Good afternoon,
Linaro and Arm have been standardizing the FW update mechanism for A-class devices.
The intention behind the standardization is to enable generic implementations of the UEFI UpdateCapsule where:
1) the FW store resides in Secure World controlled flash;
2) there is FW bank duplication (A/B model).
Arm published a specification, at Alpha quality, that defines the FW update model and a set of tools catering for 1) and 2) : https://developer.arm.com/-/media/Files/pdf/FWU-PSA-A_DEN0118_1.0ALP3.pdf
Arm welcomes feedback on the specification.
Please direct feedback to either myself or Grant Likely
The FW update work will be discussed at the EBBR biweekly call this Monday (26th April).
Regards,
Jose
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
Hello,
We have the DTE call today.
If Frank is ready to talk about DTB format evolution we will do that.
If not we need agenda items.
4PM UK, 11AM US Eastern
Zoom Meeting ID: 961 7042 8801
Passcode: 8250
Thanks,
Bill
--
Bill Mills
Principal Technical Consultant, Linaro
+1-240-643-0836
TZ: US Eastern
Work Schedule: Tues/Wed/Thur
Interesting topic.
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Zelalem Aweke via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2021 at 17:14
Subject: [TF-A] [RFC] TF-A threat model
To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Hi All,
We are releasing the first TF-A threat model document. This release
provides the baseline for future updates to be applied as required by
developments to the TF-A code base. Please review the document provide
comments here:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/9627.
Thanks,
Zelalem
--
TF-A mailing list
TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
--
François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
T: +33.67221.6485
francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
Hi,
next week agenda is:
- Industrial Internet Consortium patterns update
- Civil Infrastructure Project liaison update
- Open System Firmware
<https://www.opencompute.org/projects/open-system-firmware> presentation
and discussion
On this last topic, I'm glad to welcome Ron Minnich who will present Open
System Firmware initiatives from Open Compute Project. (Ron has a long
history in firmware with creation of CoreBoot and more recently LinuxBoot).
SystemReady standards define technical requirements to ensure decoupling
between firmware and operating systems.
I see OSF efforts complementing the technical standards with firmware
business lifecycle to guarantee openness and freedom of use. A checklist
<https://www.opencompute.org/wiki/Open_System_Firmware/Checklist> helps
qualify systems per those openness and freedom of use criteria.
I'd like us to be able to have an informed discussion on the checklist
(meaning need to read before the call ;-) to see how much it may apply
to Trusted
Substrate <http://trusted-substrate.org>, and wether it would make sense
(if technically feasible) to setup a liaison between our two groups.
Cordially,
FF
PS: I will be sending additional invites for new attendees
--
François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
T: +33.67221.6485
francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
Hi
even though I am not an "ecology activist", sustainability is a topic dear
to me. And it can translate into firmware world... So I am targeting this
message to the audience of the two firmware communities I know and hope it
is okay to do so.
March 2021 was a big date for Open Source Firmware
<https://www.opencompute.org/projects/open-system-firmware>: that was the
deadline to get
"
Owners must be able to change firmware and share it -- including any binary
components -- with other owners. Starting in March, 2021, OCP badging for
servers will require that systems support OSF.
"
That's a big step towards sustainability in the OCP world.
More generally, we should have the capacity to characterize firmware
sustainability for post official firmware End Of Life.
What about the following :
level 0: system cannot evolve or be updated.
level 1: the system can be updated to a bootable minimal functionality with
open community effort.It may lack some features. For instance, you can
still look at your TV but lose Netflix 4K because the owners (in OCP sense)
cannot get a signed Netflix TA (either updated or not).
level 2: the TAs and other binaries can be made available (signed) to the
ones maintaining open source firmware projects (TF-A, OP-TEE, U-Boot...).
For instance, owners (in the OCP sense) can get the updated Netflix TA
binary (updated or not) and sign it for inclusion.
level 3: all firmware components are open source and can thus be community
maintained.
I think :
Level 2 is the right balance between business value and "ecological" goal
of sustainability.
Level 3 is not mandatory and not the ultimate goal.
Is this a good way to characterize sustainability?
How to make at least level 2 happen ?
Cheers
FF
--
François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
T: +33.67221.6485
francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
Hi,
From TF-A project point of view, we prefer to use existing mechanism to pass parameters across boot stages using linked list of tagged elements (as suggested by Julius). It has support for both generic and SiP-specific tags. Having said that, it does not stop partners to introduce new mechanisms suitable for their usecase in platform port initially and later move to generic code if its suitable for other platforms.
To start with, Ampere can introduce a platform specific implementation of memory tag(speed/NUMA topology etc) which can be evaluated and discussed for generalization in future. The tag will be populated in BL2 stage and can be forwarded to further stages(and to BL33) by passing the head of list pointer in one of the registers. Initially any register can be used but going forward a standardization will be needed.
The U-boot bloblist mentioned by Simon is conceptually similar to what TF-A is using, if there is consensus of using bloblist/taglist then TF-A tag list may be enhanced to take best of both the implementations.
One of the potential problems of having structure used in different projects is maintainability, this can be avoided by having a single copy of these structures in TF-A (kept inside "include/export" which intended to be used by other projects.)
Regarding usage of either UUID or tag, I echo the sentiments of Simon and Julius to keep it simple and use tag values.
Looking forward to having further discussions on zoom call today.
Thanks
Manish P
________________________________
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Julius Werner via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 25 March 2021 02:43
To: Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Harb Abdulhamid OS <abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com>; Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; U-Boot Mailing List <u-boot(a)lists.denx.de>; Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org>; Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for information passing between boot stages
Just want to point out that TF-A currently already supports a (very simple) mechanism like this:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/…https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/…https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/…
It's just a linked list of tagged elements. The tag space is split into TF-A-wide generic tags and SiP-specific tags (with plenty of room to spare if more areas need to be defined -- a 64-bit tag can fit a lot). This is currently being used by some platforms that run coreboot in place of BL1/BL2, to pass information from coreboot (BL2) to BL31.
I would echo Simon's sentiment of keeping this as simple as possible and avoiding complicated and bloated data structures with UUIDs. You usually want to parse something like this as early as possible in the passed-to firmware stage, particularly if the structure encodes information about the debug console (like it does for the platforms I mentioned above). For example, in BL31 this basically means doing it right after moving from assembly to C in bl31_early_platform_setup2() to get the console up before running anything else. At that point in the BL31 initialization, the MMU and caches are disabled, so data accesses are pretty expensive and you don't want to spend a lot of parsing effort or calculate complicated checksums or the like. You just want something extremely simple where you ideally have to touch every data word only once.
On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 5:06 PM Simon Glass via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
Hi Harb,
On Wed, 24 Mar 2021 at 11:39, Harb Abdulhamid OS <abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com<mailto:abdulhamid@os.amperecomputing.com>> wrote:
Hello Folks,
Appreciate the feedback and replies on this. Glad to see that there is interest in this topic. 😊
I try to address the comments/feedback from Francois and Simon below….
@François Ozog<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> – happy to discuss this on a zoom call. I will make that time slot work, and will be available to attend April 8, 4pm CT.
Note that I’m using the term “HOB” here more generically, as there are typically vendor specific structures beyond the resource descriptor HOB, which provides only a small subset of the information that needs to be passed between the boot phases.
The whole point here is to provide mechanism to develop firmware that we can build ARM Server SoC’s that support *any* BL33 payload (e.g. EDK2, AptioV, CoreBoot, and maybe even directly boot strapping LinuxBoot at some point). In other-words, we are trying to come up with a TF-A that would be completely agnostic to the implementation of BL33 (i.e. BL33 is built completely independently by a separate entity – e.g. an ODM/OEM).
Keep in mind, in the server/datacenter market segment we are not building vertically integrated systems with a single entity compiling firmware/software stacks like most folks in TF-A have become use to. There are two categories of higher level firmware code blobs in the server/datacenter model:
1. “SoC” or “silicon” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL1, BL2, BL31, and *possibly* one or more BL32 instances
2. “Platform” or “board” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL33 and *possibly* one or more BL32 instances.
Even the platform firmware stack could be further fragmented by having multiple entities involved in delivering the entire firmware stack: IBVs, ODMs, OEMs, CSPs, and possibly even device vendor code.
To support a broad range of platform designs with a broad range of memory devices, we need a crisp and clear contract between the SoC firmware that initializes memory (e.g. BL2) and how that platform boot firmware (e.g. BL33) gathers information about what memory that was initialized, at what speeds, NUMA topology, and many other relevant information that needs to be known and comprehended by the platform firmware and eventually by the platform software.
I understand the versatility of DT, but I see two major problems with DT:
* DT requires more complicated parsing to get properties, and even more complex to dynamically set properties – this HOB structures may need to be generated in boot phases where DDR is not available, and therefore we will be extremely memory constrained.
* DT is probably overkill for this purpose – We really just want a list of pointers to simple C structures that code cast (e.g. JEDEC SPD data blob)
I think that we should not mix the efforts around DT/ACPI specs with what we are doing here, because those specs and concepts were developed for a completely different purpose (i.e. abstractions needed for OS / RTOS software, and not necessarily suitable for firmware-to-firmware hand-offs).
Frankly, I would personally push back pretty hard on defining SMC’s for something that should be one way information passing. Every SMC we add is another attack vector to the secure world and an increased burden on the folks that have to do security auditing and threat analysis. I see no benefit in exposing these boot/HOB/BOB structures at run-time via SMC calls.
Please do let me know if you disagree and why. Look forward to discussing on this thread or on the call.
@Simon Glass<mailto:sjg@chromium.org> - Thanks for the pointer to bloblist. I briefly reviewed and it seems like a good baseline for what we may be looking for.
That being said, I would say that there is some benefit in having some kind of unique identifiers (e.g. UUID or some unique signature) so that we can tie standardized data structures (based on some future TBD specs) to a particular ID. For example, if the TPM driver in BL33 is looking for the TPM structure in the HOB/BOB list, and may not care about the other data blobs. The driver needs a way to identify and locate the blob it cares about.
The tag is intended to serve that purpose, although perhaps it should switch from an auto-allocating enum to one with explicit values for each entry and a range for 'local' use.
I guess we can achieve this with the tag, but the problem with tag when you have eco-system with a lot of parties doing parallel development, you can end up with tag collisions and folks fighting about who has rights to what tag values. We would need some official process for folks to register tags for whatever new structures we define, or maybe some tag range for vendor specific structures. This comes with a lot of pain and bureaucracy. On the other hand, UUID has been a proven way to make it easy to just define your own blobs with *either* standard or vendor specific structures without worry of ID collisions between vendors.
True. I think the pain is overstated, though. In this case I think we actually want something that can be shared between projects and orgs, so some amount of coordination could be considered a benefit. It could just be a github pull request. I find the UUID unfriendly and not just to code size and eyesight! Trying to discover what GUIDs mean or are valid is quite tricky. E.g. see this code:
#define FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_TSEG_GUID \
EFI_GUID(0xd038747c, 0xd00c, 0x4980, \
0xb3, 0x19, 0x49, 0x01, 0x99, 0xa4, 0x7d, 0x55)
(etc.)
static struct guid_name {
efi_guid_t guid;
const char *name;
} guid_name[] = {
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_TSEG_GUID, "TSEG" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_FSP_GUID, "FSP" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_SMM_PEI_SMRAM_GUID, "SMM PEI SMRAM" },
{ FSP_NON_VOLATILE_STORAGE_HOB_GUID, "NVS" },
{ FSP_VARIABLE_NV_DATA_HOB_GUID, "Variable NVS" },
{ FSP_GRAPHICS_INFO_HOB_GUID, "Graphics info" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PCD_DATABASE_GUID1, "PCD database ea" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PCD_DATABASE_GUID2, "PCD database 9b" },
(never figured out what those two are)
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PEIM_DXE_GUID, "PEIM Init DXE" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_ALLOC_STACK_GUID, "Alloc stack" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_SMBIOS_MEMORY_GUID, "SMBIOS memory" },
{ {}, "zero-guid" },
{}
};
static const char *guid_to_name(const efi_guid_t *guid)
{
struct guid_name *entry;
for (entry = guid_name; entry->name; entry++) {
if (!guidcmp(guid, &entry->guid))
return entry->name;
}
return NULL;
}
Believe it or not it took a fair bit of effort to find just that small list, with nearly every one in a separate doc, from memory.
We can probably debate whether there is any value in GUID/UUID or not during the call… but again, boblist seems like a reasonable starting point as an alternative to HOB.
Indeed. There is certainly value in both approaches.
Regards,
Simon
Thanks,
--Harb
From: François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org>>
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2021 10:00 AM
To: François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org>>; Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com<mailto:rminnich@google.com>>; Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org<mailto:paul.isaacs@linaro.org>>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org<mailto:sjg@chromium.org>>; Harb Abdulhamid OS <abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com<mailto:abdulhamid@os.amperecomputing.com>>; Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org<mailto:boot-architecture@lists.linaro.org>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for information passing between boot stages
+Ron Minnich<mailto:rminnich@google.com> +Paul Isaac's<mailto:paul.isaacs@linaro.org>
Adding Ron and Paul because I think this interface should be also benefiting LinuxBoot efforts.
On Tue, 23 Mar 2021 at 11:17, François Ozog via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
Hi,
I propose we cover the topic at the next Trusted Substrate<https://collaborate.linaro.org/display/TS/Trusted+Substrate+Home> zoom call<https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/94563644892> on April 8th 4pm CET.
The agenda:
ABI between non-secure firmware and the rest of firmware (EL3, S-EL1, S-EL2, SCP) to adapt hardware description to some runtime conditions.
runtime conditions here relates to DRAM size and topology detection, secure DRAM memory carvings, PSCI and SCMI interface publishing.
For additional background on existing metadata: UEFI Platform Initialization Specification Version 1.7<https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/PI_Spec_1_7_final_Jan_2019.p…>, 5.5 Resource Descriptor HOB
Out of the ResourceType we care about is EFI_RESOURCE_SYSTEM_MEMORY.
This HOB lacks memory NUMA attachment or something that could be related to fill SRAT table for ACPI or relevant DT proximity domains.
HOB is not consistent accros platforms: some platforms (Arm) lists memory from the booting NUMA node, other platforms (x86) lists all memory from all NUMA nodes. (At least this is the case on the two platforms I tested).
There are two proposals to use memory structures from SPL/BLx up to the handover function (as defined in the Device Tree technical report<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CLkhLRaz_zcCq44DLGmPZQFPbYHOC6nzPowaL0X…>) which can be U-boot (BL33 or just U-Boot in case of SPL/U-Boot scheme) or EDK2.
I would propose we also discuss possibility of FF-A interface to actually query information or request actions to be done (this is a model actually used in some SoCs with proprietary SMC calls).
Requirements (to be validated):
- ACPI and DT hardware descriptions.
- agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2)
- agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2, TF-A/LinuxBoot)
- at least allows complete DRAM description and "persistent" usage (reserved areas for secure world or other usages)
- support secure world device assignment
Cheers
FF
On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 19:56, Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org<mailto:sjg@chromium.org>> wrote:
Hi,
Can I suggest using bloblist for this instead? It is lightweight,
easier to parse, doesn't have GUIDs and is already used within U-Boot
for passing info between SPL/U-Boot, etc.
Docs here: https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/doc/README.bloblist
Header file describes the format:
https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/include/bloblist.h
Full set of unit tests:
https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/test/bloblist.c
Regards,
Simon
On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 23:58, François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org>> wrote:
>
> +Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org<mailto:boot-architecture@lists.linaro.org>>
>
> standardization is very much welcomed here and need to accommodate a very
> diverse set of situations.
> For example, TEE OS may need to pass memory reservations to BL33 or
> "capture" a device for the secure world.
>
> I have observed a number of architectures:
> 1) pass information from BLx to BLy in the form of a specific object
> 2) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to get information
> 3) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to perform Device Tree
> fixups
>
> I also imagined a standardized "broadcast" FF-A call so that any firmware
> element can either provide information or "do something".
>
> My understanding of your proposal is about standardizing on architecture 1)
> with the HOB format.
>
> The advantage of the HOB is simplicity but it may be difficult to implement
> schemes such as pruning a DT because device assignment in the secure world.
>
> In any case, it looks feasible to have TF-A and OP-TEE complement the list
> of HOBs to pass information downstream (the bootflow).
>
> It would be good to start with building the comprehensive list of
> information that need to be conveyed between firmware elements:
>
> information. | authoritative entity | reporting entity | information
> exchanged:
> dram | TFA | TFA |
> <format to be detailed, NUMA topology to build the SRAT table or DT
> equivalent?>
> PSCI | SCP | TFA? |
> SCMI | SCP or TEE-OS | TFA? TEE-OS?|
> secure SRAM | TFA. | TFA. |
> secure DRAM | TFA? TEE-OS? | TFA? TEE-OS? |
> other? | |
> |
>
> Cheers
>
> FF
>
>
> On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 09:34, Harb Abdulhamid OS via TF-A <
> tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
>
> > Hello Folks,
> >
> >
> >
> > I'm emailing to start an open discussion about the adoption of a concept
> > known as "hand-off blocks" or HOB to become a part of the TF-A Firmware
> > Framework Architecture (FFA). This is something that is a pretty major
> > pain point when it comes to the adoption of TF-A in ARM Server SoC’s
> > designed to enable a broad range of highly configurable datacenter
> > platforms.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > What is a HOB (Background)?
> >
> > ---------------------------
> >
> > UEFI PI spec describes a particular definition for how HOB may be used for
> > transitioning between the PEI and DXE boot phases, which is a good
> > reference point for this discussion, but not necessarily the exact solution
> > appropriate for TF-A.
> >
> >
> >
> > A HOB is simply a dynamically generated data structure passed in between
> > two boot phases. This is information that was obtained through discovery
> > and needs to be passed forward to the next boot phase *once*, with no API
> > needed to call back (e.g. no call back into previous firmware phase is
> > needed to fetch this information at run-time - it is simply passed one time
> > during boot).
> >
> >
> >
> > There may be one or more HOBs passed in between boot phases. If there are
> > more than one HOB that needs to be passed, this can be in a form of a "HOB
> > table", which (for example) could be a UUID indexed array of pointers to
> > HOB structures, used to locate a HOB of interest (based on UUID). In such
> > cases, instead of passing a single HOB, the boot phases may rely on passing
> > the pointer to the HOB table.
> >
> >
> >
> > This has been extremely useful concept to employ on highly configurable
> > systems that must rely on flexible discovery mechanisms to initialize and
> > boot the system. This is especially helpful when you have multiple
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Why do we need HOBs in TF-A?:
> >
> > -----------------------------
> >
> > It is desirable that EL3 firmware (e.g. TF-A) built for ARM Server SoC in
> > a way that is SoC specific *but* platform agnostic. This means that a
> > single ARM SoC that a SiP may deliver to customers may provide a single
> > TF-A binary (e.g. BL1, BL2, BL31) that could be used to support a broad
> > range of platform designs and configurations in order to boot a platform
> > specific firmware (e.g. BL33 and possibly even BL32 code). In order to
> > achieve this, the platform configuration must be *discovered* instead of
> > statically compiled as it is today in TF-A via device tree based
> > enumeration. The mechanisms of discovery may differ broadly depending on
> > the relevant industry standard, or in some cases may have rely on SiP
> > specific discovery flows.
