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Re: [System-dt] Notes (brief) from System DT call: OpenAMP bindings

by Bjorn Andersson

On Mon 31 Aug 16:04 UTC 2020, Tomas Evensen via System-dt wrote: > Here are some brief notes from the meeting. > > If nothing else as a showcase on how much we miss Nathalie when she is on vacation ???? > > Krzysztof Kepa – GE > Mathieu Poirier – Linaro > Etsam Anjum – Mentor > Anrnoud Pouliquen – ST > Loic Pallardy - ST > Suman Anna - TI > Dan Milea – Wind River > Mark Dapoz – Wind River > Tomas Evensen – Xilinx > Stefano Stabellini – Xilinx > Bruce Ashfield – Xilinx > Ed Mooring – Xilinx > Ben Levinsky - Xilinx > > Stefano went through slides. > Overall idea: > > 1. Specify remoteproc channels with minimal information in System-DT in a way that is as common as possible for all vendors. > In particular, we are avoiding to have to specify the same memory regions in more than one place. A resource group is specially marked to contain most information. > 2. Use Lopper to create the vendor specific remoteproc specification > Generating reserved-memory, etc. information that has duplicate information. > For the time being, no plans to unify the vendor specific information that goes into the traditional device tree for Linux > 3. Later (or in parallel), but without making it a gating item, start discussions on what we can do to unify the vendor specific information in the traditional DT Can anyone point me to some examples of vendor specific information referred to here? Regards, Bjorn > > Discussion about how TI and ST might generate their specific information from this specification. > > Stefano to send out examples and slides. > Ben: Xilinx backend to Lopper is upstreamed and available as an example. Might change as upstreaming continues. > > Question: > * How do we configure VirtIO? > > > > From: nathalie(a)xilinx.com > When: 8:00 AM - 9:00 AM August 31, 2020 > Subject: [System-dt] System DT call: OpenAMP bindings > Location: webex > > > CAUTION: This message has originated from an External Source. Please use proper judgment and caution when opening attachments, clicking links, or responding to this email. > > Hi all, > > The OpenAMP-remoteproc working group is looking forward to discuss OpenAMP bindings with the System DT working group & all others interested in System DT. > > Best regards, > > Nathalie C. Chan King Choy > Program Manager focused on Open Source & Community > > Meeting number (access code): 145 853 2028 > > Meeting password: NgTwf4r8R$3 > > > > Monday, August 31, 2020 > 8:00 am | (UTC-07:00) Pacific Time (US & Canada) | 1 hr > > > > Join meeting<https://xilinx.webex.com/xilinx/j.php?MTID=mcd4ad9bca009dfef38671c26d5a1d301> > > > > Canada toll free 1-844-426-4405 > France toll free 0800-912-485 > India toll free 000-800-040-1016 > Sweden toll free 020-033-6721 > UK toll free 08000315372 > United States Toll Free 1-844-621-3956 > > Global call-in numbers<https://xilinx.webex.com/xilinx/globalcallin.php?MTID=m370fae0984a8792a3592…> | Toll-free calling restrictions<https://www.webex.com/pdf/tollfree_restrictions.pdf> > This email and any attachments are intended for the sole use of the named recipient(s) and contain(s) confidential information that may be proprietary, privileged or copyrighted under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient, do not read, copy, or forward this email message or any attachments. Delete this email message and any attachments immediately. > -- > System-dt mailing list > System-dt(a)lists.openampproject.org > https://lists.openampproject.org/mailman/listinfo/system-dt

5 years, 5 months

DTE call this Wednesday

by François Ozog

Hi, This Wednesday agenda is: - Presentation of RiscV DT by Atish Patra - Proposal of DT authentication/identification/format PoC by Joakim/FF Cordially, FF

