- tools/testing/selftests/riscv/hwprobe/cbo.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 139 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/hwprobe/cbo.c b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/hwprobe/cbo.c index 5e96ef785d0d..281ab440e696 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/hwprobe/cbo.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/hwprobe/cbo.c @@ -15,24 +15,31 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <asm/ucontext.h> +#include <getopt.h> #include "hwprobe.h" #include "../../kselftest.h" #define MK_CBO(fn) le32_bswap((uint32_t)(fn) << 20 | 10 << 15 | 2 << 12 | 0 << 7 | 15) +#define MK_PREFETCH(fn) \ + le32_bswap(0 << 25 | (uint32_t)(fn) << 20 | 10 << 15 | 6 << 12 | 0 << 7 | 19) static char mem[4096] __aligned(4096) = { [0 ... 4095] = 0xa5 }; -static bool illegal_insn; +static bool got_fault; -static void sigill_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *context) +static void fault_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *context) { unsigned long *regs = (unsigned long *)&((ucontext_t *)context)->uc_mcontext; uint32_t insn = *(uint32_t *)regs[0]; - assert(insn == MK_CBO(regs[11])); + if (sig == SIGILL) + assert(insn == MK_CBO(regs[11])); - illegal_insn = true; + if (sig == SIGSEGV || sig == SIGBUS) + assert(insn == MK_PREFETCH(regs[11])); + + got_fault = true; regs[0] += 4; } @@ -45,39 +52,51 @@ static void sigill_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *context) : : "r" (base), "i" (fn), "i" (MK_CBO(fn)) : "a0", "a1", "memory"); \ }) +#define prefetch_insn(base, fn) \ +({ \ + asm volatile( \ + "mv a0, %0\n" \ + "li a1, %1\n" \ + ".4byte %2\n" \ + : : "r" (base), "i" (fn), "i" (MK_PREFETCH(fn)) : "a0", "a1"); \ +}) + static void cbo_inval(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 0); } static void cbo_clean(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 1); } static void cbo_flush(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 2); } static void cbo_zero(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 4); } +static void prefetch_i(char *base) { prefetch_insn(base, 0); } +static void prefetch_r(char *base) { prefetch_insn(base, 1); } +static void prefetch_w(char *base) { prefetch_insn(base, 3); } static void test_no_cbo_inval(void *arg) { ksft_print_msg("Testing cbo.inval instruction remain privileged\n"); - illegal_insn = false; + got_fault = false; cbo_inval(&mem[0]); - ksft_test_result(illegal_insn, "No cbo.inval\n"); + ksft_test_result(got_fault, "No cbo.inval\n"); } static void test_no_zicbom(void *arg) { ksft_print_msg("Testing Zicbom instructions remain privileged\n"); - illegal_insn = false; + got_fault = false; cbo_clean(&mem[0]); - ksft_test_result(illegal_insn, "No cbo.clean\n"); + ksft_test_result(got_fault, "No cbo.clean\n"); - illegal_insn = false; + got_fault = false; cbo_flush(&mem[0]); - ksft_test_result(illegal_insn, "No cbo.flush\n"); + ksft_test_result(got_fault, "No cbo.flush\n"); } static void test_no_zicboz(void *arg) { ksft_print_msg("No Zicboz, testing cbo.zero remains privileged\n"); - illegal_insn = false; + got_fault = false; cbo_zero(&mem[0]); - ksft_test_result(illegal_insn, "No cbo.zero\n"); + ksft_test_result(got_fault, "No cbo.zero\n"); } static bool is_power_of_2(__u64 n) @@ -85,6 +104,54 @@ static bool is_power_of_2(__u64 n) return n != 0 && (n & (n - 1)) == 0; } +static void test_zicbop(void *arg) +{ + struct riscv_hwprobe pair = { + .key = RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_ZICBOP_BLOCK_SIZE, + }; + + struct sigaction act = { + .sa_sigaction = &fault_handler, + .sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO + }; + + struct sigaction dfl = { + .sa_handler = SIG_DFL + }; + + cpu_set_t *cpus = (cpu_set_t *)arg; + __u64 block_size; + long rc; + + rc = sigaction(SIGSEGV, &act, NULL); + assert(rc == 0); + rc = sigaction(SIGBUS, &act, NULL); + assert(rc == 0); + + rc = riscv_hwprobe(&pair, 1, sizeof(cpu_set_t), (unsigned long *)cpus, 0); + block_size = pair.value; + ksft_test_result(rc == 0 && pair.key == RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_ZICBOP_BLOCK_SIZE && + is_power_of_2(block_size), "Zicbop block size\n"); + ksft_print_msg("Zicbop block size: %llu\n", block_size); + + got_fault = false; + prefetch_i(&mem[0]); + prefetch_r(&mem[0]); + prefetch_w(&mem[0]); + ksft_test_result(!got_fault, "Zicbop prefetch.