> >
> >
> >
> > For example: On server systems that support a broad range DIMM memory
> > population/topologies, all the necessary information required to boot is
> > fully discovered via standard JEDEC Serial Presence Detect (SPD) over an
> > I2C bus. Leveraging the SPD bus, may platform variants could be supported
> > with a single TF-A binary. Not only is this information required to
> > initialize memory in early boot phases (e.g. BL2), the subsequent boot
> > phases will also need this SPD info to construct a system physical address
> > map and properly initialize the MMU based on the memory present, and where
> > the memory may be present. Subsequent boot phases (e.g. BL33 / UEFI) may
> > need to generate standard firmware tables to the operating systems, such as
> > SMBIOS tables describing DIMM topology and various ACPI tables (e.g. SLIT,
> > SRAT, even NFIT if NVDIMM's are present).
> >
> >
> >
> > In short, it all starts with a standardized or vendor specific discovery
> > flow in an early boot stage (e.g. BL1/BL2), followed by the passing of
> > information to the next boot stages (e.g. BL31/BL32/BL33).
> >
> >
> >
> > Today, every HOB may be a vendor specific structure, but in the future
> > there may be benefit of defining standard HOBs. This may be useful for
> > memory discovery, passing the system physical address map, enabling TPM
> > measured boot, and potentially many other common HOB use-cases.
> >
> >
> >
> > It would be extremely beneficial to the datacenter market segment if the
> > TF-A community would adopt this concept of information passing between all
> > boot phases as opposed to rely solely on device tree enumeration. This is
> > not intended to replace device tree, rather intended as an alternative way
> > to describe the info that must be discovered and dynamically generated.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Conclusion:
> >
> > -----------
> >
> > We are proposing that the TF-A community begin pursuing the adoption of
> > HOBs as a mechanism used for information exchange between each boot stage
> > (e.g. BL1->BL2, BL2->BL31, BL31->BL32, and BL31->BL33)? Longer term we
> > want to explore standardizing some HOB structures for the BL33 phase (e.g.
> > UEFI HOB structures), but initially would like to agree on this being a
> > useful mechanism used to pass information between each boot stage.
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > --Harb
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > TF-A mailing list
> > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
> >
>
>
> --
> François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
> T: +33.67221.6485
> francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> | Skype: ffozog
> _______________________________________________
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François-Frédéric Ozog | Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group
T: +33.67221.6485
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François-Frédéric Ozog | Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group
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I'm cancelling today's EBBR biweekly as I don't have an agenda for
today. From discussion at the last EBBR meeting, with EBBR v2 about to
be released and not a lot of new content to discuss, future EBBR
meetings will be more of a tech forum format.
Please email me if there is a tech topic you want to discuss in the
biweekly EBBR forum and I'll add it to the schedule which will start in
2 weeks time.
g.
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
Hello,
Last week's meeting about HOBs for the DRAM information, I would like
to give an example of the Socionext SynQuacer case.
SynQuacer SoC is a bit unique SoC, it consists of 24xCA53(AP) +
CM3(SCP), and it uses DIMM cards like PCs.
Thus, when initializing the memory, it has to detect the DIMM and
initialize it and notify the configuration to BL3X.
The SynQuacer boots from SCP and runs SCP firmware on it. The SCP
firmware initializes DDR memory and secure memory area.
Since the SynQuacer has a GPIO (DIP switch) to enable or disable
secure memory, secure memory is dynamically configurable.
So, it has a vendor extension of SCMI call to pass that information.
https://github.com/ARM-software/SCP-firmware/blob/master/product/synquacer/…
When the TF-A is booted by SCP on AP, TF-A calls the SCMI and gets the
DDR information, from which the secure memory area is removed.
TF-A saved the information on an address, and EDK2 and U-Boot uses it
(of course BL33 can issue the SCMI to get the information)
[SCP fw] <-(SCMI)-> [TF-A] <-(memory*)-> [U-Boot/EDK2]
* it will be updated to use SMC.
- The SynQuacer doesn't use Devicetree to pass this information
because EDK2 uses ACPI by default.
- Secure memory information is not shared. that size and address are
fixed in SCP-firmware, TF-A and OP-TEE.
Thank you,
--
Masami Hiramatsu
Julius, Simon,
It appears there are opinions you carry around UUID being complicated, bloated, code being an eyesore, parsing these lists early with MMU/Caches disabled, calculating checksums etc. While there is certainly a LOT of truth to those statements, these concerns need to be put into context and may not necessarily apply to all platforms running TF-A. Standardization and interoperability may be valued more on some platforms and some of the bloat and performance issues may be worth those tradeoffs. Some of these concerns may not even apply on powerful CPU’s and SoC’s with lots of memory. Also a quick grep for “uuid” in the TF-A repository shows that there is significant use of UUID’s for FIP, some SMC’s, secure partitions etc so use of UUID is not something new to TF-A.
While there are many ways to solve the same problem, there are also potential dis-advantages to something like the mechanism pointed out below. For example, this is yet another solution to an already solved problem. If we use UEFI hob’s, the code and problem has been solved for decades and there is code re-use possible and that *potentially*(opinions may vary) is better for security as there have been eyes on it for long and is more stable.(I’m very aware UEFI is not the gold standard for security, but again, it is a blanket statement to say all UEFI code is bad).
Does the method mentioned below allow you to create a dynamic list of arbitrary lengths and NOT lists of lengths decided at compile time? It appears that it is mainly being used on lists fixed at compile time.
What about interoperability with UEFI? Coreboot is great for platforms/companies that use it but what about platforms that *must* use UEFI for various reasons? Do we need a conversion from the method below to a UEFI HOB if BL33 is UEFI? Clearly the solution below was tailored to coreboot.
We can support multiple ways in the same code base through build and run time options and a platform should be free to make calls on whether the problems you mentioned below really apply or not. What is a pain to do(having co-ordination with multiple companies vs vendor defined tags/UUID’s) is also subjective and whether or not it is overstated is matter of opinion/context.
I think it may be best to discuss this in the call and understand the requirements fully. It may turn out that what you have proposed below works anyway 😊
Thanks
Raghu
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Julius Werner via TF-A
Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2021 7:44 PM
To: Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org>
Cc: Harb Abdulhamid OS <abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com>; Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; U-Boot Mailing List <u-boot(a)lists.denx.de>; Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org>; Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for information passing between boot stages
Just want to point out that TF-A currently already supports a (very simple) mechanism like this:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/…https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/…https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/…
It's just a linked list of tagged elements. The tag space is split into TF-A-wide generic tags and SiP-specific tags (with plenty of room to spare if more areas need to be defined -- a 64-bit tag can fit a lot). This is currently being used by some platforms that run coreboot in place of BL1/BL2, to pass information from coreboot (BL2) to BL31.
I would echo Simon's sentiment of keeping this as simple as possible and avoiding complicated and bloated data structures with UUIDs. You usually want to parse something like this as early as possible in the passed-to firmware stage, particularly if the structure encodes information about the debug console (like it does for the platforms I mentioned above). For example, in BL31 this basically means doing it right after moving from assembly to C in bl31_early_platform_setup2() to get the console up before running anything else. At that point in the BL31 initialization, the MMU and caches are disabled, so data accesses are pretty expensive and you don't want to spend a lot of parsing effort or calculate complicated checksums or the like. You just want something extremely simple where you ideally have to touch every data word only once.
On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 5:06 PM Simon Glass via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > wrote:
Hi Harb,
On Wed, 24 Mar 2021 at 11:39, Harb Abdulhamid OS <abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com <mailto:abdulhamid@os.amperecomputing.com> > wrote:
Hello Folks,
Appreciate the feedback and replies on this. Glad to see that there is interest in this topic. 😊
I try to address the comments/feedback from Francois and Simon below….
<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> @François Ozog – happy to discuss this on a zoom call. I will make that time slot work, and will be available to attend April 8, 4pm CT.
Note that I’m using the term “HOB” here more generically, as there are typically vendor specific structures beyond the resource descriptor HOB, which provides only a small subset of the information that needs to be passed between the boot phases.
The whole point here is to provide mechanism to develop firmware that we can build ARM Server SoC’s that support *any* BL33 payload (e.g. EDK2, AptioV, CoreBoot, and maybe even directly boot strapping LinuxBoot at some point). In other-words, we are trying to come up with a TF-A that would be completely agnostic to the implementation of BL33 (i.e. BL33 is built completely independently by a separate entity – e.g. an ODM/OEM).
Keep in mind, in the server/datacenter market segment we are not building vertically integrated systems with a single entity compiling firmware/software stacks like most folks in TF-A have become use to. There are two categories of higher level firmware code blobs in the server/datacenter model:
1. “SoC” or “silicon” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL1, BL2, BL31, and *possibly* one or more BL32 instances
2. “Platform” or “board” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL33 and *possibly* one or more BL32 instances.
Even the platform firmware stack could be further fragmented by having multiple entities involved in delivering the entire firmware stack: IBVs, ODMs, OEMs, CSPs, and possibly even device vendor code.
To support a broad range of platform designs with a broad range of memory devices, we need a crisp and clear contract between the SoC firmware that initializes memory (e.g. BL2) and how that platform boot firmware (e.g. BL33) gathers information about what memory that was initialized, at what speeds, NUMA topology, and many other relevant information that needs to be known and comprehended by the platform firmware and eventually by the platform software.
I understand the versatility of DT, but I see two major problems with DT:
* DT requires more complicated parsing to get properties, and even more complex to dynamically set properties – this HOB structures may need to be generated in boot phases where DDR is not available, and therefore we will be extremely memory constrained.
* DT is probably overkill for this purpose – We really just want a list of pointers to simple C structures that code cast (e.g. JEDEC SPD data blob)
I think that we should not mix the efforts around DT/ACPI specs with what we are doing here, because those specs and concepts were developed for a completely different purpose (i.e. abstractions needed for OS / RTOS software, and not necessarily suitable for firmware-to-firmware hand-offs).
Frankly, I would personally push back pretty hard on defining SMC’s for something that should be one way information passing. Every SMC we add is another attack vector to the secure world and an increased burden on the folks that have to do security auditing and threat analysis. I see no benefit in exposing these boot/HOB/BOB structures at run-time via SMC calls.
Please do let me know if you disagree and why. Look forward to discussing on this thread or on the call.
<mailto:sjg@chromium.org> @Simon Glass - Thanks for the pointer to bloblist. I briefly reviewed and it seems like a good baseline for what we may be looking for.
That being said, I would say that there is some benefit in having some kind of unique identifiers (e.g. UUID or some unique signature) so that we can tie standardized data structures (based on some future TBD specs) to a particular ID. For example, if the TPM driver in BL33 is looking for the TPM structure in the HOB/BOB list, and may not care about the other data blobs. The driver needs a way to identify and locate the blob it cares about.
The tag is intended to serve that purpose, although perhaps it should switch from an auto-allocating enum to one with explicit values for each entry and a range for 'local' use.
I guess we can achieve this with the tag, but the problem with tag when you have eco-system with a lot of parties doing parallel development, you can end up with tag collisions and folks fighting about who has rights to what tag values. We would need some official process for folks to register tags for whatever new structures we define, or maybe some tag range for vendor specific structures. This comes with a lot of pain and bureaucracy. On the other hand, UUID has been a proven way to make it easy to just define your own blobs with *either* standard or vendor specific structures without worry of ID collisions between vendors.
True. I think the pain is overstated, though. In this case I think we actually want something that can be shared between projects and orgs, so some amount of coordination could be considered a benefit. It could just be a github pull request. I find the UUID unfriendly and not just to code size and eyesight! Trying to discover what GUIDs mean or are valid is quite tricky. E.g. see this code:
#define FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_TSEG_GUID \
EFI_GUID(0xd038747c, 0xd00c, 0x4980, \
0xb3, 0x19, 0x49, 0x01, 0x99, 0xa4, 0x7d, 0x55)
(etc.)
static struct guid_name {
efi_guid_t guid;
const char *name;
} guid_name[] = {
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_TSEG_GUID, "TSEG" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_FSP_GUID, "FSP" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_SMM_PEI_SMRAM_GUID, "SMM PEI SMRAM" },
{ FSP_NON_VOLATILE_STORAGE_HOB_GUID, "NVS" },
{ FSP_VARIABLE_NV_DATA_HOB_GUID, "Variable NVS" },
{ FSP_GRAPHICS_INFO_HOB_GUID, "Graphics info" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PCD_DATABASE_GUID1, "PCD database ea" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PCD_DATABASE_GUID2, "PCD database 9b" },
(never figured out what those two are)
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PEIM_DXE_GUID, "PEIM Init DXE" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_ALLOC_STACK_GUID, "Alloc stack" },
{ FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_SMBIOS_MEMORY_GUID, "SMBIOS memory" },
{ {}, "zero-guid" },
{}
};
static const char *guid_to_name(const efi_guid_t *guid)
{
struct guid_name *entry;
for (entry = guid_name; entry->name; entry++) {
if (!guidcmp(guid, &entry->guid))
return entry->name;
}
return NULL;
}
Believe it or not it took a fair bit of effort to find just that small list, with nearly every one in a separate doc, from memory.
We can probably debate whether there is any value in GUID/UUID or not during the call… but again, boblist seems like a reasonable starting point as an alternative to HOB.
Indeed. There is certainly value in both approaches.
Regards,
Simon
Thanks,
--Harb
From: François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org <mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> >
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2021 10:00 AM
To: François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org <mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> >; Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com <mailto:rminnich@google.com> >; Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org <mailto:paul.isaacs@linaro.org> >
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org <mailto:sjg@chromium.org> >; Harb Abdulhamid OS <abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com <mailto:abdulhamid@os.amperecomputing.com> >; Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org <mailto:boot-architecture@lists.linaro.org> >; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for information passing between boot stages
+Ron Minnich <mailto:rminnich@google.com> +Paul Isaac's <mailto:paul.isaacs@linaro.org>
Adding Ron and Paul because I think this interface should be also benefiting LinuxBoot efforts.
On Tue, 23 Mar 2021 at 11:17, François Ozog via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > wrote:
Hi,
I propose we cover the topic at the next Trusted Substrate <https://collaborate.linaro.org/display/TS/Trusted+Substrate+Home> zoom call <https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/94563644892> on April 8th 4pm CET.
The agenda:
ABI between non-secure firmware and the rest of firmware (EL3, S-EL1, S-EL2, SCP) to adapt hardware description to some runtime conditions.
runtime conditions here relates to DRAM size and topology detection, secure DRAM memory carvings, PSCI and SCMI interface publishing.
For additional background on existing metadata: <https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/PI_Spec_1_7_final_Jan_2019.p…> UEFI Platform Initialization Specification Version 1.7, 5.5 Resource Descriptor HOB
Out of the ResourceType we care about is EFI_RESOURCE_SYSTEM_MEMORY.
This HOB lacks memory NUMA attachment or something that could be related to fill SRAT table for ACPI or relevant DT proximity domains.
HOB is not consistent accros platforms: some platforms (Arm) lists memory from the booting NUMA node, other platforms (x86) lists all memory from all NUMA nodes. (At least this is the case on the two platforms I tested).
There are two proposals to use memory structures from SPL/BLx up to the handover function (as defined in the Device Tree technical report <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CLkhLRaz_zcCq44DLGmPZQFPbYHOC6nzPowaL0X…> ) which can be U-boot (BL33 or just U-Boot in case of SPL/U-Boot scheme) or EDK2.
I would propose we also discuss possibility of FF-A interface to actually query information or request actions to be done (this is a model actually used in some SoCs with proprietary SMC calls).
Requirements (to be validated):
- ACPI and DT hardware descriptions.
- agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2)
- agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2, TF-A/LinuxBoot)
- at least allows complete DRAM description and "persistent" usage (reserved areas for secure world or other usages)
- support secure world device assignment
Cheers
FF
On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 19:56, Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org <mailto:sjg@chromium.org> > wrote:
Hi,
Can I suggest using bloblist for this instead? It is lightweight,
easier to parse, doesn't have GUIDs and is already used within U-Boot
for passing info between SPL/U-Boot, etc.
Docs here: https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/doc/README.bloblist
Header file describes the format:
https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/include/bloblist.h
Full set of unit tests:
https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/test/bloblist.c
Regards,
Simon
On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 23:58, François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org <mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> > wrote:
>
> +Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org <mailto:boot-architecture@lists.linaro.org> >
>
> standardization is very much welcomed here and need to accommodate a very
> diverse set of situations.
> For example, TEE OS may need to pass memory reservations to BL33 or
> "capture" a device for the secure world.
>
> I have observed a number of architectures:
> 1) pass information from BLx to BLy in the form of a specific object
> 2) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to get information
> 3) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to perform Device Tree
> fixups
>
> I also imagined a standardized "broadcast" FF-A call so that any firmware
> element can either provide information or "do something".
>
> My understanding of your proposal is about standardizing on architecture 1)
> with the HOB format.
>
> The advantage of the HOB is simplicity but it may be difficult to implement
> schemes such as pruning a DT because device assignment in the secure world.
>
> In any case, it looks feasible to have TF-A and OP-TEE complement the list
> of HOBs to pass information downstream (the bootflow).
>
> It would be good to start with building the comprehensive list of
> information that need to be conveyed between firmware elements:
>
> information. | authoritative entity | reporting entity | information
> exchanged:
> dram | TFA | TFA |
> <format to be detailed, NUMA topology to build the SRAT table or DT
> equivalent?>
> PSCI | SCP | TFA? |
> SCMI | SCP or TEE-OS | TFA? TEE-OS?|
> secure SRAM | TFA. | TFA. |
> secure DRAM | TFA? TEE-OS? | TFA? TEE-OS? |
> other? | |
> |
>
> Cheers
>
> FF
>
>
> On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 09:34, Harb Abdulhamid OS via TF-A <
> tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > wrote:
>
> > Hello Folks,
> >
> >
> >
> > I'm emailing to start an open discussion about the adoption of a concept
> > known as "hand-off blocks" or HOB to become a part of the TF-A Firmware
> > Framework Architecture (FFA). This is something that is a pretty major
> > pain point when it comes to the adoption of TF-A in ARM Server SoC’s
> > designed to enable a broad range of highly configurable datacenter
> > platforms.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > What is a HOB (Background)?
> >
> > ---------------------------
> >
> > UEFI PI spec describes a particular definition for how HOB may be used for
> > transitioning between the PEI and DXE boot phases, which is a good
> > reference point for this discussion, but not necessarily the exact solution
> > appropriate for TF-A.
> >
> >
> >
> > A HOB is simply a dynamically generated data structure passed in between
> > two boot phases. This is information that was obtained through discovery
> > and needs to be passed forward to the next boot phase *once*, with no API
> > needed to call back (e.g. no call back into previous firmware phase is
> > needed to fetch this information at run-time - it is simply passed one time
> > during boot).
> >
> >
> >
> > There may be one or more HOBs passed in between boot phases. If there are
> > more than one HOB that needs to be passed, this can be in a form of a "HOB
> > table", which (for example) could be a UUID indexed array of pointers to
> > HOB structures, used to locate a HOB of interest (based on UUID). In such
> > cases, instead of passing a single HOB, the boot phases may rely on passing
> > the pointer to the HOB table.