5 years, 5 months

Restarting EBBR biweekly meetings

by Grant Likely

It has been a long time since there has been a regular EBBR review meeting, and with the amount of activity that has happened in the last year I think it is time to start meeting again. I'd like to start talking about content for EBBR v1.0+. A biweekly cadence seems about right to me, but we can discuss when we start meetings again. Would Monday, 31 Aug at 16:00BST, 08:00PST work? Email me privately if you want me to send you a calendar invite. Discussion topics: - EBBR testing progress - EBBR Scope -- doing a better job to describe the purpose of EBBR - Tightening requirements as U-Boot implementation matures (make fewer things optional) - Security requirements - Secure boot and secure capsule update - issue review - Signing requirements on dtbs and variables Send me an email if you want to add to the agenda, or add an issue to the github page: https://github.com/arm-software/ebbr/issues g. ---- Time: Every second Monday starting 31 Aug at 16:00BST, 08:00PST Join Zoom Meeting https://armltd.zoom.us/j/92081365511?pwd=SFZpRitXUEp3Zy9GM0h3UUZ1b1pnUT09 Meeting ID: 920 8136 5511 Password: 490324 One tap mobile +14086380968,,92081365511#,,#,490324# US (San Jose) +16465189805,,92081365511#,,#,490324# US (New York) Dial by your location +1 408 638 0968 US (San Jose) +1 646 518 9805 US (New York) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) Meeting ID: 920 8136 5511 Password: 490324 Find your local number: https://armltd.zoom.us/u/adYiWaDyys IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 5 months

Trusting DT

by François Ozog

Hi, I just updated the technical report <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CLkhLRaz_zcCq44DLGmPZQFPbYHOC6nzPowaL0X…> with a section on "Trusting DT" that is the result of my analysis of the discussion we had (not what I presented). Please comment, correct, update... Cordially, FF -- François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group* T: +33.67221.6485 francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog

5 years, 5 months

System DT call: OpenAMP bindings

by Nathalie Chan King Choy

Hi all, The OpenAMP-remoteproc working group is looking forward to discuss OpenAMP bindings with the System DT working group & all others interested in System DT. Best regards, Nathalie C. Chan King Choy Program Manager focused on Open Source & Community Meeting number (access code): 145 853 2028 Meeting password: NgTwf4r8R$3 Monday, August 31, 2020 8:00 am | (UTC-07:00) Pacific Time (US & Canada) | 1 hr Join meeting<https://xilinx.webex.com/xilinx/j.php?MTID=mcd4ad9bca009dfef38671c26d5a1d301> Canada toll free 1-844-426-4405 France toll free 0800-912-485 India toll free 000-800-040-1016 Sweden toll free 020-033-6721 UK toll free 08000315372 United States Toll Free 1-844-621-3956 Global call-in numbers<https://xilinx.webex.com/xilinx/globalcallin.php?MTID=m370fae0984a8792a3592…> | Toll-free calling restrictions<https://www.webex.com/pdf/tollfree_restrictions.pdf>

5 years, 5 months

Adding RISC-V to EBBR

by Atish Patra

Hi All, We are interested in adopting EBBR as the boot specification for the embedded RISC-V platforms. We firmly believe that EBBR is a very well defined specification for boot requirement and there is no need for reinventing the wheel for RISC-V. Hence, this is a thread to discuss all the requirements for adding RISC-V to EBBR. Here is my current understanding. Please correct me if I am wrong. Logistic Requirement: 1. As per the contribution guidelines[1], patches should be sent to boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org. and the specification will be hosted under "ARM-software" Github. I am hoping that introducing RISC-V related changes are okay with the current maintainers. 2. The specification is licensed under Creative Commons. The RISC-V related changes will refer to some of the RISC-V specifications as well. AFAIK, there shouldn't be an issue with that. 3. It should be okay to add other copyrights in addition to "Arm Limited and Contributors". Technical Requirement: 1. Software status: a. UEFI support for RISC-V Linux kernel is already available in the mailing list[2]. The targeted upstream merge is the 5.10 merge window. b. U-Boot already supports UEFI for RISC-V. c. EDK2 upstreaming is currently under progress [3] as well. Is it okay to start sending patches for EBBR RISC-V related changes now or do we need to wait for EDK2 and Linux kernel patches to be available upstream ? 2. RISC-V related sections in EBBR a. UEFI: Currently, RISC-V doesn't support a EFI_RESET_SYSTEM boot service as firmware doesn't have a standard way to reset the system. There is a proposal to add a system reset function to Supervisor Binary Specification(SBI) which can be mapped to EFI_RESET_SYSTEM by the firmware. Apart from that, I believe RISC-V supports all UEFI boot and run time services mandated by EBBR. Is it a blocker for RISC-V EBBR compatibility? b. RISC-V Multiprocessor Startup Protocol: This section will contain the details of booting protocol for RISC-V and mandatory RISC-V specifications that need to be implemented. c. Firmware Storage: AFAIK, RISC-V platforms are already compatible with this. Please let me know if I missed something or oversimplified any requirement. We want to make RISC-V compatible with EBBR sooner than later and ready work on any missing pieces if any. [1] https://github.com/ARM-software/ebbr/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.rst [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/19/1252 [3] https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/63831?p=,,,20,0,0,0::Created,,RISC-V… [4] https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-unixplatformspec/message/49?p=,,,20,0,0,0::r… -- Regards, Atish

