- boot-architecture - lists.linaro.org

Re: [PATCH] arm64: add support for rng-seed

by Rob Herring

On Wed, May 8, 2019 at 10:06 AM Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi(a)chromium.org> wrote: > > On Wed, May 8, 2019 at 10:04 PM Rob Herring <robh+dt(a)kernel.org> wrote: > > > > On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 11:08 PM Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi(a)chromium.org> wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, May 8, 2019 at 3:47 AM Rob Herring <robh+dt(a)kernel.org> wrote: > > > > > > > > +boot-architecture list as there was some discussion about this IIRC. > > > > > > > > On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:54 PM Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi(a)chromium.org> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Introducing a chosen node, rng-seed, which is an 64 bytes entropy > > > > > that can be passed to kernel called very early to increase device > > > > > randomness. Bootloader should provide this entropy and the value is > > > > > read from /chosen/rng-seed in DT. > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi(a)chromium.org> > > > > > > > > > > --- > > > > > Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt | 14 +++++++++ > > > > > > > > Actually, this file has been converted to json-schema and lives > > > > here[1]. I need to remove this one (or leave it with a reference to > > > > the new one). > > > > > > > > > arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++ > > > > > drivers/of/fdt.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++ > > > > > include/linux/of_fdt.h | 1 + > > > > > 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt > > > > > index 45e79172a646..bfd360691650 100644 > > > > > --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt > > > > > @@ -28,6 +28,20 @@ mode) when EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL is supported, it will be overwritten by > > > > > the Linux EFI stub (which will populate the property itself, using > > > > > EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL). > > > > > > > > > > +rng-seed > > > > > +----------- > > > > > + > > > > > +This property served as an entropy to add device randomness. It is parsed > > > > > +as a 64 byte value, e.g. > > > > > > > > Why only 64-bytes? > > > We can also not specify size and read what bootloader can provide. > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > +/ { > > > > > + chosen { > > > > > + rng-seed = <0x31951b3c 0xc9fab3a5 0xffdf1660 ...> > > > > > + }; > > > > > +}; > > > > > + > > > > > +This random value should be provided by bootloader. > > > > > + > > > > > stdout-path > > > > > ----------- > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c > > > > > index 413d566405d1..ade4261516dd 100644 > > > > > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c > > > > > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c > > > > > @@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) > > > > > early_fixmap_init(); > > > > > early_ioremap_init(); > > > > > > > > > > + early_init_dt_rng_seed(__fdt_pointer); > > > > > + > > > > > > > > I'm trying to reduce or eliminate all these early_init_dt_* calls. > > > > > > > > Why is this arch specific and why can't this be done after > > > > unflattening? It doesn't look like add_device_randomness() needs > > > > anything early. > > > Currently unflattening is called after setup_machine_fdt(), which > > > called fixmap_remap_fdt() //__fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &size, > > > PAGE_KERNEL_RO), and we can't modify DT after that since it's read > > > only. But we need to clear (eg. write 0 to it) the rng-seed after > > > reading from DT. > > > > Why do you need to clear it? That wasn't necessary for kaslr-seed. > I think it's for security purpose. If we know the random seed, it's > more likely we can predict randomness. > Currently on arm64, kaslr-seed will be wiped out (in > arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c#get_kaslr_seed(), it's set to 0) so we can't > read from sysfs (eg. /sys/firmware/devicetree/.../kaslr-seed) > I'm not sure on other arch if it will be wiped out. The difference is if I have the kaslr seed, I can calculate the kernel base address. In your case, you are feeding an RNG which continually has entropy added to it. I can't see that knowing one piece of the entropy data is a security hole. It looks more like you've just copied what what done for kaslr-seed. > > Why not change the mapping to RW? It would be nice if this worked on > > more than one arch. Still wondering on this question. Mapping it R/W would mean rng-seed could be handled later and completely out of the arch code and so could the zeroing of the kaslr-seed. Also, we generally assume the FDT is modifiable for any fixups. This happens on arm32 and powerpc, but I guess we haven't needed that yet on arm64. Rob

7 years, 4 months

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Re: [PATCH] arm64: add support for rng-seed

by Rob Herring

+boot-architecture list as there was some discussion about this IIRC. On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:54 PM Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi(a)chromium.org> wrote: > > Introducing a chosen node, rng-seed, which is an 64 bytes entropy > that can be passed to kernel called very early to increase device > randomness. Bootloader should provide this entropy and the value is > read from /chosen/rng-seed in DT. > > Signed-off-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi(a)chromium.org> > > --- > Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt | 14 +++++++++ Actually, this file has been converted to json-schema and lives here[1]. I need to remove this one (or leave it with a reference to the new one). > arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++ > drivers/of/fdt.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/of_fdt.h | 1 + > 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt > index 45e79172a646..bfd360691650 100644 > --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt > +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt > @@ -28,6 +28,20 @@ mode) when EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL is supported, it will be overwritten by > the Linux EFI stub (which will populate the property itself, using > EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL). > > +rng-seed > +----------- > + > +This property served as an entropy to add device randomness. It is parsed > +as a 64 byte value, e.g. Why only 64-bytes? > + > +/ { > + chosen { > + rng-seed = <0x31951b3c 0xc9fab3a5 0xffdf1660 ...> > + }; > +}; > + > +This random value should be provided by bootloader. > + > stdout-path > ----------- > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c > index 413d566405d1..ade4261516dd 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c > @@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) > early_fixmap_init(); > early_ioremap_init(); > > + early_init_dt_rng_seed(__fdt_pointer); > + I'm trying to reduce or eliminate all these early_init_dt_* calls. Why is this arch specific and why can't this be done after unflattening? It doesn't look like add_device_randomness() needs anything early. > setup_machine_fdt(__fdt_pointer); > > parse_early_param(); > diff --git a/drivers/of/fdt.c b/drivers/of/fdt.c > index de893c9616a1..74e2c0c80b91 100644 > --- a/drivers/of/fdt.c > +++ b/drivers/of/fdt.c > @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/libfdt.h> > #include <linux/debugfs.h> > +#include <linux/random.h> > #include <linux/serial_core.h> > #include <linux/sysfs.h> > > @@ -1117,6 +1118,38 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(unsigned long node, const char *uname, > return 1; > } > > +extern void *__init __fixmap_remap_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys, int *size, > + pgprot_t prot); > + > +void __init early_init_dt_rng_seed(u64 dt_phys) > +{ > + void *fdt; > + int node, size, i; > + fdt64_t *prop; > + u64 rng_seed[8]; > + > + fdt = __fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &size, PAGE_KERNEL); > + if (!fdt) > + return; > + > + node = fdt_path_offset(fdt, "/chosen"); > + if (node < 0) > + return; > + > + prop = fdt_getprop_w(fdt, node, "rng-seed", &size); > + if (!prop || size != sizeof(u64) * 8) > + return; > + > + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { > + rng_seed[i] = fdt64_to_cpu(*(prop + i)); > + /* clear seed so it won't be found. */ > + *(prop + i) = 0; > + } > + add_device_randomness(rng_seed, size); > + > + return; > +} > + > #ifndef MIN_MEMBLOCK_ADDR > #define MIN_MEMBLOCK_ADDR __pa(PAGE_OFFSET) > #endif > diff --git a/include/linux/of_fdt.h b/include/linux/of_fdt.h > index a713e5d156d8..a4548dd6351e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/of_fdt.h > +++ b/include/linux/of_fdt.h > @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ extern uint32_t of_get_flat_dt_phandle(unsigned long node); > > extern int early_init_dt_scan_chosen(unsigned long node, const char *uname, > int depth, void *data); > +extern void early_init_dt_rng_seed(u64 dt_phys); > extern int early_init_dt_scan_memory(unsigned long node, const char *uname, > int depth, void *data); > extern int early_init_dt_scan_chosen_stdout(void); > -- > 2.20.1 >