> >
> >
> >
> > This has been extremely useful concept to employ on highly configurable
> > systems that must rely on flexible discovery mechanisms to initialize and
> > boot the system. This is especially helpful when you have multiple
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Why do we need HOBs in TF-A?:
> >
> > -----------------------------
> >
> > It is desirable that EL3 firmware (e.g. TF-A) built for ARM Server SoC in
> > a way that is SoC specific *but* platform agnostic. This means that a
> > single ARM SoC that a SiP may deliver to customers may provide a single
> > TF-A binary (e.g. BL1, BL2, BL31) that could be used to support a broad
> > range of platform designs and configurations in order to boot a platform
> > specific firmware (e.g. BL33 and possibly even BL32 code). In order to
> > achieve this, the platform configuration must be *discovered* instead of
> > statically compiled as it is today in TF-A via device tree based
> > enumeration. The mechanisms of discovery may differ broadly depending on
> > the relevant industry standard, or in some cases may have rely on SiP
> > specific discovery flows.
> >
> >
> >
> > For example: On server systems that support a broad range DIMM memory
> > population/topologies, all the necessary information required to boot is
> > fully discovered via standard JEDEC Serial Presence Detect (SPD) over an
> > I2C bus. Leveraging the SPD bus, may platform variants could be supported
> > with a single TF-A binary. Not only is this information required to
> > initialize memory in early boot phases (e.g. BL2), the subsequent boot
> > phases will also need this SPD info to construct a system physical address
> > map and properly initialize the MMU based on the memory present, and where
> > the memory may be present. Subsequent boot phases (e.g. BL33 / UEFI) may
> > need to generate standard firmware tables to the operating systems, such as
> > SMBIOS tables describing DIMM topology and various ACPI tables (e.g. SLIT,
> > SRAT, even NFIT if NVDIMM's are present).
> >
> >
> >
> > In short, it all starts with a standardized or vendor specific discovery
> > flow in an early boot stage (e.g. BL1/BL2), followed by the passing of
> > information to the next boot stages (e.g. BL31/BL32/BL33).
> >
> >
> >
> > Today, every HOB may be a vendor specific structure, but in the future
> > there may be benefit of defining standard HOBs. This may be useful for
> > memory discovery, passing the system physical address map, enabling TPM
> > measured boot, and potentially many other common HOB use-cases.
> >
> >
> >
> > It would be extremely beneficial to the datacenter market segment if the
> > TF-A community would adopt this concept of information passing between all
> > boot phases as opposed to rely solely on device tree enumeration. This is
> > not intended to replace device tree, rather intended as an alternative way
> > to describe the info that must be discovered and dynamically generated.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Conclusion:
> >
> > -----------
> >
> > We are proposing that the TF-A community begin pursuing the adoption of
> > HOBs as a mechanism used for information exchange between each boot stage
> > (e.g. BL1->BL2, BL2->BL31, BL31->BL32, and BL31->BL33)? Longer term we
> > want to explore standardizing some HOB structures for the BL33 phase (e.g.
> > UEFI HOB structures), but initially would like to agree on this being a
> > useful mechanism used to pass information between each boot stage.
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > --Harb
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > TF-A mailing list
> > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
> >
>
>
> --
> François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
> T: +33.67221.6485
> francois.ozog(a)linaro.org <mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> | Skype: ffozog
> _______________________________________________
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<https://drive.google.com/a/linaro.org/uc?id=0BxTAygkus3RgQVhuNHMwUi1mYWc&ex…>
François-Frédéric Ozog | Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group
T: +33.67221.6485
<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
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François-Frédéric Ozog | Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group
T: +33.67221.6485
<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
--
TF-A mailing list
TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
Hi
Trusted Firmware M recently introduced protection against glitching at
key decision points:
https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/pull/776
To me this is a key mitigation element for companies that target PSA
level 3 compliance which means hardware attacks resilience.
I believe similar techniques need to be used in different projects
involved in Linux secure booting (TF-A, OP-TEE, U-Boot, Linux kernel).
Are there any efforts planned around this ?
Is it feasible to have a "library" that could be integrated in
different projects?
Cheers
FF
To += op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of François Ozog via TF-A
Sent: 26 March 2021 19:08
To: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk(a)gmx.de>
Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>; Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [TF-A] Firmware FuSa workshop
Le ven. 26 mars 2021 à 18:42, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk(a)gmx.de<mailto:xypron.glpk@gmx.de>> a écrit :
On 26.03.21 16:05, François Ozog wrote:
> Hi,
>
>
> Linaro is conducting an opportunity assessment to make OP-TEE ready for
> functional safety sensitive environments. The goal is to present a plan to
> Linaro members by the end of July 2021.
>
> The scope of the research is somewhat bigger because we can’t think of
> OP-TEE without thinking of Trusted Firmware and Hafnium. The plan will
> though not address those (unless we recognize we have to). We don’t think
> U-Boot shall be part of the picture but we are welcoming contradictory
> points of views.
Hello François,
Some boards boot via SPL->TF-A->U-Boot. Here U-Boot's SPL is relevant
for OP-TEE's security.
U-Boot can save variables via OP-TEE (implemented by Ilias). In this
case OP-TEE has an implication on secure boot.
I fully understand that these scenarios are not in the focus of the
workshop.
it may if companies have this particular flow in mind for safety certification. Our goal is not to make all boot flows safety ready but to identify which ones we need to consider. And the workshop may help in this identification.
Best regards
Heinrich
>
> We are organizing a 2 hours workshop on April 15th 9am CET to mostly hear
> about use cases and ideas about Long Term Support requirements . We will
> present the state of the research.
>
> The first use case is booting a safety certified type-1 hypervisor (open
> source or commercial is irrelevant).
>
> But we know there are many more: please be ready to contribute.
>
> We think of more radical use cases: a safety payload is actually loaded as
> a Secure Partition on top of Hafnium with OP-TEE or Zephyr used as a device
> backends. In other words, Trust Zone hosts both safety and security worlds
> , EL3 being the « software root of trust » pivot world. In those cases,
> some cores never go out of secure state…
>
>
> Agenda (to be refined)
>
> -
>
> Vision
> -
>
> State of the research
> <https://docs.google.com/presentation/u/0/d/1jWqu39gCF-5XzbFkodXsiVNJJLUN88B…>
> -
>
> Use cases discussion
> -
>
> What is the right scope?
> -
>
> “Who do what” discussion (LTS, archiving...)
> -
>
> Safety personnel (Linaro and contractors) discussion
> -
>
> Other considerations from participants?
> -
>
> Community organizations and funding?
> -
>
> Closing and next steps
>
>
> Should you want to participate and have not yet received an invite, please
> contact me directly.
>
> Cordially,
>
> François-Frédéric
>
> PS: Please reach out should you want another date with a time compatible
> with more time zones. This alternate date is not guaranteed though.
>
>
--
[https://drive.google.com/a/linaro.org/uc?id=0BxTAygkus3RgQVhuNHMwUi1mYWc&ex…]
François-Frédéric Ozog | Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group
T: +33.67221.6485
francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> | Skype: ffozog
Hi,
Linaro is conducting an opportunity assessment to make OP-TEE ready for
functional safety sensitive environments. The goal is to present a plan to
Linaro members by the end of July 2021.
The scope of the research is somewhat bigger because we can’t think of
OP-TEE without thinking of Trusted Firmware and Hafnium. The plan will
though not address those (unless we recognize we have to). We don’t think
U-Boot shall be part of the picture but we are welcoming contradictory
points of views.
We are organizing a 2 hours workshop on April 15th 9am CET to mostly hear
about use cases and ideas about Long Term Support requirements . We will
present the state of the research.
The first use case is booting a safety certified type-1 hypervisor (open
source or commercial is irrelevant).
But we know there are many more: please be ready to contribute.
We think of more radical use cases: a safety payload is actually loaded as
a Secure Partition on top of Hafnium with OP-TEE or Zephyr used as a device
backends. In other words, Trust Zone hosts both safety and security worlds
, EL3 being the « software root of trust » pivot world. In those cases,
some cores never go out of secure state…
Agenda (to be refined)
-
Vision
-
State of the research
<https://docs.google.com/presentation/u/0/d/1jWqu39gCF-5XzbFkodXsiVNJJLUN88B…>
-
Use cases discussion
-
What is the right scope?
-
“Who do what” discussion (LTS, archiving...)
-
Safety personnel (Linaro and contractors) discussion
-
Other considerations from participants?
-
Community organizations and funding?
-
Closing and next steps
Should you want to participate and have not yet received an invite, please
contact me directly.
Cordially,
François-Frédéric
PS: Please reach out should you want another date with a time compatible
with more time zones. This alternate date is not guaranteed though.
--
François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
T: +33.67221.6485
francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
Hi François,
The TF-A team members have thought about trying to explore the use of more mitigations for Side Channel attacks along the lines of "Canary In the Coalmine" type techniques to as you say build additional resilience and as you can expect the techniques used by our peer TF-M project are one we would like to explore. I would not say this is a plan as such but definitely something already listed on our backlog. As to if the TF-M code can be reused that would need to be explored more.
Cheers
Joanna
On 26/03/2021, 14:12, "TF-A on behalf of François Ozog via TF-A" <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
Hi
Trusted Firmware M recently introduced protection against glitching at
key decision points:
https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/pull/776
To me this is a key mitigation element for companies that target PSA
level 3 compliance which means hardware attacks resilience.
I believe similar techniques need to be used in different projects
involved in Linux secure booting (TF-A, OP-TEE, U-Boot, Linux kernel).
Are there any efforts planned around this ?
Is it feasible to have a "library" that could be integrated in
different projects?
Cheers
FF
--
TF-A mailing list
TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
Just want to point out that TF-A currently already supports a (very simple)
mechanism like this:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/…https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/…https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/…
It's just a linked list of tagged elements. The tag space is split into
TF-A-wide generic tags and SiP-specific tags (with plenty of room to spare
if more areas need to be defined -- a 64-bit tag can fit a lot). This is
currently being used by some platforms that run coreboot in place of
BL1/BL2, to pass information from coreboot (BL2) to BL31.
I would echo Simon's sentiment of keeping this as simple as possible and
avoiding complicated and bloated data structures with UUIDs. You usually
want to parse something like this as early as possible in the passed-to
firmware stage, particularly if the structure encodes information about the
debug console (like it does for the platforms I mentioned above). For
example, in BL31 this basically means doing it right after moving from
assembly to C in bl31_early_platform_setup2() to get the console up before
running anything else. At that point in the BL31 initialization, the MMU
and caches are disabled, so data accesses are pretty expensive and you
don't want to spend a lot of parsing effort or calculate complicated
checksums or the like. You just want something extremely simple where you
ideally have to touch every data word only once.
On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 5:06 PM Simon Glass via TF-A <
tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
> Hi Harb,
>
> On Wed, 24 Mar 2021 at 11:39, Harb Abdulhamid OS <
> abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com> wrote:
>
>> Hello Folks,
>>
>> Appreciate the feedback and replies on this. Glad to see that there is
>> interest in this topic. 😊
>>
>>
>>
>> I try to address the comments/feedback from Francois and Simon below….
>>
>>
>>
>> @François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org> – happy to discuss this on a
>> zoom call. I will make that time slot work, and will be available to
>> attend April 8, 4pm CT.
>>
>>
>>
>> Note that I’m using the term “HOB” here more generically, as there are
>> typically vendor specific structures beyond the resource descriptor HOB,
>> which provides only a small subset of the information that needs to be
>> passed between the boot phases.
>>
>>
>>
>> The whole point here is to provide mechanism to develop firmware that we
>> can build ARM Server SoC’s that support **any** BL33 payload (e.g. EDK2,
>> AptioV, CoreBoot, and maybe even directly boot strapping LinuxBoot at some
>> point). In other-words, we are trying to come up with a TF-A that would
>> be completely agnostic to the implementation of BL33 (i.e. BL33 is built
>> completely independently by a separate entity – e.g. an ODM/OEM).
>>
>>
>>
>> Keep in mind, in the server/datacenter market segment we are not building
>> vertically integrated systems with a single entity compiling
>> firmware/software stacks like most folks in TF-A have become use to. There
>> are two categories of higher level firmware code blobs in the
>> server/datacenter model:
>>
>> 1. “SoC” or “silicon” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL1, BL2,
>> BL31, and **possibly** one or more BL32 instances
>> 2. “Platform” or “board” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL33 and *
>> *possibly** one or more BL32 instances.
>>
>>
>>
>> Even the platform firmware stack could be further fragmented by having
>> multiple entities involved in delivering the entire firmware stack: IBVs,
>> ODMs, OEMs, CSPs, and possibly even device vendor code.
>>
>>
>>
>> To support a broad range of platform designs with a broad range of memory
>> devices, we need a crisp and clear contract between the SoC firmware that
>> initializes memory (e.g. BL2) and how that platform boot firmware (e.g.
>> BL33) gathers information about what memory that was initialized, at what
>> speeds, NUMA topology, and many other relevant information that needs to be
>> known and comprehended by the platform firmware and eventually by the
>> platform software.
>>
>>
>>
>> I understand the versatility of DT, but I see two major problems with DT:
>>
>> - DT requires more complicated parsing to get properties, and even
>> more complex to dynamically set properties – this HOB structures may need
>> to be generated in boot phases where DDR is not available, and therefore we
>> will be extremely memory constrained.
>> - DT is probably overkill for this purpose – We really just want a
>> list of pointers to simple C structures that code cast (e.g. JEDEC SPD data
>> blob)
>>
>>
>>
>> I think that we should not mix the efforts around DT/ACPI specs with what
>> we are doing here, because those specs and concepts were developed for a
>> completely different purpose (i.e. abstractions needed for OS / RTOS
>> software, and not necessarily suitable for firmware-to-firmware hand-offs).
>>
>>
>>
>> Frankly, I would personally push back pretty hard on defining SMC’s for
>> something that should be one way information passing. Every SMC we add is
>> another attack vector to the secure world and an increased burden on the
>> folks that have to do security auditing and threat analysis. I see no
>> benefit in exposing these boot/HOB/BOB structures at run-time via SMC
>> calls.
>>
>>
>>
>> Please do let me know if you disagree and why. Look forward to
>> discussing on this thread or on the call.
>>
>>
>>
>> @Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org> - Thanks for the pointer to
>> bloblist. I briefly reviewed and it seems like a good baseline for what
>> we may be looking for.
>>
>>
>>
>> That being said, I would say that there is some benefit in having some
>> kind of unique identifiers (e.g. UUID or some unique signature) so that we
>> can tie standardized data structures (based on some future TBD specs) to a
>> particular ID. For example, if the TPM driver in BL33 is looking for the
>> TPM structure in the HOB/BOB list, and may not care about the other data
>> blobs. The driver needs a way to identify and locate the blob it cares
>> about.
>>
>
> The tag is intended to serve that purpose, although perhaps it should
> switch from an auto-allocating enum to one with explicit values for each
> entry and a range for 'local' use.
>
>>
>>
>> I guess we can achieve this with the tag, but the problem with tag when
>> you have eco-system with a lot of parties doing parallel development, you
>> can end up with tag collisions and folks fighting about who has rights to
>> what tag values. We would need some official process for folks to register
>> tags for whatever new structures we define, or maybe some tag range for
>> vendor specific structures. This comes with a lot of pain and
>> bureaucracy. On the other hand, UUID has been a proven way to make it easy
>> to just define your own blobs with **either** standard or vendor
>> specific structures without worry of ID collisions between vendors.
>>
>
> True. I think the pain is overstated, though. In this case I think we
> actually want something that can be shared between projects and orgs, so
> some amount of coordination could be considered a benefit. It could just be
> a github pull request. I find the UUID unfriendly and not just to code size
> and eyesight! Trying to discover what GUIDs mean or are valid is quite
> tricky. E.g. see this code:
>
> #define FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_TSEG_GUID \
> EFI_GUID(0xd038747c, 0xd00c, 0x4980, \
> 0xb3, 0x19, 0x49, 0x01, 0x99, 0xa4, 0x7d, 0x55)
> (etc.)
>
> static struct guid_name {
> efi_guid_t guid;
> const char *name;
> } guid_name[] = {
> { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_TSEG_GUID, "TSEG" },
> { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_FSP_GUID, "FSP" },
> { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_SMM_PEI_SMRAM_GUID, "SMM PEI SMRAM" },
> { FSP_NON_VOLATILE_STORAGE_HOB_GUID, "NVS" },
> { FSP_VARIABLE_NV_DATA_HOB_GUID, "Variable NVS" },
> { FSP_GRAPHICS_INFO_HOB_GUID, "Graphics info" },
> { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PCD_DATABASE_GUID1, "PCD database ea" },
> { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PCD_DATABASE_GUID2, "PCD database 9b" },
> (never figured out what those two are)
>
> { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PEIM_DXE_GUID, "PEIM Init DXE" },
> { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_ALLOC_STACK_GUID, "Alloc stack" },
> { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_SMBIOS_MEMORY_GUID, "SMBIOS memory" },
> { {}, "zero-guid" },
> {}
> };
>
> static const char *guid_to_name(const efi_guid_t *guid)
> {
> struct guid_name *entry;
>
> for (entry = guid_name; entry->name; entry++) {
> if (!guidcmp(guid, &entry->guid))
> return entry->name;
> }
>
> return NULL;
> }
>
> Believe it or not it took a fair bit of effort to find just that small
> list, with nearly every one in a separate doc, from memory.
>
>
>>
>> We can probably debate whether there is any value in GUID/UUID or not
>> during the call… but again, boblist seems like a reasonable starting point
>> as an alternative to HOB.
>>
>
> Indeed. There is certainly value in both approaches.
>
> Regards,
> Simon
>
>
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> --Harb
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org>
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 23, 2021 10:00 AM
>> *To:* François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org>; Ron Minnich <
>> rminnich(a)google.com>; Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org>
>> *Cc:* Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org>; Harb Abdulhamid OS <
>> abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com>; Boot Architecture Mailman List <
>> boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for
>> information passing between boot stages
>>
>>
>>
>> +Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com> +Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Adding Ron and Paul because I think this interface should be also
>> benefiting LinuxBoot efforts.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, 23 Mar 2021 at 11:17, François Ozog via TF-A <
>> tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>>
>>
>> I propose we cover the topic at the next Trusted Substrate
>> <https://collaborate.linaro.org/display/TS/Trusted+Substrate+Home> zoom
>> call <https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/94563644892> on April 8th 4pm CET.
>>
>>
>>
>> The agenda:
>>
>> ABI between non-secure firmware and the rest of firmware (EL3, S-EL1,
>> S-EL2, SCP) to adapt hardware description to some runtime conditions.
>>
>> runtime conditions here relates to DRAM size and topology detection,
>> secure DRAM memory carvings, PSCI and SCMI interface publishing.
>>
>>
>>
>> For additional background on existing metadata: UEFI Platform
>> Initialization Specification Version 1.7
>> <https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/PI_Spec_1_7_final_Jan_2019.p…>
>> , 5.5 Resource Descriptor HOB
>>
>> Out of the ResourceType we care about is EFI_RESOURCE_SYSTEM_MEMORY.
>>
>> This HOB lacks memory NUMA attachment or something that could be related
>> to fill SRAT table for ACPI or relevant DT proximity domains.
>>
>> HOB is not consistent accros platforms: some platforms (Arm) lists memory
>> from the booting NUMA node, other platforms (x86) lists all memory from all
>> NUMA nodes. (At least this is the case on the two platforms I tested).