* on valid address\n"); + + got_fault = false; + prefetch_i(NULL); + prefetch_r(NULL); + prefetch_w(NULL); + ksft_test_result(!got_fault, "Zicbop prefetch.* on NULL\n"); + + rc = sigaction(SIGBUS, &dfl, NULL); + assert(rc == 0); + rc = sigaction(SIGSEGV, &dfl, NULL); + assert(rc == 0); +} + static void test_zicbom(void *arg) { struct riscv_hwprobe pair = { @@ -100,13 +167,13 @@ static void test_zicbom(void *arg) is_power_of_2(block_size), "Zicbom block size\n"); ksft_print_msg("Zicbom block size: %llu\n", block_size); - illegal_insn = false; + got_fault = false; cbo_clean(&mem[block_size]); - ksft_test_result(!illegal_insn, "cbo.clean\n"); + ksft_test_result(!got_fault, "cbo.clean\n"); - illegal_insn = false; + got_fault = false; cbo_flush(&mem[block_size]); - ksft_test_result(!illegal_insn, "cbo.flush\n"); + ksft_test_result(!got_fault, "cbo.flush\n"); } static void test_zicboz(void *arg) @@ -125,11 +192,11 @@ static void test_zicboz(void *arg) is_power_of_2(block_size), "Zicboz block size\n"); ksft_print_msg("Zicboz block size: %llu\n", block_size); - illegal_insn = false; + got_fault = false; cbo_zero(&mem[block_size]); - ksft_test_result(!illegal_insn, "cbo.zero\n"); + ksft_test_result(!got_fault, "cbo.zero\n"); - if (illegal_insn || !is_power_of_2(block_size)) { + if (got_fault || !is_power_of_2(block_size)) { ksft_test_result_skip("cbo.zero check\n"); return; } @@ -177,7 +244,19 @@ static void check_no_zicbo_cpus(cpu_set_t *cpus, __u64 cbo) rc = riscv_hwprobe(&pair, 1, sizeof(cpu_set_t), (unsigned long *)&one_cpu, 0); assert(rc == 0 && pair.key == RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_IMA_EXT_0); - cbostr = cbo == RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZICBOZ ? "Zicboz" : "Zicbom"; + switch (cbo) { + case RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZICBOZ: + cbostr = "Zicboz"; + break; + case RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZICBOM: + cbostr = "Zicbom"; + break; + case RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZICBOP: + cbostr = "Zicbop"; + break; + default: + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Internal error: invalid cbo %llu\n", cbo); + } if (pair.value & cbo) ksft_exit_fail_msg("%s is only present on a subset of harts.\n" @@ -194,6 +273,7 @@ enum { TEST_ZICBOM, TEST_NO_ZICBOM, TEST_NO_CBO_INVAL, + TEST_ZICBOP }; static struct test_info { @@ -206,26 +286,51 @@ static struct test_info { [TEST_ZICBOM] = { .nr_tests = 3, test_zicbom }, [TEST_NO_ZICBOM] = { .nr_tests = 2, test_no_zicbom }, [TEST_NO_CBO_INVAL] = { .nr_tests = 1, test_no_cbo_inval }, + [TEST_ZICBOP] = { .nr_tests = 3, test_zicbop } +}; + +static const struct option long_opts[] = { + {"zicbom-raises-sigill", no_argument, 0, 'm'}, + {"zicboz-raises-sigill", no_argument, 0, 'z'}, + {0, 0, 0, 0} }; int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct sigaction act = { - .sa_sigaction = &sigill_handler, + .sa_sigaction = &fault_handler, .sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO, }; + struct riscv_hwprobe pair; unsigned int plan = 0; cpu_set_t cpus; long rc; - int i; - - if (argc > 1 && !strcmp(argv[1], "--sigill")) { - rc = sigaction(SIGILL, &act, NULL); - assert(rc == 0); - tests[TEST_NO_ZICBOZ].enabled = true; - tests[TEST_NO_ZICBOM].enabled = true; - tests[TEST_NO_CBO_INVAL].enabled = true; + int i, opt, long_index; + + long_index = 0; + + while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, "mz", long_opts, &long_index)) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case 'm': + tests[TEST_NO_ZICBOM].enabled = true; + tests[TEST_NO_CBO_INVAL].enabled = true; + rc = sigaction(SIGILL, &act, NULL); + assert(rc == 0); + break; + case 'z': + tests[TEST_NO_ZICBOZ].enabled = true; + rc = sigaction(SIGILL, &act, NULL); + assert(rc == 0); + break; + case '?': + fprintf(stderr, + "Usage: %s [--zicbom-raises-sigill|-m] [--zicboz-raises-sigill|-z]\n", + argv[0]); + exit(1); + default: + break; + } } rc = sched_getaffinity(0, sizeof(cpu_set_t), &cpus); @@ -253,6 +358,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) check_no_zicbo_cpus(&cpus, RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZICBOM); } + if (pair.value & RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZICBOP) + tests[TEST_ZICBOP].enabled = true; + else + check_no_zicbo_cpus(&cpus, RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZICBOP); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tests); ++i) plan += tests[i].enabled ? tests[i].nr_tests : 0; -- 2.47.2