7 years, 4 months

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RE: EFIBootGuard for CIP and SecureBoot

by daniel.sangorrin＠toshiba.co.jp

Hello Francois, Jan, Christian, and all Sorry for the late reply, I was waiting for the administrator of the Boot Architecture mailing list to accept my subscription request, but it seems it will take a bit more time. I will send this reply and hope it will not be blocked. I have also added the u-boot mailing list to Cc, as Tom suggested (although I'm not a member), the CIP mailing list, Jan Kiszka (one of the main developers of Efibootguard) and Christian (an expert in software updates). Background: during the last Linaro connect in Bangkok I was told that Linaro Edge (LEDGE) were working on a secure software update mechanism based on UEFI capsules that would flash firmware updates from a UEFI application, instead of using a Linux agent such as SWUpdate. Then, I had an online meeting with Francois, director of LEDGE. I explained to Francois that in CIP we are using the Linux agent approach right now, and we are also considering the use of a UEFI application (Efibootguard) to arm a watchdog and deal with the state-machine variables (installed, testing, ok, failed..) needed for A/B software updates. Efibootguard sounds like an excellent place to collaborate with Linaro (particularly on the watchdog drivers front) because it does not strictly depend on where the firmware is flashed (UEFI capsule or Linux agent). > On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 12:48:51PM +0200, Francois Ozog wrote: > > Hi Daniel, > > > > We will be conducting a UEFI gap analysis to support EFIBootGuard in U-Boot. > > > > As we are working on UEFI SecureBoot implementation in U-Boot, how do > > you expect the boot process to be secured? Would U-Boot UEFI > > SecureBoot verify EFIBootGuard signature and in turn EFIBootGuard will > > check either grub or Linux signature? > > > > Please elaborate on your vision of a secured boot process. Efibootguard is composed of two parts. - A UEFI application that can arm a watchdog and decide what environment (kernel, boot args, etc.) to use next depending on a set of variables (update status, highest revision, etc.) stored in FAT16 partitions. - A Linux application that can read and set those variables from Linux (similar to u-boot's fw_setenv). This functionality is also available in the form of a library. As far as I know, there is no concept of "Secure Booting" in Efibootguard at the moment. Adding signature checks before booting into the selected kernel would be a possible solution. Thanks, Daniel

7 years, 5 months

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StandaloneMM discussion

by Ilias Apalodimas

Hi all, This started as an internal discussion for U-Booa and SSL which quickly span out of control, so the mailing list is a better suited place for this discussion. Akashi-san had an interesting idea. Since we will try to implement StandaloneMM as an OP-TEE TA, why not add payload authentication capabilities on it. Since it's already doing variable authentication on the secure side, the needed changes would be minimal (at least that's what i think, please correct me if i am wrong), since most of the code should already be there. This means that the payload authentication will be moved to the secure world. Although doing the authentication in secure world won't offer any security enhancements, the common code across firmware implementations is probably nice to have. The obvious drawback is that you limit the payload authentication capabilities, since running StMM will become obligatory for image that. Thanks /Ilias

7 years, 5 months

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EBBR Plugfest at ELC and/or ELC-E

by Grant Likely

Hi Bill and Peter, [cc'ing boot-architecture to trawl for additional volunteers] As discussed during EBBR monthly call today, we should have an EBBR plugfest at ELC and/or ELC-E this year with the goal of working out compatibility issues between platforms+firmware and OS images (distro images, OpenEmbedded, Buildroot, Yocto builds, etc). My initial thought is to run a full day event that is part hacking sprint and part plugfest. We could ask participants to either bring a platform (SBC with firmware installed) or an OS images and then set up a test matrix for each OS to test on each board. After an initial set of attempts the rest of the day could be a hacking sprint to solve problems and squash bugs. I'm only going to be at ELC this year (Aug 21-23rd in San Diego). I might be able to get the LF to provide a co-located room Tuesday the 20th. ELC-E will be in late October. If we do this at both events, then someone will need to take the lead on organizing the European version. Thoughts? g.

7 years, 5 months

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Shutting down arm.ebbr-discuss@arm.com mailing list

by Grant Likely

As discussed at Linaro Connect BKK19 in early April, the arm.ebbr-discuss mailing list isn't very functional because it doesn't have a public archive and non-Arm folks cannot subscribe themselves. I'm shutting down the arm.ebbr-discuss mailing list. From this date all EBBR discussion will be held on the boot-architecture(a)linaro.org mailing list. g.