>>
>>
>>
>> There are two proposals to use memory structures from SPL/BLx up to the
>> handover function (as defined in the Device Tree technical report
>> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CLkhLRaz_zcCq44DLGmPZQFPbYHOC6nzPowaL0X…>)
>> which can be U-boot (BL33 or just U-Boot in case of SPL/U-Boot scheme) or
>> EDK2.
>>
>> I would propose we also discuss possibility of FF-A interface to actually
>> query information or request actions to be done (this is a model actually
>> used in some SoCs with proprietary SMC calls).
>>
>>
>>
>> Requirements (to be validated):
>>
>> - ACPI and DT hardware descriptions.
>>
>> - agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2)
>>
>> - agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2,
>> TF-A/LinuxBoot)
>>
>> - at least allows complete DRAM description and "persistent" usage
>> (reserved areas for secure world or other usages)
>>
>> - support secure world device assignment
>>
>>
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>>
>>
>> FF
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 19:56, Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org> wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Can I suggest using bloblist for this instead? It is lightweight,
>> easier to parse, doesn't have GUIDs and is already used within U-Boot
>> for passing info between SPL/U-Boot, etc.
>>
>> Docs here:
>> https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/doc/README.bloblist
>> Header file describes the format:
>> https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/include/bloblist.h
>>
>> Full set of unit tests:
>> https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/test/bloblist.c
>>
>> Regards,
>> Simon
>>
>> On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 23:58, François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > +Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>
>> >
>> > standardization is very much welcomed here and need to accommodate a
>> very
>> > diverse set of situations.
>> > For example, TEE OS may need to pass memory reservations to BL33 or
>> > "capture" a device for the secure world.
>> >
>> > I have observed a number of architectures:
>> > 1) pass information from BLx to BLy in the form of a specific object
>> > 2) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to get information
>> > 3) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to perform Device Tree
>> > fixups
>> >
>> > I also imagined a standardized "broadcast" FF-A call so that any
>> firmware
>> > element can either provide information or "do something".
>> >
>> > My understanding of your proposal is about standardizing on
>> architecture 1)
>> > with the HOB format.
>> >
>> > The advantage of the HOB is simplicity but it may be difficult to
>> implement
>> > schemes such as pruning a DT because device assignment in the secure
>> world.
>> >
>> > In any case, it looks feasible to have TF-A and OP-TEE complement the
>> list
>> > of HOBs to pass information downstream (the bootflow).
>> >
>> > It would be good to start with building the comprehensive list of
>> > information that need to be conveyed between firmware elements:
>> >
>> > information. | authoritative entity | reporting entity | information
>> > exchanged:
>> > dram | TFA | TFA |
>> > <format to be detailed, NUMA topology to build the SRAT table or DT
>> > equivalent?>
>> > PSCI | SCP | TFA? |
>> > SCMI | SCP or TEE-OS | TFA? TEE-OS?|
>> > secure SRAM | TFA. | TFA. |
>> > secure DRAM | TFA? TEE-OS? | TFA? TEE-OS? |
>> > other? | |
>> > |
>> >
>> > Cheers
>> >
>> > FF
>> >
>> >
>> > On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 09:34, Harb Abdulhamid OS via TF-A <
>> > tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > > Hello Folks,
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > I'm emailing to start an open discussion about the adoption of a
>> concept
>> > > known as "hand-off blocks" or HOB to become a part of the TF-A
>> Firmware
>> > > Framework Architecture (FFA). This is something that is a pretty
>> major
>> > > pain point when it comes to the adoption of TF-A in ARM Server SoC’s
>> > > designed to enable a broad range of highly configurable datacenter
>> > > platforms.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > What is a HOB (Background)?
>> > >
>> > > ---------------------------
>> > >
>> > > UEFI PI spec describes a particular definition for how HOB may be
>> used for
>> > > transitioning between the PEI and DXE boot phases, which is a good
>> > > reference point for this discussion, but not necessarily the exact
>> solution
>> > > appropriate for TF-A.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > A HOB is simply a dynamically generated data structure passed in
>> between
>> > > two boot phases. This is information that was obtained through
>> discovery
>> > > and needs to be passed forward to the next boot phase *once*, with no
>> API
>> > > needed to call back (e.g. no call back into previous firmware phase is
>> > > needed to fetch this information at run-time - it is simply passed
>> one time
>> > > during boot).
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > There may be one or more HOBs passed in between boot phases. If
>> there are
>> > > more than one HOB that needs to be passed, this can be in a form of a
>> "HOB
>> > > table", which (for example) could be a UUID indexed array of pointers
>> to
>> > > HOB structures, used to locate a HOB of interest (based on UUID). In
>> such
>> > > cases, instead of passing a single HOB, the boot phases may rely on
>> passing
>> > > the pointer to the HOB table.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > This has been extremely useful concept to employ on highly
>> configurable
>> > > systems that must rely on flexible discovery mechanisms to initialize
>> and
>> > > boot the system. This is especially helpful when you have multiple
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > Why do we need HOBs in TF-A?:
>> > >
>> > > -----------------------------
>> > >
>> > > It is desirable that EL3 firmware (e.g. TF-A) built for ARM Server
>> SoC in
>> > > a way that is SoC specific *but* platform agnostic. This means that a
>> > > single ARM SoC that a SiP may deliver to customers may provide a
>> single
>> > > TF-A binary (e.g. BL1, BL2, BL31) that could be used to support a
>> broad
>> > > range of platform designs and configurations in order to boot a
>> platform
>> > > specific firmware (e.g. BL33 and possibly even BL32 code). In order
>> to
>> > > achieve this, the platform configuration must be *discovered* instead
>> of
>> > > statically compiled as it is today in TF-A via device tree based
>> > > enumeration. The mechanisms of discovery may differ broadly
>> depending on
>> > > the relevant industry standard, or in some cases may have rely on SiP
>> > > specific discovery flows.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > For example: On server systems that support a broad range DIMM memory
>> > > population/topologies, all the necessary information required to boot
>> is
>> > > fully discovered via standard JEDEC Serial Presence Detect (SPD) over
>> an
>> > > I2C bus. Leveraging the SPD bus, may platform variants could be
>> supported
>> > > with a single TF-A binary. Not only is this information required to
>> > > initialize memory in early boot phases (e.g. BL2), the subsequent boot
>> > > phases will also need this SPD info to construct a system physical
>> address
>> > > map and properly initialize the MMU based on the memory present, and
>> where
>> > > the memory may be present. Subsequent boot phases (e.g. BL33 / UEFI)
>> may
>> > > need to generate standard firmware tables to the operating systems,
>> such as
>> > > SMBIOS tables describing DIMM topology and various ACPI tables (e.g.
>> SLIT,
>> > > SRAT, even NFIT if NVDIMM's are present).
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > In short, it all starts with a standardized or vendor specific
>> discovery
>> > > flow in an early boot stage (e.g. BL1/BL2), followed by the passing of
>> > > information to the next boot stages (e.g. BL31/BL32/BL33).
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > Today, every HOB may be a vendor specific structure, but in the future
>> > > there may be benefit of defining standard HOBs. This may be useful
>> for
>> > > memory discovery, passing the system physical address map, enabling
>> TPM
>> > > measured boot, and potentially many other common HOB use-cases.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > It would be extremely beneficial to the datacenter market segment if
>> the
>> > > TF-A community would adopt this concept of information passing
>> between all
>> > > boot phases as opposed to rely solely on device tree enumeration.
>> This is
>> > > not intended to replace device tree, rather intended as an
>> alternative way
>> > > to describe the info that must be discovered and dynamically
>> generated.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > Conclusion:
>> > >
>> > > -----------
>> > >
>> > > We are proposing that the TF-A community begin pursuing the adoption
>> of
>> > > HOBs as a mechanism used for information exchange between each boot
>> stage
>> > > (e.g. BL1->BL2, BL2->BL31, BL31->BL32, and BL31->BL33)? Longer term
>> we
>> > > want to explore standardizing some HOB structures for the BL33 phase
>> (e.g.
>> > > UEFI HOB structures), but initially would like to agree on this being
>> a
>> > > useful mechanism used to pass information between each boot stage.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > Thanks,
>> > >
>> > > --Harb
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > --
>> > > TF-A mailing list
>> > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
>> > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
>> > >
>> >
>> >
>> > --
>> > François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
>> > T: +33.67221.6485
>> > francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > boot-architecture mailing list
>> > boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org
>> > https://lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/boot-architecture
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> *François-Frédéric Ozog* | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
>>
>> T: +33.67221.6485
>> francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> TF-A mailing list
>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> *François-Frédéric Ozog* | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
>>
>> T: +33.67221.6485
>> francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
>>
>>
>>
> --
> TF-A mailing list
> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
>
+Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com> +Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org>
Adding Ron and Paul because I think this interface should be also
benefiting LinuxBoot efforts.
On Tue, 23 Mar 2021 at 11:17, François Ozog via TF-A <
tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I propose we cover the topic at the next Trusted Substrate
> <https://collaborate.linaro.org/display/TS/Trusted+Substrate+Home> zoom
> call <https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/94563644892> on April 8th 4pm CET.
>
> The agenda:
> ABI between non-secure firmware and the rest of firmware (EL3, S-EL1,
> S-EL2, SCP) to adapt hardware description to some runtime conditions.
> runtime conditions here relates to DRAM size and topology detection,
> secure DRAM memory carvings, PSCI and SCMI interface publishing.
>
> For additional background on existing metadata: UEFI Platform
> Initialization Specification Version 1.7
> <https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/PI_Spec_1_7_final_Jan_2019.p…>
> , 5.5 Resource Descriptor HOB
> Out of the ResourceType we care about is EFI_RESOURCE_SYSTEM_MEMORY.
> This HOB lacks memory NUMA attachment or something that could be related
> to fill SRAT table for ACPI or relevant DT proximity domains.
> HOB is not consistent accros platforms: some platforms (Arm) lists memory
> from the booting NUMA node, other platforms (x86) lists all memory from all
> NUMA nodes. (At least this is the case on the two platforms I tested).
>
> There are two proposals to use memory structures from SPL/BLx up to the
> handover function (as defined in the Device Tree technical report
> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CLkhLRaz_zcCq44DLGmPZQFPbYHOC6nzPowaL0X…>)
> which can be U-boot (BL33 or just U-Boot in case of SPL/U-Boot scheme) or
> EDK2.
> I would propose we also discuss possibility of FF-A interface to actually
> query information or request actions to be done (this is a model actually
> used in some SoCs with proprietary SMC calls).
>
> Requirements (to be validated):
> - ACPI and DT hardware descriptions.
> - agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2)
>
- agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2,
TF-A/LinuxBoot)
> - at least allows complete DRAM description and "persistent" usage
> (reserved areas for secure world or other usages)
> - support secure world device assignment
>
> Cheers
>
> FF
>
>
> On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 19:56, Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Can I suggest using bloblist for this instead? It is lightweight,
>> easier to parse, doesn't have GUIDs and is already used within U-Boot
>> for passing info between SPL/U-Boot, etc.
>>
>> Docs here:
>> https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/doc/README.bloblist
>> Header file describes the format:
>> https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/include/bloblist.h
>>
>> Full set of unit tests:
>> https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/test/bloblist.c
>>
>> Regards,
>> Simon
>>
>> On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 23:58, François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > +Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>
>> >
>> > standardization is very much welcomed here and need to accommodate a
>> very
>> > diverse set of situations.
>> > For example, TEE OS may need to pass memory reservations to BL33 or
>> > "capture" a device for the secure world.
>> >
>> > I have observed a number of architectures:
>> > 1) pass information from BLx to BLy in the form of a specific object
>> > 2) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to get information
>> > 3) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to perform Device Tree
>> > fixups
>> >
>> > I also imagined a standardized "broadcast" FF-A call so that any
>> firmware
>> > element can either provide information or "do something".
>> >
>> > My understanding of your proposal is about standardizing on
>> architecture 1)
>> > with the HOB format.
>> >
>> > The advantage of the HOB is simplicity but it may be difficult to
>> implement
>> > schemes such as pruning a DT because device assignment in the secure
>> world.
>> >
>> > In any case, it looks feasible to have TF-A and OP-TEE complement the
>> list
>> > of HOBs to pass information downstream (the bootflow).
>> >
>> > It would be good to start with building the comprehensive list of
>> > information that need to be conveyed between firmware elements:
>> >
>> > information. | authoritative entity | reporting entity | information
>> > exchanged:
>> > dram | TFA | TFA |
>> > <format to be detailed, NUMA topology to build the SRAT table or DT
>> > equivalent?>
>> > PSCI | SCP | TFA? |
>> > SCMI | SCP or TEE-OS | TFA? TEE-OS?|
>> > secure SRAM | TFA. | TFA. |
>> > secure DRAM | TFA? TEE-OS? | TFA? TEE-OS? |
>> > other? | |
>> > |
>> >
>> > Cheers
>> >
>> > FF
>> >
>> >
>> > On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 09:34, Harb Abdulhamid OS via TF-A <
>> > tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > > Hello Folks,
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > I'm emailing to start an open discussion about the adoption of a
>> concept
>> > > known as "hand-off blocks" or HOB to become a part of the TF-A
>> Firmware
>> > > Framework Architecture (FFA). This is something that is a pretty
>> major
>> > > pain point when it comes to the adoption of TF-A in ARM Server SoC’s
>> > > designed to enable a broad range of highly configurable datacenter
>> > > platforms.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > What is a HOB (Background)?
>> > >
>> > > ---------------------------
>> > >
>> > > UEFI PI spec describes a particular definition for how HOB may be
>> used for
>> > > transitioning between the PEI and DXE boot phases, which is a good
>> > > reference point for this discussion, but not necessarily the exact
>> solution
>> > > appropriate for TF-A.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > A HOB is simply a dynamically generated data structure passed in
>> between
>> > > two boot phases. This is information that was obtained through
>> discovery
>> > > and needs to be passed forward to the next boot phase *once*, with no
>> API
>> > > needed to call back (e.g. no call back into previous firmware phase is
>> > > needed to fetch this information at run-time - it is simply passed
>> one time
>> > > during boot).
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > There may be one or more HOBs passed in between boot phases. If
>> there are
>> > > more than one HOB that needs to be passed, this can be in a form of a
>> "HOB
>> > > table", which (for example) could be a UUID indexed array of pointers
>> to
>> > > HOB structures, used to locate a HOB of interest (based on UUID). In
>> such
>> > > cases, instead of passing a single HOB, the boot phases may rely on
>> passing
>> > > the pointer to the HOB table.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > This has been extremely useful concept to employ on highly
>> configurable
>> > > systems that must rely on flexible discovery mechanisms to initialize
>> and
>> > > boot the system. This is especially helpful when you have multiple
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > Why do we need HOBs in TF-A?:
>> > >
>> > > -----------------------------
>> > >
>> > > It is desirable that EL3 firmware (e.g. TF-A) built for ARM Server
>> SoC in
>> > > a way that is SoC specific *but* platform agnostic. This means that a
>> > > single ARM SoC that a SiP may deliver to customers may provide a
>> single
>> > > TF-A binary (e.g. BL1, BL2, BL31) that could be used to support a
>> broad
>> > > range of platform designs and configurations in order to boot a
>> platform
>> > > specific firmware (e.g. BL33 and possibly even BL32 code). In order
>> to
>> > > achieve this, the platform configuration must be *discovered* instead
>> of
>> > > statically compiled as it is today in TF-A via device tree based
>> > > enumeration. The mechanisms of discovery may differ broadly
>> depending on
>> > > the relevant industry standard, or in some cases may have rely on SiP
>> > > specific discovery flows.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > For example: On server systems that support a broad range DIMM memory
>> > > population/topologies, all the necessary information required to boot
>> is
>> > > fully discovered via standard JEDEC Serial Presence Detect (SPD) over
>> an
>> > > I2C bus. Leveraging the SPD bus, may platform variants could be
>> supported
>> > > with a single TF-A binary. Not only is this information required to
>> > > initialize memory in early boot phases (e.g. BL2), the subsequent boot
>> > > phases will also need this SPD info to construct a system physical
>> address
>> > > map and properly initialize the MMU based on the memory present, and
>> where
>> > > the memory may be present. Subsequent boot phases (e.g. BL33 / UEFI)
>> may
>> > > need to generate standard firmware tables to the operating systems,
>> such as
>> > > SMBIOS tables describing DIMM topology and various ACPI tables (e.g.
>> SLIT,
>> > > SRAT, even NFIT if NVDIMM's are present).
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > In short, it all starts with a standardized or vendor specific
>> discovery
>> > > flow in an early boot stage (e.g. BL1/BL2), followed by the passing of
>> > > information to the next boot stages (e.g. BL31/BL32/BL33).
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > Today, every HOB may be a vendor specific structure, but in the future
>> > > there may be benefit of defining standard HOBs. This may be useful
>> for
>> > > memory discovery, passing the system physical address map, enabling
>> TPM
>> > > measured boot, and potentially many other common HOB use-cases.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > It would be extremely beneficial to the datacenter market segment if
>> the
>> > > TF-A community would adopt this concept of information passing
>> between all
>> > > boot phases as opposed to rely solely on device tree enumeration.
>> This is
>> > > not intended to replace device tree, rather intended as an
>> alternative way
>> > > to describe the info that must be discovered and dynamically
>> generated.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > Conclusion:
>> > >
>> > > -----------
>> > >
>> > > We are proposing that the TF-A community begin pursuing the adoption
>> of
>> > > HOBs as a mechanism used for information exchange between each boot
>> stage
>> > > (e.g. BL1->BL2, BL2->BL31, BL31->BL32, and BL31->BL33)? Longer term
>> we
>> > > want to explore standardizing some HOB structures for the BL33 phase
>> (e.g.
>> > > UEFI HOB structures), but initially would like to agree on this being
>> a
>> > > useful mechanism used to pass information between each boot stage.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > Thanks,
>> > >
>> > > --Harb
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > --
>> > > TF-A mailing list
>> > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
>> > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
>> > >
>> >
>> >
>> > --
>> > François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
>> > T: +33.67221.6485
>> > francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > boot-architecture mailing list
>> > boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org
>> > https://lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/boot-architecture
>>
>
>
> --
> François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
> T: +33.67221.6485
> francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
>
> --
> TF-A mailing list
> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
>
--
François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
T: +33.67221.6485
francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
Adding Andrea
On Wed, 24 Mar 2021 at 13:55, Joanna Farley via TF-A <
tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
> Hi Harb and others,
>
>
>
> This thread is now multi-mailing list and I can see some broader needs and
> opinions on aspects not directly defined by the TF-A project such as
> differing information exchange formats. However, this is definitely
> something the TF-A project can try and help provide enablement for to help
> with the goal of supplying support for single or common TF-A binaries builds
> for different images. TF-A already have some limited support in this space
> and are considering how this can be extended given some of the needs
> expressed here. Folks on the TF-A project are studying the below and will
> propose soon some ideas on how TF-A could provide more versatile enablement
> in this space shortly.