2 weeks

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[PATCH iommufd] iommufd: Make vfio_compat's unmap succeed if the range is already empty

by Jason Gunthorpe

iommufd returns ENOENT when attempting to unmap a range that is already empty, while vfio type1 returns success. Fix vfio_compat to match. Fixes: d624d6652a65 ("iommufd: vfio container FD ioctl compatibility") Reported-by: Alex Mastro <amastro(a)fb.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aP0S5ZF9l3sWkJ1G@devgpu012.nha5.facebook.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> --- drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c | 12 +++--------- drivers/iommu/iommufd/ioas.c | 4 ++++ tools/testing/selftests/iommu/iommufd.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c index c0360c450880b8..75d60f2ad90082 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c @@ -707,7 +707,8 @@ static int iopt_unmap_iova_range(struct io_pagetable *iopt, unsigned long start, struct iopt_area *area; unsigned long unmapped_bytes = 0; unsigned int tries = 0; - int rc = -ENOENT; + /* If there are no mapped entries then success */ + int rc = 0; /* * The domains_rwsem must be held in read mode any time any area->pages @@ -777,8 +778,6 @@ static int iopt_unmap_iova_range(struct io_pagetable *iopt, unsigned long start, down_write(&iopt->iova_rwsem); } - if (unmapped_bytes) - rc = 0; out_unlock_iova: up_write(&iopt->iova_rwsem); @@ -815,13 +814,8 @@ int iopt_unmap_iova(struct io_pagetable *iopt, unsigned long iova, int iopt_unmap_all(struct io_pagetable *iopt, unsigned long *unmapped) { - int rc; - - rc = iopt_unmap_iova_range(iopt, 0, ULONG_MAX, unmapped); /* If the IOVAs are empty then unmap all succeeds */ - if (rc == -ENOENT) - return 0; - return rc; + return iopt_unmap_iova_range(iopt, 0, ULONG_MAX, unmapped); } /* The caller must always free all the nodes in the allowed_iova rb_root. */ diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/ioas.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/ioas.c index 1542c5fd10a85c..459a7c5169154b 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/ioas.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/ioas.c @@ -367,6 +367,10 @@ int iommufd_ioas_unmap(struct iommufd_ucmd *ucmd) &unmapped); if (rc) goto out_put; + if (!unmapped) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out_put; + } } cmd->length = unmapped; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/iommu/iommufd.c b/tools/testing/selftests/iommu/iommufd.c index 3eebf5e3b974f4..bb4d33dde3c899 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/iommu/iommufd.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/iommu/iommufd.c @@ -2638,6 +2638,8 @@ TEST_F(vfio_compat_mock_domain, map) ASSERT_EQ(0, ioctl(self->fd, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &map_cmd)); ASSERT_EQ(0, ioctl(self->fd, VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA, &unmap_cmd)); ASSERT_EQ(BUFFER_SIZE, unmap_cmd.size); + /* Unmap of empty is success */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, ioctl(self->fd, VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA, &unmap_cmd)); /* UNMAP_FLAG_ALL requires 0 iova/size */ ASSERT_EQ(0, ioctl(self->fd, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &map_cmd)); base-commit: b09ed52db1e688eb8205b1939ca1345179ecd515 -- 2.43.0

2 weeks

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[PATCH v6 0/3] platform/chrome: Fix an UAF via replacing fops

by Tzung-Bi Shih

The series is separated from [1] to show the independency and compare potential use cases easier. This use case replaces filp->f_op to revocable-aware warppers. It relies on the revocable core part [2]. It tries to fix an UAF in the fops of cros_ec_chardev after the underlying protocol device has gone by using revocable. The warppers make sure file operations in drivers won't be called if the resource has been revoked. The 1st patch introduces revocable fops replacement. The 2nd patch supports the fops replacement in miscdevice. The 3rd patch uses the support from miscdevice to fix the UAF. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/chrome-platform/20251016054204.1523139-1-tzungbi@ke… [2] https://lore.kernel.org/chrome-platform/20251106152330.11733-1-tzungbi@kern… v6: - New, separated from an existing series. Tzung-Bi Shih (3): revocable: Add fops replacement char: misc: Leverage revocable fops replacement platform/chrome: cros_ec_chardev: Secure cros_ec_device via revocable drivers/char/misc.c | 18 ++- drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_chardev.c | 1 + fs/Makefile | 2 +- fs/fs_revocable.c | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fs_revocable.h | 14 ++ include/linux/miscdevice.h | 2 + 6 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/fs_revocable.c create mode 100644 include/linux/fs_revocable.h -- 2.48.1

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