7 years, 5 months

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EBBR Monthly Meeting - 23 April 2019

by Grant Likely

Hi all, The EBBR monthly meeting is later today. We're in the quiet period after releasing EBBR v1.0 and are unlikely to add new content immediately. Instead, we'll use the monthly meeting to track and discuss progress on Secure Boot with U-Boot, TF-A, and OP-TEE, as well as other desired EBBR features. As those features mature, we'll add language to EBBR to match. Dial in details below. g. --- There is a monthly conference call to discuss EBBR topics on the 4th Tuesday of the month at 15:00 UTC/BST, 7:00 PST/PDT, 23:00/22:00 CST (following UTC/BST daylight savings time shifts). Anyone is welcome to join. Online meeting: https://arm-onsite.webex.com/meet/gralik01 Phone 1-408-792-6300 Call-in toll number (US/Canada) 1-877-668-4490 Call-in toll-free number (US/Canada) 44-203-478-5285 Call-in toll number (UK) 08-002061177 Call-in toll-free (UK) More access numbers: webex-global-numbers Access code: 809 053 990

7 years, 5 months

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Re: EFIBootGuard for CIP and SecureBoot

by Heinrich Schuchardt

On Fri Apr 19 10:48:51 UTC 2019 François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org> wrote > We will be conducting a UEFI gap analysis to support EFIBootGuard in > U-Boot. > > As we are working on UEFI SecureBoot implementation in U-Boot, how do > you expect the boot process to be secured? Would U-Boot UEFI > SecureBoot verify EFIBootGuard signature and in turn EFIBootGuard will > check either grub or Linux signature? > > Please elaborate on your vision of a secured boot process. The UEFI spec is quite clear about this: An implementation of SecureBoot will check the signature of any EFI binary before starting it. StartImage() will return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION when trying to start an image that is neither correctly signed nor whose hash is known. As we use StartImage() for starting any image the signature of EFIBootGuard would be checked first and then any of the child applications it starts. You will not be able to start GRUB or the Linux kernel if their signature are not added to U-Boot's key database. Of cause you could implement inside EFIBootGuard your own mechanism to start a loaded image without calling StartImage(). In this case U-Boot cannot protect you from invalid images. Best regards Heinrich

7 years, 5 months

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EFIBootGuard for CIP and SecureBoot

by Francois Ozog

Hi Daniel, We will be conducting a UEFI gap analysis to support EFIBootGuard in U-Boot. As we are working on UEFI SecureBoot implementation in U-Boot, how do you expect the boot process to be secured? Would U-Boot UEFI SecureBoot verify EFIBootGuard signature and in turn EFIBootGuard will check either grub or Linux signature? Please elaborate on your vision of a secured boot process. Cheers FF PS: you may want to subscribe to the boot-architecture mailing list in Linaro.

7 years, 5 months

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Re: Standalone MM interface on U-Boot

by Francois Ozog

Hi, I suggest we move the discussion to https://lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/boot-architecture I am sending the subscription link to BKK19 boot sprint attendees. Cheers FF On Thu, 11 Apr 2019 at 10:31, Francois Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org> wrote: > > > On Thu, 11 Apr 2019 at 10:23, AKASHI, Takahiro <takahiro.akashi(a)linaro.org> > wrote: > >> On Thu, 11 Apr 2019 at 16:49, Joakim Bech <joakim.bech(a)linaro.org> wrote: >> > >> > Hi, >> > >> > @Takahiro, thanks for teaching me what is right and wrong :) >> >> No, no. Everything is right, but some are only suitable for a specific >> relationship :) >> >> > @Ilias, @FF, replies inline below. >> > >> > On Thu, 11 Apr 2019 at 09:22, Francois Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, 11 Apr 2019 at 08:51, Ilias Apalodimas < >> ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org> wrote: >> >>> >> >>> Hi Akashi-san, >> >>> >> >>> > > I'm just drafting a new card for running the Standalone MM >> >>> > > as Trusted Application in OP-TEE. The use case as I understand >> >>> > > it is to call this TA from U-Boot environment (and when Linux is >> >>> > > up and running). >> >>> > >> >>> > I heard the almost same thing from Francois. >> >>> > I don't mind how the service will be implemented in secure world. >> What I'd >> >>> > like to do here is to add an interface for communicating with >> secure world >> >>> > on U-Boot side (normal world). >> >>> Can we try and avoid double and triple Jira epics, while still giving >> credit to >> >>> SIGs/Groups doing the work? >> >>> We already have an initiative up for u-boot relasted issues. >> >>> https://projects.linaro.org/browse/LEDGE-134 >> >>> >> >> >> >> My proposal is that EPICS related to OPTEE are owned by SWG, even if >> they are resourced by LEDGE. >> >> For instance, I can task a LEDGE assignee to do the OPTEE work under >> Joakim guidance and reporting on a SWG EPIC. >> > >> > This is inline with my thoughts. >> > >> >> >> >> LEDGE Initiative would include an EPIC link to the SWG EPIC: LEDGE can >> then track the many tasks done in KWG and SWG. >> >> Actually I proposed the creation of a lead project: dependable boot. >> >> >> >> For the time being, lets create all the Jira cards we think we need to >> address. Lets check each other iniatives to ensure we have identified all >> pieces of work. >> >> https://projects.linaro.org/browse/LEDGE-151 >> >> https://projects.linaro.org/browse/LEDGE-134 >> > >> > As we're speaking I'm drafting the work for a Standalone MM OP-TEE as >> well as the fTPM stuff: >> > https://projects.linaro.org/browse/SWG-372 (I'm going to add more >> details here after having a chat with Ard ... who is travelling to US for >> the moment). >> > https://projects.linaro.org/browse/SWG-373 >> > >> > Note that I'll more and more start creating Initiatives instead of >> Epics, since I believe the consensus after TSC voting is that our current >> Initiatives are too broad containing unrelated features. Having that said, >> beneath the Initiatives I'll split up sub-tasks as Epics. >> >> Let me make clear; I started my UEFI-related tasks almost >> independently from other groups' activities. In this sense, my >> 'initiative' is KWG-339 (I don't care much though). KWG-403 is >> a card where I want to keep my status updated. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >>> > >> >>> > Yes, I remember that we discussed lots about running Standalone MM >> as >> >>> > OP-TEE application, and what I'm asking is >> >>> > - do you have any chance to use Standalone MM service on SPM, or >> >>> > - do you want to use it solely as OP-TEE application. >> >>> For the moment all LEDGE platforms we know of are based on u-boot. >> >>> The only platform we have that not u-boot based is the SynQuacer box, >> but Ard >> >>> has already finished his StandaloneMM in SPM on that. >> >> >> >> >> >> SPM does not work with ST32MP1 which is a LEDGE 32 bit target platform >> and, AFAIK, will not work with virtualization in trustzone. >> >> So SPD is our way to go. >> > >> > Yes, and IIRC, this is why we need to make Ard's current Standalone MM >> implementation possible to run as an OP-TEE Trusted Application (basically >> SWG-372). It's even useful on Armv8 devices until we have support for >> running multiple SP's. >> >> So even for some sort of prototyping or POC, you won't use Standalone >> MM services >> in the current form and will be willing to wait for the completion of >> SWG-372? >> >> I think we can swap very easily the protocol used between u-boot and the > Standalone MM. You can surely do a first iteration with SPM version as it > exists today and you can just add the u-boot part. > This allows working in parrallel on different aspects of the > implementation. > We will focus on the SPD part. > > I heard from Ard that some assignee has finished porting Standalone MM >> services >> to qemu, and so I will be able to work on it integrating it into my >> current secure boot patch. >> >> > Sounds perfect! > > >> In addition, in my previous e-mail, I think that I raised some topic >> that we should >> discuss, image authentication as well as rolls of secure world and >> non-secure world. >> This will have impacts on my secure boot patch; in some scenario, my >> current work will >> make almost no sense. >> >> That needs proper discussion: > shall we use the boot-arch mail alias as the mailing list so that we reach > a broad community for comments? > shall we setup a weekly call ? (most attendees are europe to asia time > zones I believe) > > >> Thanks, >> -Takahiro Akashi >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >>> Cheers >> >>> /Ilias >> > >> > >> > Regards, >> > Joakim >> > > > -- > [image: Linaro] > <https://www.linaro.org/assets/content/RGB-Linaro_Standard.png> > François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group* > T: +33.67221.6485 > francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog > > -- [image: Linaro] <https://www.linaro.org/assets/content/RGB-Linaro_Standard.png> François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group* T: +33.67221.6485 francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog

7 years, 5 months

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Re: [Arm.ebbr-discuss] [EXT] Re: EBBR SC meeting on-site at Connect

by AKASHI Takahiro

# My apology if this kind of discussion is not appropriate in this ML. On Tue, Apr 09, 2019 at 04:20:48PM +0100, Yang Zhang wrote: > On Tue, 9 Apr 2019 at 16:18, Udit Kumar <udit.kumar(a)nxp.com> wrote: > > > Thanks for information AKASHI > > > > IMO for EBBR, we need to define subset of test-cases, which are required > > in EBBR specs. > > > > +1 Since I have been away from SCT long time, I almost forgot details of how SCT runs but at the first glance, it would be quite simple and straightforward as SCT already has a feature to run only a specific list of test cases (through TestCase.ini file). * create a list of test cases (TestCase.ini is automatically generated by SCT if we want to run all.) * check/mark only interested cases (There are always two types of tests: conformance and function.) * run SCT with this list The issue would be who maintain this list and where :) and I don't know that the 'granularity' of each test case would fit well for our subset. > > > I expect some fail in u-boot. > > Also need to find a better way to build uefi-sct > > > > +1 I used pre-built binary of SCT. -Takahiro Akashi > > > > Regards > > Udit > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi(a)linaro.org> > > > Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2019 10:53 AM > > > To: Grant Likely <Grant.Likely(a)arm.com> > > > Cc: Udit Kumar <udit.kumar(a)nxp.com>; Dong Wei <Dong.Wei(a)arm.com>; Eric > > > FINCO <eric.finco(a)st.com>; Robert Oshana <robert.oshana(a)nxp.com>; Tony > > > Wu <tonywu(a)realtek.com>; boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org; arm.ebbr- > > > discuss <arm.ebbr-discuss(a)arm.com>; LEDGE SC <ledge-sc(a)linaro.org>; > > Varis, > > > Pekka <p-varis(a)ti.com>; nd <nd(a)arm.com> > > > Subject: [EXT] Re: EBBR SC meeting on-site at Connect > > > > > > WARNING: This email was created outside of NXP. DO NOT CLICK links or > > > attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Apr 06, 2019 at 07:42:46PM +0000, Grant Likely wrote: > > > > Hi Udit, > > > > > > > > We talked about testing. We generally agreed that UEFI-SCT is > > > > important, even though it is limited. LuvOS (which includes UEFI-SCT) > > > > is a good candidate to do more complete testing, and we also talked > > > > about getting UEFI test cases into the U-Boot CI testing. > > > > > > Just FYI, it was last July that I ran UEFI SCT with U-Boot on qemu. > > > Here is a summary of the result: > > > > > https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.goo > > > gle.com%2Fspreadsheets%2Fd%2F17e45yojM2nLdRovx0gcgHIAmvv9b_yc9iIUjZ > > > 2LY22c%2Fedit%3Fusp%3Dsharing&data=02%7C01%7Cudit.kumar%40nxp. > > > com%7Cc5b24ae4bd26466e1a7008d6bcab1c5c%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99 > > > c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C636903840436702643&sdata=00NOqcpsKPi8DkJ > > > u8y%2F7mLqSI8qQGFSGqzBhbpo3bbE%3D&reserved=0 > > > (Please note that this is not for public review, but just informative.) > > > > > > In my experience, I saw lots of failure cases (some or most of them are > > trivial > > > and can be duplicated ones though), and running through all the test > > cases took > > > a whole week. This is partly because SCT crashes occasionally and I > > needed to > > > restart it next morning :) > > > > > > So I'm not sure that U-Boot UEFI is ready for automated testing with SCT. > > > (We made lots of improvements recently, but I have had no time to re-run > > SCT > > > these days. Give me a fast machine :) > > > > > > -Takahiro Akashi > > > > > > > Linaro LEDGE is looking at adding U-Boot testing to their backlog, but > > > > they don't have any engineering resources who can be assigned to the > > > > work right now. I'm also going to try and resource this from Arm. > > > > > > > > g. > > > > > > > > On 04/04/2019 16:08, Udit Kumar wrote: > > > > > Hi Grant > > > > > > > > > >>>- other business > > > > > > > > > > See, if you can add compliance test suits for EBBR, or subset of > > > > > UEFI-SCT is enough ? > > > > > > > > > > Regards > > > > > > > > > > Udit > > > > > > > > > > *From:* arm.ebbr-discuss-bounces(a)arm.com > > > > > <arm.ebbr-discuss-bounces(a)arm.com> *On Behalf Of *Grant Likely > > > > > *Sent:* Wednesday, April 3, 2019 12:49 PM > > > > > *To:* Dong Wei <Dong.Wei(a)arm.com>; Eric FINCO <eric.finco(a)st.com>; > > > > > Robert Oshana <robert.oshana(a)nxp.com>; Tony Wu > > > <tonywu(a)realtek.com>; > > > > > boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org; arm.ebbr-discuss > > > > > <arm.ebbr-discuss(a)arm.com>; LEDGE SC <ledge-sc(a)linaro.org>; Varis, > > > > > Pekka <p-varis(a)ti.com> > > > > > *Subject:* Re: [Arm.ebbr-discuss] EBBR SC meeting on-site at Connect > > > > > > > > > > Agenda for today: > > > > > > > > > > - EBBR v1.0 released (yay!) > > > > > > > > > > - goals for v1.1 or v2.0 > > > > > > > > > > - other issues > > > > > > > > > > - secure world interfaces > > > > > > > > > > - non-block storage > > > > > > > > > > - identification of protected blocks > > > > > > > > > > - other business > > > > > > > > > > --- > > > > > > > > > > Grant Likely > > > > > > > > > > Sr. Technical Director SW Engineering > > > > > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > ---- > > > > > > > > > > *From:*Grant Likely > > > > > *Sent:* Wednesday, April 3, 2019 1:49:23 PM > > > > > *To:* Dong Wei; Eric FINCO; robert.oshana(a)nxp.com; Tony Wu; > > > > > boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org; arm.ebbr-discuss; LEDGE SC; > > > > > Varis, Pekka > > > > > *Subject:* Re: EBBR SC meeting on-site at Connect > > > > > > > > > > details for those who had trouble with the calendar invite: > > > > > > > > > > Room: Lotus 5-6 > > > > > > > > > > Time: 5:00pm > > > > > > > > > > Sorry for those of you who aren’t here. I’m not going to have a dial > > > > > in, but I’ll take good notes. > > > > > > > > > > g. > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > boot-architecture mailing list > > > > boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org > > > > https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flist > > > > s.linaro.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fboot- > > > architecture&data=02%7C01 > > > > > > > %7Cudit.kumar%40nxp.com%7Cc5b24ae4bd26466e1a7008d6bcab1c5c%7C686 > > > ea1d3b > > > > > > > c2b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C636903840436702643&sdata=F > > > Rd8%2B > > > > nzRF827ZMG1fYeDwEr90V%2BZHvIHbFiIPAhBFiQ%3D&reserved=0 > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Arm.ebbr-discuss mailing list > > Arm.ebbr-discuss(a)arm.com