5 years, 5 months

UN regulations about cybersecurity and automotive

by François Ozog

At some point, the following regulations and forming standard ISO 24089 will impact how we implement firmware updates and securely boot OSes in vehicles. https://www.unece.org/info/media/presscurrent-press-h/transport/2020/un-reg… https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2020/wp29grva/ECE-TRANS-WP29-… http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2019/wp29grva/ECE-TRANS-WP29-G… Cheers FF

5 years, 5 months

EBBR v1.0.1 released

by Grant Likely

Minor release to clean up a few problems. Thanks to all who helped get the text updated. https://github.com/ARM-software/ebbr/releases/tag/v1.0.1 Cheers, g.

5 years, 5 months

Fwd: There’s a Hole in the Boot - Eclypsium

by Joakim Bech

Hi, Yet another security issue surfaced yesterday, see this blog post about it https://eclypsium.com/2020/07/29/theres-a-hole-in-the-boot/ When I was reading it I cannot avoid seeing similarities to what I've tried to raise in the DT(E) discussions. I.e., firmware run-time exploits running after signatures have been verified successfully (slide 27, 28 [1]) can be devastating and therefore I've tried to suggest that each component verifies the DTB that it gets from the previous firmware component (slide 29, 30 [1]), alternatively and probably better ... doing something like a measured boot (including DTB's) where you compute a running hash spanning across all firmware (+configuration) being loaded. Some quotes from the blog post: > Almost all signed versions of GRUB2 are vulnerable, meaning virtually > every Linux distribution is affected. We don't want to read something similar about DTS/DTB in the future. > Additionally, as we will show in this blog post, a vulnerability in the boot > process that enables arbitrary code execution can allow attackers to control > the boot process and operating system, even when secure boot signatures are verified. Confirm my concerns. > In the course of Eclypsium’s analysis, we have identified a buffer overflow vulnerability > in the way that GRUB2 parses content from the GRUB2 config file (grub.cfg). > Of note: The GRUB2 config file is a text file and typically is not signed like other files > and executables. This vulnerability enables arbitrary code execution within GRUB2 and > thus control over the booting of the operating system. As a result, an attacker could > modify the contents of the GRUB2 configuration file to ensure that attack code is run > before the operating system is loaded. In this way, attackers gain persistence on the device. Replace "GRUB2" with "DT" and "grub.cfg" with "*.dts/dtb" in the quote above and we have another potential future quote about DT security issues. A solid, useable and robust solution for problems like this might be complex to realize, but I think it's worth continuing to look into what can be done, since it seems risky to continue loading and running "DT code" like we're doing in many places today (and it's not only DT that is subject to this, regular firmware suffers with the same kind of issues). I.e., I'm going to raise this again in future DT(E) calls. [1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1CvKBBZ33ggzyhP2ub8iZ410I_KGrFjHftZL… <https://eclypsium.com/2020/07/29/theres-a-hole-in-the-boot/> Regards, Joakim