>
>
>
> Thanks
>
>
>
> Joanna
>
>
>
> *From: *TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of
> François Ozog via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> *Reply to: *François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org>
> *Date: *Wednesday, 24 March 2021 at 08:34
> *To: *Harb Abdulhamid OS <abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com>
> *Cc: *"tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>,
> Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org>, Boot Architecture Mailman List <
> boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>, Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org>,
> Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com>
> *Subject: *Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for
> information passing between boot stages
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, 23 Mar 2021 at 23:39, Harb Abdulhamid OS <
> abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com> wrote:
>
> Hello Folks,
>
> Appreciate the feedback and replies on this. Glad to see that there is
> interest in this topic. 😊
>
>
>
> I try to address the comments/feedback from Francois and Simon below….
>
>
>
> @François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org> – happy to discuss this on a
> zoom call. I will make that time slot work, and will be available to
> attend April 8, 4pm CT.
>
>
>
> Note that I’m using the term “HOB” here more generically, as there are
> typically vendor specific structures beyond the resource descriptor HOB,
> which provides only a small subset of the information that needs to be
> passed between the boot phases.
>
>
>
> The whole point here is to provide mechanism to develop firmware that we
> can build ARM Server SoC’s that support **any** BL33 payload (e.g. EDK2,
> AptioV, CoreBoot, and maybe even directly boot strapping LinuxBoot at some
> point). In other-words, we are trying to come up with a TF-A that would
> be completely agnostic to the implementation of BL33 (i.e. BL33 is built
> completely independently by a separate entity – e.g. an ODM/OEM).
>
>
>
> Keep in mind, in the server/datacenter market segment we are not building
> vertically integrated systems with a single entity compiling
> firmware/software stacks like most folks in TF-A have become use to. There
> are two categories of higher level firmware code blobs in the
> server/datacenter model:
>
> 1. “SoC” or “silicon” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL1, BL2,
> BL31, and **possibly** one or more BL32 instances
> 2. “Platform” or “board” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL33 and *
> *possibly** one or more BL32 instances.
>
>
>
> Even the platform firmware stack could be further fragmented by having
> multiple entities involved in delivering the entire firmware stack: IBVs,
> ODMs, OEMs, CSPs, and possibly even device vendor code.
>
>
>
> To support a broad range of platform designs with a broad range of memory
> devices, we need a crisp and clear contract between the SoC firmware that
> initializes memory (e.g. BL2) and how that platform boot firmware (e.g.
> BL33) gathers information about what memory that was initialized, at what
> speeds, NUMA topology, and many other relevant information that needs to be
> known and comprehended by the platform firmware and eventually by the
> platform software.
>
>
>
> I understand the versatility of DT, but I see two major problems with DT:
>
> - DT requires more complicated parsing to get properties, and even
> more complex to dynamically set properties – this HOB structures may need
> to be generated in boot phases where DDR is not available, and therefore we
> will be extremely memory constrained.
> - DT is probably overkill for this purpose – We really just want a
> list of pointers to simple C structures that code cast (e.g. JEDEC SPD data
> blob)
>
>
>
> I think that we should not mix the efforts around DT/ACPI specs with what
> we are doing here, because those specs and concepts were developed for a
> completely different purpose (i.e. abstractions needed for OS / RTOS
> software, and not necessarily suitable for firmware-to-firmware hand-offs).
>
>
>
> Frankly, I would personally push back pretty hard on defining SMC’s for
> something that should be one way information passing. Every SMC we add is
> another attack vector to the secure world and an increased burden on the
> folks that have to do security auditing and threat analysis. I see no
> benefit in exposing these boot/HOB/BOB structures at run-time via SMC
> calls.
>
>
>
> Please do let me know if you disagree and why. Look forward to discussing
> on this thread or on the call.
>
>
>
> I am not tied to a particular data representation and using SMC to just
> pass data structures is overkill as you say. The SMC model seems useful to
> do complex things like device assignment to secure world. Or something else
> we don't have yet an idea.
>
> Let's say there is one board with two eMMCs. This board is used by two
> OEMs. One is fine with all eMMCs in non-secure world, the other wants to
> assign the eMMC to secure world.
>
> That's something that is related to inter-firmware component communication
> to be authoritative.
>
> We need to avoid "little arrangements between friends" that exist today,
> where the Linux provided DT is pruned from the second eMMC to accommodate
> the use case. We need to think the OS as "immutable" across platforms and
> adapt to available hardware (not come with its own description of what the
> board is).
>
> May be a hob would contain a DT overlay or ACPI equivalent that would do
> the job.
>
> In that case we do not need SMC.
>
> What do you think of this use case?
>
>
>
> @Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org> - Thanks for the pointer to bloblist.
> I briefly reviewed and it seems like a good baseline for what we may be
> looking for.
>
>
>
> That being said, I would say that there is some benefit in having some
> kind of unique identifiers (e.g. UUID or some unique signature) so that we
> can tie standardized data structures (based on some future TBD specs) to a
> particular ID. For example, if the TPM driver in BL33 is looking for the
> TPM structure in the HOB/BOB list, and may not care about the other data
> blobs. The driver needs a way to identify and locate the blob it cares
> about.
>
>
>
> I guess we can achieve this with the tag, but the problem with tag when
> you have eco-system with a lot of parties doing parallel development, you
> can end up with tag collisions and folks fighting about who has rights to
> what tag values. We would need some official process for folks to register
> tags for whatever new structures we define, or maybe some tag range for
> vendor specific structures. This comes with a lot of pain and
> bureaucracy. On the other hand, UUID has been a proven way to make it easy
> to just define your own blobs with **either** standard or vendor specific
> structures without worry of ID collisions between vendors.
>
>
>
> We can probably debate whether there is any value in GUID/UUID or not
> during the call… but again, boblist seems like a reasonable starting point
> as an alternative to HOB.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> --Harb
>
>
>
> *From:* François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 23, 2021 10:00 AM
> *To:* François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org>; Ron Minnich <
> rminnich(a)google.com>; Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org>
> *Cc:* Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org>; Harb Abdulhamid OS <
> abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com>; Boot Architecture Mailman List <
> boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> *Subject:* Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for
> information passing between boot stages
>
>
>
> +Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com> +Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org>
>
>
>
> Adding Ron and Paul because I think this interface should be also
> benefiting LinuxBoot efforts.
>
>
>
> On Tue, 23 Mar 2021 at 11:17, François Ozog via TF-A <
> tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
>
>
> I propose we cover the topic at the next Trusted Substrate
> <https://collaborate.linaro.org/display/TS/Trusted+Substrate+Home> zoom
> call <https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/94563644892> on April 8th 4pm CET.
>
>
>
> The agenda:
>
> ABI between non-secure firmware and the rest of firmware (EL3, S-EL1,
> S-EL2, SCP) to adapt hardware description to some runtime conditions.
>
> runtime conditions here relates to DRAM size and topology detection,
> secure DRAM memory carvings, PSCI and SCMI interface publishing.
>
>
>
> For additional background on existing metadata: UEFI Platform
> Initialization Specification Version 1.7
> <https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/PI_Spec_1_7_final_Jan_2019.p…>
> , 5.5 Resource Descriptor HOB
>
> Out of the ResourceType we care about is EFI_RESOURCE_SYSTEM_MEMORY.
>
> This HOB lacks memory NUMA attachment or something that could be related
> to fill SRAT table for ACPI or relevant DT proximity domains.
>
> HOB is not consistent accros platforms: some platforms (Arm) lists memory
> from the booting NUMA node, other platforms (x86) lists all memory from all
> NUMA nodes. (At least this is the case on the two platforms I tested).
>
>
>
> There are two proposals to use memory structures from SPL/BLx up to the
> handover function (as defined in the Device Tree technical report
> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CLkhLRaz_zcCq44DLGmPZQFPbYHOC6nzPowaL0X…>)
> which can be U-boot (BL33 or just U-Boot in case of SPL/U-Boot scheme) or
> EDK2.
>
> I would propose we also discuss possibility of FF-A interface to actually
> query information or request actions to be done (this is a model actually
> used in some SoCs with proprietary SMC calls).
>
>
>
> Requirements (to be validated):
>
> - ACPI and DT hardware descriptions.
>
> - agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2)
>
> - agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2,
> TF-A/LinuxBoot)
>
> - at least allows complete DRAM description and "persistent" usage
> (reserved areas for secure world or other usages)
>
> - support secure world device assignment
>
>
>
> Cheers
>
>
>
> FF
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 19:56, Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> Can I suggest using bloblist for this instead? It is lightweight,
> easier to parse, doesn't have GUIDs and is already used within U-Boot
> for passing info between SPL/U-Boot, etc.
>
> Docs here:
> https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/doc/README.bloblist
> Header file describes the format:
> https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/include/bloblist.h
>
> Full set of unit tests:
> https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/test/bloblist.c
>
> Regards,
> Simon
>
> On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 23:58, François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org>
> wrote:
> >
> > +Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>
> >
> > standardization is very much welcomed here and need to accommodate a very
> > diverse set of situations.
> > For example, TEE OS may need to pass memory reservations to BL33 or
> > "capture" a device for the secure world.
> >
> > I have observed a number of architectures:
> > 1) pass information from BLx to BLy in the form of a specific object
> > 2) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to get information
> > 3) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to perform Device Tree
> > fixups
> >
> > I also imagined a standardized "broadcast" FF-A call so that any firmware
> > element can either provide information or "do something".
> >
> > My understanding of your proposal is about standardizing on architecture
> 1)
> > with the HOB format.
> >
> > The advantage of the HOB is simplicity but it may be difficult to
> implement
> > schemes such as pruning a DT because device assignment in the secure
> world.
> >
> > In any case, it looks feasible to have TF-A and OP-TEE complement the
> list
> > of HOBs to pass information downstream (the bootflow).
> >
> > It would be good to start with building the comprehensive list of
> > information that need to be conveyed between firmware elements:
> >
> > information. | authoritative entity | reporting entity | information
> > exchanged:
> > dram | TFA | TFA |
> > <format to be detailed, NUMA topology to build the SRAT table or DT
> > equivalent?>
> > PSCI | SCP | TFA? |
> > SCMI | SCP or TEE-OS | TFA? TEE-OS?|
> > secure SRAM | TFA. | TFA. |
> > secure DRAM | TFA? TEE-OS? | TFA? TEE-OS? |
> > other? | |
> > |
> >
> > Cheers
> >
> > FF
> >
> >
> > On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 09:34, Harb Abdulhamid OS via TF-A <
> > tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
> >
> > > Hello Folks,
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > I'm emailing to start an open discussion about the adoption of a
> concept
> > > known as "hand-off blocks" or HOB to become a part of the TF-A Firmware
> > > Framework Architecture (FFA). This is something that is a pretty major
> > > pain point when it comes to the adoption of TF-A in ARM Server SoC’s
> > > designed to enable a broad range of highly configurable datacenter
> > > platforms.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > What is a HOB (Background)?
> > >
> > > ---------------------------
> > >
> > > UEFI PI spec describes a particular definition for how HOB may be used
> for
> > > transitioning between the PEI and DXE boot phases, which is a good
> > > reference point for this discussion, but not necessarily the exact
> solution
> > > appropriate for TF-A.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > A HOB is simply a dynamically generated data structure passed in
> between
> > > two boot phases. This is information that was obtained through
> discovery
> > > and needs to be passed forward to the next boot phase *once*, with no
> API
> > > needed to call back (e.g. no call back into previous firmware phase is
> > > needed to fetch this information at run-time - it is simply passed one
> time
> > > during boot).
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > There may be one or more HOBs passed in between boot phases. If there
> are
> > > more than one HOB that needs to be passed, this can be in a form of a
> "HOB
> > > table", which (for example) could be a UUID indexed array of pointers
> to
> > > HOB structures, used to locate a HOB of interest (based on UUID). In
> such
> > > cases, instead of passing a single HOB, the boot phases may rely on
> passing
> > > the pointer to the HOB table.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > This has been extremely useful concept to employ on highly configurable
> > > systems that must rely on flexible discovery mechanisms to initialize
> and
> > > boot the system. This is especially helpful when you have multiple
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Why do we need HOBs in TF-A?:
> > >
> > > -----------------------------
> > >
> > > It is desirable that EL3 firmware (e.g. TF-A) built for ARM Server SoC
> in
> > > a way that is SoC specific *but* platform agnostic. This means that a
> > > single ARM SoC that a SiP may deliver to customers may provide a single
> > > TF-A binary (e.g. BL1, BL2, BL31) that could be used to support a broad
> > > range of platform designs and configurations in order to boot a
> platform
> > > specific firmware (e.g. BL33 and possibly even BL32 code). In order to
> > > achieve this, the platform configuration must be *discovered* instead
> of
> > > statically compiled as it is today in TF-A via device tree based
> > > enumeration. The mechanisms of discovery may differ broadly depending
> on
> > > the relevant industry standard, or in some cases may have rely on SiP
> > > specific discovery flows.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > For example: On server systems that support a broad range DIMM memory
> > > population/topologies, all the necessary information required to boot
> is
> > > fully discovered via standard JEDEC Serial Presence Detect (SPD) over
> an
> > > I2C bus. Leveraging the SPD bus, may platform variants could be
> supported
> > > with a single TF-A binary. Not only is this information required to
> > > initialize memory in early boot phases (e.g. BL2), the subsequent boot
> > > phases will also need this SPD info to construct a system physical
> address
> > > map and properly initialize the MMU based on the memory present, and
> where
> > > the memory may be present. Subsequent boot phases (e.g. BL33 / UEFI)
> may
> > > need to generate standard firmware tables to the operating systems,
> such as
> > > SMBIOS tables describing DIMM topology and various ACPI tables (e.g.
> SLIT,
> > > SRAT, even NFIT if NVDIMM's are present).
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > In short, it all starts with a standardized or vendor specific
> discovery
> > > flow in an early boot stage (e.g. BL1/BL2), followed by the passing of
> > > information to the next boot stages (e.g. BL31/BL32/BL33).
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Today, every HOB may be a vendor specific structure, but in the future
> > > there may be benefit of defining standard HOBs. This may be useful for
> > > memory discovery, passing the system physical address map, enabling TPM
> > > measured boot, and potentially many other common HOB use-cases.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It would be extremely beneficial to the datacenter market segment if
> the
> > > TF-A community would adopt this concept of information passing between
> all
> > > boot phases as opposed to rely solely on device tree enumeration.
> This is
> > > not intended to replace device tree, rather intended as an alternative
> way
> > > to describe the info that must be discovered and dynamically generated.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Conclusion:
> > >
> > > -----------
> > >
> > > We are proposing that the TF-A community begin pursuing the adoption of
> > > HOBs as a mechanism used for information exchange between each boot
> stage
> > > (e.g. BL1->BL2, BL2->BL31, BL31->BL32, and BL31->BL33)? Longer term we
> > > want to explore standardizing some HOB structures for the BL33 phase
> (e.g.
> > > UEFI HOB structures), but initially would like to agree on this being a
> > > useful mechanism used to pass information between each boot stage.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > >
> > > --Harb
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > TF-A mailing list
> > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
> > >
> >
> >
> > --
> > François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
> > T: +33.67221.6485
> > francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
> > _______________________________________________
> > boot-architecture mailing list
> > boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org
> > https://lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/boot-architecture
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> [image: Image removed by sender.]
>
> *François-Frédéric Ozog* | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
>
> T: +33.67221.6485
> francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
>
>
>
> --
> TF-A mailing list
> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> [image: Image removed by sender.]
>
> *François-Frédéric Ozog* | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
>
> T: +33.67221.6485
> francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> [image: Image removed by sender.]
>
> *François-Frédéric Ozog* | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
>
> T: +33.67221.6485
> francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
>
>
> --
> TF-A mailing list
> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
>
--
[image: Linaro] <http://www.linaro.org/>
*Bill Fletcher* | *Field Engineering*
T: +44 7833 498336 <+44+7833+498336>
bill.fletcher(a)linaro.org | Skype: billfletcher2020
Hi Harb and others,
This thread is now multi-mailing list and I can see some broader needs and opinions on aspects not directly defined by the TF-A project such as differing information exchange formats. However, this is definitely something the TF-A project can try and help provide enablement for to help with the goal of supplying support for single or common TF-A binaries builds for different images. TF-A already have some limited support in this space and are considering how this can be extended given some of the needs expressed here. Folks on the TF-A project are studying the below and will propose soon some ideas on how TF-A could provide more versatile enablement in this space shortly.
Thanks
Joanna
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of François Ozog via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Reply to: François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org>
Date: Wednesday, 24 March 2021 at 08:34
To: Harb Abdulhamid OS <abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com>
Cc: "tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org>, Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>, Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org>, Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for information passing between boot stages
On Tue, 23 Mar 2021 at 23:39, Harb Abdulhamid OS <abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com<mailto:abdulhamid@os.amperecomputing.com>> wrote:
Hello Folks,
Appreciate the feedback and replies on this. Glad to see that there is interest in this topic. 😊
I try to address the comments/feedback from Francois and Simon below….
@François Ozog<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> – happy to discuss this on a zoom call. I will make that time slot work, and will be available to attend April 8, 4pm CT.
Note that I’m using the term “HOB” here more generically, as there are typically vendor specific structures beyond the resource descriptor HOB, which provides only a small subset of the information that needs to be passed between the boot phases.
The whole point here is to provide mechanism to develop firmware that we can build ARM Server SoC’s that support *any* BL33 payload (e.g. EDK2, AptioV, CoreBoot, and maybe even directly boot strapping LinuxBoot at some point). In other-words, we are trying to come up with a TF-A that would be completely agnostic to the implementation of BL33 (i.e. BL33 is built completely independently by a separate entity – e.g. an ODM/OEM).
Keep in mind, in the server/datacenter market segment we are not building vertically integrated systems with a single entity compiling firmware/software stacks like most folks in TF-A have become use to. There are two categories of higher level firmware code blobs in the server/datacenter model:
1. “SoC” or “silicon” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL1, BL2, BL31, and *possibly* one or more BL32 instances
2. “Platform” or “board” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL33 and *possibly* one or more BL32 instances.
Even the platform firmware stack could be further fragmented by having multiple entities involved in delivering the entire firmware stack: IBVs, ODMs, OEMs, CSPs, and possibly even device vendor code.
To support a broad range of platform designs with a broad range of memory devices, we need a crisp and clear contract between the SoC firmware that initializes memory (e.g. BL2) and how that platform boot firmware (e.g. BL33) gathers information about what memory that was initialized, at what speeds, NUMA topology, and many other relevant information that needs to be known and comprehended by the platform firmware and eventually by the platform software.
I understand the versatility of DT, but I see two major problems with DT:
* DT requires more complicated parsing to get properties, and even more complex to dynamically set properties – this HOB structures may need to be generated in boot phases where DDR is not available, and therefore we will be extremely memory constrained.
* DT is probably overkill for this purpose – We really just want a list of pointers to simple C structures that code cast (e.g. JEDEC SPD data blob)
I think that we should not mix the efforts around DT/ACPI specs with what we are doing here, because those specs and concepts were developed for a completely different purpose (i.e. abstractions needed for OS / RTOS software, and not necessarily suitable for firmware-to-firmware hand-offs).
Frankly, I would personally push back pretty hard on defining SMC’s for something that should be one way information passing. Every SMC we add is another attack vector to the secure world and an increased burden on the folks that have to do security auditing and threat analysis. I see no benefit in exposing these boot/HOB/BOB structures at run-time via SMC calls.
Please do let me know if you disagree and why. Look forward to discussing on this thread or on the call.