7 years, 5 months

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Re: EBBR SC meeting on-site at Connect

by Grant Likely

details for those who had trouble with the calendar invite: Room: Lotus 5-6 Time: 5:00pm Sorry for those of you who aren’t here. I’m not going to have a dial in, but I’ll take good notes. g. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

7 years, 5 months

4
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Re: [edk2] [edk2-announce] ATTN: List Transition Begins Today

by Leif Lindholm

FYI: EDK2 development mailing list changing to devel(a)edk2.groups.io This will give us some better flexibility with regards to whitelisting non-subscribers and suchlike currently not possible through 01.org. On Wed, Apr 03, 2019 at 10:59:31AM -0500, stephano wrote: > tl;dr > If you're sending emails to this list, now would be a good time to switch > over to the new list: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel > > > We will be transitioning to Groups.io today for our devel mailing list. At > some point today, this email will begin to bounce any incoming messages. > I'll be working on getting the archive of old emails uploaded to Groups.io. > When I have a timetable for the archives I'll update the new list. > > Cheers, > Stephano > _______________________________________________ > edk2-devel mailing list > edk2-devel(a)lists.01.org > https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel

7 years, 6 months

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EBBR SC meeting on-site at Connect

by Grant Likely

[Updated with new room] Hi all, For those of you at Linaro Connect, I’ve scheduled an EBBR Face to Face on Wednesday. I’ll email around an agenda tomorrow. Email me if you’ve got anything specific you’d like to discuss. For those of you who aren’t here, I’ll try to provide a remote dial-in but I’m not hopeful that it will work. I will make sure good notes are taken, and we’ll do a summary on the next regular conference call. Cheers, g. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

7 years, 6 months

1
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EBBR SC meeting on-site at Connect

by Grant Likely

Hi all, For those of you at Linaro Connect, I’ve scheduled an EBBR Face to Face on Wednesday. I’ll email around an agenda tomorrow. Email me if you’ve got anything specific you’d like to discuss. For those of you who aren’t here, I’ll try to provide a remote dial-in but I’m not hopeful that it will work. I will make sure good notes are taken, and we’ll do a summary on the next regular conference call. Cheers, g. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

7 years, 6 months

1
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EBBR SC meeting on-site at Connect

by Grant Likely

Hi all, For those of you at Linaro Connect, I’ve scheduled an EBBR Face to Face on Wednesday. I’ll email around an agenda tomorrow. Email me if you’ve got anything specific you’d like to discuss. For those of you who aren’t here, I’ll try to provide a remote dial-in but I’m not hopeful that it will work. I will make sure good notes are taken, and we’ll do a summary on the next regular conference call. Cheers, g. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

7 years, 6 months

1
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EBBR v1.0-rc1

by Grant Likely

Hi all, Last week I tagged v1.0-rc1 of EBBR. The release .pdf can be found here: https://github.com/ARM-software/ebbr/releases It should represent the content we've discussed in the regular meetings for a baseline v1.0 EBBR. Please review and comment. If there are no major objections I intend to release v1.0 final on Friday this week ahead of Linaro Connect. g.

