The Power ISA mandates that all writes to the Authority Mask Register (AMR) must always be preceded as well as succeeded by a context synchronizing instruction.

This makes sure that the tests follow this requirement when attempting to update a pkey's access rights.

Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das sandipan@linux.ibm.com --- tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/include/reg.h | 6 ++++++ tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/core-pkey.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/ptrace-pkey.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/include/reg.h b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/include/reg.h index 022c5076b2c5..c0f2742a3a59 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/include/reg.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/include/reg.h @@ -57,6 +57,12 @@ #define SPRN_PPR 896 /* Program Priority Register */ #define SPRN_AMR 13 /* Authority Mask Register - problem state */

+#define set_amr(v) asm volatile("isync;" \ + "mtspr " __stringify(SPRN_AMR) ",%0;" \ + "isync" : \ + : "r" ((unsigned long)(v)) \ + : "memory") + /* TEXASR register bits */ #define TEXASR_FC 0xFE00000000000000 #define TEXASR_FP 0x0100000000000000 diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/core-pkey.c b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/core-pkey.c index d5c64fee032d..bbc05ffc5860 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/core-pkey.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/core-pkey.c @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static int child(struct shared_info *info) printf("%-30s AMR: %016lx pkey1: %d pkey2: %d pkey3: %d\n", user_write, info->amr, pkey1, pkey2, pkey3);

- mtspr(SPRN_AMR, info->amr); + set_amr(info->amr);

/* * We won't use pkey3. This tests whether the kernel restores the UAMOR diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/ptrace-pkey.c b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/ptrace-pkey.c index bdbbbe8431e0..904c04f8c919 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/ptrace-pkey.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/ptrace-pkey.c @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int child(struct shared_info *info) printf("%-30s AMR: %016lx pkey1: %d pkey2: %d pkey3: %d\n", user_write, info->amr1, pkey1, pkey2, pkey3);

- mtspr(SPRN_AMR, info->amr1); + set_amr(info->amr1);

/* Wait for parent to read our AMR value and write a new one. */ ret = prod_parent(&info->child_sync);

Apart from read and write access, memory protection keys can also be used for restricting execute permission of pages on powerpc. This adds a test to verify if the feature works as expected.

Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das sandipan@linux.ibm.com --- tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/Makefile | 3 +- .../selftests/powerpc/mm/pkey_exec_prot.c | 388 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 391 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/pkey_exec_prot.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/.gitignore index 2ca523255b1b..8f841f925baa 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/.gitignore +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/.gitignore @@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ wild_bctr large_vm_fork_separation bad_accesses tlbie_test +pkey_exec_prot diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/Makefile index 2389bf791fd6..f9fa0ba7435c 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/Makefile @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ noarg: $(MAKE) -C ../

TEST_GEN_PROGS := hugetlb_vs_thp_test subpage_prot prot_sao segv_errors wild_bctr \ - large_vm_fork_separation bad_accesses + large_vm_fork_separation bad_accesses pkey_exec_prot TEST_GEN_PROGS_EXTENDED := tlbie_test TEST_GEN_FILES := tempfile

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ $(OUTPUT)/prot_sao: ../utils.c $(OUTPUT)/wild_bctr: CFLAGS += -m64 $(OUTPUT)/large_vm_fork_separation: CFLAGS += -m64 $(OUTPUT)/bad_accesses: CFLAGS += -m64 +$(OUTPUT)/pkey_exec_prot: CFLAGS += -m64