I am not tied to a particular data representation and using SMC to just pass data structures is overkill as you say. The SMC model seems useful to do complex things like device assignment to secure world. Or something else we don't have yet an idea.
Let's say there is one board with two eMMCs. This board is used by two OEMs. One is fine with all eMMCs in non-secure world, the other wants to assign the eMMC to secure world.
That's something that is related to inter-firmware component communication to be authoritative.
We need to avoid "little arrangements between friends" that exist today, where the Linux provided DT is pruned from the second eMMC to accommodate the use case. We need to think the OS as "immutable" across platforms and adapt to available hardware (not come with its own description of what the board is).
May be a hob would contain a DT overlay or ACPI equivalent that would do the job.
In that case we do not need SMC.
What do you think of this use case?
@Simon Glass<mailto:sjg@chromium.org> - Thanks for the pointer to bloblist. I briefly reviewed and it seems like a good baseline for what we may be looking for.
That being said, I would say that there is some benefit in having some kind of unique identifiers (e.g. UUID or some unique signature) so that we can tie standardized data structures (based on some future TBD specs) to a particular ID. For example, if the TPM driver in BL33 is looking for the TPM structure in the HOB/BOB list, and may not care about the other data blobs. The driver needs a way to identify and locate the blob it cares about.
I guess we can achieve this with the tag, but the problem with tag when you have eco-system with a lot of parties doing parallel development, you can end up with tag collisions and folks fighting about who has rights to what tag values. We would need some official process for folks to register tags for whatever new structures we define, or maybe some tag range for vendor specific structures. This comes with a lot of pain and bureaucracy. On the other hand, UUID has been a proven way to make it easy to just define your own blobs with *either* standard or vendor specific structures without worry of ID collisions between vendors.
We can probably debate whether there is any value in GUID/UUID or not during the call… but again, boblist seems like a reasonable starting point as an alternative to HOB.
Thanks,
--Harb
From: François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org>>
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2021 10:00 AM
To: François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org>>; Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com<mailto:rminnich@google.com>>; Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org<mailto:paul.isaacs@linaro.org>>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org<mailto:sjg@chromium.org>>; Harb Abdulhamid OS <abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com<mailto:abdulhamid@os.amperecomputing.com>>; Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org<mailto:boot-architecture@lists.linaro.org>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for information passing between boot stages
+Ron Minnich<mailto:rminnich@google.com> +Paul Isaac's<mailto:paul.isaacs@linaro.org>
Adding Ron and Paul because I think this interface should be also benefiting LinuxBoot efforts.
On Tue, 23 Mar 2021 at 11:17, François Ozog via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
Hi,
I propose we cover the topic at the next Trusted Substrate<https://collaborate.linaro.org/display/TS/Trusted+Substrate+Home> zoom call<https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/94563644892> on April 8th 4pm CET.
The agenda:
ABI between non-secure firmware and the rest of firmware (EL3, S-EL1, S-EL2, SCP) to adapt hardware description to some runtime conditions.
runtime conditions here relates to DRAM size and topology detection, secure DRAM memory carvings, PSCI and SCMI interface publishing.
For additional background on existing metadata: UEFI Platform Initialization Specification Version 1.7<https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/PI_Spec_1_7_final_Jan_2019.p…>, 5.5 Resource Descriptor HOB
Out of the ResourceType we care about is EFI_RESOURCE_SYSTEM_MEMORY.
This HOB lacks memory NUMA attachment or something that could be related to fill SRAT table for ACPI or relevant DT proximity domains.
HOB is not consistent accros platforms: some platforms (Arm) lists memory from the booting NUMA node, other platforms (x86) lists all memory from all NUMA nodes. (At least this is the case on the two platforms I tested).
There are two proposals to use memory structures from SPL/BLx up to the handover function (as defined in the Device Tree technical report<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CLkhLRaz_zcCq44DLGmPZQFPbYHOC6nzPowaL0X…>) which can be U-boot (BL33 or just U-Boot in case of SPL/U-Boot scheme) or EDK2.
I would propose we also discuss possibility of FF-A interface to actually query information or request actions to be done (this is a model actually used in some SoCs with proprietary SMC calls).
Requirements (to be validated):
- ACPI and DT hardware descriptions.
- agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2)
- agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2, TF-A/LinuxBoot)
- at least allows complete DRAM description and "persistent" usage (reserved areas for secure world or other usages)
- support secure world device assignment
Cheers
FF
On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 19:56, Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org<mailto:sjg@chromium.org>> wrote:
Hi,
Can I suggest using bloblist for this instead? It is lightweight,
easier to parse, doesn't have GUIDs and is already used within U-Boot
for passing info between SPL/U-Boot, etc.
Docs here: https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/doc/README.bloblist
Header file describes the format:
https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/include/bloblist.h
Full set of unit tests:
https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/test/bloblist.c
Regards,
Simon
On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 23:58, François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org>> wrote:
>
> +Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org<mailto:boot-architecture@lists.linaro.org>>
>
> standardization is very much welcomed here and need to accommodate a very
> diverse set of situations.
> For example, TEE OS may need to pass memory reservations to BL33 or
> "capture" a device for the secure world.
>
> I have observed a number of architectures:
> 1) pass information from BLx to BLy in the form of a specific object
> 2) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to get information
> 3) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to perform Device Tree
> fixups
>
> I also imagined a standardized "broadcast" FF-A call so that any firmware
> element can either provide information or "do something".
>
> My understanding of your proposal is about standardizing on architecture 1)
> with the HOB format.
>
> The advantage of the HOB is simplicity but it may be difficult to implement
> schemes such as pruning a DT because device assignment in the secure world.
>
> In any case, it looks feasible to have TF-A and OP-TEE complement the list
> of HOBs to pass information downstream (the bootflow).
>
> It would be good to start with building the comprehensive list of
> information that need to be conveyed between firmware elements:
>
> information. | authoritative entity | reporting entity | information
> exchanged:
> dram | TFA | TFA |
> <format to be detailed, NUMA topology to build the SRAT table or DT
> equivalent?>
> PSCI | SCP | TFA? |
> SCMI | SCP or TEE-OS | TFA? TEE-OS?|
> secure SRAM | TFA. | TFA. |
> secure DRAM | TFA? TEE-OS? | TFA? TEE-OS? |
> other? | |
> |
>
> Cheers
>
> FF
>
>
> On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 09:34, Harb Abdulhamid OS via TF-A <
> tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
>
> > Hello Folks,
> >
> >
> >
> > I'm emailing to start an open discussion about the adoption of a concept
> > known as "hand-off blocks" or HOB to become a part of the TF-A Firmware
> > Framework Architecture (FFA). This is something that is a pretty major
> > pain point when it comes to the adoption of TF-A in ARM Server SoC’s
> > designed to enable a broad range of highly configurable datacenter
> > platforms.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > What is a HOB (Background)?
> >
> > ---------------------------
> >
> > UEFI PI spec describes a particular definition for how HOB may be used for
> > transitioning between the PEI and DXE boot phases, which is a good
> > reference point for this discussion, but not necessarily the exact solution
> > appropriate for TF-A.
> >
> >
> >
> > A HOB is simply a dynamically generated data structure passed in between
> > two boot phases. This is information that was obtained through discovery
> > and needs to be passed forward to the next boot phase *once*, with no API
> > needed to call back (e.g. no call back into previous firmware phase is
> > needed to fetch this information at run-time - it is simply passed one time
> > during boot).
> >
> >
> >
> > There may be one or more HOBs passed in between boot phases. If there are
> > more than one HOB that needs to be passed, this can be in a form of a "HOB
> > table", which (for example) could be a UUID indexed array of pointers to
> > HOB structures, used to locate a HOB of interest (based on UUID). In such
> > cases, instead of passing a single HOB, the boot phases may rely on passing
> > the pointer to the HOB table.
> >
> >
> >
> > This has been extremely useful concept to employ on highly configurable
> > systems that must rely on flexible discovery mechanisms to initialize and
> > boot the system. This is especially helpful when you have multiple
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Why do we need HOBs in TF-A?:
> >
> > -----------------------------
> >
> > It is desirable that EL3 firmware (e.g. TF-A) built for ARM Server SoC in
> > a way that is SoC specific *but* platform agnostic. This means that a
> > single ARM SoC that a SiP may deliver to customers may provide a single
> > TF-A binary (e.g. BL1, BL2, BL31) that could be used to support a broad
> > range of platform designs and configurations in order to boot a platform
> > specific firmware (e.g. BL33 and possibly even BL32 code). In order to
> > achieve this, the platform configuration must be *discovered* instead of
> > statically compiled as it is today in TF-A via device tree based
> > enumeration. The mechanisms of discovery may differ broadly depending on
> > the relevant industry standard, or in some cases may have rely on SiP
> > specific discovery flows.
> >
> >
> >
> > For example: On server systems that support a broad range DIMM memory
> > population/topologies, all the necessary information required to boot is
> > fully discovered via standard JEDEC Serial Presence Detect (SPD) over an
> > I2C bus. Leveraging the SPD bus, may platform variants could be supported
> > with a single TF-A binary. Not only is this information required to
> > initialize memory in early boot phases (e.g. BL2), the subsequent boot
> > phases will also need this SPD info to construct a system physical address
> > map and properly initialize the MMU based on the memory present, and where
> > the memory may be present. Subsequent boot phases (e.g. BL33 / UEFI) may
> > need to generate standard firmware tables to the operating systems, such as
> > SMBIOS tables describing DIMM topology and various ACPI tables (e.g. SLIT,
> > SRAT, even NFIT if NVDIMM's are present).
> >
> >
> >
> > In short, it all starts with a standardized or vendor specific discovery
> > flow in an early boot stage (e.g. BL1/BL2), followed by the passing of
> > information to the next boot stages (e.g. BL31/BL32/BL33).
> >
> >
> >
> > Today, every HOB may be a vendor specific structure, but in the future
> > there may be benefit of defining standard HOBs. This may be useful for
> > memory discovery, passing the system physical address map, enabling TPM
> > measured boot, and potentially many other common HOB use-cases.
> >
> >
> >
> > It would be extremely beneficial to the datacenter market segment if the
> > TF-A community would adopt this concept of information passing between all
> > boot phases as opposed to rely solely on device tree enumeration. This is
> > not intended to replace device tree, rather intended as an alternative way
> > to describe the info that must be discovered and dynamically generated.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Conclusion:
> >
> > -----------
> >
> > We are proposing that the TF-A community begin pursuing the adoption of
> > HOBs as a mechanism used for information exchange between each boot stage
> > (e.g. BL1->BL2, BL2->BL31, BL31->BL32, and BL31->BL33)? Longer term we
> > want to explore standardizing some HOB structures for the BL33 phase (e.g.
> > UEFI HOB structures), but initially would like to agree on this being a
> > useful mechanism used to pass information between each boot stage.
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > --Harb
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > TF-A mailing list
> > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
> >
>
>
> --
> François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
> T: +33.67221.6485
> francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> | Skype: ffozog
> _______________________________________________
> boot-architecture mailing list
> boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org<mailto:boot-architecture@lists.linaro.org>
> https://lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/boot-architecture
--
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T: +33.67221.6485
francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> | Skype: ffozog
--
TF-A mailing list
TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
--
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François-Frédéric Ozog | Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group
T: +33.67221.6485
francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> | Skype: ffozog
--
[Image removed by sender.]
François-Frédéric Ozog | Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group
T: +33.67221.6485
francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> | Skype: ffozog
+Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>
standardization is very much welcomed here and need to accommodate a very
diverse set of situations.
For example, TEE OS may need to pass memory reservations to BL33 or
"capture" a device for the secure world.
I have observed a number of architectures:
1) pass information from BLx to BLy in the form of a specific object
2) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to get information
3) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to perform Device Tree
fixups
I also imagined a standardized "broadcast" FF-A call so that any firmware
element can either provide information or "do something".
My understanding of your proposal is about standardizing on architecture 1)
with the HOB format.
The advantage of the HOB is simplicity but it may be difficult to implement
schemes such as pruning a DT because device assignment in the secure world.
In any case, it looks feasible to have TF-A and OP-TEE complement the list
of HOBs to pass information downstream (the bootflow).
It would be good to start with building the comprehensive list of
information that need to be conveyed between firmware elements:
information. | authoritative entity | reporting entity | information
exchanged:
dram | TFA | TFA |
<format to be detailed, NUMA topology to build the SRAT table or DT
equivalent?>
PSCI | SCP | TFA? |
SCMI | SCP or TEE-OS | TFA? TEE-OS?|
secure SRAM | TFA. | TFA. |
secure DRAM | TFA? TEE-OS? | TFA? TEE-OS? |
other? | |
|
Cheers
FF
On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 09:34, Harb Abdulhamid OS via TF-A <
tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
> Hello Folks,
>
>
>
> I'm emailing to start an open discussion about the adoption of a concept
> known as "hand-off blocks" or HOB to become a part of the TF-A Firmware
> Framework Architecture (FFA). This is something that is a pretty major
> pain point when it comes to the adoption of TF-A in ARM Server SoC’s
> designed to enable a broad range of highly configurable datacenter
> platforms.
>
>
>
>
>
> What is a HOB (Background)?
>
> ---------------------------
>
> UEFI PI spec describes a particular definition for how HOB may be used for
> transitioning between the PEI and DXE boot phases, which is a good
> reference point for this discussion, but not necessarily the exact solution
> appropriate for TF-A.
>
>
>
> A HOB is simply a dynamically generated data structure passed in between
> two boot phases. This is information that was obtained through discovery
> and needs to be passed forward to the next boot phase *once*, with no API
> needed to call back (e.g. no call back into previous firmware phase is
> needed to fetch this information at run-time - it is simply passed one time
> during boot).
>
>
>
> There may be one or more HOBs passed in between boot phases. If there are
> more than one HOB that needs to be passed, this can be in a form of a "HOB
> table", which (for example) could be a UUID indexed array of pointers to
> HOB structures, used to locate a HOB of interest (based on UUID). In such
> cases, instead of passing a single HOB, the boot phases may rely on passing
> the pointer to the HOB table.
>
>
>
> This has been extremely useful concept to employ on highly configurable
> systems that must rely on flexible discovery mechanisms to initialize and
> boot the system. This is especially helpful when you have multiple
>
>
>
>
>
> Why do we need HOBs in TF-A?:
>
> -----------------------------
>
> It is desirable that EL3 firmware (e.g. TF-A) built for ARM Server SoC in
> a way that is SoC specific *but* platform agnostic. This means that a
> single ARM SoC that a SiP may deliver to customers may provide a single
> TF-A binary (e.g. BL1, BL2, BL31) that could be used to support a broad
> range of platform designs and configurations in order to boot a platform
> specific firmware (e.g. BL33 and possibly even BL32 code). In order to
> achieve this, the platform configuration must be *discovered* instead of
> statically compiled as it is today in TF-A via device tree based
> enumeration. The mechanisms of discovery may differ broadly depending on
> the relevant industry standard, or in some cases may have rely on SiP
> specific discovery flows.
>
>
>
> For example: On server systems that support a broad range DIMM memory
> population/topologies, all the necessary information required to boot is
> fully discovered via standard JEDEC Serial Presence Detect (SPD) over an
> I2C bus. Leveraging the SPD bus, may platform variants could be supported
> with a single TF-A binary. Not only is this information required to
> initialize memory in early boot phases (e.g. BL2), the subsequent boot
> phases will also need this SPD info to construct a system physical address
> map and properly initialize the MMU based on the memory present, and where
> the memory may be present. Subsequent boot phases (e.g. BL33 / UEFI) may
> need to generate standard firmware tables to the operating systems, such as
> SMBIOS tables describing DIMM topology and various ACPI tables (e.g. SLIT,
> SRAT, even NFIT if NVDIMM's are present).
>
>
>
> In short, it all starts with a standardized or vendor specific discovery
> flow in an early boot stage (e.g. BL1/BL2), followed by the passing of
> information to the next boot stages (e.g. BL31/BL32/BL33).
>
>
>
> Today, every HOB may be a vendor specific structure, but in the future
> there may be benefit of defining standard HOBs. This may be useful for
> memory discovery, passing the system physical address map, enabling TPM
> measured boot, and potentially many other common HOB use-cases.
>
>
>
> It would be extremely beneficial to the datacenter market segment if the
> TF-A community would adopt this concept of information passing between all
> boot phases as opposed to rely solely on device tree enumeration. This is
> not intended to replace device tree, rather intended as an alternative way
> to describe the info that must be discovered and dynamically generated.
>
>
>
>
>
> Conclusion:
>
> -----------
>
> We are proposing that the TF-A community begin pursuing the adoption of
> HOBs as a mechanism used for information exchange between each boot stage
> (e.g. BL1->BL2, BL2->BL31, BL31->BL32, and BL31->BL33)? Longer term we
> want to explore standardizing some HOB structures for the BL33 phase (e.g.
> UEFI HOB structures), but initially would like to agree on this being a
> useful mechanism used to pass information between each boot stage.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> --Harb
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> TF-A mailing list
> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
>
--
François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group*
T: +33.67221.6485
francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
All,
We have our normal DTE call today. Due to different day light saving
time dates in US vs UK the meeting will be one hour later than usual for
most US people.
When I checked yesterday Frank was not yet ready to talk about the DTB
format changes so I have no ready made agenda today.
We have a DT & SysDT talk and BOF tomorrow at Linaro Connect. Hope to
see you all there.
Attendance is free: https://connect.linaro.org/
Thanks,
Bill
--
Bill Mills
Principal Technical Consultant, Linaro
+1-240-643-0836
TZ: US Eastern
Work Schedule: Tues/Wed/Thur
Hi all,
I'm about ready to tag the first pre-release of EBBR v2.0. Here is the
full changelog as compared to v1.0.1. Once I tag this release I'll be
casting the net wider for comments before the document gets released.