7 years, 6 months

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EBBR v0.8 released

by Grant Likely

Hi all, Yesterday I tagged EBBR v0.8 in the git repo and published a new pdf. Please go review and comment. https://github.com/ARM-software/ebbr/releases/tag/v0.8 We're nearing the end of the v1.0 process. I would like to tag a v1.0 release before the end of March. Feedback comments from v0.6 and v0.7 have been incorporated. Presuming no major objections, I will tag a v1.0-rc1 on Monday 18 March 2019, to be followed by a final v1.0 on Friday 29 March, There is one more outstanding change that didn't make it into v0.8, but will be in the next release. The UEFI requirements appendix has been removed as it merely duplicates requirements already listed in the UEFI specification. Thanks, g.

7 years, 6 months

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[PATCH] Remove unnecessary UEFI requirement tables

by Grant Likely

Nothing in the UEFI Requirements appendix is valuable. The table of required boot services is unnecessary because it is an exact duplicate of the UEFI boot services list in the UEFI spec (and it also happens to be slightly incorrect) (UEFI 2.6.1). It is providing no value to include in EBBR as all UEFI implementations are required to implement the full set. The tables of required core protocols are already specified in the UEFI spec (UEFI 2.6.1) The table of required media i/o protocols are already required if the device supports booting from a disk device (UEFI 2.6.2). The table of console protocols is similarly already required if a console device is present. It isn't clear that HII protocols need to be required. U-Boot does implement them, but it doesn't appear to be a critical requirement on whether or not an OSV can support the platform. The tables of optional UEFI protocols isn't adding any value because it doesn't require anything of implementers, and it doesn't provide any commentary on when the protocols should be included. This is just additional text. Remove the lot to simplify the spec. Signed-off-by: Grant Likely <grant.likely(a)arm.com> --- source/appendix-a-uefi-features.rst | 203 ------------------------------------ source/chapter2-uefi.rst | 4 - source/index.rst | 1 - 3 files changed, 208 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 source/appendix-a-uefi-features.rst diff --git a/source/appendix-a-uefi-features.rst b/source/appendix-a-uefi-features.rst deleted file mode 100644 index bb74ca5..0000000 --- a/source/appendix-a-uefi-features.rst +++ /dev/null @@ -1,203 +0,0 @@ -.. SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-SA-4.0 -.. _appendix-uefi-requirements: - -############################################# -APPENDIX A - UEFI Implementation Requirements -############################################# - -Required Boot Services -********************** - -========================================== ====== -Service UEFI § -========================================== ====== -EFI_RAISE_TPL 7.1 -EFI_RESTORE_TPL 7.1 -EFI_ALLOCATE_PAGES 7.2 -EFI_FREE_PAGES 7.2 -EFI_GET_MEMORY_MAP 7.2 -EFI_ALLOCATE_POOL 7.2 -EFI_FREE_POOL 7.2 -EFI_CREATE_EVENT 7.1 -EFI_SET_TIMER 7.1 -EFI_WAIT_FOR_EVENT 7.1 -EFI_SIGNAL_EVENT 7.1 -EFI_CLOSE_EVENT 7.1 -EFI_INSTALL_PROTOCOL_INTERFACE 7.3 -EFI_REINSTALL_PROTOCOL_INTERFACE 7.3 -EFI_UNINSTALL_PROTOCOL_INTERFACE 7.3 -EFI_HANDLE_PROTOCOL 7.3 -EFI_REGISTER_PROTOCOL_NOTIFY 7.3 -EFI_LOCATE_HANDLE 7.3 -EFI_LOCATE_PROTOCOL 7.3 -EFI_LOCATE_DEVICE_PATH 7.3 -EFI_INSTALL_CONFIGURATION_TABLE 7.3 -EFI_IMAGE_LOAD 7.4 -EFI_IMAGE_START 7.4 -EFI_EXIT 7.4 -EFI_IMAGE_UNLOAD 7.4 -EFI_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES 7.4 -EFI_GET_NEXT_MONOTONIC_COUNT 7.5 -EFI_STALL 7.5 -EFI_SET_WATCHDOG_TIMER 7.5 -EFI_CONNECT_CONTROLLER 7.3 -EFI_DISCONNECT_CONTROLLER 7.3 -EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL 7.3 -EFI_CLOSE_PROTOCOL 7.3 -EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_INFORMATION 7.3 -EFI_PROTOCOLS_PER_HANDLE 7.3 -EFI_LOCATE_HANDLE_BUFFER 7.3 -EFI_LOCATE_PROTOCOL 7.3 -EFI_INSTALL_MULTIPLE_PROTOCOL_INTERFACES 7.3 -EFI_UNINSTALL_MULTIPLE_PROTOCOL_INTERFACES 7.3 -EFI_CALCULATE_CRC32 7.5 -EFI_COPY_MEM 7.5 -EFI_SET_MEM 7.5 -EFI_CREATE_EVENT_EX 7.5 -========================================== ====== - -Required UEFI Protocols -*********************** - -Core UEFI Protocols -=================== - -========================================== ====== -Service UEFI § -========================================== ====== -EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL 9.1 -EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL 9.2 -EFI_DECOMPRESS_PROTOCOL 19.5 -EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL 10.2 -EFI_DEVICE_PATH_UTILITIES_PROTOCOL 10.3 -========================================== ====== - -Media I/O Protocols -=================== - -========================================== ====== -Service UEFI § -========================================== ====== -EFI_LOAD_FILE2_PROTOCOL 13.2 -EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL 13.4 -EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL 13.5 -========================================== ====== - -Console Protocols -================= - -========================================== ====== -Service UEFI § -========================================== ====== -EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_INPUT_PROTOCOL 12.2 -EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_INPUT_EX_PROTOCOL 12.3 -EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL 12.4 -========================================== ====== - -Driver Configuration Protocols -============================== - -========================================== ====== -Service UEFI § -========================================== ====== -EFI_HII_DATABASE_PROTOCOL 33.4 -EFI_HII_STRING_PROTOCOL 33.4 -EFI_HII_CONFIG_ROUTING_PROTOCOL 33.4 -EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL 33.4 -========================================== ====== - -Optional UEFI Protocols -*********************** - -Basic Networking Support -======================== - -============================================ ====== -Service UEFI § -============================================ ====== -EFI_SIMPLE_NETWORK_PROTOCOL 24.1 -EFI_MANAGED_NETWORK_PROTOCOL 25.1 -EFI_MANAGED_NETWORK_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL 25.1 -============================================ ====== - -.. note:: Networking services are optional on platforms that do not support - networking. - -Network Boot Protocols -====================== - -========================================== ====== -Service UEFI § -========================================== ====== -EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_PROTOCOL 24.3 -EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_CALLBACK_PROTOCOL 24.4 -EFI_BIS_PROTOCOL 24.5 -EFI_MTFTP4_PROTOCOL 30.3 -EFI_MTFTP6_PROTOCOL 30.4 -========================================== ====== - -.. note:: EFI_BIS_PROTOCOL is optional on machines that do not support Secure - Boot. - -IPV4 Network Support -==================== - -========================================== ====== -Service UEFI § -========================================== ====== -EFI_ARP_PROTOCOL 29.1 -EFI_ARP_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL 29.1 -EFI_DHCP4_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL 29.2 -EFI_DHCP4_PROTOCOL 29.2 -EFI_TCP4_PROTOCOL 28.1.2 -EFI_TCP4_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL 28.1.1 -EFI_IP4_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL 28.3.1 -EFI_IP4_CONFIG2_PROTOCOL 28.5 -EFI_UDP4_PROTOCOL 30.1.2 -EFI_UDP4_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL 30.1.1 -========================================== ====== - -.. note:: Networking services are optional on platforms that do not support - networking. - -IPV6 Network Support -==================== - -========================================== ====== -Service UEFI § -========================================== ====== -EFI_DHCP6_PROTOCOL 29.3.2 -EFI_DHCP6_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL 29.3.1 -EFI_TCP6_PROTOCOL 28.2.2 -EFI_TCP6_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL 28.2.1 -EFI_IP6_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL 28.6.1 -EFI_IP6_CONFIG_PROTOCOL 28.7 -EFI_UDP6_PROTOCOL 30.2.2 -EFI_UDP6_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL 30.2.1 -========================================== ====== - -.. note:: Networking services are optional on platforms that do not support - networking. - -VLAN Protocols -============== - -========================================== ====== -Service UEFI § -========================================== ====== -EFI_VLAN_CONFIG_PROTOCOL 27.1 -========================================== ====== - -iSCSI Protocols -=============== - -========================================== ====== -Service UEFI § -========================================== ====== -EFI_ISCSI_INITIATOR_NAME_PROTOCOL 16.2 -========================================== ====== - -.. note:: Support for iSCSI is only required on machines that lack persistent - storage, such as a, HDD. This configuration is intended for thin clients and - compute-only nodes - diff --git a/source/chapter2-uefi.rst b/source/chapter2-uefi.rst index a8fe3a3..f6a5802 100644 --- a/source/chapter2-uefi.rst +++ b/source/chapter2-uefi.rst @@ -17,10 +17,6 @@ UEFI Compliance EBBR compliant platforms shall conform to the requirements in [UEFI]_ § 2.6, except where explicit exemptions are provided by this document. -EBBR compliant platforms shall also implement the UEFI services and -protocols that are listed in :ref:`appendix-uefi-requirements` of this -document. - Block device partitioning ------------------------- diff --git a/source/index.rst b/source/index.rst index 8722694..186498f 100644 --- a/source/index.rst +++ b/source/index.rst @@ -51,5 +51,4 @@ Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View, CA 94042, USA. chapter2-uefi chapter3-secureworld chapter4-firmware-media - appendix-a-uefi-features references -- 2.13.0