$(OUTPUT)/tempfile: dd if=/dev/zero of=$@ bs=64k count=1 diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/pkey_exec_prot.c b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/pkey_exec_prot.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7c7c93425c5e --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/pkey_exec_prot.c @@ -0,0 +1,388 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + +/* + * Copyright 2020, Sandipan Das, IBM Corp. + * + * Test if applying execute protection on pages using memory + * protection keys works as expected. + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <signal.h> + +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> + +#include "reg.h" +#include "utils.h" + +/* + * Older versions of libc use the Intel-specific access rights. + * Hence, override the definitions as they might be incorrect. + */ +#undef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS +#define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x3 + +#undef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE +#define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2 + +#undef PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE +#define PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE 0x4 + +/* Older versions of libc do not not define this */ +#ifndef SEGV_PKUERR +#define SEGV_PKUERR 4 +#endif + +#define SI_PKEY_OFFSET 0x20 + +#define SYS_pkey_mprotect 386 +#define SYS_pkey_alloc 384 +#define SYS_pkey_free 385 + +#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2 +#define NR_PKEYS 32 +#define PKEY_BITS_MASK ((1UL << PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY) - 1) + +#define PPC_INST_NOP 0x60000000 +#define PPC_INST_TRAP 0x7fe00008 +#define PPC_INST_BLR 0x4e800020 + +#define sigsafe_err(msg) ({ \ + ssize_t nbytes __attribute__((unused)); \ + nbytes = write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, strlen(msg)); }) + +static inline unsigned long pkeyreg_get(void) +{ + return mfspr(SPRN_AMR); +} + +static inline void pkeyreg_set(unsigned long amr) +{ + set_amr(amr); +} + +static void pkey_set_rights(int pkey, unsigned long rights) +{ + unsigned long amr, shift; + + shift = (NR_PKEYS - pkey - 1) * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY; + amr = pkeyreg_get(); + amr &= ~(PKEY_BITS_MASK << shift); + amr |= (rights & PKEY_BITS_MASK) << shift; + pkeyreg_set(amr); +} + +static int sys_pkey_mprotect(void *addr, size_t len, int prot, int pkey) +{ + return syscall(SYS_pkey_mprotect, addr, len, prot, pkey); +} + +static int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long rights) +{ + return syscall(SYS_pkey_alloc, flags, rights); +} + +static int sys_pkey_free(int pkey) +{ + return syscall(SYS_pkey_free, pkey); +} + +static volatile sig_atomic_t fault_pkey, fault_code, fault_type; +static volatile sig_atomic_t remaining_faults; +static volatile unsigned int *fault_addr; +static unsigned long pgsize, numinsns; +static unsigned int *insns; + +static void trap_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *sinfo, void *ctx) +{ + /* Check if this fault originated from the expected address */ + if (sinfo->si_addr != (void *) fault_addr) + sigsafe_err("got a fault for an unexpected address\n"); + + _exit(1); +} + +static void segv_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *sinfo, void *ctx) +{ + int signal_pkey; + + /* + * In older versions of libc, siginfo_t does not have si_pkey as + * a member. + */ +#ifdef si_pkey + signal_pkey = sinfo->si_pkey; +#else + signal_pkey = *((int *)(((char *) sinfo) + SI_PKEY_OFFSET)); +#endif + + fault_code = sinfo->si_code; + + /* Check if this fault originated from the expected address */ + if (sinfo->si_addr != (void *) fault_addr) { + sigsafe_err("got a fault for an unexpected address\n"); + _exit(1); + } + + /* Check if too many faults have occurred for a single test case */ + if (!remaining_faults) { + sigsafe_err("got too many faults for the same address\n"); + _exit(1); + } + + + /* Restore permissions in order to continue */ + switch (fault_code) { + case SEGV_ACCERR: + if (mprotect(insns, pgsize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE)) { + sigsafe_err("failed to set access permissions\n"); + _exit(1); + } + break; + case SEGV_PKUERR: + if (signal_pkey != fault_pkey) { + sigsafe_err("got a fault for an unexpected pkey\n"); + _exit(1); + } + + switch (fault_type) { + case PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS: + pkey_set_rights(fault_pkey, 0); + break; + case PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE: + /* + * Reassociate the exec-only pkey with the region + * to be able to continue. Unlike AMR, we cannot + * set IAMR directly from userspace to restore the + * permissions. + */ + if (mprotect(insns, pgsize, PROT_EXEC)) { + sigsafe_err("failed to set execute permissions\n"); + _exit(1); + } + break; + default: + sigsafe_err("got a fault with an unexpected type\n"); + _exit(1); + } + break; + default: + sigsafe_err("got a fault with an unexpected code\n"); + _exit(1); + } + + remaining_faults--; +} + +static int pkeys_unsupported(void) +{ + bool hash_mmu = false; + int pkey; + + /* Protection keys are currently supported on Hash MMU only */ + FAIL_IF(using_hash_mmu(&hash_mmu)); + SKIP_IF(!hash_mmu); + + /* Check if the system call is supported */ + pkey = sys_pkey_alloc(0, 0); + SKIP_IF(pkey < 0); + sys_pkey_free(pkey); + + return 0; +} + +static int test(void) +{ + struct sigaction segv_act, trap_act; + int pkey, ret, i; + + ret = pkeys_unsupported(); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Setup SIGSEGV handler */ + segv_act.sa_handler = 0; + segv_act.sa_sigaction = segv_handler; + FAIL_IF(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, 0, &segv_act.sa_mask) != 0); + segv_act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; + segv_act.sa_restorer = 0; + FAIL_IF(sigaction(SIGSEGV, &segv_act, NULL) != 0); + + /* Setup SIGTRAP handler */ + trap_act.sa_handler = 0; + trap_act.sa_sigaction = trap_handler; + FAIL_IF(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, 0, &trap_act.sa_mask) != 0); + trap_act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; + trap_act.sa_restorer = 0; + FAIL_IF(sigaction(SIGTRAP, &trap_act, NULL) != 0); + + /* Setup executable region */ + pgsize = getpagesize(); + numinsns = pgsize / sizeof(unsigned int); + insns = (unsigned int *) mmap(NULL, pgsize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); + FAIL_IF(insns == MAP_FAILED); + + /* Write the instruction words */ + for (i = 1; i < numinsns - 1; i++) + insns[i] = PPC_INST_NOP; + + /* + * Set the first instruction as an unconditional trap. If + * the last write to this address succeeds, this should + * get overwritten by a no-op. + */ + insns[0] = PPC_INST_TRAP; + + /* + * Later, to jump to the executable region, we use a branch + * and link instruction (bctrl) which sets the return address + * automatically in LR. Use that to return back. + */ + insns[numinsns - 1] = PPC_INST_BLR; + + /* Allocate a pkey that restricts execution */ + pkey = sys_pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE); + FAIL_IF(pkey < 0); + + /* + * Pick the first instruction's address from the executable + * region. + */ + fault_addr = insns; + + /* The following two cases will avoid SEGV_PKUERR */ + fault_type = -1; + fault_pkey = -1; + + /* + * Read an instruction word from the address when AMR bits + * are not set i.e. the pkey permits both read and write + * access. + * + * This should not generate a fault as having PROT_EXEC + * implies PROT_READ on GNU systems. The pkey currently + * restricts execution only based on the IAMR bits. The + * AMR bits are cleared. + */ + remaining_faults = 0; + FAIL_IF(sys_pkey_mprotect(insns, pgsize, PROT_EXEC, pkey) != 0); + printf("read from %p, pkey is execute-disabled, access-enabled\n", + (void *) fault_addr); + i = *fault_addr; + FAIL_IF(remaining_faults != 0); + + /* + * Write an instruction word to the address when AMR bits + * are not set i.e. the pkey permits both read and write + * access. + * + * This should generate an access fault as having just + * PROT_EXEC also restricts writes. The pkey currently + * restricts execution only based on the IAMR bits. The + * AMR bits are cleared. + */ + remaining_faults = 1; + FAIL_IF(sys_pkey_mprotect(insns, pgsize, PROT_EXEC, pkey) != 0); + printf("write to %p, pkey is execute-disabled, access-enabled\n", + (void *) fault_addr); + *fault_addr = PPC_INST_TRAP; + FAIL_IF(remaining_faults != 0 || fault_code != SEGV_ACCERR); + + /* The following three cases will generate SEGV_PKUERR */ + fault_type = PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS; + fault_pkey = pkey; + + /* + * Read an instruction word from the address when AMR bits + * are set i.e. the pkey permits neither read nor write + * access. + * + * This should generate a pkey fault based on AMR bits only + * as having PROT_EXEC implicitly allows reads. + */ + remaining_faults = 1; + FAIL_IF(sys_pkey_mprotect(insns, pgsize, PROT_EXEC, pkey) != 0); + printf("read from %p, pkey is execute-disabled, access-disabled\n", + (void *) fault_addr); + pkey_set_rights(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS); + i = *fault_addr; + FAIL_IF(remaining_faults != 0 || fault_code != SEGV_PKUERR); + + /* + * Write an instruction word to the address when AMR bits + * are set i.e. the pkey permits neither read nor write + * access. + * + * This should generate two faults. First, a pkey fault + * based on AMR bits and then an access fault since + * PROT_EXEC does not allow writes. + */ + remaining_faults = 2; + FAIL_IF(sys_pkey_mprotect(insns, pgsize, PROT_EXEC, pkey) != 0); + printf("write to %p, pkey is execute-disabled, access-disabled\n", + (void *) fault_addr); + pkey_set_rights(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS); + *fault_addr = PPC_INST_NOP; + FAIL_IF(remaining_faults != 0 || fault_code != SEGV_ACCERR); + + /* + * Jump to the executable region when AMR bits are set i.e. + * the pkey permits neither read nor write access. + * + * This should generate a pkey fault based on IAMR bits which + * are set to not permit execution. AMR bits should not affect + * execution. + * + * This also checks if the overwrite of the first instruction + * word from a trap to a no-op succeeded. + */ + fault_addr = insns; + fault_type = PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE; + fault_pkey = pkey; + remaining_faults = 1; + FAIL_IF(sys_pkey_mprotect(insns, pgsize, PROT_EXEC, pkey) != 0); + pkey_set_rights(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS); + printf("execute at %p, pkey is execute-disabled, access-disabled\n", + (void *) fault_addr); + asm volatile("mtctr %0; bctrl" : : "r"(insns)); + FAIL_IF(remaining_faults != 0 || fault_code != SEGV_PKUERR); + + /* + * Free the current pkey and allocate a new one that is + * fully permissive. + */ + sys_pkey_free(pkey); + pkey = sys_pkey_alloc(0, 0); + + /* + * Jump to the executable region when AMR bits are not set + * i.e. the pkey permits read and write access. + * + * This should not generate any faults as the IAMR bits are + * also not set and hence will the pkey will not restrict + * execution. + */ + fault_pkey = pkey; + remaining_faults = 0; + FAIL_IF(sys_pkey_mprotect(insns, pgsize, PROT_EXEC, pkey) != 0); + printf("execute at %p, pkey is execute-enabled, access-enabled\n", + (void *) fault_addr); + asm volatile("mtctr %0; bctrl" : : "r"(insns)); + FAIL_IF(remaining_faults != 0); + + /* Cleanup */ + munmap((void *) insns, pgsize); + sys_pkey_free(pkey); + + return 0; +} + +int main(void) +{ + test_harness(test, "pkey_exec_prot"); +}