5 years, 6 months

July 22nd meeting notes

by François Ozog

Attendees François-Frédéric Ozog (Linaro) Frank Rowand Simon Glass (Google) Ilias Apalodimas (Linaro) Atish Patra (Western Digital) Mark Brown (Arm) Heinrich Schuchardt CVS Arnd Bergmann Rob Herring (Arm) Loic Pallardy (ST) Poonam (NXP) Ruchika Loic Pallardy (ST) Don Harbin(linaro) Presentation SLIDE 2 Francois: if we want authentication, we can’t do fix up Simon: what is fix up? Can’t change DT or ok to change it? Francois: can orchestrate transition, [edit as typing notes: changing is not OK because you can’t identify the scope of change; adding a new node may be acceptable - because scope is easy to frame] Simon: code doing the fixup is signed , so it may be a signal that the changes are OK; don’t know how to pass that to Linux. In principle you should rely on signed code to make changes Francois: [rephrasing at note editing] two trust models 1) implicit - trust because generating/updating code is signed 2) explicit - trust because you can check signature of the DT Heinrich: if the DT comes from file system, it should be signed; for DT embedded in signed code: no need to have a signature; signature for things from file but not from memory [at writing notes, I understand this as a DT fragment generated by FT-A in memory does not need to be signed] SLIDE 3 Francois: cold-plug by U-Boot, hotplug by OS Francois: Board DTB + cape DTBo + cape_on_board DTBo (pin muxing config, irq config…) Frank: Device removal triggers DT correspond node(s) removal? If so, then we should limiting a single device per overlay Francois: yes. It is also connected to device assignment. There should be a way to identify all nodes of a device in DT to actually simplify device assignment (to be discussed later in the deck) SLIDE 4 Lets use a special config DTBo (chosen…) Let’s get the parameters out of DT in local OS config (or worst case, in that config DTBo) Rob: problem with systems with loadable modules Arnd: can be passed on command line Rob: Greg KH say: don’t add module parameters Arnd: device specific parameters should be done via sysfs/ioctl; driver wide parameters could be as module parameters or boot command line Frank or it could be a “chosen” [editig time] Francois: for Linux, can we organize module parameters in modules.d are parsed when modules are statically linked? Let’s not use DT when we can avoid (OP-TEE bus to discover TAs) SLIDE 5 Francois: wherever we choose, we shall ensure backward compatibility SLIDE 6 DTB=base board + 1 DTBo per device Statically merge DTB + DTBos at compile time and keep metadata about the merge in a section of the new DT file format. SLIDE 7 Arnd/Simon: Right now the Android boot loader merges DTB/DTBos and passes one DTB to the kernel Simon: ChromeOS has a FIT image with multiple DTs, it selects one to pass to OS Arnd/Ilias: FIT is only understood by U-Boot Francois: wherever we choose, we shall ensure backward compatibility Arnd: It’s simpler to have a single DTB for the kernel Early kernel is not really powerful There are security advantages in signed DTBos Francois: I think the key question is decide on a model. Allow bootloaders to change the DTB and rely on signed DTBos? Simon: is either or ? [explicit vs implicit trust models], what is the threat model? Francois: yes, I think so. Heinrich: problem is wrong voltage in DT results in destroying the board Arnd: steal sensitive data Ilias: DoS can become a problem Ilias: signing per device (key mgmt complexity) ? or per device model (can compromise all devices of a model)? Francois: Who signs what is also a fundamental concept, because there might be different signing authorities Loic: That’s the current case wit ST devices Arnd: There’s 3 options here: Kernel with embedded DTB, if the kernel signature is checked, the DTB does not need to be checked The bootloader loads the kernel from a disk Nothing is checked Checking one of those makes no sense Simon: we have to be careful in not tying ourselves in a knot. There is *no* bidirectional root of trust. The model is that trust is built starting from the root of trust, the next level implicitly trusts the level that loaded it. Mark Brown: DT is used with EDK2 Loic: there is no direct boot from U-Boot to kernel, it is vouched by OP-TEE. security of co-processors requires the same model Hardware firewall (device and memory) can be leveraged to ensure full security DTE Project information portal: https://collaborate.linaro.org/display/DTE/DTE+Progress+Updates Security presentation: (listed in the portal, but copied here for simple access): https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1CvKBBZ33ggzyhP2ub8iZ410I_KGrFjHftZL…

5 years, 6 months

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