On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:54 PM Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com wrote:
On Nov 17, 2026 Albert Esteve aesteve@redhat.com wrote:
Both DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC and the new DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE ioctl accept a charge_fd field that, when set, causes the allocation to be charged to an arbitrary process's cgroup rather than the caller's.
Charging is currently limited to the caller's own memcg subtree unless the caller holds CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. But the capability is all-or-nothing. A process holding it, along with a dma-heap device node or a dma-buf fd can charge unlimited memory to any other process's cgroup, potentially exhausting that cgroup's limit and triggering OOM kills independent of the victim's own activity or privileges.
Add security_memcg_charge_task(), called in get_obj_cgroup_from_fd() when charge_fd refers to another process. The hook receives the credentials of the allocating process (from) and the credentials of the process whose cgroup will be charged (to), giving security modules a controlled enforcement point for cross-cgroup objcg attribution policy.
When CONFIG_SECURITY is not set the hook compiles to an inline returning 0, adding no overhead to the fast path.
Signed-off-by: Albert Esteve aesteve@redhat.com
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++ mm/memcontrol.c | 11 +++++++++++ security/security.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
...
diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c index 03cd90d5e623..2e6fcbe14d43 100644 --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ #include <linux/lockdep.h> #include <linux/resume_user_mode.h> #include <linux/psi.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/seq_buf.h> #include <linux/sched/isolation.h> #include <linux/kmemleak.h> @@ -3198,10 +3199,12 @@ static bool mem_cgroup_may_charge(struct mem_cgroup *memcg) struct obj_cgroup *get_obj_cgroup_from_fd(int fd) { struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
const struct cred *tcred; struct obj_cgroup *objcg; struct mem_cgroup *memcg; struct task_struct *task; unsigned int pidfd_flags;int ret; if (mem_cgroup_disabled()) return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);@@ -3226,6 +3229,14 @@ struct obj_cgroup *get_obj_cgroup_from_fd(int fd) if (IS_ERR(task)) return ERR_CAST(task);
tcred = get_task_cred(task);ret = security_memcg_charge_task(current_cred(), tcred);Do you ever envision this "from" cred being something other than current_cred()?
Good point. No, I do not.
If the answer is "no", we might want to consider changing the LSM hook slightly to help prevent misuse in the future:
int security_current_memcg_charge_task(const struct cred *tcred);
Agreed. I'll apply the same to the cgroupfd variant for symmetry (its "from" is also always current_cred()).
BR, Albert.
put_cred(tcred);if (ret) {put_task_struct(task);return ERR_PTR(ret);}rcu_read_lock(); css = task_css(task, memory_cgrp_id); put_task_struct(task);-- paul-moore.com