There are lots of little changes to the document, and a few notable big
ones. Big things to look for are:
- Reduced required elements in UEFI requirements
- Firmware shared storage refinements
- Capsule Update is now required
Please let me know if you have any comments. Better yet, open an issue
in github so that it doesn't get forgotten. We'll also be discussing the
release at the EBBR biweekly on Monday 15th March.
https://github.com/ARM-software/ebbr/issues
Here's the full list of changes:
96dbb03 Reference BBR instead of SBBR (not yet merged)
2a6ca89 Fedora needs two more packages
2e3e873 CONTRIBUTING: let wording follow branching
cf29c4c README.rst: Python 2 is long time gone
396abac Fix build warnings:
e5d32ca trivial: remove duplicate SCSI pass through support
98e24fe Merge pull request #73 from glikely/for-next
eb34dbf Require EFI_UPDATE_CAPSULE
139e6c2 Refine RTC requirements
48e1e56 UEFI section 2.6 exceptions for boot services
72f3e2d Override UEFI section 2.6 requirements
58a2a27 Change required services table titles to be more accurate
d4ff44e Minor suggestions to hopefully improve the text
0555e38 Reformat revision history table to render better
5d836bc Refine firmware shared storage requirements.
a89cf43 Add reference to RFC 2119 in conventions
8db9eed Fix ResetSystem() text to describe failure condition
eda36e4 Merge pull request #48 from jbech-linaro/optee-url
c4ef5c7 Update link to OP-TEE secure storage
And here is the full diff:
CONTRIBUTING.rst | 2 +-
README.rst | 15 ++--
source/chapter1-about.rst | 30 ++++---
source/chapter2-uefi.rst | 292
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
source/chapter4-firmware-media.rst | 72 ++++++++++++----
source/conf.py | 2 +-
source/index.rst | 57 ++++++-------
source/references.rst | 12 ++-
8 files changed, 378 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.rst b/CONTRIBUTING.rst
index 7021f0f..be979e0 100644
--- a/CONTRIBUTING.rst
+++ b/CONTRIBUTING.rst
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Contributing
============
-Master copy of this project is hosted on GitHub:
+Main copy of this project is hosted on GitHub:
https://github.com/ARM-software/ebbr
Anyone may contribute to the EBBR project.
diff --git a/README.rst b/README.rst
index 7480dcb..acf6742 100644
--- a/README.rst
+++ b/README.rst
@@ -41,31 +41,28 @@ On Debian and Ubuntu
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
::
- # apt-get install python-sphinx texlive texlive-latex-extra
libalgorithm-diff-perl \
+ # apt-get install python3-sphinx texlive texlive-latex-extra
libalgorithm-diff-perl \
texlive-humanities texlive-generic-recommended
texlive-generic-extra \
latexmk
If the version of python-sphinx installed is too old, then an additional
new version can be installed with the Python package installer::
- $ apt-get install python-pip
- $ pip install --user --upgrade Sphinx
+ $ apt-get install python3-pip
+ $ pip3 install --user --upgrade Sphinx
$ export SPHINXBUILD=~/.local/bin/sphinx-build
-Export SPHINXBUILD (see above) if Sphinx was installed with pip --user,
then follow Make commands below
+Export SPHINXBUILD (see above) if Sphinx was installed with pip3
--user, then follow Make commands below.
On Fedora
^^^^^^^^^
::
- # dnf install python2-sphinx texlive texlive-capt-of
texlive-draftwatermark \
+ # dnf install python3-sphinx texlive texlive-capt-of
texlive-draftwatermark \
texlive-fncychap texlive-framed texlive-needspace \
texlive-tabulary texlive-titlesec texlive-upquote \
- texlive-wrapfig
-
-It is also possible to use python3-sphinx; this requires
-SPHINXBUILD=sphinx-build-3 to be passed on the Make command line.
+ texlive-wrapfig texinfo latexmk
On Mac OS X
^^^^^^^^^^^
diff --git a/source/chapter1-about.rst b/source/chapter1-about.rst
index 3744d8a..6f69f53 100644
--- a/source/chapter1-about.rst
+++ b/source/chapter1-about.rst
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ Vendors have heavy investments in both projects and
are not interested in large
scale changes to their firmware architecture.
The challenge for EBBR is to define a set of boot standards that
reduce the
amount of custom engineering required, make it possible for OS
distributions to
-support embedded platforms, while still preserving the firmware stack
product
-vendors are comfortable with.
+support embedded platforms, while still preserving the firmware stack that
+product vendors are comfortable with.
Or in simpler terms, EBBR is designed to solve the embedded boot mess by
adding a defined standard (UEFI) to the existing firmware projects
(U-Boot).
@@ -146,19 +146,23 @@ including services that are required for
virtualization.
It does not define a standardized abstract virtual machine view for a
Guest
Operating System.
-This specification is similar to the Arm Server Base Boot Requirements
-specification [SBBR]_ in that it defines the firmware interface
presented to an
-operating system.
-SBBR is targeted at the server ecosystem and places strict requirements
on the
-platform to ensure cross vendor interoperability.
-EBBR on the other hand allows more flexibility to support embedded designs
-which do not fit within the SBBR model.
-For example, a platform that isn't SBBR compliant because the SoC is only
-supported using Devicetree could be EBBR compliant, but not SBBR compliant.
-
-By definition, all SBBR compliant systems are also EBBR compliant, but the
+This specification is referenced by the Arm Base Boot Requirements
+Specification [ArmBBR]_ § 4.3.
+The UEFI requirements found in this document are similar but not
identical to
+the requirements found in BBR.
+EBBR provides greater flexibility for support embedded designs which cannot
+easily meet the stricter BBR requirements.
+
+By definition, all BBR compliant systems are also EBBR compliant, but the
converse is not true.
+Conventions Used in this Document
+=================================
+
+The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD",
+"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are
to be
+interpreted as described in :rfc:`2119`.
+
Cross References
================
This document cross-references sources that are listed in the References
diff --git a/source/chapter2-uefi.rst b/source/chapter2-uefi.rst
index 066fefb..a0b3e8d 100644
--- a/source/chapter2-uefi.rst
+++ b/source/chapter2-uefi.rst
@@ -14,8 +14,179 @@ This document uses version 2.8 Errata A of the UEFI
specification [UEFI]_.
UEFI Compliance
===============
-EBBR compliant platforms shall conform to the requirements in [UEFI]_ §
2.6,
-except where explicit exemptions are provided by this document.
+EBBR compliant platform shall conform to a subset of the [UEFI]_ spec
as listed
+in this section.
+Normally, UEFI compliance would require full compliance with all items
listed
+in UEFI § 2.6.
+However, the EBBR target market has a reduced set of requirements,
+and so some UEFI features are omitted as unnecessary.
+
+Required Elements
+-----------------
+
+This section replaces the list of required elements in [UEFI]_ § 2.6.1.
+All of the following UEFI elements are required for EBBR compliance.
+
+.. list-table:: UEFI Required Elements
+ :widths: 50 50
+ :header-rows: 1
+
+ * - Element
+ - Requirement
+ * - `EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE`
+ - The system table is required to provide required to access UEFI
Boot Services,
+ UEFI Runtime Services, consoles, and other firmware, vendor and
platform
+ information.
+ * - `EFI_BOOT_SERVICES`
+ - All functions defined as boot services must exist.
+ Methods for unsupported or unimplemented behaviour must return
+ an appropriate error code.
+ * - `EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES`
+ - All functions defined as runtime services must exist.
+ Methods for unsupported or unimplemented behaviour must return
+ an appropriate error code.
+ If any runtime service is unimplemented, it must be indicated
+ via the EFI_RT_PROPERTIES_TABLE.
+ * - `EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL`
+ - Must be installed for each loaded image
+ * - `EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL`
+ - Must be installed for each loaded image
+ * - `EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL`
+ - An `EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL` must be installed onto all device
+ handles provided by the firmware.
+ * - `EFI_DEVICE_PATH_UTILITIES_PROTOCOL`
+ - Interface for creating and manipulating UEFI device paths
+
+.. list-table:: Notable omissions from UEFI § 2.6.1
+ :header-rows: 1
+
+ * - Element
+ - Note
+ * - `EFI_DECOMPRESS_PROTOCOL`
+ - Native EFI decompression is rarely used and therefore not required.
+
+Required Platform Specific Elements
+-----------------------------------
+
+This section replaces the list of required elements in [UEFI]_ § 2.6.2.
+All of the following UEFI elements are required for EBBR compliance.
+
+.. list-table:: UEFI Platform-Specific Required Elements
+ :widths: 50 50
+ :header-rows: 1
+
+ * - Element
+ - Description
+ * - Console devices
+ - The platform must have at least one console device
+ * - `EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_INPUT_PROTOCOL`
+ - Needed for console input
+ * - `EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_INPUT_EX_PROTOCOL`
+ - Needed for console input
+ * - `EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL`
+ - Needed for console output
+ * - `EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TO_TEXT_PROTOCOL`
+ - Needed for console output
+ * - `EFI_HII_STRING_PROTOCOL`
+ - Required by EFI shell and for compliance testing
+ * - `EFI_HII_DATABASE_PROTOCOL`
+ - Required by EFI shell and for compliance testing
+ * - `EFI_UNICODE_COLLATION2_PROTOCOL`
+ - Required by EFI shell and for compliance testing
+ * - `EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL`
+ - Required for block device access
+ * - `EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL`
+ - Required if booting from block device is supported
+ * - `EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL`
+ - Required if the platform has a hardware entropy source
+ * - `EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL`
+ - Required if the platform has a network device.
+ * - HTTP Boot (UEFI § 24.7)
+ - Required if the platform supports network booting
+
+The following table is a list of notable deviations from UEFI § 2.6.2.
+Many of these deviations are because the EBBR use cases do not require
+interface specific UEFI protocols, and so they have been made optional.
+
+.. list-table:: Notable Deviations from UEFI § 2.6.2
+ :widths: 50 50
+ :header-rows: 1
+
+ * - Element
+ - Description of deviation
+ * - `LoadImage()`
+ - The LoadImage() boot service is not required to install an
+ EFI_HII_PACKAGE_LIST_PROTOCOL for an image containing a custom
PE/COFF
+ resource with the type 'HII'. - HII resource images are not
needed to run
+ the UEFI shell or the SCT.
+ * - `ConnectController()`
+ - The ConnectController()` boot service is not required to support the
+ EFI_PLATFORM_DRIVER_OVERRIDE_PROTOCOL,
+ EFI_DRIVER_FAMILY_OVERRIDE_PROTOCOL, and
+ EFI_BUS_SPECIFIC_DRIVER_OVERRIDE_PROTOCOL. - These override
protocols are
+ only useful if drivers are loaded as EFI binaries by the firmware.
+ * - `EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL`
+ - UEFI requires this for console devices, but it is rarely
necessary in practice.
+ Therefore this protocol is not required.
+ * - `EFI_HII_CONFIG_ROUTING_PROTOCOL`
+ - UEFI requires this for console devices, but it is rarely
necessary in practice.
+ Therefore this protocol is not required.
+ * - Graphical console
+ - Platforms with a graphical device are not required to expose it
as a graphical console.
+ * - `EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL`
+ - Rarely used interface that isn't required for EBBR use cases
+ * - `EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_PROTOCOL`
+ - Booting via the Preboot Execution Environment (PXE) is insecure.
+ Loading via PXE is typically executed before launching the first
UEFI application.
+ * - Network protocols
+ - A full implementation of the UEFI general purpose networking
ABIs is not required,
+ including `EFI_NETWORK_INTERFACE_IDENTIFIER_PROTOCOL`,
`EFI_MANAGED_NETWORK_PROTOCOL`,
+ `EFI_*_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL`, or any of the IPv4 or IPv6
protocols.
+ * - Byte stream device support (UART)
+ - UEFI protocols not required
+ * - PCI bus support
+ - UEFI protocols not required
+ * - USB bus support
+ - UEFI protocols not required
+ * - NVMe pass through support
+ - UEFI protocols not required
+ * - SCSI pass through support
+ - UEFI protocols not required
+ * - `EFI_DRIVER_FAMILY_OVERRIDE_PROTOCOL`
+ - Not required
+ * - Option ROM support
+ - In many EBBR use cases there is no requirement to generically
support
+ any PCIe add in card at the firmware level.
+ When PCIe devices are used, drivers for the device are often
built into
+ the firmware itself rather than loaded as option ROMs.
+ For this reason EBBR implementations are not required to support
option
+ ROM loading.
+
+Required Global Variables
+-------------------------
+
+EBBR compliant platforms are required to support the following Global
+Variables as found in [UEFI]_ § 3.3.
+
+.. list-table:: Required UEFI Variables
+ :widths: 25 75
+ :header-rows: 1
+
+ * - Variable Name
+ - Description
+ * - `Boot####`
+ - A boot load option. #### is a numerical hex value
+ * - `BootCurrent`
+ - The boot option that was selected for the current boot
+ * - `BootNext`
+ - The boot option that will be used for the next boot only
+ * - `BootOrder`
+ - An ordered list of boot options.
+ Firmware will attempt each Boot#### entry in this order
+ * - `OsIndications`
+ - Method for OS to request features from firmware
+ * - `OsIndicationsSupported`
+ - Variable for firmware to indicate which features can be enabled
Block device partitioning
-------------------------
@@ -53,7 +224,7 @@ a hypervisor or a virtualization aware Operating System.
UEFI Boot at EL1
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-Booting of UEFI at EL1 is most likely within a hypervisor hosted Guest
+Booting of UEFI at EL1 is most likely employed within a hypervisor
hosted Guest
Operating System environment, to allow the subsequent booting of a
UEFI-compliant Operating System.
In this instance, the UEFI boot-time environment can be provided, as a
@@ -77,7 +248,7 @@ The default RAM allocated attribute must be
EFI_MEMORY_WB.
Configuration Tables
--------------------
-A UEFI system that complies with this specification may provide the
additional
+A UEFI system that complies with this specification may provide additional
tables via the EFI Configuration Table.
Compliant systems are required to provide one, but not both, of the
following
@@ -151,26 +322,55 @@ EFI_UNSUPPORTED.
are required to be implemented during boot services and runtime services.
.. _uefi_runtime_service_requirements:
-.. table:: EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES Implementation Requirements
-
- ============================== ============= ================
- EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES function Boot Services Runtime Services
- ============================== ============= ================
- EFI_GET_TIME Optional Optional
- EFI_SET_TIME Optional Optional
- EFI_GET_WAKEUP_TIME Optional Optional
- EFI_SET_WAKEUP_TIME Optional Optional
- EFI_SET_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_MAP N/A Required
- EFI_CONVERT_POINTER N/A Required
- EFI_GET_VARIABLE Required Optional
- EFI_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME Required Optional
- EFI_SET_VARIABLE Required Optional
- EFI_GET_NEXT_HIGH_MONO_COUNT N/A Optional
- EFI_RESET_SYSTEM Required Optional
- EFI_UPDATE_CAPSULE Optional Optional
- EFI_QUERY_CAPSULE_CAPABILITIES Optional Optional
- EFI_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO Optional Optional
- ============================== ============= ================
+.. list-table:: `EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES` Implementation Requirements
+ :widths: 40 30 30
+ :header-rows: 1
+
+ * - `EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES` function
+ - Before ExitBootServices()
+ - After ExitBootServices()
+ * - `EFI_GET_TIME`
+ - Required if RTC present
+ - Optional
+ * - `EFI_SET_TIME`
+ - Required if RTC present
+ - Optional
+ * - `EFI_GET_WAKEUP_TIME`
+ - Required if wakeup supported
+ - Optional
+ * - `EFI_SET_WAKEUP_TIME`
+ - Required if wakeup supported
+ - Optional
+ * - `EFI_SET_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_MAP`
+ - N/A
+ - Required
+ * - `EFI_CONVERT_POINTER`
+ - N/A
+ - Required
+ * - `EFI_GET_VARIABLE`
+ - Required
+ - Optional
+ * - `EFI_GET_NEXT_VARIABLE_NAME`
+ - Required
+ - Optional
+ * - `EFI_SET_VARIABLE`
+ - Required
+ - Optional
+ * - `EFI_GET_NEXT_HIGH_MONO_COUNT`
+ - N/A
+ - Optional
+ * - `EFI_RESET_SYSTEM`
+ - Required
+ - Optional
+ * - `EFI_UPDATE_CAPSULE`
+ - Required for in-band update
+ - Optional
+ * - `EFI_QUERY_CAPSULE_CAPABILITIES`
+ - Optional
+ - Optional
+ * - `EFI_QUERY_VARIABLE_INFO`
+ - Optional
+ - Optional
Runtime Device Mappings
-----------------------
@@ -198,8 +398,11 @@ it may not be possible to access the RTC from
runtime services.
e.g., The RTC may be on a shared I2C bus which runtime services cannot
access
because it will conflict with the OS.
-If firmware does not support access to the RTC, then GetTime() and
-SetTime() shall return EFI_UNSUPPORTED,
+If an RTC is present, then GetTime() and SetTime() must be supported
+before ExitBootServices() is called.
+
+However, if firmware does not support access to the RTC after
+ExitBootServices(), then GetTime() and SetTime() shall return
EFI_UNSUPPORTED
and the OS must use a device driver to control the RTC.
UEFI Reset and Shutdown
@@ -209,9 +412,10 @@ ResetSystem() is required to be implemented in boot
services, but it is
optional for runtime services.
During runtime services, the operating system should first attempt to
use ResetSystem() to reset the system.
-If firmware doesn't support ResetSystem() during runtime services,
-then the call will immediately return EFI_UNSUPPORTED, and the OS should
-fall back to an architecture or platform specific reset mechanism.
+
+If firmware doesn't support ResetSystem() during runtime services, then
the call
+will immediately return, and the OS should fall back to an architecture or
+platform specific reset mechanism.
On AArch64 platforms implementing [PSCI]_,
if ResetSystem() is not implemented then the Operating System should fall
@@ -242,6 +446,26 @@ Even when SetVariable() is not supported during
runtime services, firmware
should cache variable names and values in EfiRuntimeServicesData memory so
that GetVariable() and GetNextVeriableName() can behave as specified.
+Firmware Update
+---------------
+
+Being able to update firmware to address security issues is a key
feature of secure platforms.
+EBBR platforms are required to implement either an in-band or an
out-of-band firmware update mechanism.
+
+If firmware update is performed in-band (firmware on the application
processor updates itself),
+then the firmware shall implement EFI_UPDATE_CAPSULE and accept updates
in the
+"Firmware Management Protocol Data Capsule Structure" format as
described in [UEFI]_ § 23.3,
+"Delivering Capsules Containing Updates to Firmware Management
Protocol. [#FMPNote]_
+Firmware is also required to provide an EFI System Resource Table
(ESRT). [UEFI]_ § 23.4
+Every firmware image that is updated in-band must be described in the ESRT.
+
+If firmware update is performed out-of-band (e.g., by an independent
Baseboard
+Management Controller (BMC), or firmware is provided by a hypervisor),
+then the platform is not required to implement EFI_UPDATE_CAPSULE.
+
+EFI_UPDATE_CAPSULE is only required before ExitBootServices() is called.
+
+
.. [#OPTEESupplicant] It is worth noting that OP-TEE has a similar problem
regarding secure storage.
OP-TEE's chosen solution is to rely on an OS supplicant agent to
perform
@@ -251,4 +475,12 @@ that GetVariable() and GetNextVeriableName() can
behave as specified.
Regardless, EBBR compliance does not require SetVariable() support
during runtime services.
-
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/documentation/secure_storage…
+ https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/architecture/secure_storage.html
+
+.. [#FMPNote] The `EFI_UPDATE_CAPSULE` implementation is expected to be
suitable
+ for use by generic firmware update services like fwupd and Windows
Update.
+ Both fwupd and Windows Update read the ESRT table to determine what
firmware
+ can be updated, and use an EFI helper application to call
`EFI_UPDATE_CAPSULE`
+ before ExitBootServices() is called.
+
+ https://fwupd.org/
diff --git a/source/chapter4-firmware-media.rst
b/source/chapter4-firmware-media.rst
index fc71274..cfcc8bd 100644
--- a/source/chapter4-firmware-media.rst
+++ b/source/chapter4-firmware-media.rst
@@ -47,13 +47,19 @@ conflict with normal usage of the media by an OS.
Partitioning of Shared Storage
==============================
-A shared storage device shall use GPT partitioning unless it is
incompatible
-with the platform boot sequence.
-In which case, MBR partitioning shall be used. [#MBRReqExample]_
-
-.. [#MBRReqExample] For example, if the boot ROM doesn't understand GPT
- partitioning, and will only work with an MBR, then the storage must be
- partitioned using an MBR.
+The shared storage device must use the GUID Partition Table (GPT) disk
+layout as defined in [UEFI]_ § 5.3, unless the platform boot sequence is
+fundamentally incompatible with the GPT disk layout.