7 years, 6 months

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New series of EBBR meetings

by Grant Likely

Hi all, I've created a new series of EBBR meetings; this time biweekly on the 2nd and 4th Tuesday of each month based on the feedback I received on the Doodle poll. First meeting today and the one topic on the agenda is pickup up from where things were left off in December. Here are the dial-in details: - Online meeting: https://arm-onsite.webex.com/meet/gralik01 - Phone - Access code: 809 053 990 - 1-408-792-6300 Call-in toll number (US/Canada) - 1-877-668-4490 Call-in toll-free number (US/Canada) - 44-203-478-5285 Call-in toll number (UK) - 08-002061177 Call-in toll-free (UK) More access numbers: https://arm-onsite.webex.com/cmp3300/webcomponents/widget/globalcallin/glob… IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

7 years, 6 months

1
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[PATCH 0/4] Updates for EBBR v0.8 (maybe v1.0-rc)

by Grant Likely

I've made the following changes to EBBR to prepare for the v1.0 release. Most of these are editorial. The biggest change is the SetVariable() language which has already been discussed. Cheers, g.

7 years, 6 months

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Re: Question: how to identify vendor firmware setups conflicting with disk partitions?

by Steve McIntyre

Hi Grant! [ Re-adding the CC to the list, I guess you dropped that by mistake ] On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 05:22:10PM +0000, Grant Likely wrote: >On 28/02/2019 17:12, Steve McIntyre wrote: >> >> I'm now looking at updating our logic on armhf/arm64 to do something >> like: >> >> if (booted via UEFI); then >> if (booted using U-Boot); then >> echo MBR >> else >> echo GPT >> fi >> else >> echo MBR >> fi >> >> but I'll need to find a sane way to detect U-Boot->UEFI boot. For now >> I'm looking at parsing dmesg output to look for something like >> >> [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by Das U-Boot >> >> but I'm hoping for a better solution. This is also somewhat assuming >> that detecting U-Boot in the boot chain is a valid indicator for >> "unsafe location for firmware", but I'm not sure of a better way! > >I really want to avoid installers checking for specific firmware >implementations. The interface is UEFI regardless of U-Boot or tianocore >as the implementation. > >It also isn't actually about U-Boot. It's a limitation of the boot >masked ROM in the SoC that do not respect partitioning schemes. In these >cases both Tianocore and U-Boot have the same problem, and >repartitioning the device will blow away the bootloader. ACK - I've acknowledged that above. I've personally seen very few devices with Tianocore firmware at arbitrary locations, but lots with U-Boot. That seems to be the pattern. Do you have any common examples for Tianocore? >Perhaps there should be a property in the DT that lists the reserved >blocks on the SD or eMMC device. Maybe, but that bird has already flown surely? I'm talking about existing devices that vendors are not updating. >Or, maybe, we can define an information block that has an >identifiable header+checksum which can tell the OS which blocks are >occupied by firmware. If it exists somewhere within the first few >blocks then the partitioning tool could scan for it before >repartitioning. It could also be embedded into the firmware image >that gets dd'ed onto the media. Maybe we can scan the first few sectors of a disk to see if it has any other recognisable strings, then. I'm trying to work out a safe(!) yet also reasonably easy way for partitioning to work. Our existing code isn't working, and we are already over-writing firmware stored in dumb places. :-( Cheers, -- Steve McIntyre steve.mcintyre(a)linaro.org <http://www.linaro.org/> Linaro.org | Open source software for ARM SoCs

7 years, 6 months

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New series of EBBR meetings

by Grant Likely

I accidentally deleted the old series of EBBR meetings. However, that's okay since other meetings have moved around and it is time to review the meeting time anyway. I think we should switch to bi-weekly meetings alternating with the LEDGE SC meeting. Here is a doodle poll for a new meeting time: https://doodle.com/poll/359273ngta74rqut I'll set up a new meeting series about this time next week. Please let me know what times work for you. Thanks, g.

7 years, 6 months

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Question: how to identify vendor firmware setups conflicting with disk partitions?

by Steve McIntyre

Hi folks, I've just been having a discussion with folks about installing Debian on an arm64 device. Another developer is booting via U-Boot with UEFI and things are working OK, except... The intructions for their board [0] include writing things raw to both sector 0 and sector 1 of an SD card, meaning that both MBR and GPT partitioning schemes are likely to break. Ugh. :-/ So, I have two (related) worries: 1. At the moment in Debian, our installer will default to using GPT for arm64 machines (where disks are not already formatted). That was fine when we were expecting server systems booting using edk2, but it looks like that's now a dangerous assumption, as more and more U-Boot devices are out there which will be wanting to load firmware from low-numbered LBAs. 2. I'm just in the middle of adding EFI armhf installer support, and that is also (currently) defaulting to GPT if you've booted via EFI. This is fine for VMs booted using a 32-bit Arm build of edk2, but also it's starting to look like a bad option for real boards booting using U-Boot's EFI support (for similar reasons). The "Firmware Storage" section of EBBR v0.6 touches on this and describes how to store firmware in a safer manner, but obviously (some/many) vendors are not following the spec thus far. What are other folks doing in this area? How do you recognise which devices it's safe to use GPT on, for example? I'm now looking at updating our logic on armhf/arm64 to do something like: if (booted via UEFI); then if (booted using U-Boot); then echo MBR else echo GPT fi else echo MBR fi but I'll need to find a sane way to detect U-Boot->UEFI boot. For now I'm looking at parsing dmesg output to look for something like [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by Das U-Boot but I'm hoping for a better solution. This is also somewhat assuming that detecting U-Boot in the boot chain is a valid indicator for "unsafe location for firmware", but I'm not sure of a better way! [0] http://share.loverpi.com/board/libre-computer-project/libre-computer-board-… Cheers, -- Steve McIntyre steve.mcintyre(a)linaro.org <http://www.linaro.org/> Linaro.org | Open source software for ARM SoCs

7 years, 7 months

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Re: [RFC v9 2/5] dt-bindings: pstore-block: new support for blkoops

by Rob Herring

+boot-architecture list On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 07:52:47PM +0800, liaoweixiong wrote: > Create DT binding document for blkoops. > > Signed-off-by: liaoweixiong <liaoweixiong(a)allwinnertech.com> > --- > .../devicetree/bindings/pstore/blkoops.txt | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > MAINTAINERS | 1 + > 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pstore/blkoops.txt > > diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pstore/blkoops.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pstore/blkoops.txt > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..5462915 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pstore/blkoops.txt > @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ > +Blkoops oops logger > +=================== > + > +Blkoops provides a block partition for oops, excluding panics now, so they can > +be recovered after a reboot. > + > +Any space of block device will be used for a circular buffer of oops records. > +These records have a configurable size, with a size of 0 indicating that they > +should be disabled. > + > +At least one of "block-device" and "total_size" must be set. > + > +At least one of "dmesg-size" or "pmsg-size" must be set non-zero. > + > +Required properties: > + > +- compatible: must be "blkoops". > + > +Optional properties: > + > +- block-device: The block device to use. Most of the time, it is a partition of > + device. If block-device is NULL, no block device is effective > + and the data will be lost after rebooting. > + It accept the following variants: > + 1) <hex_major><hex_minor> device number in hexadecimal > + represents itself no leading 0x, for example b302. > + 2) /dev/<disk_name> represents the device number of disk > + 3) /dev/<disk_name><decimal> represents the device number of > + partition - device number of disk plus the partition number > + 4) /dev/<disk_name>p<decimal> - same as the above, that form is > + used when disk name of partitioned disk ends on a digit. > + 5) PARTUUID=00112233-4455-6677-8899-AABBCCDDEEFF representing > + the unique id of a partition if the partition table provides > + it. The UUID may be either an EFI/GPT UUID, or refer to an > + MSDOS partition using the format SSSSSSSS-PP, where SSSSSSSS > + is a zero-filled hex representation of the 32-bit > + "NT disk signature", and PP is a zero-filled hex > + representation of the 1-based partition number. > + 6) PARTUUID=<UUID>/PARTNROFF=<int> to select a partition in > + relation to a partition with a known unique id. > + 7) <major>:<minor> major and minor number of the device > + separated by a colon. No. I didn't suggest to go look at PARTUUID to copy it into the binding, but rather to point out that the kernel can already mount by UUID. Specifying the UUID in DT is also not what I suggested. My suggestion is to define a known UUID so that the kernel (and bootloaders, userspace, the world) can just know the UUID. Just like the EFI system partition. Now this means you have to get it defined in the UEFI specification (or maybe EBBR[1]). If you want help with how to do that, the boot-architecture list is a good place to start. major/minor numbers are a Linux thing, so they don't go in DT. /dev/* is Linux thing, so it doesn't go in DT. You can always define all these parameters as kernel command line options and avoid DT. That would also make this work on *all* systems, not just DT based systems. (Though I still believe that the partition should be discoverable.) Rob [1] https://github.com/ARM-software/ebbr

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