+In which case, a legacy Master Boot Recored (MBR) must be used.
+[#MBRReqExample]_
+
+.. [#MBRReqExample] For example, if the SoC boot ROM requires an MBR to
+ find the next stage firmware image, then it is incompatible with
+ the GPT boot layout.
+ Similarly, if the boot ROM expects the next stage firmware to be located
+ at LBA1 (the location of the GPT Header), then it is incompatible with
+ the GPT disk layout.
+ In both cases the shared storage device must use legacy MBR
partitioning.
.. warning::
@@ -62,7 +68,8 @@ In which case, MBR partitioning shall be used.
[#MBRReqExample]_
GPT partitioning supports a much larger number of partitions, and
has built in resiliency.
- A future issue of this specification will remove the MBR allowance.
+ A future issue of this specification will disallow the use of MBR
+ partitioning.
Firmware images and data in shared storage should be contained
in partitions described by the GPT or MBR.
@@ -71,15 +78,14 @@ the partition(s) containing firmware.
However, some SoCs load firmware from a fixed offset into the storage
media.
In this case, to protect against partitioning tools overwriting
firmware, the
-firmware image shall either reside entirely within the first 1MiB of
storage,
-or should be covered by a protective partition entry in the partition
table as
+partition table must be formed in a way to protect the firmware image(s) as
described in sections :ref:`section-gpt-parts` and
:ref:`section-mbr-parts`.
-Automatic partitioning tools (e.g. an OS installer) must not create
-partitions within the first 1MiB of storage, or delete, move, or modify
-protective partition entries.
+Automatic partitioning tools (e.g. an OS installer) must not
+delete the protective information in the partition table, or
+delete, move, or modify protective partition entries.
Manual partitioning tools should provide warnings when modifying
-protective partitions or creating partitions within the first 1MiB.
+protective partitions.
.. warning::
@@ -95,19 +101,49 @@ GPT partitioning
----------------
The partition table must strictly conform to the UEFI specification
and include
-a protective MBR authored exactly as described in [UEFI]_ § 5 (hybrid
+a protective MBR authored exactly as described in [UEFI]_ § 5.3 (hybrid
partitioning schemes are not permitted).
-Protective partitions must have the Platform Required Attribute Flag set.
+Fixed-location firmware images must be protected by creating protective
+partition entries, or by placing GPT data structures away from the LBAs
+occupied by firmware,
+
+Protective partitions are entries in the partition table that cover the
+LBA region occupied by firmware and have the 'Required Partition' attribute
+set.
+A protective partition must use a `PartitionTypeGUID` that identifies it
+as a firmware protective partition. (e.g., don't reuse a GUID used by
+non-protective partitions).
+There are no requirements on the contents or layout of the firmware
+protective partition.
+
+Placing GPT data structures away from firmware images can be
accomplished by
+adjusting the GUID Partition Entry array location
+(adjusting the values of `PartitionEntryLBA` and
`NumberOfPartitionEntries`,
+and `SizeOfPartitionEntry`),
+or by specifying the usable LBAs (Choosing `FirstUsableLBA`/`LastUsableLBA`
+to not overlap the fixed firmware location).
+See [UEFI]_ § 5.3.2.
+
+Given the choice, platforms should use protective partitions over
+adjusting the placement of GPT data structures because protective
partitions
+provide explicit information about the protected region.
.. _section-mbr-parts:
MBR partitioning
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-Protective partitions should have a partition type of 0xF8 unless some
+If firmware is at a fixed location entirely within the first 1MiB of
+storage (<= LBA2047) then no protective partitions are required.
+If firmware resides in a fixed location outside the first 1MiB,
+then a protective partition must be used to cover the firmware LBAs.
+Protective partitions should have a partition type of 0xF8 unless an
immutable feature of the platform makes this impossible.
+OS partitioning tools must not create partitions in the first 1MiB
+of the storage device, and must not remove protective partitions.
+
.. _section-fw-partition-fs:
Firmware Partition Filesystem
@@ -202,7 +238,7 @@ and cannot be moved between systems.
eMMC and Universal Flash Storage (UFS) device are often used as
shared fixed storage for both firmware and the OS.
-Where possible, it is prefered for the system to boot from a dedicated boot
+Where possible, it is preferred for the system to boot from a dedicated
boot
region on media that provides one (e.g., eMMC) that is sufficiently large.
Otherwise, the platform storage should be pre-formatted in the factory
with
a partition table, a dedicated firmware partition, and firmware binaries
diff --git a/source/conf.py b/source/conf.py
index 86f7b88..4a2566a 100644
--- a/source/conf.py
+++ b/source/conf.py
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ html_theme = 'alabaster'
# Add any paths that contain custom static files (such as style
sheets) here,
# relative to this directory. They are copied after the builtin static
files,
# so a file named "default.css" will overwrite the builtin "default.css".
-html_static_path = ['_static']
+# html_static_path = ['_static']
# -- Options for HTMLHelp output
------------------------------------------
diff --git a/source/index.rst b/source/index.rst
index 8eab909..bf2dadf 100644
--- a/source/index.rst
+++ b/source/index.rst
@@ -21,35 +21,34 @@ Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View, CA
94042, USA.
.. tabularcolumns:: l c p{11.5cm}
.. table:: Revision History
- ================= =========
=============================================
- Date Issue Changes
- ================= =========
=============================================
- 20 September 2017 0.51 Confidentiality Change, EBBR version 0.51
- 6 July 2018 0.6-pre1 - Relicense to CC-BY-SA 4.0
- - Added Devicetree requirements
- - Added Multiprocessor boot requirements
- - Transitioned to reStructuredText and
GitHub
- - Added firmware on shared media
requirements
- - RTC is optional
- - Add constraints on sharing devices between
- firmware and OS
- 12 July 2018 0.6 - Response to comments on v0.6-pre1
- - Add large note on implementation of
runtime
- modification of non-volatile variables
- 18 October 2018 0.7 - Add AArch32 details
- - Refactor Runtime Services text after face
- to fact meeting at Linaro Connect YVR18
- 12 March 2019 0.8 - Update language around SetVariable() and
- what is available during runtime services
- - Editorial changes preparing for v1.0
- 31 March 2019 1.0 - Remove unnecessary UEFI requirements
- appendix
- - Allow for ACPI vendor id in firmware path
- 5 August 2020 1.0.1 - Update to UEFI 2.8 Errata A
- - Specify UUID for passing DTB
- - Typo and editorial fixes
- - Document the release process
- ================= =========
=============================================
+ ============= ======= =============================================
+ Date Issue Changes
+ ============= ======= =============================================
+ 20 Sep 2017 0.51 - Confidentiality Change, EBBR version 0.51
+ 12 Jul 2018 0.6 - Relicense to CC-BY-SA 4.0
+ - Added Devicetree requirements
+ - Added Multiprocessor boot requirements
+ - Transitioned to reStructuredText and GitHub
+ - Added firmware on shared media requirements
+ - RTC is optional
+ - Add constraints on sharing devices between
+ firmware and OS
+ - Add large note on implementation of runtime
+ modification of non-volatile variables
+ 18 Oct 2018 0.7 - Add AArch32 details
+ - Refactor Runtime Services text after face
+ to fact meeting at Linaro Connect YVR18
+ 12 Mar 2019 0.8 - Update language around SetVariable() and
+ what is available during runtime services
+ - Editorial changes preparing for v1.0
+ 31 Mar 2019 1.0 - Remove unnecessary UEFI requirements
+ appendix
+ - Allow for ACPI vendor id in firmware path
+ 5 Aug 2020 1.0.1 - Update to UEFI 2.8 Errata A
+ - Specify UUID for passing DTB
+ - Typo and editorial fixes
+ - Document the release process
+ ============= ======= =============================================
.. toctree::
:numbered:
diff --git a/source/references.rst b/source/references.rst
index 1eb0509..fb7dc81 100644
--- a/source/references.rst
+++ b/source/references.rst
@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-SA-4.0
+.. only:: html
+
+ ************
+ Bibliography
+ ************
+
.. [ACPI] `Advanced Configuration and Power Interface specification v6.2A
<http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/ACPI%206_2_A_Sept29.pdf>`_,
September 2017, `UEFI Forum <http://www.uefi.org>`_
@@ -16,9 +22,9 @@
<https://static.docs.arm.com/den0022/c/DEN0022C_Power_State_Coordination_Int…>`_
30 January 2015, `Arm Limited <http://arm.com>`_
-.. [SBBR] `Arm Server Base Boot Requirements specification Issue B (v1.0)
-
<https://static.docs.arm.com/den0044/b/DEN0044B_Server_Base_Boot_Requirement…>`_
- 8 March 2016, `Arm Limited <http://arm.com>`_
+.. [ArmBBR] `Arm Base Boot Requirements specification Issue F (v1.0)
+ <https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0044/f>`_
+ 6 Oct 2020, `Arm Limited <http://arm.com>`_
.. [UEFI] `Unified Extensable Firmware Interface Specification v2.8
Errata A
<https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_8_A_Feb14.pdf>`_,
SBBR has been superseded by Arm BBR. Update the about section to
reference BBR instead. However, none of the specification language
changes because EBBR has a relaxed set of UEFI requirements compared to
BBR.
Fixes: #62
Signed-off-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely(a)secretlab.ca>
---
source/chapter1-about.rst | 19 ++++++++-----------
source/references.rst | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/chapter1-about.rst b/source/chapter1-about.rst
index 68a1abc..6f69f53 100644
--- a/source/chapter1-about.rst
+++ b/source/chapter1-about.rst
@@ -146,17 +146,14 @@ including services that are required for virtualization.
It does not define a standardized abstract virtual machine view for a Guest
Operating System.
-This specification is similar to the Arm Server Base Boot Requirements
-specification [SBBR]_ in that it defines the firmware interface presented to an
-operating system.
-SBBR is targeted at the server ecosystem and places strict requirements on the
-platform to ensure cross vendor interoperability.
-EBBR on the other hand allows more flexibility to support embedded designs
-which do not fit within the SBBR model.
-For example, a platform that isn't SBBR compliant because the SoC is only
-supported using Devicetree could be EBBR compliant, but not SBBR compliant.
-
-By definition, all SBBR compliant systems are also EBBR compliant, but the
+This specification is referenced by the Arm Base Boot Requirements
+Specification [ArmBBR]_ § 4.3.
+The UEFI requirements found in this document are similar but not identical to
+the requirements found in BBR.
+EBBR provides greater flexibility for support embedded designs which cannot
+easily meet the stricter BBR requirements.
+
+By definition, all BBR compliant systems are also EBBR compliant, but the
converse is not true.
Conventions Used in this Document
diff --git a/source/references.rst b/source/references.rst
index d91dc08..fb7dc81 100644
--- a/source/references.rst
+++ b/source/references.rst
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@
<https://static.docs.arm.com/den0022/c/DEN0022C_Power_State_Coordination_Int…>`_
30 January 2015, `Arm Limited <http://arm.com>`_
-.. [SBBR] `Arm Server Base Boot Requirements specification Issue B (v1.0)
- <https://static.docs.arm.com/den0044/b/DEN0044B_Server_Base_Boot_Requirement…>`_
- 8 March 2016, `Arm Limited <http://arm.com>`_
+.. [ArmBBR] `Arm Base Boot Requirements specification Issue F (v1.0)
+ <https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0044/f>`_
+ 6 Oct 2020, `Arm Limited <http://arm.com>`_
.. [UEFI] `Unified Extensable Firmware Interface Specification v2.8 Errata A
<https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_8_A_Feb14.pdf>`_,
--
2.20.1
All,
Here are my notes from today. Please correct anything I got wrong.
Attendees:
Bruce Ashfield
Frank Rowand
Simon Glass
Etienne Carriere
Heinrich Schuchardt
Ilias Apalodimas
Joakim Bech
Loic Pallardy
Mark Brown
Mathieu Poirier
Rob Herring
Ruchika Gupta
Vincent Guittot
Vincent Stehle
CC:
Stefano Stabellini
Kumar Gala
Discussion:
Today we did a brainstorming session on goals/requirements for a new DTB
format.
Remember this is a laundry list of requirements / concerns. Not all will
necessarily be included in the new format but all will be considered.
It is not a discussion of the format changes to achieve these goals.
Frank Rowand will be collecting past discussions related to this and
expects this to be ready for the meeting on March 22.
* FR: Reduce Size
* FR: Overlay support in "symbol table" not looking like HW description
* FR: Ability to express "delete node" and "delete property"
** many: do we really need delete node, every node should have status
** RH: not everyone today looks for status != ok
** general agreement that they should
** RH: perhaps we should make it more automatic somehow
* SG: New format should be little endian
** most current active / popular CPU arch are LE these days
* SG: Ability to refer to data blob by reference instead of inline
** blob would still be in DTB file/image
but not inline as a property blob
* RH: Include type info
** Know what is a u64 vs u32 vs phandle
** replicate what we have in schema with bit fields etc
** enums?? structs??
* SG: Provision for comments
* RH: In general want more less conversion DTS -> DTB -> DTS
** WAM: Is it OK to rely on schema?
** SG: Ideally not, would prefer self describing format
* HS: Want to be able to validate DTB (against schema)
** WAM: Isnt this the same as type info?
** RH: That is a lot of it but there is more
* WAM: We want a new section for meta data
** WAM: signatures as discussed on this call
** FR: Source file info / version markers
** HS/WAM: taint flag if the DTC compile or validate is not clean
* SG: IN yaml we can import a node,
** would be good to have this in DTS as well
** FR: It is valid to bring in DTS requirements as some of this
will effect anyway
* WAM: Segmeneted DTB or DTB set
** instead of applying overlays leave base and overlay intact
** deliver to OS as a set with assembly order.
** [We can call it IKEA mode :) ]
** allows signatures to reamin valid, can be passed on
** makes it clear what fixups were performed by the firmware
* SG: a previous node "pointer"
** going backwards is very slow in FDT
* WAM: Huawei is asking for B-Tree to speed up search in FDT
** FR/RH: probably too far but we will consider
* RH: DTB format could be unflattened
** SG: could be too big
** SG: we may really need more than one format to balance speed vs size
** [WAM: learns that libfdt does not unflatten.
U-boot copies Linux code for this.]
** RH: we could have a libdt that would be lib for live trees
* SG: for speed it would be nice to have a directory for quick access
** WAM: improved alias? SG: Yes if they were phandles perhaps
* WAM: Can we revist size, that is pretty broad
** Eliminate as many strings as possible
** FR: Compiler does "tail recursion" on strings already
** WAM: strings in properties are not in symbold table today
** SG: Yes I studied that and elimination of that did not help a lot.
** SG: Today everything is 32 bit
*** I looked at reducing and could save 20%
*** But it is not as regular
*** WAM: is it aligned today?
*** RH: Yes, 64 bit aligned but not very clear in spec
** HS: Just gzip the DTB if you just want to reduce storage size
** WAM: Published ATOM based DTB doc a few years ago.
*** Try to move most strings to 32 bit ATOM constants (not offsets)
*** Optionally include ATOM table to include the strings
Devicetree Atom Table Format:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/19XbxN-zX-GYwOXdF78lGnp0j7UNx1MT3wzyCjai…
Frank reminds us that we want to collect all the stake holders:
* Linux
* DTC
* U-Boot
* BSDs
** One has its own DTC
* RTOS
** Zephyr (mostly DTS)
*** Have their own DTS parser, DOM lib, and code gen
*** Want to make it more generic
** Vxworks (does use runtime DT of some sort)
All agree: Old DTB format will need to be supported for a good while
after new DTB format is defined.
Thanks,
Bill
--
Bill Mills
Principal Technical Consultant, Linaro
+1-240-643-0836
TZ: US Eastern
Work Schedule: Tues/Wed/Thur
Hello,
We have our DTE call today.
I don't have anything on the agenda unless we want to brainstorm on the
DTB format changes.
I know Frank is trying to collect/organize past work on this. Is it
worth while talking today or should we wait for Frank?
Open to any other agenda items.
Join Zoom Meeting
https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/96170428801?pwd=elBJNFdVMFJub0UzanFUcVQxTHBqdz…
Meeting ID: 961 7042 8801
Passcode: 8250
------
A note on timezones.
This meeting is now anchored to the UK timezone to match the EBBR call.
UK goes to Daylight savings on March 28
Most of the USA goes to Daylight savings on March 14.
This means:
UK:
no visible change in time slot.
USA (most):
Meeting on 22nd will be one hour later.
(and EBBR meeting on 15th)
Non-daylight savings time zones:
DTE and EBBR meetings are 1 hour earlier
from March 28 to Oct 31.
Thanks,
Bill
--
Bill Mills
Principal Technical Consultant, Linaro
+1-240-643-0836
TZ: US Eastern
Work Schedule: Tues/Wed/Thur
Hi,
An arch agnostic way was recently added on the kernel, as an alternative method
to load an initrd [1]. The kernel call to the firmware ends up calling the
protocol with a Device Path End Structure, so the firmware must know which
initrd to load on the buffer the kernel provides.
The protocol is currently implemented by U-boot and EDK2, which both
define a way of specifying the initrd to load. We could use this protocol,
in order to provide vertical distros a way of loading (kernel, initrd) pairs
without GRUB. In that case we need a common way for firmware implementations
to define and manage the initrd. User space applications that control the boot
flow (e.g efibootmgr), should also be able to change the variable accordingly.
Looking at the EFI spec and specifically § 3.1.3 Load Options, we can use the
FilePathList[] of the EFI_LOAD_OPTION, which is described as:
"A packed array of UEFI device paths. The first element of the array is a
device path that describes the device and location of the Image for this
load option. The FilePathList[0] is specific to the device type. Other device
paths may optionally exist in the FilePathList, but their usage is OSV specific.
Each element in the array is variable length, and ends at the device path end
structure. Because the size of Description is arbitrary, this data structure
is not guaranteed to be aligned on a natural boundary. This data structure may
have to be copied to an aligned natural boundary before it is used."
So FilePatrhList[1-n] are available for OS usage. There are 3 ways we could
implement that. All 3 ways would allow us to specify multiple initrds (and we
could extend the same logic to DTBs, but that's a different discussion).
They all re-use the same idea, prepend a VenMedia DP, which has a GUID. We can
then use that GUID to identify the filetype and behavior of the device paths.
1. Prepend a VenMedia Device Path in every initrd Device Path. In that case
FilePathList[] would look like this:
Loaded Image device path - end node - VenMedia - Initrd DP - end node
- VenMedia - Initrd DP - end node - repeat
2. Prepend a VenMedia Device Path once. In that case FilePathList[] would look
like this:
Loaded Image device path - end node - VenMedia - Initrd DP - end
instance - (repeat) - Initrd DP - end node - other DPs
In this case we could use the VenMedia Vendor Defined Data to indicate
the number
of device paths that follow, although it's redundant, since each instance would
terminate on the Device Path End Structure.
3. Use Vendor Defined Data of the VenMedia device path and copy the initrd
device path(s) in there. In that case the Vendor Defined Data will it self
be in a device path format with all the initrds we want.
Loaded Image device path - end node - VenMedia - end node - other DPs
Any preference on these?
Is one of them closer to the EFI spec, so we could go ahead and try to
standardize some of the GUIDs of the VenMedia?
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/2/16/105
Regards
/Ilias